VIKRAMJIT SEN ( 1 ) IN the case of O/vgc Vs. Collector of General Excise, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC432 the Apex Court had observed that it had "on more than one occasion pointed outthat Public Section Undertakings of Central Government and the Union of Indiashould not right their litigations in Court by spending money on fees of counsel, courtfees, procedural expenses and wasting public time. Courts are maintained forappropriate litigations. Court s time is not to be consumed by litigation which arecarried on either side at public expenses from the source. Notwithstanding theseobservations repeated on a number of occasions, the present cases appear to be aninstance of total callousness. The letter of 3/10/1988, indicated that the Cabinetsecretary was looking into the matter. That has not obviously been followed up. As aninstance of wasting public time and energy this matter involves a principle to beexamined at the highest level". Five years later the Court explained this decision insteel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. , (1997) 5 SCC 51 1, holding that the previous directions for the constituting of a Highpowered Committee to resolve disputes between the Public Sector Undertakingsand the Government of India was still the need of the hour so that needless consumptionof time and waste of public funds could be avoided. The Apex Court had recorded thefollowing observations: "the object of issuing direction in those matters was to decide the fiscaldisputes in case of major policy matters to save the public money and Court svaluable time, and disputes could amicably be settled between the Publicsector Undertaking and the Government of India or the State Governments. The intention was not to resolve the disputes like eviction of a Company orpublic Undertaking under Public Premises (Unauthorised Occupants) Act;such petty disputes are not directed to be dealt with by the high level officerswhose duty and time is of very important nature otherwise. Under thesecircumstances, the High Court has not committed any error warrantinginterference. " ( 2 ) KEEPING the facts of the case in perspective, the dispute now raised by theindian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) by means of application under Order 1rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a typical case falling within the proscriptionof the ONGC ruling. The proceedings should have been halted at the threshold andthe application should have been heard only post obtainment of the Cabinet Committeeclearance. The proceedings should have been halted at the threshold andthe application should have been heard only post obtainment of the Cabinet Committeeclearance. Since this objection had not been voiced at that stage, and argumentswere heard in extensio, I think it appropriate to decide the application on merits. VERY briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the State Bank of India (SBI) hadinitiated a suit for the recovery of Rs. 6,98,24,219. 12 (Rupees Six Crores Ninetyeight Lakhs Twenty Four Thousand Two Hundred Nineteen and Twelve paise only)stated to have been paid by it by mistake to Defendant No. 1, Messers Glavkosmos. The provisions of Section 72 of the Contract Act have been relied upon by theplaintiff. ( 3 ) ON the first hearing itself i. e. on 20. 11. 1996, an injunction was issued restrainingthe movement of moneys of Defendant No. 1 into the coffers of its Bankers namely,bank of Rajasthan Ltd, Defendant No. 2. Shortly thereafter, on 9. 12. 1996, on a freshapplication being initiated, the Project Director, GSLV, ISRO, was also restrainedfrom transferring, debiting or otherwise parting with the funds of Defendant No. 1 lyingwith ISRO to the extent of the money claimed in the suit. After hearing the argumentsof the parties my learned brother, K. Ramamoorthy, J. directed the Plaintiff to receivefrom ISRO the sum of Rs. 6,98,24,219. 12 plus interest at the rate of 24 per cent perannum on Rs. 4. 8 crores from the date of the plaint till 30. 9. 1998. Till this money wasreceived by the Plaintiff, the learned Judge continued the operation of the interimorders passed earlier. These orders were passed on 7. 10. 1998. The annals ofthelitigation do not end here since the controversy was carried to the portals of thedivision Bench. Significantly the applicant ISRO participated in the appellate hearings. On 16. 12. 1998 the following order was passed: "cms. 3822 and 4270/98 in FAO (OS) 290/98mr. Nigam states that without prejudice to the rights and contentions of theappellant, as an interim measure, the appellant will have no objection if a sumof Rs. 5,90,40,000. 00 is withdrawn by respondent No. 1 State Bank of India. Counsel further submits that rupees equivalent to US 2,10,000. 00 may bewithdrawn from the account of appellant with respondent No. 2 and thebalance from ISRO from whom some amount are payable to the appellant. Itis ordered accordingly. 5,90,40,000. 00 is withdrawn by respondent No. 1 State Bank of India. Counsel further submits that rupees equivalent to US 2,10,000. 00 may bewithdrawn from the account of appellant with respondent No. 2 and thebalance from ISRO from whom some amount are payable to the appellant. Itis ordered accordingly. We also direct that the order under appeal by thebank would cover the amount of Rs:5,90,40,000. 00 so received by State Bankof India. As an interim measure the impugned order in appeal is modified inthe above terms. We are, however, not inclined to grant the stay of proceedingsin the suit. On payment so made, the interim orders dated 20/11/1996 and 9/12/1996 passed in the suit shall stand vacated. Considering the nature of controversy as also the fact that we have declinedto stay further proceedings in the suit, we direct that the appeal may be listedfor hearing at Item No. 1 subject to part-heard on 5/04/1998. A copy ofthis order be given dasti to counsel for the parties. " ( 4 ) IN the application it has been pleaded by ISRO that it had entered into a supplycontract with GLAVKOSMOS, and had been making payments to the latter form timeto time. While the applicant ISRO was making arrangements for the payment of US $4. 3 million (approx. Rs. 15. 50 crores) it obtained, on 11. 12. 1996, knowledge of theinjunction passed by this court. It is pleaded by ISRO that so far as it is concerned allpayments due under this contract totalling Rs. 60. 31 crores has been remitted toglavkosmos in full. In strictly complying with the orders passed by the Division Bench,isro paid the balance amount due to Defendant No. 1, Glavkosmos, but in thisprocess has incurred an additional burden of Rs. 1,24,70,534. 88 because of variationsin the exchange rate, "solely on account of the Court case filed by SBI against M/s. Glavkosmos over the double payment purportedly made by them to M/s. G. K. " It isfurther averred "that in event of Glavkosmos or SBI winning the case, it is likely thatthese parties to the litigation would claim for payment of interest on the amountwithheld upto the date of the judgment. . . . ISRO s liability is limited only to the amountwithheld". . . . ISRO s liability is limited only to the amountwithheld". Thereafter the following prayers are made, which are reproduced verbatimsince, on a plain reading, the application for impleadment has been initiated forpurposes of the other reliefs, all of which are not directly in issue in the present suit. These reliefs are palpably of a nature that would be prayed for in a separate suit butwithout payment of the advelorem fees that would be immediately attracted. "1. It is therefore, respectfully prayed that this Hon ble Court may be pleasedto implead the Union of India in the present proceedings. 2. Decree for payment of Rs. 1,24,70,534. 88 (Rupees one crore twenty fourlakhs seventy thousand five hundred and thirty four and paise eighty eightonly) to the impleader (ISRO) by the State Bank of India, towards refund ofthe excess amount paid by ISRO in Indian Rupees to M/s. GK, Russia onaccount of delayed payment to M/s. GK and the consequent exchange ratevariation, caused by the order dated 9. 12. 96 passed by the Hon ble Court inthe case filed by SBI against M/s. GK over the double payment. 3. A decree restraining SBI and M/s. GK, as the case may be from claimingpayment of any interest from ISRO on the amount with-held and subsequentlyreleased and upto the date of judgment inasmuch as ISRO had with-held theamount solely in compliance with the court s order dated 9. 12. 96 and wouldhave released the payments to GK on the due date but for the court s order. 4. Cost of suit be awarded in favour of impleader (ISRO ). 5. Any other relief that the Hon ble Court may deem fit. " ( 5 ) ONLY the Plaintiff has filed a reply to the application, but significantly, it has beenactively and vociferously joined in its opposition to it also by Defendant No. 3, therussian Bank. ( 6 ) IN Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Ors. , AIR 1958 SC 886 ,razia Begum had prayed for two declarations in the suit: (1) that she was the legallywedded wife of the Defendant and (2) that she was entitled Rs. 2000. 00 as maintenance. An application under Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code was filed by the applicants, claiming tobe the lawful and legally wedded wife and son. It was, inter alia, pleaded that litigationwas collusive. 2000. 00 as maintenance. An application under Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code was filed by the applicants, claiming tobe the lawful and legally wedded wife and son. It was, inter alia, pleaded that litigationwas collusive. In this context the Apex Court made the following observations, thesecond having assumed the proportions of a jurisprudential grund norm. "as a result of these considerations, we have arrived at the followingconclusions: (1) That the question of addiction of parties under R. 10 of 0. 1 of the Codeof Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court, but ofa judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts andcircumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raisecontroversies as to the power of the court, in contradistinction to its inherentjurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it isused in Sec. 1 15 of the Code, (2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be addedas a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercialinterest, in the subject-matter of the litigation; (3) Where the subject matter of a litigation, is a declaration as regardsstatus or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may berelaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding thatparty, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicateupon the controversy. (4) The cases contemplated in the last proposition, have to be determinedin accordance with the statutory provisions of Sec. 42 and 43 of the Specificrelief Act; (5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions, the court is not bound togrant the declaration prayed for, on a mere admission of the claim by thedefendant, if the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from theadmission, (6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as incontroversy in the instant case, affects not. only the parties actually beforethe Court, but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the ruleof present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes aboutproperty does not apply with full force; and (7) The rule laid down in Sec. 43 of the Specific Relief Act, is not exactly, arule of res judicata. only the parties actually beforethe Court, but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the ruleof present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes aboutproperty does not apply with full force; and (7) The rule laid down in Sec. 43 of the Specific Relief Act, is not exactly, arule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another. ( 7 ) IT would be improper for this court to reflect upon or express any observations onthe tenability of the surmises, concerns and/or conjectures pertaining to the liability ofisro towards payment of interest. It does not arise in the facts of the present caseespecially for the disposal of the application. Before moving on it cannot but bementioned that the contents of the application and the reliefs contained therein areessentially in the nature of a plaint. The objection of Mr. Vineet Malhotra, learnedcounsel for Defendant No. 3, to the effect that appropriate court fees has not beenpaid on the relief of the recovery of Rs. 1,24,70,534. 88 underscores and highlightsthis impression. However, the averments made in the application as well as thereliefs claimed therein provide the answer to the question whether to implead or notto implead. The applicant has itself expressed that it is not concerned in the disputebetween the parties to the suit, and that it has been allegedly obliquely or indirectlyaffected by the orders passed by the court, to its financial detriment. It is now fairlywell established that merely because a third party is so affected is no ground forallowing it to be impleaded in a suit. There must be a direct interest in contradistinctionto a commercial, monetary or financial interest. The Plaintiff has prayed for a decreeof recovery of Rs. 6,98,24,219. 12 against Defendant No. 1 on the foundation ofsection 72 of the Contract Act, as double payment made by mistake. In thiscontroversy, the applicant is not even obliquely concerned; it has come into thepicture only incidently, as a consequence of the orders passed in this suit. This is noreason for ignoring and violating the principle that the Plaintiff is dominus litus. If thesuit is decreed it would be of no consequence to the applicant. There would be noground, in that event, for Defendant No. 1 to claim any interest, because it would notbe entitled to any money. This is noreason for ignoring and violating the principle that the Plaintiff is dominus litus. If thesuit is decreed it would be of no consequence to the applicant. There would be noground, in that event, for Defendant No. 1 to claim any interest, because it would notbe entitled to any money. What appears to me to be most important is that it would beillogical and wholly improper for the Court to be influenced by the consideration ofisro being rendered vulnerable to a claim for payment of interest if the suit isrejected. In other words, if ISRO is allowed to be impleaded all it would represent,impress and stress before the Court is that the suit should be dismissed becauseotherwise it may possibly be rendered liable to payment of interest. ( 8 ) THIS brings me to the question of the timing of the application. Learned counselfor the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 3 have strongly imputed connivance betweenisro and Defendant No. 1 inasmuch as the application has been preferred even postdisposal of the appeal of Defendant No. 1 on a concession, albeit without prejudice,made by Defendant No. 1 who was the appellant, before the Learned Division Bench. It was upon this accusation being voiced that the decision in the ONGC s case (supra) came to be reflected upon. This very application could have been filed threeyears previously, immediately after 11. 12. 1996 on ISRO having gained knowledge ofthe passing of the injunction orders. Having failed to do so it ought not to be heard atthis belated stage. In these proceedings, especially where no explanation isforthcoming as to why it has now filed the application after such inordinate delay. Allthe more so because had the present relief been asked for in December 1996, thealleged liability for extra payment having been incurred due to variation in exchangerates between 1996 and 1999 would not have arisen at all, or would have beenimmediately obviated. All that had to be done was to deposit the amount in disputeand thereby obtain a complete discharge. ( 9 ) PRIMA facie, collusion between ISRO and Defendant No. 1 appears to exist. Learned counsel for the Russian Bank, Defendant No. 3, has supported the Plaintiffsallegation that money has been paid twice over to Defendant No. 1. All that had to be done was to deposit the amount in disputeand thereby obtain a complete discharge. ( 9 ) PRIMA facie, collusion between ISRO and Defendant No. 1 appears to exist. Learned counsel for the Russian Bank, Defendant No. 3, has supported the Plaintiffsallegation that money has been paid twice over to Defendant No. 1. Inspite of this,isro is speculating upon its liability to pay interest to Defendant No. l and therebyespousing the cause of M/s. Glavkosmos against the State Bank of India. The directconsequence of the intervention of ISRO is to buttress and support Defendant No. 1 sdefence that it has not received double payment and that further foreign exchangeshould leave India. This is, therefore, definitely a case which was within thecontemplation of the Supreme Court when it made its observations in ONGC s case (supra) and Steel Authority of India s case (supra ). One arm of the Government isnot expected to truncate the other - prior clearance from the Cabinet Committeeshould have been obtained. An argument was put forward on behalf of the applicantisro that its functioning would be impaired if payments are not made to Defendantno. 1. There is no justification for this argument been made in circumstances wherethe Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 3, who do not have any common or joint interest,have joined issue on double payment having been made. If ISRO would be preparedto countenance and be privy to the alleged double-payment it should separatelypetition its fountainhead of finance. There is no justification for passing the buck tothe Plaintiff. ( 10 ) THE application is wholly untenable in the context of the scope of Order I, Rule10. It is clearly belated, and in my view vexatious. It is dismissed with exemplary costsof Rs. 25,000. 00 payable to the Prime Minister s National Relief Fund, (for Draught), bydemand Draft to be deposited with the Registrar of this Court within fifteen days.