JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil Misc. Appeal has been preferred by the defendant against order dated 14.3.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 3. Kota dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay of about seven years in moving application under Order 9, Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside ex parte decree passed on 15.4.1991 for eviction. 2. The facts relevant for deciding this appeal are that plaintiff respondent filed a suit for eviction and realisation of rent against the defendant appellant before the District Judge Kota on the ground of default in not having paid rent of suit premises @ Rs. 1,100/- per month for 10 months upto 1.3.1989 and Rs. 730/- towards deficit payment of rent for February, 1988. After service of the summons, though the defendant appeared on 17.3.1990 but thereafter defaulted by remaining absent. Since the defendant appellant discontinued to appear nor on his behalf, has advocate appeared in Court. Therefore, the trial Court had no option but to proceed in the suit ex parte and during ex parte proceedings, plaintiffs produced Udai Shanker (PW 1) in support of the averments made in the plaint. Accordingly, ex parte decree was passed by the trial Court on 15.4.1991 on the basis of evidence of Udai Shanker who proved that Rs. 730,-was paid less towards monthly rent of Rs. 1,100/- for February, 1988 and on the date of instituting the suit for eviction, 10 months' rent was outstanding against the tenant (defendant). However, the decree was passed for arrears of rent of Rs. 11,730/- as well as eviction with the direction to regularly pay monthly rent @' Rs. 1,100/- till the decree is executed for eviction against the defendant. 3. After a lapse of about seven years on or about 16.3.1988, the defendant appellant moved an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay stating therein that when he returned from Bombay on 17.3.1998, he was informed by his family members about Court notice having been sent on 12.3.1998, whereupon he contacted his counsel when it came to his notice on 18.3.1998 that ex parte decree was passed long back on 15.4.1991. 4. 4. In order to explain sufficient cause for the delay of about seven years, the defendant has contended inter alia : (1) that he appeared on 17.3.1990 in Court upon service of notice to him, when an assurance was given by the respondent that since it was a case of first default so in case the monthly rent was continued to be deposited by him, there was no need to join the proceedings ; and (2) that though the suit was transferred to the Court of the Additional District Judge No. 3, Kota on 18.5.1990 but with no intimation to the defendant, thereby he could not appear in Court on 26.5.1990 resulting in drawing ex parte proceedings against him. 5. In reply to the aforesaid application, the plaintiff specifically denied to have given any assurance as pleaded by the defendant as to the suit being withdrawn in case of regular deposit or payment of outstanding and monthly rent of suit premises. The plaintiff contended that the application itself being time barred is not sustainable inasmuch as it is merely a dilatory tactics to avoid eviction with no payment of rent of the suit premises since February, 1988 and that apart, even during suit proceedings the levant had defaulted in depositing the rent regularly and so also the arrears without furnishing any plausible explanation for the delay. 6. The learned trial Court after hearing both the parties and on the basis of assessment of the material on record of original suit, by its order dated 14.3.2000 dismissed both the aforesaid applications under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence this appeal. 7. Mr. A.K. Pareek teamed Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid applications which explained and established sufficient cause not only for the condonation of the delay but also for setting aside the ex parte decree of eviction, because in view of the assurance having been given by the plaintiff on 17.3.1990, the defendant had no option but to entertain the bona fide belief and reasonable apprehension that even otherwise it was a case of first default in case of non deposit of the rent in dispute and no decree of eviction could be passed. Mr. Mr. Pareek then contended that the respondent had accepted rent upto March, 1995 where after he did not accept the rent from appellant for which a notice under Section 19A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was also sent. 8. Mr. Pareek, however, urged that since original suit which was decree ex parte and the finding of the trial Court were confined to the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent and also regular monthly rent, no decree could even otherwise have been issued against the defendant because at the most it could be a case of first default and moreover, this significant aspect of the matter had not been examined by the trial Court and, therefore, it committed error of law as also jurisdictional error apparent on the face of record, especially when the decree in the aforesaid circumstances was not executable in view of Section 13(6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for short "the Act" and when the respondent had got the decree fraudulently obtained by defying the assurance of withdrawing the suit on having received the rent upto March, 1995. 9. Mr. Pareek also contended that it is the duty of the Court to have made proper enquiry by recording evidence of the respective parties to the applications on the facts stated therein and this having not been done, the trial Court committed serious illegality, material irregularity and jurisdictional error in deciding such applications. Mr. Pareek cited decisions of the Apex Court (1) N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) SCC 123 , and other High Courts in N.N. Waghmare v. N.M. Mokal, AIR 1980 Bombay 250 , M/s. Mohan Steels v. U.P. Financial Corporation, AIR 1986 Allahabad 151 , and Sagayam Engineering Works v. M/s. Srivasta Tube Corporation, AIR 1989 Madras 237 . 10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and also perused the findings recorded by the trial Court in the light of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel at the bar. 10. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and also perused the findings recorded by the trial Court in the light of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel at the bar. Prima facie I am of the opinion that it was a bounden duty of the appellant to have kept vigil and also observed all safeguards particularly to see that since the matter related to his eviction from rented premises and the ground on which eviction was sought, was of default in making payment of arrears of rent for more than six months as per Section 13(1) (a) of the Act, which mandates that where a tenant is in arrears of rent for more than six months, the landlord has right to seek eviction of tenant from rented premises in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the Act. Where a suit is based on such ground, undoubtedly the benefit of first default should be extended by the trial Court. 11. In the instant case, the suit for eviction was based purely on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent prior to the institution of the suit and even after the suit was filed, the defendant appeared on 17.3.1990. When the proceedings were fixed for next date granting adjournment to file his written statement, which admittedly was not done and having not been filed and rather he had defaulted in appearing before the, Court since 17.3.1990 till 18.3.1998 when he came out with a case with no justification or sufficient cause on record not only with regard to the delay in moving application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code but also the default in payment of arrears as well as also the future rent outstanding prior to and after the filing of the suit. There was no justification and rather failure on the part of the defendant (tenant) for having not taken admittedly any steps either; (i) for filing written statement to the plaint in a suit for eviction once he appeared on 17.3.1990 and if he was interested in contesting the suit may be for first default, he had in fact defaulted in payment of arrears of rent and also the future rent to the landlord, as is contended before this Court that rent has already been paid upto March, 1995, or (2) for moving the trial Court for getting ex parte decree dated 15.4.1991 set aside within time, as against the limitation of thirty days as provided under the Limitation Act. Thus, in my considered view, the application under Order 9, Rule 13 , Civil Procedure Code was hopelessly barred by limitation as on 18.3.1998, when it was filed after lapse of seven years of passing of ex parte decree of eviction. It is not as if responsibility stands absolved on the part of the defaulting party. The delay has to be explained convincingly with sufficient cause to the established on record. On the one hand, though stated but not established or explained on record, it is the case of the tenant that he was kept in bona fide belief as a result of the assurance having been given by the landlord as to the withdrawal of the suit because the payment upto March, 1995 was made to the landlord, while on the other hand now before this Court it has also been contended that since after March, 1995 the landlord (plaintiff) did not accept the rent, a notice under Section 19A of the Act was given by the tenant to the landlord. Surprisingly enough, no material on the record to support his such a case as is being contended subsequently at this belated stage, has been produced along with applications which are subject matter of this appeal, either before the trial Court or this Court. Contrarily, it has also been urged that the defendant had no intimation as to the transfer of the suit from the Court of District Judge to Additional District Judge after 17.3.1990. The appellant cannot blow hot and cold altogether by approbating and reprobating in the same breath. 12. Contrarily, it has also been urged that the defendant had no intimation as to the transfer of the suit from the Court of District Judge to Additional District Judge after 17.3.1990. The appellant cannot blow hot and cold altogether by approbating and reprobating in the same breath. 12. There is no explanation established on record to what amount and when the payment was allegedly made towards arrears of rent or future or advance rent and what prevented the defendant to produce any document to establish as to the deposit of future rent after the notice under Section 19A of the Act was sent or for the rent payable after March 1995, if any. 13. In Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with similar circumstances in appeals preferred before it, held that the object of fixing time limit in such matters is of great importance as it is founded on public policy and the primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but are meant to help those parties who seek their remedies promptly. The law is well settled that the law helps vigilant and not the indolent. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy to see that there should be redressal of legal injury suffered by a party but also to see that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. Though the condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court but Section 5 of the limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be stretched too far so as to condone any length of time. There has to be rationale criterion as regards exception to the explanation seeking condonation of delay. In some cases, the delay of shortest range maybe uncondonable due to a want Of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned provided the explanation thereof is satisfactory. There has to be rationale criterion as regards exception to the explanation seeking condonation of delay. In some cases, the delay of shortest range maybe uncondonable due to a want Of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned provided the explanation thereof is satisfactory. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, but it does not mean to infer that the delay should be condoned in each and every case unless discretion exercised by the Court is on untenable grounds or is arbitrary or perverse and in that eventuality, it would be a different matter. While condoning the delay in such cases, the Apex Court has further taken the view that the Court should not forget valuable rights which have accrued to the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he too is a looser if the delay is condoned whereas he would have incurred huge litigation expenses. Likewise the High Courts of Bombay, Allahabad and Madras have taken similar view in (i) Nirutte Nana v. Narain Mahadeu (supra), (ii) M/s. Mohan Steels v. U.P.F.C. Kanpur (supra) and (iii) Saga yam Engineering Works v. M/s. Sriuasta Tube Corporation (supra). 14. Thus, in my view, ratio of the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant do not help in advancing cause of the appellant in any manner as it is not a case of advancing substantial justice by extending undue charity on compassionate ground to the appellant at the expenses of the respondents who have obviously been vested with valuable rights consequent upon the decree drawn up long ago and undisputedly seven years have lapsed since then while the appellant kept silence for no, sufficient cause being shown and established on record, resulting in inordinate delay on the part of the tenant for which I find no sufficient cause to condone the same. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed. *******