VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. ( 1 ) THE plaint contains several prayers, inter alia, for the passing of a decree ofpossession of the property in suit. This prayer is available to the Plaintiff if the monthlyrent of the suit premises is in excess of Rs. 3500. 00. and if the tenancy has been validlyterminated. The allegations in the plaint are that the period of lease had expired on31. 8. 1995 but that Defendant No. 2 continued to occupy the premises even thereafter. Hence the tenancy of the Defendants had been terminated vide notice dated 2. 3. 1998,the receipt of which is admitted by the Defendants. In para 8 of the its Writtenstatement the Defendants have pleaded inter alia, as follows: "that the contents of para No. 8 of the plaint are wrong and denied. It iswrong that tenancy was terminated or no reply to the notice dated 2/03/1998 was given by the defendants. It is submitted that a detailed reply to thesaid notice was, duly sent by the defendant through speed post dated23. 4. 1998.-That even otherwise it is respectfully submitted that notices issued by theplaintiff stand waived by express and also impleaded consent of plaintiffno. 1. The plaintiff renewed the lease and agreed that the defendant cancontinue to use the leased premises for further period w. e. f. August 1997. Further even after, issued of the said notice the plaintiff has accepted therentals from the defendant including Pay Order No. 026649 drawn on HDFCBank Ltd. for Rs. 60. 000. 00 towards the rent up to 30/06/1998. Having thusaccepted the rent the plaintiff has waived the rent the plaintiff has waived thenotice. Hence the present suit is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed". ( 2 ) WITH regard to the prayer for a decree of possession, on a holistic reading of thewritten Statement, it would be fair to hold the Defendant had made an admission withregard io the receipt of notice as well as its legality. Two defences have been putforward, (a) that the lease had been renewed and (b) that the notice had beenwaived. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff has vehemently and vociferously argued theprayer for the passing of a decree of possession under Order XII, Rule 6 ismisconceived because no admissions have been made which would warrant orjustify the grant of this relief. Two defences have been putforward, (a) that the lease had been renewed and (b) that the notice had beenwaived. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff has vehemently and vociferously argued theprayer for the passing of a decree of possession under Order XII, Rule 6 ismisconceived because no admissions have been made which would warrant orjustify the grant of this relief. He has submitted that a detailed denial of thesestatements has not been made by the Plaintiff in its Replication. On this failure,sections 17 and 31 of the Evidence Act are attracted and this being so a trial isnecessary. It is his submission that the estoppel which has come into effect could onlybe dispelled by the Plaintiff leading and adducing evidence to controvert the standadopted by the Defendant. Learned counsel further argues that the details furnishedby the Plaintiff in its Rejoinder to the Defendant s Reply cannot be taken intoconsideration since these details should have been incorporated in the Replicationitself. Learned counsel further submits that a discretion is vested in the Court underorder X l l Rule 6 and it is not an automatic progression that a Decree will follow evenwhere admission have been made. Order XII Rule 6 reads as under :- "6. Judgment on admission.- (1) Where admissions of fact have been madeeither in the. pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court mayat any stage of the suit, either on the application of any part or of its ownmotion and without waiting for the determination of any other questionbetween the parties, make such order or given such judgment as it may thinkfit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced underjsub-rule (1) a decree shall bedrawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the dateon which the judgment was pronounced. (emphasis supplied) ( 3 ) THESE provisions make it abundantly clear that if admission of facts have beenmade, the Court can pass such orders and give such judgment as it may think fit. having regard to the admissions. In granting the decree for possession what isexpected to be proved by the Plaintiff? Where the tenancy is governed by theprovisions of Transfer of Property Act, a tenancy come to an end either by efflux oftime or by the issuance of notice to quit if the circumstances so allow. having regard to the admissions. In granting the decree for possession what isexpected to be proved by the Plaintiff? Where the tenancy is governed by theprovisions of Transfer of Property Act, a tenancy come to an end either by efflux oftime or by the issuance of notice to quit if the circumstances so allow. Even if thereceipt of a notice is not in dispute, it is open to the Defendant/tenant to show that it isnot in consonance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Where no suchobjections have been taken, the legitimacy and legality of the notice to quit wouldstand admitted. In the present case this is the admission which the plaintiff seeks torely on, and in my view rightly so. The only illegality which is sought to be broughtforward by the Defendant is that the lease was renewed "for further period with effectfrom August 1997". Taken at its face value this pleading amounts to an admissionthat post August 1997 a tenancy from month to month had come into effect. Thelegality of the notice to quit could have been assailed if it had been pleaded that therenewal was for a period which would have expired after the issuance of the legalnotice to quit. In such a case unless there was a breach of any of the covenantsbetween the party, thereby enabling and empowering the landlord to determine andterminate the lease, which breach was cifically dealt with in the notice to quit, it wouldnot be open to the landlord/plaintiff to rely on such notice. There is no pleading to thiseffect and, therefore, I am satisfied that an admission as to the legality of the notice toquit must be read into the Written Statement. It would be too pedantic an approach tomaintain that an admission can only be considered to have been made where aparticular party specifically agrees to the correctness of a statement made in pleadingsby the opposite party. The admission must be drawn from the totality of thecircumstances of the case; the Court is not powerless to review the entire defencepresented in the written Statement. It is only in those instances where, from otherattendant facts the Court is of the view that despite the existence of admissionstriable issue have arisen, that its discretion should be exercised. There would be nojustified for the exercise of discretionary powers where no triable issues havearisen. It is only in those instances where, from otherattendant facts the Court is of the view that despite the existence of admissionstriable issue have arisen, that its discretion should be exercised. There would be nojustified for the exercise of discretionary powers where no triable issues havearisen. ( 4 ) I will now deal with the plea of waiver. This is necessary in considering anyapplication under Order XII, Rule 6, because the plea of waiver would tantamount to achallenge to the continued legality of the notice to quit and its efficacy forpronouncement of a decree for possession. If no such plea is taken then it wouldamount to an admission. In this context, to argue that consequence decree forpossession could not follow, learned counsel for the Defendant has stated that thisplea having been raised, can only be appropriately dealt with after evidence isadduced. However, evidence can be permitted only where there is a pleadingjustifying the leading of evidence. It is impermissible to allow evidence to be led in theabsence of pleadings. I have already reproduced para 8 of the Written Statementwhich contain a plea of waiver which is predicated on the acceptance by the Plaintiffof pay Order No. 026649 drawn on HDFC Bank Limited for Rs. 60,000. 00 towards therent upto 30. 6. 1998. The pleadings of the Defendant have already been extractedabove. The explanation given by the Plaintiff is contained in paragraph 2 of its reply tothe Preliminary Objections and reads as follows: "with respect to para 2 of the Preliminary Submission it is submitted that thetenancy was terminated vide notice dated 2. 3. 1998. It is denied that therehas been any agreement tor further lease or any renewal of tenancy at alt. The defendant has deliberately not given the dates of the drafts and whenthey were given in order to create confusion. The plaintiffs have not acceptedany money at all from the defendant after issue of said notice of terminationdated 2. 3. 1998. The defendant had given a cheque for Rs. 1,45,000. 00 dated5. 6. 1997 towards arrears of rent. This cheque was dishonoured and towardsthe said cheque the defendant paid, Rs. 60,000. 00 vide Pay Order No. 123913dated 2. 9. 1997 drawn on State Bank of Swarashtra which was deposited byplaintiff on 4. 9. 1997 and another pay order No. 026649 drawn on HDFCBank dated 18. 11. 1997 which was deposited on 19. 11. 97 by plaintiff. This cheque was dishonoured and towardsthe said cheque the defendant paid, Rs. 60,000. 00 vide Pay Order No. 123913dated 2. 9. 1997 drawn on State Bank of Swarashtra which was deposited byplaintiff on 4. 9. 1997 and another pay order No. 026649 drawn on HDFCBank dated 18. 11. 1997 which was deposited on 19. 11. 97 by plaintiff. Thesaid drafts were towards the dishonoured cheque. It is specifically deniedthat any draft was given for advance rent in November, 1997 or accepted bythe Plaintiffs for any period after the notice of termination. Notice dated2. 3. 1998 is neither vexatious nor bogus etc. as alleged. The terminationnotice has been served on the defendant, and duly replied by the defendants. There is no waiver of notice at all because the payment is prior to notice andnot after notice, and further it was for arrears of rent. It is denied thatapplication is false, baseless or frivolous as alleged. "( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the said Pay Order wasdated 21. 11. 1997 and that this dated had deliberately and dishonestly withheld fromthe pleadings of the Defendant for obvious reasons. These reasons are that thispayments as received much before the issuance of the legal notice dated 2. 3. 1998and in respect of rent due prior to March 1998. It would, therefore, obviously notoperate as a waiver of that notice. It has not been pleaded that rent has beentendered in any other manner, even after the receipt of the notice dated 2. 3. 1998. Even if a bald assertion had been made in this regard, the Court is not powerless to look into the surrounding circumstances to see whether this was only a plea calculatedto protract and prolong the litigation. In the present case, however, this exercise doesnot lead inexorably and unmistakingly to this conclusion, since the Defendants caseis that the waiver was in terms of the Pay Order No. 026649. As already mentionedabove this would be clearly an anachronism, in as much as the Pay Order predatesthe notice. Furthermore, if the argument of the learned counsel for the Defendant isaccepted, it would result in the anomalous position that whilst the pleadings of thedefendant is substantiation of its plea of waiver are allowed to be sketchy and bereftof necessary and requisite detail, the Plaintiff s explanatory pleadings containing thenecessary details would have to be ignored. Furthermore, if the argument of the learned counsel for the Defendant isaccepted, it would result in the anomalous position that whilst the pleadings of thedefendant is substantiation of its plea of waiver are allowed to be sketchy and bereftof necessary and requisite detail, the Plaintiff s explanatory pleadings containing thenecessary details would have to be ignored. The failure of the Defendant to plead fullparticulars cannot be countenanced, it is palpably clear that the Defendant hasdeliberately made vague pleadings in order to mislead the Court. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Defendant had relied on a decision of my learnedbrother J. B. Goel, J. in Kanta Manocha Vs. M/s. Hindustan Paper Corpn. , 1998 VAD (Delhi) 486 and M/s. Simla Wholesale Mart. , Vs. M/s. Baishnodas Kishorilal Bhalla and others, AIR 1997 HP 29. Having perused these decision I am of theview that they have no application. to the facts of the present case. ( 7 ) HAVING considered the submissions made before me I am satisfied that, on acomplete and meaningful reading of the Written Statement, there is an admission ofthe receipt of the notice to quit. There is a further admission as to its legality becauseno triable issues have been raised in the challenge thereto. Merely because apalpably false case has been set up, in the present circumstances relating to thewaiver of the notice, it would not lead to the consequence that a judgment should not be passed. Failure to plead facts which constitute a valid defence, must be read asadmissions made as contemplated by Rule VI of Order 12. To hold otherwise wouldbe an emasculation of judicial powers to dispense complete justice. Justice delayedis justice denied. ( 8 ) IN these circumstances the application is allowed and a decree of possession ispassed in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in respect of the first floorof property bearing No. C-52, Soami Nagar, New Delhi-110017, comprising threebedrooms with attached bathrooms, drawing/dining, kitchen and family lounge. Theplaintiff shall be entitled to Rs. 5000. 00 as costs.