G. P. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT Smt, Ratan Bala Yadav was appointed as Assistant Teacher in C. T. Grade in the vacancy of Smt. Ranjana Srivastava and approval to this short term ad hoc appointment was granted by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools on 18. 2. 1982. She continued to work as assistant Teacher till 31. 3. 86 whereafter the management discontinued her services. She filed writ petition No. 12026 of 1986 which was decided on 26. 2. 97 and a direction was issued to the dios, Kanpur to examine the matter and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the DIOS passed an order on 6. 5. 97 holding that the appellant is entitled to continue in institution and to get her salary. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the dios the Committee of Management filed writ petition No. 33093 of 1997 which was allowed by a learned Single Judge on 4. 1. 2000 and the orders passed by the DIOS dated 6. 5. 97 and 7. 8. 1997 were quashed. The present special appeal has been filed by Smt. Ratan Bala Yadav challenging the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge. ( 2 ) SRI Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 33-B of U. P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and was entitled to continue in the institution as a regular assistant Teacher. In our opinion the contention raised has no substance. It is not in dispute that the appellant was appointed as Assistant Teacher on a short term vacancy on account of the fact that the regular teacher Smt. Ranjana Srivastava had taken leave. The Regional Inspectress of girls Schools had accorded approval only to her short term appointment in the leave vacancy by the order dated 18. 10. 1982. Smt. Ranjana Srivastava resigned from her post on 11. 12. 1984 and the result whereof was that the aforesaid short-term vacancy got converted into a substantive vacancy. She no-doubt continued to work till 31. 3. 86 and thereafter the management stopped taking work from her. It has been held by a Full Bench in Dr. 10. 1982. Smt. Ranjana Srivastava resigned from her post on 11. 12. 1984 and the result whereof was that the aforesaid short-term vacancy got converted into a substantive vacancy. She no-doubt continued to work till 31. 3. 86 and thereafter the management stopped taking work from her. It has been held by a Full Bench in Dr. Pramila Misra v. Deputy Director education, 1992 UPLBEC 1329, that a teacher appointed on a short term vacancy can not claim any right to continue if the vacancy gets converted into a substantive vacancy. Therefore, after the resignation of Smt. Ranjana Srivastava the appellant had no right to continue as Assistant teacher in the institution. Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 33-B of the Act reads as follows : "clause (c) has been continuously serving the institution from the date of such appointment up to the date of commencement of the Act, referred to in Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a ). " ( 3 ) THE date of the commencement of the Act is 7. 8. 1993. It is not in dispute that the appellant did not work in the institution after 31. 3. 1986 and thus she was not working in the institution on the date of commencement of Section 33-B of the Act namely 7. 8. 1993. Therefore, she was not at all entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid provision and she can not claim regularisation on its basis. ( 4 ) SRI Khare has submitted that if the termination of service of the appellant on 31. 3. 86 was invalid, it will be deemed that she continued in service and she will be entitled to the benefit of section 33-B of the Act. In support of this submission he has relied upon a decision rendered in smt. Goyal v. Vice Chancellor, (1995) 3 UPLBEC 1931. In our opinion the authority cited by learned Counsel is clearly distinguishable as it dealt with the provisions of Sections 31-A to 33-C of U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act and Removal of Difficulty Order, 1982. In support of this submission he has relied upon a decision rendered in smt. Goyal v. Vice Chancellor, (1995) 3 UPLBEC 1931. In our opinion the authority cited by learned Counsel is clearly distinguishable as it dealt with the provisions of Sections 31-A to 33-C of U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act and Removal of Difficulty Order, 1982. It is noteworthy that in Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala, Kanpur v. Sri Kumar tiwari, 1997 Allahabad Law Report 208 (SC), the Apex Court while considering the same provision namely Section 33-B of the Act held that a teacher continuing on the basis of a stay order passed by the High Court would not be entitled to get the benefit of regularisation. In the case in hand, it is admitted that the appellant has not been working in the institution after 31. 3. 86. Generally a law relating to regularisation of services is enacted for the benefit of those who have been appointed de hors the rules or on short term basis but have continuously worked for a long period of time and are actually in service on the date of enforcement of such a law. In the present case the appellant ceased to be in employment nearly seven and half years before the commencement of the Act whose benefit she wants to take. ( 5 ) THE order passed by the D10s on 6. 5. 1997 cannot be sustained on an other ground. Civil misc. Writ Petition No. 12026 of 1986 was decided on 26. 2. 1997 with the following directions : "in the aforesaid back ground, as such facts are to be ascertained and presumption drawn from the approval letter as Annexure-1 to the writ petition is also to be confirmed, I dispose of the present writ petition directing the respondent No. 2 to consider and decide the matter and to find out as to whether the vacancy against which petitioner was appointed was really a short term vacancy and whether petitioner is such appointment was with due approval by the appropriate authority in respect of any period which entitled the petitioner to the benefit of confirmation by virtue of the provisions of law applicable and respondent No. 2 will decide the matter within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order in accordance with law. The respondent No. 2 will also consider whether the appointment of the petitioner was in accordance with law as considered in the case of Km. Radha Raizada v. Committee of management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College, Allahabad and Ors. , 1994 (2) ESC 345 (All) (FB ). " ( 6 ) THE order of DIOS shows that he did not at all examine the question whether the appointment of the appellant was in accordance with law as laid down in the case of Kumari Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, 1994 (2) ESC 345 (All) (FB ). It was the case of the Committee of management that the appointment of the appellant had been made as a local interim arrangement without following the prescribed procedure. This fact was not disputed by the appellant in the counter-affidavit filed on her behalf in the writ petition. On the contrary she pleaded that the management is estopped from pleading any infirmity in her initial appointment. Therefore, she did not seriously challenge the assertion of the Committee of Management that her appointment had not been made in accordance with the prescribed procedure. In fact she did not give any detail as to how her appointment was made. The order passed on 26. 2. 97 in writ petition No. 12026 of 1986 has become final and is binding on the parties. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for the DIOS to have examined the validity of the appointment of the petitioner in the light of the law laid down in the case of Kumari Radha Raizada (supra), which he did not do. Sri khare has also urged that subsequently it has been held by a Division Bench that the law laid down in Km. Radha Raizada (supra), with regard to advertisement of the vacancy in a news paper while making appointment on a short term vacancy should be treated as prospective in nature. In this connection it may be observed that the order dated 26. 2. 97 having been passed in the writ petition filed by the appellant herself, it is binding upon the parties and the DIOS had to examine here appointment strictly in accordance with the directions in the aforesaid order. Therefore, it was obligatory upon the DIOS to have examined her appointment in the light of the law laid down in Km. Radha Raizada (supra ). Therefore, it was obligatory upon the DIOS to have examined her appointment in the light of the law laid down in Km. Radha Raizada (supra ). The order of the DIOS is completely silent in this regard. In fact he did not at all consider the relevant aspect of the matter and after referring to some circulars of the department passed the operative portion of the order in favour of the appellant. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the order passed by the DIOS is wholly erroneous and the appellant is not entitled to regularisation under Section 33-B of the Act. ( 7 ) THE special appeal lacks merit and is dismissed summarily at the admission stage. .