This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 18.6.1994 passed by the learned District Judge, Manipur West, in Civil Appeal Case No. 6 of 1994 confirming the judgment and decree dated 12.9.1991 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge No. 1, Manipur East in Original Suit No.4 of 1993. 2. This case has a chequered history. After a protracted litigation, the suitwas eventually decreed by the learned Subordinate Judge by judgment dated 12.9.1991 whereby the plaintiff was declared to have subsisting title over the suit land and on such findings a decree was passed for recovery of possession by evicting the defendant-appellants. 3. At the very outset, I would like to place on record that in view of the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is not authorised to reappreciate the evidence on record, especially when both the Courts below have rendered concurrent findings on all the issues. In Hari Singh vs. Kanhaiya Lal, (1959)7 SCC 288, the Suprehie Court held as follows : “7. On the question of interference by the High Court in second appeal, its principle stands settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The jurisdiction of Courts in first appeals, second appeals or revisions are'all, to the extent conferred by the Legislature. No litigant possesses any natural or inherent right to appeal against any order, unless a statute confers it and it is to the extent it is conferred. Thus the area to challenge is also hedged by the Legislature hence challenge to the impugned order has to be confined within such limitation. How the Legislature limits such right could be visualised from section 96 and section 100 CPG as it stood prior to the amendment by the Amendment Act, 1976 (104 of 1976^and as it stands after this amendment. ..... 9. Prior to the amendment of section 100 CPG a second appeal^ould have been filed before the High Court on the grounds as set out in clauses (a) to (c) of section100(1), namely, “100. ..... 9. Prior to the amendment of section 100 CPG a second appeal^ould have been filed before the High Court on the grounds as set out in clauses (a) to (c) of section100(1), namely, “100. (1) (a) the,decisipn being cqntrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law of the time being in force, which may possibly have, produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits”. So, the purpose for amending section 100 by the aforesaid mending Act was to further limit the jurisdiction of the High Court. Prior to the amendment the inference could have been where an order is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law. But now it could only be if any substantial question of law arises. The words 'substantial question of law' brought in have significance not superfluous. So now interference cannot be only because the order is contrary to law, but when the disputed issues raise a substantial.question of law. Creation of powers or limitng such powers in the appellate authorities is always a decision based on public policy expressed in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. This pplic,y tirings to finality some issues or a litigation at some point of time. If no appeal is provided, the original order becomes final. Thus it is open for the Legislature to bring finality to the adjudication on question of facts up to the stage of first appeal and limit the second appeal to question of laws or to the substantial question of law or to such other limitation which the Legislature deems fit and proper. Section 100 CPC after the amendflaefit m reproduced below: “100. Second appeal- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded the appeal or any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” Sub-section (3) places an obligation on the appellant to precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. Sub-section (4) confers on the High Court an obligation to formulate the substantial question of law, if it is satisfied that it is involved. Then sub-section (4) confers right on the respondent to urge that no substantial question of law arises. The proviso supplements the discretion to the Court to formulate it some other substantial question of law arises if not formulated. The aforesaid scheme of this section clearly reveals the intent of the Legislature to limit the exercise of power of the High Court under section 100. Thus the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of power by the High Court under this section.” The decision quoted above with regard to the powers of this Court under section 100 CPC make it abundantly clear that the existence of a substantial question of law is the requirement of law for exercising powers by this Court under section 100 CPC. 4. This Court while admitting the appeal by the order dated 9.11.1994 formulated the following question as substantial question of law: “Whether the plaintiff can succeed on the point admitted by the defendant. The appellant is also at liberty to urge any substantial question of law at the time of hearing this appeal.” 5. 4. This Court while admitting the appeal by the order dated 9.11.1994 formulated the following question as substantial question of law: “Whether the plaintiff can succeed on the point admitted by the defendant. The appellant is also at liberty to urge any substantial question of law at the time of hearing this appeal.” 5. The answer to the above question as to whether a plaintiff can succeed on the admission of the defendant is partly available in Order IX Rule 8 of CPC which allows a Court to pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission. I have examined the judgments of both the Courts below and I find that the Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding on all the issues after a thread bare discussion of the evidence - both oral and documentary. The decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and confirmed by the learned first appellate Court on the face of it shows that it was not passed on admission made by the defendants-appellants. Therefore, the question formulated-at the time of admission of the appeal by no means can be termed as a substantial question of law. 6. Mr. Ng. Premkumar, learned counsel for the appellants strenuously endeavoured to project certain matters as substantial question of law. I would, therefore like to deal with those matters essentially for the purpose of ascertaining whether-any of such matter can be rationally proposed as a substantial question of law. Before that, I would-like to record the facts of the case in brief for better appreciation of the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants. 7. The respondents filed the aforesaid suit for recovery of possession on the basis of title by removing the unauthorised construction of kutcha hut etc made by the appellants. There is an averment in the plaint to the effect that the respondent is the absolute owner of the suit land described in Schedule A to the plaint and, taking advantage of his intermittent absence, the defendants encroached upon the land and constructed the kutcha hut with thatch roof described in Schedule B. The respondent could come to know of it on 11th February, 1983 and requested the appellants to vacate the land. On refusal, he filed the suit for eviction of the defendant-appellants. 8. On refusal, he filed the suit for eviction of the defendant-appellants. 8. The defendant No.1 is the father of defendant No.2 and they filed separate written statements setting forth the defence that they are in possession of the suit land in exercise of proprietary possessory right for more than 14 years. According to them, the suit land was originally owned and possessed by T. Manikchand who was looked after and taken care of by the defendants. On his death in 1967, the defendant No, 1 has taken physical possession of the suit land and since then the defendants arc in uninterrupted hostile possession beyond the period of 12 years. The defence case essentially is of acquisition of title by adverse possession. 9. Mr. Ng. Premkumar, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the identity of the suit land has been in dispute and the Sale Deed Ext A/3 which the Courts below relied upon as source of title of the respondents is not relatable to the suit land. It is needless to say that the question relating to identity of a particular land is not a question of law but of fact. Both the Courts below after elaborate discussion of this point came to the conclusion that Annexure A3 is the Sale Deed by which the plaintiff purchased the suit land. According to them, this document is relatable to the suit land. The concurrent findings have been recorded with reference to both documentary and oral evidence. That apart, the appellants in their written statement did not challenge the identity of the land in any manner whatsoever. Their plea that they have acquired title by adverse possession is sufficient indication that there is no dispute as to the identity of the land. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants further argued that this document Annexure A3 has been admitted in evidence under provisions of section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act and that the contents thereof cannot be read in evidence unless proved by supporting evidence. A document 30 years old and produced from proper custody is a proof of its execution. Section 90 permits a Court to presume a document, 30 years old, as genuine and allows it to be admitted without formal proof. It is a matter of discretion and once the discretion is exercised by the trial Court, the appellate Court shall not interfere except on overwhelming reasons. Section 90 permits a Court to presume a document, 30 years old, as genuine and allows it to be admitted without formal proof. It is a matter of discretion and once the discretion is exercised by the trial Court, the appellate Court shall not interfere except on overwhelming reasons. How does the admission of this document and reading of its' contents in evidence emerge as a substantial question of law is not understood. In my opinion, the argument that it raises a substantial question of law is of no significance. 8 11. The learned counsel for the appellants further argued that the Courts below rejected certain documents tendered by the appellants. He has drawn my attention to a number of orders passed in miscellaneous petitions filed by the appellants before the first appellate Court. I have perused the records of those miscellaneous cases and I find that these were filed before remand of the suit by the learned District Judge. After remand, the defendants-appellants had the opportunity to tender these documents in evidence and, in fact, some of the documents have been tendered in evidence. If there was any improper rejection of any document, the appellants could have approached the higher Courts either on appeal or revision, as the case may be. At this belated stage, the appellants cannot be permitted to reopen those questions. That apart, the learned counsel could not point out a single document rejected by the Courts below which would have reversed the decision. 12. In my opinion, no substantial question of law can be formulated out of this submission. Provisions of section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot , be invoked to salvage the situation for the appellants and remand the case back again for no significant purpose. This view is also applicable with regard to the submission that his prayer for amendment of the pleadings was rejected by the Court below. Rejection of a prayer for amendment not controverted under provisions of the Code at the appropriate moment cannot be banked upon at a later stage to frustrate a decree passed by the Court. 13. The dispute as emerges is very simple in nature. The defendant-appellants asserted title by adverse possession. The burden is obviously upon the defendant appellants to prove that they have acquired title over the disputed land by uninterrupted hostile possession for a period beyond 12 years. 13. The dispute as emerges is very simple in nature. The defendant-appellants asserted title by adverse possession. The burden is obviously upon the defendant appellants to prove that they have acquired title over the disputed land by uninterrupted hostile possession for a period beyond 12 years. This is undoubtedly a question of fact, and both the Courts below have in details dealt with the evidence on this point. Their concurrent finding is that the appellants have failed to establish hostile possession for a period beyond 12 years. This Court is not required to reappreciate the evidence on this point. In a suit where a defendant asserts title by adverse possession in respect of a plot of land, there cannot be any doubt that the defendant has any confusion about the identity of the land. That apart, assertion of title by adverse possession also amounts to admission of title of the adversary. The Courts below also concurrently held transfer of title by the Sale Deed Ext A/3 executed by Tobnal Devi, a co-pattadar. Besides, the original respondent late T. Mani Singh was the brother of the admitted owner late Manikchand. The defendant No. 1 is the son of another predeceased brother of Mgnikchand. T. Mani Singh survived Manikchand while the father of defendant No. 1 predeceased him. From that point of view, it is the respondents who appear to have better claim of title over the disputed land. It is not the Sale Deed (Ext A/ 3) alone which prevailed upon the Courts below to conclude that the respondents are the owners of the suit land. The Courts below also considered and found the respondents as the lawful owners of the suit land on the death of his brother Manikchand, who died intestate. On overall consideration, I do not find any inconsistency in the concurrent decision rendered by the Courts below. The question relating to title and its extinction by adverse possession have been dealt with in minute details with reference to the evidence on record. In my considered opinion, there is no room for interference with the impugned judgment. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a number ofdecisions of the Apex Court in order to bring home the points urged by him. In my considered opinion, there is no room for interference with the impugned judgment. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a number ofdecisions of the Apex Court in order to bring home the points urged by him. He has relied upon AIR 1954 SC 526 ; AIR 1951 SC 193 ; AIR 1982 NOC 185 (Rajasthan); AIR 1987 SC 1242 ; AIR 1981 Allahabad; AIR 1984 Orissa 88; AIR 1982 Allahabad 503; AIR 1992 SC 1604 and 1997 (III) GLT 511 Munindra Deb Barma vs. Aurabinda Paul. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Singh (supra) and the factual matrix of the case as discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, I do not consider that the decisions relied upon be dealt with at length specially when the evidence relatable to the pleadings admit of no ambiguity and confusion. 15. Mr. A. Nilamani, learned senior counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SC 1549 to show that the question relating to adverse possession is not a substantial question of law. In addition, he has also relied upon AIR 1999 SC 2203 and AIR 1999 SC 2213 . The decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned senior counsel reiterate the established principle of law with regard to adverse possession and substantial question of law. I do not think that reproduction of the said decisions is necessary for the purpose ofadjudication of the question at hand. 16. The factual matrix of the case, the evidence on record and the points raised during the course of argument on evaluation do not inspire this Court to formulate any question as the substantial question of law for the purpose of this appeal. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of merit has to be dismissed. 17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Considering the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.