D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the distress warrant issued against the petitioner on the ground that the property situated at No. 52a, Shakespeare Sarani has since been transferred by it to one Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani some times between 1969 and 1971 and, therefore, they are not liable for payment of tax. Mr. Mallick contends that the amount of tax sought to be recovered was for the period from the 2nd quarters 1976-77 till 4th quarters 1987-88. For the period till the coming into force of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, the petitioner was liable, if at all, to pay tax with regard to occupier's share only and not beyond. Be that as it may, his other point was that no notice was, however, issued to the petitioner and the distress warrant was issued without any notice to him. In order to save execution of the distress warrant, the petitioner had issued 6 cheques in favour of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation representing an amount of Rs. 6 lakhs. These cheques have since bounced. According to Mr. Das Adhikari, it was on the ground that there was a stop-payment instruction by the petitioner. Mr. Mullick, on the other hand, submits that there was no fund. Mr. Mullick further contends that the petitioner cannot be liable for payment of tax. It is the owner, who is liable for the same and no recovery can be made from the petitioner since the petitioner had informed the Municipality about the transfer as back as in January 1970, which is at annexure 'd' to the petition. Subsequently, it was again communicated through a letter, which does not bear any date, alleged to have been sent under registered post-the acknowledgement due card showing the date as on June 6, 1983. In the said communication Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnanai was shown as transferee of the said property. A subsequent letter was issued on 13th December, 1976 where it was contended that the property was mutated in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani and the copies of the order of mutation was annexed with the said letter. But annexure 'g' does not contain copy of any such enclosure. A subsequent letter was issued on 13th December, 1976 where it was contended that the property was mutated in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani and the copies of the order of mutation was annexed with the said letter. But annexure 'g' does not contain copy of any such enclosure. A subsequent letter was issued on 4th April, 1974 along with which it was claimed that the property was mutated in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani, and the mutation forms signed by Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani were forwarded. Howerver, the letter being annexure 'h' does not contain copies of these forms. Subsequently, another letter was issued in 1975 where also it was claimed that the property was mutated in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. Therefore, it is contended by Mr. Mullick that the Corporation could not have proceeded against the petitoner and ought to have proceeded against Smt. Jamuna Devi, the address of whom was disclosed by the petitioner in these letters. ( 2 ) MR. Das Adhikari, learned counsel for the Corporation, on the other hand, produces the records of the Municipality and points out that the property which was originally numbered as 208/1b, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road was alleged to have been sold in part to one Gajendra Kumar Karnani, who had applied for separation and mutation. Accordingly, the said separation was affected and the said premises was separated as 52a and 52b Shakespeare Sarani respectively. Premises No. 52b, Shakespeare Sarani was mutated in favour of Gajendra Kumar Karnani and the tax was separated. Whereas in respect of 52a though the premises was separated and tax was apportioned, but the same continued to be in the name of Karnani Estates Pvt. Ltd. , 3, Synagogue Street, Calcutta-700001. Thus even in 1989 the said situation continued as is appearing from the Municipal Assessment Book of the Assessment Department produced in Court. ( 3 ) IN the affidavit-in opposition it was contended by the Corporation that though there was separation and mutation but there was no transfer. However in the supplementary affidavit it was explained and the said fact has been clarified as stated hereinbefore. Therefore the tax can be recovered so far as 52a is concerned from the petitioner. He relies on a decision in the case of Machinnon Machenzie and Co. However in the supplementary affidavit it was explained and the said fact has been clarified as stated hereinbefore. Therefore the tax can be recovered so far as 52a is concerned from the petitioner. He relies on a decision in the case of Machinnon Machenzie and Co. Ltd. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in AIR 1999 Calcutta 205 in support of his contention. ( 4 ) I have heard both the counsel at length. ( 5 ) IN the present case it appears that though the petitioner had been claiming that the property has since been transferred to Sri Gajendra Kumar Karnani and Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani, but none of them have been made parties in he proceedings before this Court. The petitioner makes a simple claim that since the property has been transferred, therefore the petitioner cannot be held responsible for payment of tax. ( 6 ) BUT the records show that even in 1989 the name of Karnani Estates stands in respect of 52a Shakespeare Sarani. If the bill is raised in respect of both the premises, in that event since 52b is recorded in the name of Sri Gajendra Kumar Karnani, therefore, the tax in respect of the premises No. 52b cannot be recovered from the petitioner and the Municipal Authorities may proceed against Sri Gajendra Kumar Karnani and recover the same from the later in any manner as may be permissible under the 1980 Act. But so far as the tax in respect of premises No. 52a is concerned, the same requires an examination. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY till 1980 the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was in force. The transfer alleged to have been made between 1969 and 1972, therefore these questions ought to have been governed by sections 186 and 187 of the 1951 Act which provides as follows :-"186. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY till 1980 the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was in force. The transfer alleged to have been made between 1969 and 1972, therefore these questions ought to have been governed by sections 186 and 187 of the 1951 Act which provides as follows :-"186. Whenever the title in any land or building or in any part or share of any land or building, is transferred, the transferee shall, within six months after the execution of the instrument of transfer, or, if no such instrument be executed, after the transfer is effected, give notice in writing of such transfer to the Commissioner ; provided that in the event of the death of a person in whom such title vests, the persons to whom, as heir or otherwise, the title of the deceased is transferred by descent or devise, shall, within one year from the death of the deceased, give notice in writing of such transfer to the Commissioner. 187. (1)-Any owner or occupier may at any time apply to the Commissioner to have his name entered as owner or occupier, as the case may be, in the assessment-book; and the Commissioner shall, after giving the parties interested and opportunity of being heard, unless there is sufficient reason to refuse such application, cause such name to be entered in the assessment-books provided that if such application is refused, the reason for refusal shall be recorded in writing : provided further that such application shall be disposed of within one year from the date of its receipt. Where there are gradations of owners or occupiers, and doubt exist as to who is entitled to have his name entered in the assessment-book as owner or occupier of the premises, the Commissioner shall, after giving the parties interested an opportunity of being heard, determine which of the several owners or occupiers is so entitled, and his decision shall remain in force for the purposes of this Act unless and until it is set aside by the order of a competent Court. No owner or occupier whose name is not entered in the assessment-book shall be entitled to object that any bill, notice of demand, warrant or other notice of any kind required by this Act to be served on the owner or occupier of any land or building, has not been made out in his own name. No owner or occupier whose name is not entered in the assessment-book shall be entitled to object that any bill, notice of demand, warrant or other notice of any kind required by this Act to be served on the owner or occupier of any land or building, has not been made out in his own name. " ( 8 ) A plain reading of section 186 shows that, whenever the title of a building or a part or share is transferred, the transferee has to give a notice within six months after the execution of the document in writing of such transfer to the Commissioner. Whereas section 187 provides that any owner or occupier may apply at any time to the Commissioner to have his name entered as owner or occupier, as the case may be, in the assessment-book and the Commissioner shall after giving the parties interested an opportunity of being heard, unless there are sufficient reasons to refuse such application, cause such name to be entered in the assessment book. In case there is any dispute or doubt in that event under sub-section (2) of section 187 the Commissioner may determine as to the names of which of the several owners or occupiers are to be entered as such and such entry shall remain valid until set aside by a competent Court. Sub-section (3) prohibits an owner or occupier whose name is not entered in the assessment-book to object the raising of the bill in the name of the owner or occupier recorded in the assessment-book on the ground that it ought to have been issued in his name. ( 9 ) THUS a combined reading of sections 186 and 187 of the 1951 Act implies that on transfer of a property the transferee is required to give notice within six months. At the same time both owner or occupiers are entitled to apply for recording their names in the assessment-book in such capacity. In the present case Karnani Estate was the owner who had transferred the property to Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. It is also admitted in the writ petition that the petitioner is in occupation of the part of the property. Thus it remained an occupier of the property. In the present case Karnani Estate was the owner who had transferred the property to Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. It is also admitted in the writ petition that the petitioner is in occupation of the part of the property. Thus it remained an occupier of the property. Therefore it was open to it to apply for recording its name as occupier in the assessment-book even if the transferee does not apply for entering her name to be recorded in the assessment-book. On the other hand the petitioner had allowed its name to be continued as owner in the Assessment Register. Though it has been pointed out by Mr. Mullick that the petitioner had been addressing several letters right from 1970 and had been referring to certain documents relating to mutation, yet no document relating to mutation has since been produced before this Court nor has been annexed with the writ petition. ( 10 ) IN course of submission it was pointed out that the petitioner should have produced copy of the mutation but the said question was refuted by the submission that since this document is expected to be with the transferee, therefore the petitioner cannot produce it. But the fact remains that in the letter contained in annexures "g" and "m" the copies of the document relating to mutation were alleged to have been annexed though no such copies appears to have been annexed with annexures "g" and "h" of the writ petition. Thus it does not lie on the petitioner to contend that the petitioner had no copy of the order of mutation. In one of the communications it was pointed out that the filled up forms of mutation signed by Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani were being forwarded. Thus it appears that the petitioner had also been in possession of filled up forms signed by the transferee. Therefore, the petitioner ought to have produced the mutation showing that it was so mutated in the name of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani and that the records of the Corporation depicting the name of the petitioner in the assessment-book even in 1989 is a wrong document. ( 11 ) MR. Mullick had also pointed out that the Corporation had sanctioned plan in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. ( 11 ) MR. Mullick had also pointed out that the Corporation had sanctioned plan in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. Thus, by their conduct the Corporation had accepted the mutation since according to them there cannot be any sanction of plan in favour of Smt. jamuna Devi unless her name was mutated in respect of the property. The original plan has also been produced in Court by Mr. Mullick. It appears that there is a signature of J. D. Karnani in the column "owner's signature" but the application does not bear the name of the owner. It is only in the column of owner's signature that the signature of J. D. Karnani has been appended to. In the absence of any record of the name of Smt. Jamuna Devi in the original sanctioned plan, simply by reason of the signature of J. D. Karnani at the owner's signature column, the same cannot be a proof that the property was mutated in favour of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani. The petitioner can be in possession of a plan sanctioned to Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani including the original produced before this Court but when it comes to the production of the order for mutation it pleads that it is the transferee who can produce and that the petitioner cannot. If all the documents belonging to the transferee can be produced by the petitioner then the simple presumption may be drawn that the petitioner is not producing the order of mutation or there is no order of mutation. ( 12 ) BE that as it may, under section 35 of the Evidence Act a document maintained by the Corporation can be an evidence showing the entries made therein by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty specially enjoined by law and by reason of section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act every official act shall be taken to have been correctly done unless the contrary is proved. In the present case there is nothing to show that the entires made in the Assessment Book could be refuted either under section 35 or under section 114 of the Evidence Act. In the present case there is nothing to show that the entires made in the Assessment Book could be refuted either under section 35 or under section 114 of the Evidence Act. Though entries made in the Municipal Assessment Register is not an evidence of title in a proceeding before the Civil Court, but the same would be an evidence between the Municipal Authority and the persons concerned for the purpose of the 1951 Act until it is reversed by a competent Civil Court in view of section 187 sub-section (3) of the 1951 Act. ( 13 ) SECTION 188 of the 1951 Act prescribes the power of Commissioner to amend the assessment books. Under sub-section (1) Clause (A) name of any person whose name ought to, in the opinion of the Commissioner, to be inserted may be inserted or name of any person whose name ought, in his opinion, to be struck out. Thus, even by this provision, the assessment book could be amended. But all such amendment are relevant only for the purpose of collection of tax as is apparent from the scheme of the said provision on account of being inserted in Chapter 10 of the 1951 Act in part-4 chapter 11 relating to taxation under which consolidated rate is imposed. It has no other relevance. It is only to enable the corporation to recover the tax from the person named in the assessment books who remains primarily liable for payment of the tax unless he himself has taken steps for inserting his name or correcting the record. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, povisions have also been made in the 1980 Act with regard to notice of transfer in section 183 and amendment of municipal assessment book under section 192 of the 1980 Act. Such municipal assessment book is maintained in terms of section 183 of the 1980 Act. ( 15 ) THERE appears to be a little difference or changes with regard to section 187 of the 1951 Act and those of section 183 of the 1980 Act. Section 183 which came into being in 1980 however does not include the provision that once an entry made in the assessment book the same would continue until reversed by a competent Court. But then all these provisions have been included in part-4 Chapter 12 relating to taxation and consolidated rates. Section 183 which came into being in 1980 however does not include the provision that once an entry made in the assessment book the same would continue until reversed by a competent Court. But then all these provisions have been included in part-4 Chapter 12 relating to taxation and consolidated rates. Thus, the purpose of these provisions are aimed at the object of collection of tax. The change that has been effected in the 1980 Act clearly indicates that it was for the purpose of fixing liability on the person responsible to the corporation for payment of taxes and from whom the corporation may realise the tax. ( 16 ) IN the amended provision specified in section 183 in the 1980 Act, it has been described as notice of transfer by a person primarily liable for consolidated rate. It is he, who, to give notice whenever he transfers such title to another. Here, the person, to whom the transfer is made, he is to give notice within 3 months after execution of the instrument. At the same time, the transferer is also equally liable under sub-section (1 ). However, by reason of the transfer having been effected when the 1951 Act was in force and on account of the time limit prescribed in 1980 Act there is no scope for giving any notice for such transfer on account of expiry of the period stipulated therein. Under sub-section (4) if the transferor fails to give notice, he continues to be liable for payemnt of consolidated rate until he gives such notice though however the same will not affect the liability of the transferee for payment of the consolidated rate. Under sub-section (5) on receipt of a notice of transfer or devolution of title the corporation may record such transfer or the devolution in a book in such form and in such a manner as may be prescribed. Though time limit has been prescribed for such notice under sub-section (1) but it does not appear that failure to give notice within the period mentioned in section 183 would prohibit giving such notice afterwards. There being no penal provision or prohibition prohibiting giving of such notice afterwords there was nothing to prevent the petitioner from giving the notice even after the 1980 Act come into force. It had never done so. There being no penal provision or prohibition prohibiting giving of such notice afterwords there was nothing to prevent the petitioner from giving the notice even after the 1980 Act come into force. It had never done so. ( 17 ) AT the same time, under section 188 of the 1951 Act and under section 192 of the 1980 Act respectively, the assessment book could have been amended at the instance of the petitioner. The petitioner could itself apply for the amendment of the assessment book and ought to have get its name struck off insisting upon the insertion of the name of the transferee Smt. Jamuna Debi Karnani. Nowhere the petitioner had made out a case that the petitioner itself had ever given notice or had taken any steps either under section 188 of the 1951 Act or 192 of the 1980 Act. The Municipal Assessment book had always remained open to inspection under section 191 of the 1980 Act. ( 18 ) SECTION 186 of the 1951 Act also required giving of notice by the transferee whenever title in any land or building is transferred to it. Section 186 did not postulate giving a notice by the transferor. In the present case, the transferor had given notice but not a single notice addressed by the transferee has since been produced or relied upon. Thus, it was open to the transferor to take advantage of section 188 of the 1951 Act. ( 19 ) THE transfer of title within the meaning of municipal law may not confine solely to legal title to the land. It may also include the possessory title thereto for the purpose of the Municipality Act. In the case of Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. v. South Dum Dum Municipal and Ors. 78 CWN 494 the name of a co-operative society was recorded in the municipal assessment book. Despite transfer of it to the members, the co-operative society remained primarily liable for payment of the tax since it remained liable to pay tax for the purpose of the Municipal Act. ( 20 ) ALL these aspects are to be taken note of and considered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, Smt. Jamuna Debi is related to the Directors of the petitioner. The address of the petitioner as well as that of Smt. Jamuna Devi is 4, Synagogue Street. ( 20 ) ALL these aspects are to be taken note of and considered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, Smt. Jamuna Debi is related to the Directors of the petitioner. The address of the petitioner as well as that of Smt. Jamuna Devi is 4, Synagogue Street. All documents are coming through the petitioner though the petitioner had been alleging that those documents are in the custody of Smt. Jamuna Devi. Then again the petitioner has not made Smt. Jamuna Debi a party to the proceeding. Evidence during the course of hearing neither any accommodation not any leave to add the said Jamuna Debi or her representatives, as the case may be, was asked for. The sending of the form for mutation signed by Smt. Jamuna Debi, by the petitioner itself shows that the petitioner had been taking all steps on behalf of Smt. Jamuna Debi. But, however, it may be noted that the petitioner being a corporate body has a different entity than Smt. Jamuna Debi. But still then it was open to the petitioner to apply either under section 188 of the 1951 Act for striking off its name and insertion of the name of Smt. Jamuna Debi or under section 192 of the 1980 Act. The petitioner does not seem to have acted diligently. Thus, it is open to the Corporation to realise tax from the recorded owner i. e. the petitioner. It is very difficult to accept that there was a transfer so far as the liability to pay consolidated rate under the Municipal Act is concerned. This does not seem to have been seriously taken note of by the petitioner when the petitioner itself was an occupier of the building. ( 21 ) THUS, on the face of the materials produced before this Court it appears that the property is recorded in the name of the petitioner. Be that as it may, by reason of section 187 of the 1951 Act the petitioner ought to have got its name mutated, in respect of the portion in its occupation, as occupier of the said property without allowing its name to be continued as owner thereof. Under the 1951 Act the occupier was also responsible for payment of 50% tax by reason of section 191 of the 1951 Act. Under the 1951 Act the occupier was also responsible for payment of 50% tax by reason of section 191 of the 1951 Act. Thus for the period 2nd quarters of 1976-77 till the 1980 Act had come into operation, the petitioner would be liable for payment of occupier's share of taxes for the portion of the building under its occupation. This liability of the petitioner cannot be avoided altogether. Since the name of the petitioner is recorded in the assessment-book, the petitioner is primarily liable for payment of tax in respect of the said premises and the same having not reversed by any competent Civil Court, until the 1980 Act had come into operation, in view of section 187 sub-section (2) of the 1951 Act. ( 22 ) AFTER the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was repealed and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 had come into operation, the question of mutation is governed by section 183 which provide in, sub-section (1) that the transferor as well as the transferee both are liable to give notice of such transfer. But since in the present case the question had arisen in 1972, sub-section (1) of section 183 may not apply. But by reason of sub-section (4) of section 183 if the transferor fails to give notice then in addition to penalty to which he may be subjected under the said Act, continue to be liable for payment of the consolidated rate until he gives such notice. Thus, even if the petitioner had not given notice under section 186 or 187 of the 1951 Act but by reason of sub-section (4) of section 183 it remains to be liable for payment of tax until such notice is given. But Mr. Mullick contends that since such notices had been given in 1970, sub-section (4) of section 183 cannot be attracted in the present case. It seems that there may be some substance in the contention of Mr. Mullick, particularly when it shows that those notices were received by the Corporation as is apparent from the acknowledgement slips attached to the relevant annexures to the writ petition, though however the same is disputed by Mr. Das Adhikary. Thus, the liability cannot be fixed on the petitioner on the basis of section 183 as has been sought to be contended by Mr. Das Adhikary. Das Adhikary. Thus, the liability cannot be fixed on the petitioner on the basis of section 183 as has been sought to be contended by Mr. Das Adhikary. ( 23 ) STILL then the liability that was there as occupier had continued till the 1980 Act had come into operation. At the same time, since the name of the petitioner stands recorded in the assessment-book, therefore it continues to remain liable for payment of tax till the 1980 Act came into operation. After the 1980 Act has come into operation it continues to remain liable to pay tax so long the name of the petitioner continues in the assessment book. In case the transferee had accepted her liability in that event the question would have been different. The fact remains that the transferees were related to the transferor in one way or the other namely Gajendra Kumar was one of the Directors and Smt. Jamuna Devi, though not a Director but was one of the relatives of one of such Directors. Then again the production of documents as contained in the writ petition clearly indicates that there was some contact between the petitioner and those transferees on the basis whereof the documents belongintg to the transferees could be produced or relied upon by the petitioner. That apart the address of the petitioner as well as that of Smt. Jamuna Devi was the same 4, Synagog Street, Calcutta. ( 24 ) BE that as it may so long the name of the petitioner appears in the record of the Municipality and it is not shown that the property has been mutated in the name of the transferee, the petitioner remains liable for payment of the tax. ( 25 ) EVEN if the transferee may be liable the building remains first charged under section 232 of the 1980 Act. Thus it is open to the Municipality to proceed against the petitioner as well as it has the authority to realise tax by utilising the building through section 221a by way of attachment or otherwise, as permissible in law. ( 26 ) THUS, unless the transferee or the persons claiming through her volunteer to pay the tax, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation would be entitled to recover tax from the petitioner through due process of law. ( 26 ) THUS, unless the transferee or the persons claiming through her volunteer to pay the tax, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation would be entitled to recover tax from the petitioner through due process of law. ( 27 ) THE allegation that the petitioner was not given opportunity and suddenly a distress warrant has been issued cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the name of the petitioner had been appearing in the assessment-book and that since 1976-77 tax has not been paid. At the same time the conduct of the petitioner also does not appear to be fair for the simple reason that in order to save distress six cheques were issued, but the same could not be negotiated either on account of stop payment or on account of shortage of fund. Admittedly the cheques were issued by the petitioner. If there was a stop payment then the petitioner had deliberately stopped the payment. In order to bid time the chques were issued. In the mean time after having moved this Court the petitioner obtained an interim order. Thus it appears that the issuing of cheques and stopping of payment was a play to avoid payment even after distress in order to bid time so as to obtain an order from this Court. If it is accepted as contended by Mr Mullick that the petitioner did not stop payment but the cheques were dishonoured on account of shortage of fund, in that event the petitioner know well that it did not have fund. Still then it had issued the cheques deliberately in order to bid time so as to obtain an order from this Court. Thus the petitioner does not appear to have come with clean hands to seek equity from this Court. ( 28 ) RELYNG on the decision in the case of Machinnon Machenzie and Co. Ltd. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation (supra) Mr. Das Adhikari had pointed out that under section 193 of the 1980 Act tax can be recovered either from the owner or from the occupier as has been held in the said decision. Paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 29 of the said decision deals with the said proposition, which may be quoted as hereinbelow :-"it is now a well settled principles of law that there cannot be any intendment for tax. Paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 29 of the said decision deals with the said proposition, which may be quoted as hereinbelow :-"it is now a well settled principles of law that there cannot be any intendment for tax. Imposition of tax or assessment or steps for recovery thereof being governed by the provision of law, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation could not have gone beyond the statute. The provision contained in section 193 in no uncertain terms states that only the "owner" (respondent No. 9) would be primarily liable. In the event of failure of the owner to pay consolidated rate and other taxes, recovery can be made from the occupiers of the building but such a provision must be carried into effect strictly in accordance with law. The provision of the said Act nowhere states that the liability to pay consolidated rate is also on a lessee or sub-lessee. It merely empowers the Corporation to collect that arrears of such consolidated rates and taxes from the occupiers of the building only in the manner laid down under section 225 and not otherwise. Only in a case where the occupiers of the building failed to comply with the direction as contained in sub-secctions (1) and (2) of section 225, a tax can be recovered from the occupiers of the building in the same manner as could be done in the case of lessor or the superior lessor. It is, therefore, preposterous to contend that sections 231 and 232 of the said Act confer an absolute, unguided, unbriddled, uncanalised or naked power upon the authorities to realise the amount of consolidated rent from any person whomsoever. Section 231 of the Act is for the benefit of the person who is primarily liable. The said provision cannot be taken recourse to by the Corporation. Section 232 merely states that the land and the building belonging to any person who in the facts and circumstances of this case must be held to mean the person liable to pay the consolidated rate tax as first charge. The words upon which moveable property (if any), found within or upon such, land or building must be the moveable property belonging to the person liable to pay such tax. The distinction between a person primarily liable and persons liable to pay tax is explicit and unambiguous. The words upon which moveable property (if any), found within or upon such, land or building must be the moveable property belonging to the person liable to pay such tax. The distinction between a person primarily liable and persons liable to pay tax is explicit and unambiguous. So far as the payment of consolidated rate and taxes on lands and buildings is concerned, the owner namely, the lessor or the superior lesser, as the case may be would be primarily liable. Apart from the consolidated rate various other taxes which may be personal in nature can also be levied and persons upon where such taxes are levied, are persons liable to pay such taxes. The liability of an occupier to pay consolidated rate so as to make it a person liable therefore would come into play only in terms of sub-section (3) of section 225 of the Act i. e. , when he has failed and/or neglected to comply with the directions as contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof. If the construction of section 232 as has been put forth by Mr. Das Adhikary is accepted, the same would render the provision unconsitutional. It is now well known that the Court is entitled to read down a statute so as to render the same constitutional. The intention of legislature in making the said provision, in our opinion, is explicit, clear and unambiguous. If a literal interpretation is made, the same would give rise to absurdity as in such an event the cars, moneys and other moveable properties of the officers of the lessee and such lessee and/or the stranger who perchance happends to be in the premises would come within the mischief of the said provision. The statute must be presumed to have been enacted for doing justice and avoid injustice. See 1998 (2) SCC 1 . It is further well settled that if a literal interpretation is given to a statute resulting in manifest injustice and absurdity, the same has to be avoided. It is further well known that for the purpose of construction of a statute, the same has to be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter and then section by section. Section 232 read in such a manner, in our opinion would clearly show that the persons in the facts and circumstances of this case would come within the mischief of section 232. Section 232 read in such a manner, in our opinion would clearly show that the persons in the facts and circumstances of this case would come within the mischief of section 232. It is absurd to suggest that recovery of tax can be made by attachment of the properties belonging to a person who is not liable therefor and against whom no assessment proceedings had been initiated. The liability of a third party must clearly be stated in the statute. The liability of a third party can neither by presumed nor intended as in terms of Article 265 of the Constitution of India, a tax can be levied only in accordance with law. Recovery of a tax can thus only be made from a person who has been made liable therefore under the said Act of those from whom the same can be realised in the manner laid down under the statute and no other. " ( 29 ) IN view of the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Machinnon Machenzie and Co. Ltd. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation (supra) as quoted above, the petitioner cannot avoid its liability on any ground whatsoever. ( 30 ) MR. Mullick contended that the notices were used to be issued at 4, Synagogue Street but the alleged notices purported to have been addressed to 3, Synagogue Street. It appears that even in 1978 the Corporation had issued a notice to the petitioner at 52a, Shakespeare Sarani and that the petitioner had been requesting the Collector that the notices should be addressed to 4, Synagogue Street instead of 3, Synagogue Street. But this letter was addressed in 1967. There is nothing to show that after the said letter dated 29. 3. 1967 notices used to be addressed to 3, Synagogue Street. On the other hand, from a letter issued by the assessment department on 7th July, 1970 produced by Mr. Mullick before this Court it appears that the same was addressed to the petitioner at 4, Synagogue Street. Thus there is no reason to believe that the notices were sent to incorrect address, viz. , 3, Synagogue Street, instead of 4, Synagogue Street. It may also be noted that the address of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani is also 4, Synagogue Street. Thus there is no reason to believe that the notices were sent to incorrect address, viz. , 3, Synagogue Street, instead of 4, Synagogue Street. It may also be noted that the address of Smt. Jamuna Devi Karnani is also 4, Synagogue Street. On the other hand notices were issued to and received by the petitioner at 4 Synagogue Street or at 52a Shakespeare Sarani. ( 31 ) THUS, in the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not find any reason to interfere. This petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. The Corporation shall be entitled to proceed to recover the taxes from the petitioner or if it so desires, or is so required, through the provisions of section 221a or such other provisions as may be available in law. ( 32 ) THE interim order granted in respect of premises No. 52a, Shakespeare Sarani, stands discharged. The recovery as observed above, would relate to premises No. 52a, Shakespeare Sarani. So far as the premises No. 52b is concerned, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the recovery should proceed against Sri Gajendra Kumar Karnani. Mr. Das Adhikary however points out that the Corporation has never sought to realise tax in respect of premises No. 52b, Shakespeare Sarani from the petitioner. The demand also indicates that it was in respect of premises No. 52a, Shakespeare Sarani and as such the Corporation shall be entitled to recover whatever amount is due in respect of 52a, Shakespeare Sarani. ( 33 ) THE writ petition thus succeeds in respect of premises No. 52b, Shakespeare Sarani and fails in respect of premises No. 52a, Shakespeare Sarani. This petition is thus partly allowed and partly dismissed. ( 34 ) THE operation of the order, as prayed for, shall remain stayed till 6th September, 2000. if the petitioner deposits with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs within the said period by way of cash depsoit or Pay Order, in that event the stay will continue for a further period till 20th September, 2000 provided however, the petitioner secures a further sum of Rs. 4 lakhs within 20th September, 2000. In default of any of the conditions, the stay will stand vacated automatically. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Petitions allowed inpart.