ORDER Dipak Misra, J. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court u/s 115 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the tenants/petitioners have called in question the legal validity of the order dated 23-3-2000 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority in Case No. 15/90(B) of 98-99 whereby he has refused to grant leave as envisaged u/s 23-C of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act'). The facts in a nut shell are that the non-applicant/plaintiff filed an application u/s 23-A of the Act for eviction of the tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement. She claimed herself to be a landlady under Clause 3 of section 23-J of the Act putting forth that she is a widow and has acquired this property and she is in bona fide need of the premises. The application was resisted by filing an affidavit and seeking leave to contest the matter. The Rent Controlling Authority rejected the said application on the ground that no triable issue has been made out and in any case there are no good grounds for grant of leave. The said order is the cause of grievance of the present petitioners. I have heard Mr. Vivek Krishna Tankha, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. Alok Aradhe, learned counsel for the non-applicant. It is submitted by Mr. Tankha, learned counsel, that the Rent Controlling Authority has failed to appreciate the provisions in proper perspective, and therefore, the order passed by him is susceptible. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel for the non-applicant, has supported the order of the Authority on the ground that there has been really no challenge to the bona fide requirement. It is submitted by Mr. Tankha, learned counsel, that the Rent Controlling Authority has failed to appreciate the provisions in proper perspective, and therefore, the order passed by him is susceptible. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel for the non-applicant, has supported the order of the Authority on the ground that there has been really no challenge to the bona fide requirement. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar it is apposite to reproduce section 23-C of the Act which reads as under:- 23-C. Tenant not entitled to contest except under certain circumstances.- (1) The tenant on whom the summons is served in the form specified in the Second Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the accommodation unless he files within fifteen days from the date of service of the summons, an application supported by an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Rent Controlling Authority as hereinafter provided, and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or in default of his obtaining such leave, or if such leave is refused, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant. The Rent Controlling Authority shall in such a case pass an order of eviction of the tenant from the accommodation: Provided that the Rent Controlling Authority may, for sufficient cause shown by the tenant, excuse the delay of the tenant in entering appearance or in applying for leave to defend the application for eviction and where "ex-parte" order has been passed, may set it aside. (2) The Rent Controlling Authority shall, within one month of the date of receipt of application, give to the tenant, if necessary, leave to contest the application, if the application supported by an affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground specified in section 23-A. On a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision it is apparent that the tenant is required to file an application supported by an affidavit stating the grounds to seek to contest the application for eviction and the Rent Controlling Authority is required under law to either grant or refuse the leave sought. Mr. Mr. Alok Aradhe, learned counsel, has drawn the attention of this Court to the decision rendered in the case of Precision Steel and Engineering Works and Another Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, , wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the provisions of Delhi Rent Controlling Act. In paragraph 22 their Lordships held as under:- 22. What then follows. The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of section 25B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts no proof is needed at the stage, which could disentitle the plaintiff from seeking possession, the mere disclosure of such facts must be held sufficient to grant leave because the statute says 'on disclosure of such facts the Controller shall grant leave'. It is difficult to be exhaustive as to what such facts could be but ordinarily when an action is brought u/s 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act whereby the landlord seeks to recover possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement if the tenant alleges such facts as that the landlord has other accommodation in his possession; that the landlord has in his possession accommodation which is sufficient for him; that the conduct of the landlord discloses avarice for increasing rent by threatening eviction; that the landlord has been letting out some other premises at enhanced rent without any attempt at occupying the same or using it for himself; that the dependents of the landlord for whose benefit also possession is sought are not persons to whom in the eye of law the landlord was bound to provide accommodation; that the past conduct of the landlord is such as would disentitle him to the relief of possession; that the landlord who claims possession for his personal requirement has not cared to approach the Court in person and with a view to shielding himself from cross-examination prosecutes litigation through an agent called a constituted attorney; these and several other relevant but inexhaustible facts when disclosed should ordinarily be deemed to be sufficient to grant leave. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel, submitted that tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle no triable issue has been raised. Hence, application for grant of leave is sans merit. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel, submitted that tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle no triable issue has been raised. Hence, application for grant of leave is sans merit. He has pointed out that a stand has been taken that the plaintiff is an old lady, therefore, she cannot start the business on her own. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel, has also placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Harvilas Shivhare Vs. Jahoor Khan, wherein it has been held as under:- .........that the petitioner being 75 years or that he has no experience of running the flour mill be also examined. I am of the opinion that this cannot be made a ground for not granting relief to the petitioner. It is well settled that a person can start business and he need not have prior experience in this regard. On the basis of the aforesaid conclusion the findings recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority were affirmed. Mr. Tankha, learned counsel for the petitioners, has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Col. Surinder Pal Singh Bhattal (Retd.) Vs. Rakesh Kumar Jain, wherein their Lordships while dealing with provisions of East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act (1949) held as under:- 7. .......When an application for leave to defend is made by the tenant supported by an affidavit for grant of leave to contest the eviction petition filed by landlord u/s 13-A of the Act, the rent controller is not required to examine the issue from the point of view of the ultimate proof which the tenant may produce but the only thing which the Controller is required to examine is to look into the averments made in the application by the tenant and the affidavit in support thereof to see whether the tenant has made out a case which, if proved, would disentitle the landlord from claiming the eviction of the tenant from the premises occupied by him in summary proceedings. From the aforesaid decision it becomes apparent that the triable issue has to be raised by the tenant so that he can seek leave to contest the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority and that is the law laid down in the decisions rendered in Precision Steel & Engineering Works (supra) and Col. Surinder Pal Singh Bhattal (Retd.). From the aforesaid decision it becomes apparent that the triable issue has to be raised by the tenant so that he can seek leave to contest the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority and that is the law laid down in the decisions rendered in Precision Steel & Engineering Works (supra) and Col. Surinder Pal Singh Bhattal (Retd.). What has been done in the case of Harvilas Shivhare (supra) is a decision on final merits of the case. Therein it was distinct aspect altogether. Mere old age cannot make a person incapable of starting a business. In the present case the bona fides of the landlady have been questioned on two counts i.e. the acquisition of property in her name is a 'benami transaction' and therefore the question of bona fide need does not arise, and secondly that she being aged of 67 years and suffering from various diseases and being infirm, is incapable of starting a business. To appreciate the factual scenario of the present case it is apposite to reproduce paragraphs 15 and 16 of the defence taken by the tenant which read as under:- 15. The applicant has mentioned her age 65 years in the cause title of the application. Actual age of the applicant is above 67 years. The applicant is suffering from various diseases. She is old and weak. She is unable to do carry on any business. Being old, weak and infirm and due to her illness, she can not do business of transporting. This fact also falsify the case of the applicant. The business of transporting can not be carried on done by old, weak, infirm lady suffering from various diseases and who does not know, cannot write or read either Hindi or English which is common language for business. That the landlord, of the suit accommodation Ramesh Bahadur Kashyap started demanding of enhanced rent @ Rs. 2000.00 per month instead of Rs. 150.00 from the non-applicants father Tarasingh from November 1996. Late Sardar Tarasingh did not agreed to his demands hence he threatened late Tarasingh that he will transfer the house benami in the name of some other person and get the house vacated through benami purchaser and then dispose it on higher value. Late Tarasingh agreed to purchase it for Rs. 16,00,000.00 but Mr. Kashyap demanded more price above Rs. 25,00,000/- (Twenty five lacs) and refused to sell it for Rs. Late Tarasingh agreed to purchase it for Rs. 16,00,000.00 but Mr. Kashyap demanded more price above Rs. 25,00,000/- (Twenty five lacs) and refused to sell it for Rs. 16,00,000.00. The non applicants have been informed that a sham and bogus sale deed has been executed in the name of the applicant by the said Mr. Kashyap showing sale consideration Rs. 4,91,000.00 to evict the non applicants. This fact establishes that the transaction is sham, bogus and benami and has been made with an oblique motive to evict non-applicants. On a plain reading of these two paragraphs it is graphically clear that a stand has been taken assailing the bona fide need of the landlady. True it is, as submitted by Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel, relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, and therefore, question of sham, bogus and benami execution of the sale deed does not arise. Be that as it may, the paragraph 15 puts forth a triable issue before the Rent Controlling Authority and he cannot prejudge the matter and refuse to grant leave. In view of my preceding analysis the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority is set aside and leave is granted to the petitioners to contest the proceedings. Accordingly, the civil revision stands disposed of. As the landlady is a widow the case shall be disposed of by 15th of September, 2000. Order accordingly.