JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.—This appeal is directed against a judgment dated 1.1.1994 of the VI Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City in O.S. No. 2912 of 1990. The Appellant is the original Plaintiff and he had filed a suit for specific performance against the Defendant alleging that the Defendant who is the owner of a residential house which is the suit property had by an agreement dated 15.11.1989 agreed to sell the property in question to the Plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 98,000/-. The Plaintiff had on the same date paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as earnest money and a further sum of Rs. 30,000/- on 8.2.1990. The agreements specify that the balance amount was to be paid within a period of two months. On 8.2.1990, the time was extended up to 6.3.1990. Thereafter, the correspondence indicates that the Plaintiff was asked to remain present by the Defendant at the Sub-Registrar's Office and complete the transaction on 9.4.1990 and the Plaintiff contends that he could not do so because the letter was received by him only on 10.4.1990. It is by the letter dated 16.4.1990, that the Plaintiff once again fixed an appointment for 3.5.1990 before the Sub-Registrar, Guttahalli for the completion of the sale transaction. Whereas it is the Plaintiff's case that since the Defendant had not specified the requirement regarding vacant possession that he did not go to the said place on that date, the Defendant has contended that she was waiting at the Sub- Registrar's Office for the whole of that day and that the Plaintiff did not turn up. By a notice dated 4.5.1990 which is Ex.P-17 the Defendant intimated the Plaintiff that the amount paid by him had been forfeited on the ground that the Plaintiff had failed to honour the terms of the agreement. This briefly is the narration of the background that gave rise to the Plaintiff instituting the suit for specific performance. The Plaintiff has made the usual averments contending that he was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract, that the Defendant has committed the breach by not complying and that consequently the Court must pass a decree for specific performance. The Plaintiff has made the usual averments contending that he was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract, that the Defendant has committed the breach by not complying and that consequently the Court must pass a decree for specific performance. The defence plea in the written statement essentially revolves around the fact that according to the Defendant the Plaintiff has not exhibited the requisite readiness nd willingness to complete the sale and the Defendant seeks to rely on certain facts, the first of them being that the Defendant had handed over the title deeds to the Plaintiff, the second being that at no stage did the Defendant back out of her obligations by either writing or stating to the Plaintiff that she was unwilling to either receive the balance consideration or execute the sale deed. Lastly what is pointed out is that the Defendant had in fact gone to the Sub-Registrar's Office on 3.5.1990 and that this is the strongest indication of the desire on her part to perform the obligations as spelt out from the agreement. Also, what is pointed out by the Defendant is that there was a double default on the part of the Plaintiff once on the 9th of April and the second time on the 3rd of May on both occasions, when the Plaintiff did not turn up for the execution of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar. In sum and substance, the defence pleaded is that the Plaintiff was the defaulter and in these circumstances that the Defendant was justified in serving notice on the Plaintiff revoking the agreement. It was also contended by the Defendant that since this was a residential house which was self occupied that she in turn had desired to shift elsewhere and that certain commitments were made to this effect which according to them were dependent on the receipt of sale proceeds from the Plaintiff and it was also contended that because of the timely non-payment by the Plaintiff that the Defendant was unable to complete the second transaction and that she had in turn sustained a loss thereby. This was basically a second line of defence in justification for the Defendant forfeiting the money that had been paid to her by the Plaintiff. This was basically a second line of defence in justification for the Defendant forfeiting the money that had been paid to her by the Plaintiff. The learned trial Judge after recording the evidence evaluated it and considering the position in law, dismissed the suit holding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance. The present appeal assails the correctness of that order. After the filing of the appeal, the Appellant has sought to graft on a subsidiary relief as an alternative to the decree for specific performance. This was perhaps because of the observations made in the judgment wherein the trial Court has taken an ultra technical view of the law but it is well settled that where a party approaches a Court for a decree of specific performance that it is equally permissible for the Court if that relief is not granted or if the granting of that relief is inadvisable, to grant a lesser relief after considering the facts and circumstances and evaluating the equities. 2. At the hearing, after referring to the oral evidence and the correspondence the Appellant's learned Advocate submitted that his client was at all times ready and willing to pay the balance money and the explanation given by him for the non-appearance of the Plaintiff when called upon to complete the sale transaction on 9.4.1990 was that the letter asking the Plaintiff to remain present on that date was only received on 10.4.1990. This appears to be the correct position and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot really be faulted for what happened. Next, the learned Advocate submitted that as far as 6.5.1990 is concerned, that the evidence on record and the correspondence and particularly the relevant clauses of the agreement Ex.P-1 would justify the Plaintiff's contention that the Defendant was obliged to satisfy the Plaintiff that vacant possession of the premises was in fact possible as on 3.5.1990 and according to the learned Advocate, since the Defendant had not done so that his client was justified in not going to the Sub Registrar's Office and completing the sale on that date. It is his submission that in the case of an immovable property, particularly residential premises, if the vacant possession is not assured that the party is not obliged to complete the sale deed and he referred to the document Ex.P-1 in support of his contention in this regard. It is his submission that in the case of an immovable property, particularly residential premises, if the vacant possession is not assured that the party is not obliged to complete the sale deed and he referred to the document Ex.P-1 in support of his contention in this regard. It is true that Clause (vi) of the agreement does stipulate that the Vendor shall hand over the vacant possession of the property to the purchaser at the execution of the sale deed and the learned Advocate submitted that it was condition precedent for the Defendant to have demonstrated this to the Plaintiff before receiving the balance payment and completing the sale. In sum and substance, what is vehemently contended is that the trial Court was manifestly in error in having refused a decree on the simple facts of the present case and the learned Advocate has submitted that the decision requires to be reversed. The learned Advocate who represents the Respondent i.e. the original Defendant has submitted that the most important ingredient in law namely the fact that the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract has very rightly been held not to have been satisfied by the trial Court. What he demonstrates is that the agreement was originally entered into on 15.11.1989 and that on 8.2.1990 the time was mutually extended up to 6.3.1990. It is his submission that if the Plaintiff was genuine and serious about completing the sale transaction that this was the deadline within which it ought to have been done and he submits that the bonafides of the Defendant are apparent from the fact that she still agreed as and by way of a concession to complete the transaction by 9.4.1990 and that the Plaintiff was certainly on the wrong side of the law in not having complied within this time-frame. While there can be little dispute about the fact that the letter did not reach the Plaintiff before 9.4.1990, the learned Advocate in the course of his submissions contended that the law casts a higher obligation on the purchaser in cases of this type because it is the purchaser who has to get the money ready and indicate when the purchaser will complete the sale and he further contends that in the present instance the obligation to purchase the stamp paper and get the document drawn up was also on the Plaintiff and he submits that irrespective of the date on which the letter was received that there is nothing on record to indicate that the Plaintiff had taken any steps in this regard. What he further contends is that the Plaintiff was finally called upon to comply with his obligations by 3.5.1990 which again was an extended concession on the part of the Defendant and he submits that even on this date there was complete silence on the part of the Plaintiff. He refutes the argument regarding the question of vacant possession by pointing out that there is nothing on record to indicate that this was the reason why the Plaintiff remained absent and it is his submission that the Court must uphold the findings of the trial Court that even though the Plaintiff has repeatedly stated that he was ready and willing to perform his obligations that his action speaks larger than his words and that it was abundantly clear that he did not desire to complete the sale within the stipulated period of time. 3. Another argument which has been strongly canvassed on behalf of the Respondent-Defendant is that the Plaintiff has not been able to adduce any satisfactory evidence before the Court of the fact that at any point of time he did in fact possess the balance payment of Rs. 58,000/- and that the same was with him or in other words, that he was in a position to tender the balance payment. 58,000/- and that the same was with him or in other words, that he was in a position to tender the balance payment. Here, what the learned Advocate submitted was that the only statement which the Plaintiff has given while in the witness box was that he had secured the amount in cash and kept it in his house and it is vehemently submitted that the Plaintiff is an ordinary middle class person and that it is inconceivable that he could have obtained this relatively large amount of money in cash and taken the risk of keeping it in his house. What the learned Advocate is harping on is that in the absence of the Plaintiff giving atleast the normal indication of the source of this money or where it was raised from that it would be very clear that this is an after thought and that it is a vague explanation as the Plaintiff obviously did not have the money either in the bank or anywhere else and therefore tried to get over the embarrassment by making this statement. 4. Though this aspect of the case has been vehemently elaborated, I do not propose to attach undue importance to it for only one reason namely that when the Plaintiff stated that he had obtained the money and kept it with him in the house, the cross-examination was not pursued and consequently, it will have to be left at the position that the Defendant accepted this explanation. These are all questions of fact and if the Plaintiff was not rigorously grilled in the witness box and if it was not demonstrated that this statement was either false or doubtful, it is not open at the appellate stage to call this issue into question. In any event, the law on the point is now well defined and the Courts have held that it is not absolutely essential in such situations for the Plaintiff to have demonstrated that the money had been physically procured and the Supreme Court has virtually concluded the issue while holding that if the Plaintiff indicates that the party even had the capacity to raise the funds, that it would be sufficient. 5. 5. The next challenge to the aspect of readiness and willingness is based on a Division Bench decision of our High Court reported in Saraswathi Ammal vs. V.C. Lingam, ILR 1993 Karn 427 wherein the Court had observed that the concept of readiness involves proof of capacity to perform, which in turn requires proof of financial ability at the relevant point of time. The willingness to perform the contract is not a mere desire, it should be a genuine willingness, to be proved like any other fact; circumstances may justify an inference that the assertion of the Plaintiff as to his willingness is a mere verbal assertion and in fact, his conduct may disclose that he was really interested in procrastination because, delay was to his advantage; in many cases, a person who agreed to purchase a property of which he is already in possession, may not be anxious at all to complete the contract. The submission is that the Plaintiff has not indicated factually the capacity to have made the payment when called upon to do so and the learned Advocate reinforced his submission by pointing out that this was the real reason why the Plaintiff remained absent on 3.5.1990 and his final argument was that if one were to test the reason given for the absence, it would be clear that at no prior stage has the Plaintiff called upon the Defendant to satisfy him about handing over vacant possession. 6. I have briefly summarised the facts of this case and the respective submissions. As indicated earlier, the trial Court refused a decree and the short question that arises is as to whether on a perusal of the record interference is called for. I have already referred in passing to the fact that the trial Court has been extremely technical while construing the law and what I need to further observe is that the trial Court was also rather one sided in its evaluation of the evidence. 7. I have already referred in passing to the fact that the trial Court has been extremely technical while construing the law and what I need to further observe is that the trial Court was also rather one sided in its evaluation of the evidence. 7. In situations of the present type, what the Court needs to take into consideration is the fact that there is often times a tendency displayed on the part of the purchaser who is required to make the bulk of the payment, who wants to delay parting with the large sum of money and act in a subtle manner and this is achieved by either making unreasonable demands or raising frivolous disputes on all sorts of specious grounds. There are many reasons why the purchaser wants to do this and one of the most familiar ones is that having got the Vendor committed to a particular price, the delay is to the advantage of the purchaser because invariably property prices are on the increase and the purchaser at a much later date secures the sale of the property at an earlier and a lower price. Conversely, the sad experience of the Court has been that the Vendors of properties enter into solemn agreements for sale, hold on to the initial payment or earnest money that has been received, thereafter raise disputes only because the value of the property has arisen and ultimately seek to back out of the agreement by foisting the blame on the opposite party and thereby secure undue and unjust advantage. It is in this background that a Court is required to evaluate very carefully as to on whose part the breach is and I need to record that there will hardly be a case in which the breach is one sided. In situations such as that, the Court is again required to balance the equities or to mould the relief and finally decide as to whether to enforce a decree for specific performance or whether some other parallel relief would serve the ends of justice. It is precisely for this reason that the Specific Relief Act itself makes this provision. 8. Coming to the facts of the present case. It is precisely for this reason that the Specific Relief Act itself makes this provision. 8. Coming to the facts of the present case. I need to record that as far as the Plaintiff is concerned and as far as the record goes, there has been an indication that the Plaintiff was willing to perform his part of the contract. His non-appearance on 9.4.1990 has been satisfactorily explained and therefore cannot really be held against him. As far as the subsequent date i.e. the most important one i.e. on 3.5.1990 is concerned, we have a situation whereby admittedly the Plaintiff had noticed that he was to remain present and complete the transaction. The Plaintiff was certainly at fault in not having remained present before the Sub-Registrar on that date or for that matter in not having sent prior intimation to the Defendant indicating as to what was the reason why the transaction could not be completed on that day. Normally, I would have upheld the findings of the trial Court straight away for the aforesaid two reasons but what the law postulates is that in situations of the present type where agreements require two way obligations and performances that to my mind, it was equally important for the Defendant in terms of class (vi) of the agreement to sell, to have very clearly specified that the vacant possession of the premises would be handed over on 3.5.1990 simultaneously with the sale transaction having been completed and in the absence of this having been done, one cannot condone the conduct of the Defendant. When the law envisages obligations, the law also takes into account the reverse counter obligations and if one party is to be penalised in a given situation this cannot be unilaterally done if it is demonstrated that there was a corresponding fault or a cause. To my mind therefore, what happened on 3.5.1990 cannot be construed as an unilateral breach on the part of the Plaintiff because the Defendant had given adequate cause for it. 9. What really clinches the issue on the question of willingness to perform is to my mind the satisfactory evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the stamp paper had in fact been purchased. 9. What really clinches the issue on the question of willingness to perform is to my mind the satisfactory evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the stamp paper had in fact been purchased. This involves the investment of a considerably high amount of money having regard to the status of the Plaintiff and it is too far fetched to assume that this would have been done for any collateral purpose. It is true that the Respondent's learned Advocate vehemently submitted that the stamp paper has been bought at a very late point of time in the month of May 1990 long after 9.4.1990 and 3.5.1990 had elapsed and his submission is that this is conclusive proof of the fact that this was purchased only as a cover up for the breaches committed by the Plaintiff earlier and in order to substantiate the Plaintiff's case before the Court. It is a little difficult to uphold this defence because one needs to take into account the fact that the stamp paper is purchased for the sale deed to be drawn up and this is the final stage of execution and if the Plaintiff did not have the balance sale price with him, he would never have spent the money to purchase the stamp paper. Again, as I have held earlier there is nothing on record on the basis of which the Court can conclusively hold that the Plaintiff did not have the balance sale consideration with him and in this view of the matter, it would not be possible to uphold the view of the trial Court that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his readiness and willingness. I need to observe in passing that the concept of readiness and willingness again involves a two way concept and this is the area in which something has been found wanting on the part of the Defendant. 10. Having regard to the aforesaid situation, it is abundantly clear that the trial Court was in error in having refused the Plaintiff any reliefs. Fortunately, I do not need to seriously examine the question as to whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance because I gauge from the arguments and the submissions made that at this late point of time, the Plaintiff is not really desirous of extorting his pound of flesh. Fortunately, I do not need to seriously examine the question as to whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance because I gauge from the arguments and the submissions made that at this late point of time, the Plaintiff is not really desirous of extorting his pound of flesh. Effectively therefore, the Court would have to consider as to what would be a fair and just alternate relief in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. It is conclusively established that the Plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- on 15.11.1989 and a sum of Rs. 30,000/- on 8.2.1990 aggregating Rs. 40,000/-. The transaction did not materialise and the Defendant has been in possession of this money right through this period of time. Her learned Advocate submitted that without prejudice to the Defendant's contention that she was not at all at fault, and purely out of a sense of fair play that the Defendant had offered to refund to the Plaintiff right from the time when the suit was instituted the whole of the amount that had been deposited without insisting on the forfeiture clause. His submission therefore is that if the Plaintiff adamantly refused to receive this amount that the Defendant ought not to be penalised by way of any additional payment merely because of efflux of time. To my mind, without going into the reasons for the non acceptance, this statement would be exonerating the Defendant from the consequences of having retained the money all through these years. Under normal circumstances, if a decree for specific performance had been passed, the Defendant would have been obliged to convey the property at the 1989 rates irrespective of the rise in prices if it was found that the Defendant was alone responsible and even if the Court as is oftentimes done, had taken cognizance of the conduct of both the parties and other relevant circumstances at the highest, the Defendant would have got a marginal increase. On the other hand, it is the Plaintiff who has been at the receiving end because the transaction did not materialise and the Plaintiff did not get the property and even at this point of time, in the facts and circumstances of the case it is Plaintiff who is only being monetarily compensated. On the other hand, it is the Plaintiff who has been at the receiving end because the transaction did not materialise and the Plaintiff did not get the property and even at this point of time, in the facts and circumstances of the case it is Plaintiff who is only being monetarily compensated. Under these circumstances, a Court will have to adopt some fair standard for purposes of moulding the relief. The Courts sometimes do the evaluation of what would have been the monetary equivalent of the property after the efflux of time and while passing a decree award monetary compensation in keeping with the difference in price or the appreciation. That formula however may be too harsh in the facts and circumstances of this case where the fault lies on both sides, but more on the side of the Defendant. In this background therefore to my mind, it would be safe for the Court to compute a rough equivalent of the appreciation in principle and to direct payment of that amount. While doing this, I have taken into account the simple formula of what would have been the appreciated value of the sum of Rs. 40,000/- which the Defendant has been holding since 1989-1990 and on a conservative calculation, the interest alone aggregates to more than Rs. 40,000/- I have, however, after careful consideration decided that it is only fair and just that the amount be slightly reduced and that a total compensation in the sum of Rs. 70,000/- would meet the ends of justice. 12. In the result, the judgment of the trial Court is set aside. In modification thereof, the Plaintiff's suit is decreed. The Defendant is directed to pay to the Plaintiff a sum of Rs. 70,000/- within a period of twelve weeks from today. It is open to the Defendant to either make the payment directly to the Plaintiff or to deposit the same in the trial Court within the prescribed period of time after giving written notice to the Plaintiff or his learned Advocate. The Respondent's learned Advocate has requested that the original title deeds be returned to the Defendant as these may be required for purposes of raising the requisite funds. The Respondent's learned Advocate has requested that the original title deeds be returned to the Defendant as these may be required for purposes of raising the requisite funds. The Appellant's learned Advocate has vehemently objected to this on the ground that if there is default in the payment and the decree is required to be executed that his client will run into serious difficulties if an encumbrance has been created on the property. It is necessary even with regard to the implementation and execution of the Court orders to make fair and adequate provisions which facilitate the implementation of those orders speedily and effectively. Consequently, the trial Court will be permitted to allow the Defendant to take the original documents provided the Defendant files certified xerox copies thereof with the office and files an unconditional undertaking to the Court that the sums of money raised on the basis of that property or those documents will be utilised exclusively and immediately towards payment of the decretal amount to the Plaintiff. Also, the undertaking shall specify that if any encumbrance is created on that property that the present Plaintiff will have a prior charge on the property and that those encumbrances will take place only thereafter nd will not come in the way of the Plaintiff executing the decree as against that property if necessary. 13. The appeal succeeds to this extent and stands disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Office to retransmit the record to the trial Court immediately. As and by way of abundant caution, it is necessary for me to provide that in the event of any default committed by the Defendant in complying with the terms of this decree for whatsoever reason, that the Defendant will be liable to pay interest computed at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum on and from the date on which this decree has been passed i.e. on 29.6.2000.