JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J.:- The plaintiff-bank has filed the present suit against the two defendants for the recovery of Rs.5, 87,883/- under Order 34, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Defendant No. 1, Messres You Amm Steel Fabrication Industry, is a sole proprietorship concern of which the defendant No. 2 is the sole proprietor. The defendants on 6.12.1995 were granted a cash credit limit for working capital requirements to the tune of Rs.4, 80,000/- carrying interest at the rate of Rs.17.75% per annum with quarterly rests. Al the necessary documents including demand promissory note were executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff-Bank. Defendant No. 2 also created an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff-bank by deposit of his title deeds in respect of plot No. 33, Industrial Area, Shamshi, District Kullu, for the purpose of securing the repayment of loan. Having availed of the loan, the defendants failed to repay the same inspite of repeated demands and registered notice. As on the date of" suit a sum of Rs.5, 87,883/- was due from the defendants. 3. The defendants while resisting the suit admitted the execution of the documents pertaining to the loan. It has been leaded that in pursuance of execution of these documents no amount of loan was either paid to them or released in their favour. No consideration for such documents ever passed on to them. Rate and claim of interest was also denied. The liability for payment of the suit amount was further denied. Objections were further raised to the maintainability of the suit and that the suit has not been filed through a duly authorised and competent person. 4. In its replication, it has been pleaded by the plaintiff-bank that the defendants were earlier on 2.9.1987 granted cash credit facility to the extent of Rs.3,50,000/-. The outstanding amount of such loan as on 6.12.1995 was to the tune of Rs.4, 80,000/-, the defendants were not able to repay the same. Besides, the quarantors S/Sh. B.N. Sharma, Urbi Dass Mahant and Smt. Phulan Sharma had express 8 desire to withdraw their guarantees. Therefore, at the request of the defendants the previous loan account was closed and the outstanding amount of such loan was treated as consideration of the loan sanctioned in favour of the defendants on 6.12.1995 when fresh documents came to be executed. B.N. Sharma, Urbi Dass Mahant and Smt. Phulan Sharma had express 8 desire to withdraw their guarantees. Therefore, at the request of the defendants the previous loan account was closed and the outstanding amount of such loan was treated as consideration of the loan sanctioned in favour of the defendants on 6.12.1995 when fresh documents came to be executed. Defendant No. 2 had also executed an undertaking in this regard on the same day. The loan sanctioned on 6.12.1995 was, therefore, for consideration. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on 20.10.1998:- 1. Whether the suit has not been filed by a competent person? If so, its effect? OPD - 2. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD. 3. Whether the alleged documents executed on 6.12.1995 including the promissoy note are without consideration and, if so, its effect? OPD. 4. Relief. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. My findings on the above issues are as under :- Issue No. 1 7. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff-bank through its Branch Manager Shri R.K. Batta, in his capacity of being the principal officer of the bank. 8. It has been held by this court in State Bank of India v. Messrs Himalaya Spun Pipes & Ors., Civil Suit No. 39 of 1997, decided on 15.11.1999, that a branch manager of the State Bank of India is competent to institute a suit for and on behalf of the Bank under regulations 76 and 77 of the State Bank of India General Regulations, 1955. 9. The present suit, therefore, having been filed through the branch manager, has thus been filed through a competent person. The issue is decided against the defendants. Issue No. 3 10. Defendant No. 2, while appearing as his own witness as DW1 has categorically admitted the execution of the loan documents Ex. PB to PH. The case of the defendants is that since no consideration passed on to the defendants, all these documents including the promissory note Ex. PG are without consideration and as such they are not liable. 11. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff-bank is that the defendants were earlier on 2.9.1987 granted a loan in the form of cash credit limit to the extent of Rs. 3,50,000/-. PG are without consideration and as such they are not liable. 11. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff-bank is that the defendants were earlier on 2.9.1987 granted a loan in the form of cash credit limit to the extent of Rs. 3,50,000/-. Such loan amount could not be repaid by the defendants. The outstanding amount under this loan as on 6.12.1995 was to the tune of Rs.4,80,000/-. Since the defendants, were not in a position to repay the same, at their request the limit of cash credit facility was enhanced to Rs.4,80,000/- and the outstanding amount of previous loan was treated as consideration of the loan dated 6.12.1995 by closing the previous loan account. 12. The defendant No. 2 as DW 1 has admitted to the following :- "I was availing a cash credit limit of Rs.3,50,000/- from the plaintiff-bank, Kullu Branch since 1987. The amount in respect of the said cash credit limit has not been repaid by me till date." 13. He has also categorically admitted the execution of the undertaking Ex. PA. This undertaking was executed on 6.12.1995, that is, the day on which loan documents Ex. PB to PH were executed. Vide this undertaking Ex PA defendants have admitted that the fresh documents on 6.12.1995 were executed in lieu of the outstanding amount in respect of the previous loan sanctioned in their favour on 2.9.1987. They also under took to liquidate the entire outstanding amount by monthly instalments of Rs.5000/- each. 14. The term "consideration" has been defined under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as under :- "When at the desire of the promissor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise." 15. In the present case, as stated above, the defendants admittedly was granted loan on 2.9.1987 to the extent of Rs.3,50,000/-. The outstanding amount of this loan as on 6.12.1995 was Rs.4,80,000/-, as is evident from the copy of the ledger Ex. PW l/J-2. This outstanding amount is shown to have been paid and account closed on 6.12.1995 on which date fresh documents were executed and a new loan account was opened. The outstanding amount of this loan as on 6.12.1995 was Rs.4,80,000/-, as is evident from the copy of the ledger Ex. PW l/J-2. This outstanding amount is shown to have been paid and account closed on 6.12.1995 on which date fresh documents were executed and a new loan account was opened. The consideration for the loan dated 6.12.1995 was, therefore, the outstanding amount of the previous loan. Defendant No. 2 as DW1 has admitted that the outstanding amount of previous loan was not paid by him. 16. A contention was raised by the defendants that since loan documents Ex. PB to PH recite the payment of loan amount to the defendants on 6.12.1995, past consideration of the previous loan cannot be looked into. 17. There is no force in the contention raised on behalf of the defendants. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not prohibit the disproof of a recital in a document as to the consideration by showing that the actual consideration was something different to that alleged. It is always open to a party to establish by evidence that the consideration was really different from the consideration recited in the deed. 18. Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, past consideration is good as present consideration or future consideration and a transaction cannot be held to be not supported by consideration if the consideration for the transaction was a past one. 19. Vide undertaking, Ex. PA, the defendants have admitted their past liability and the execution of Ex. PB to PH in lieu thereof. Therefore, it cannot be said that the documents Ex. PB to PH executed on 6.12.1995 are without consideration. The issue is decided against the defendants. Issue No. 2 20. While objecting to the maintainability of the present suit, the defendants in para 3 of their written statement has averred :- "......Since no consideration was paid either through cheque, cash, bank draft on 6.12.1995 and as such the execution of the alleged documents became meaningless and not binding upon the replying defendant and as such the suit filed by the Bank on the basis of the alleged documents is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed." 21. It has been held under issue No. 3 above that the documents Ex. PB to PH were executed for consideration and as such binding on the defendants. The suit, therefore, is maintainable in the present form. It has been held under issue No. 3 above that the documents Ex. PB to PH were executed for consideration and as such binding on the defendants. The suit, therefore, is maintainable in the present form. The issue is decided against the defendants. Relief. 22. As a result, a preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 2, read with rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, for a sum of Rs.5, 87,883/- with costs is passed in favour of the plaintiff-bank and against the defendants jointly and severally. 23. In so far as the question of grant of pendente lite and future interest in concerned, the Honble Supreme Court in KM. Veerappa v. Canara Bank & Ors., 1998(1) S.L.J. 512, that the provisions contained in Section 34, Code of Civil Procedure, are not applicable to the suits filed under Order 34 Code of Civil Procedure and that the grant of interest in such cases shall be governed by rule 11 of the said Order. It has! further been held that under Order 34 Rule 11, it is not obligatory on the part of the Court while passing a preliminary decree to require payment at the contractual rate of interest from the date of suit till the date fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of the amount A discretion is vested in the Court so far as pendente lite and subsequent interest is concerned. 24. On the fact and in the circumstances of the case and following the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the above referred to case the plaintiff-Bank is allowed pendente lite and future interest on the decretal amount, which is taken as principal amount, at the simple rate of 17.75% per annum from the date of suit, that is 16.12.1997 till 30.9.2000 or actual date of payment, whichever is earlier. It is, therefore, directed that :- (a) The defendant shall pay into the court the amount as under by 30.9.2000 :- (i) Principal decretal amount of Rs.5,87,883/-; (ii) Costs of the suit as determined/assessed in the preliminary decree; (iii)The amount of pendente lite and future interest at the simple rate of 17.75% per annum on the amount at (i) above from the date of suit, that is, 16.12.1997 till the date of payment or 30.9.2000, whichever is earlier. (b) On the amount being so paid by the defendants, the plaintiff-Bank shall deliver up to the defendant No. 2 or his authorised agent, all documents in its possession or power relating to the mortgaged land, and the plaintiff-Bank shall, if so required, retransfer the mortgage land to the defendant No. 2 at his cost free from mortgage and from all encumbrances, if any, created by the plaintiff-Bank or any person , .claiming under it and also, if necessary, put the defendant No. 2 in possession of such land. (c) If payment of the amounts as determined and directed to be paid under (a) above is not made by the defendants on or before the date fixed above, the plaintiff-Bank shall be entitled to apply for a final decree debarring the defendants from all right to redeem the mortgaged land and while doing so the plaintiff-Sank may also apply for grant of interest for period after 30.9.2000 upto the date of actual realisation of the amount as provided for under clause (b) of rule 11 of Order 34, Code of Civil Procedure.