Bappasaheb Kishanrao Gaikwad and others v. State of Maharashtra and another
2000-06-30
V.K.BARDE
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - V.K. BARDE, J.:---Heard Mrs. Kulkarni, for the petitioner; and Shri Deshmukh, A.G.P., for respondent No. 1. 2. The petitioner filed Regular Civil Suit No. 60 of 1984 against the present respondents praying that the defendants be restrained from carrying out the work of percolation tank on the lands of the plaintiff mentioned in the suit and from taking possession of the lands from the plaintiff. The plaintiffs also prayed that the lands be not acquired for the purpose of percolation tank. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner filed application for amendment contending that the respondents have completed the proceedings of land acquisition as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and even the final award is passed. So, the plaintiffs wanted to bring on record all these circumstances and further for praying that the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the final award passed under the said Act be declared illegal and be quashed. 2. It is very clear that the suit is filed, as well as the amendment application is filed, challenging the acquisition of the land. However, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any such suit. The Apex Court in the matter of (State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1955, had observed in paragraph 2A as follows: "The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in section 4 and section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award.
In publication of the notifications and declaration under section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-A, now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last of date of publication envisaged under section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Govt. needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete Code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We, are therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the case under section 9 of C.P.C. stands excluded, and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under section 4, and declaration under section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction." 3. In view of this judgment, the suit itself is not maintainable. Interim injunction order passed in the matter is also not maintainable and the application of amendment is also not maintainable. 4. Hence, revision petition is dismissed. The learned Civil Judge is directed to see that the suit which is very old is disposed of within the period of three months from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. Rule discharged accordingly. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----