Grand Bazar Partnership Firm v. Padmashali Seva Samajam Trust, Secunderabad
2000-07-04
Y.V.NARAYANA
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
Y. V. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision preferred by the petitioner-tenant against the order of the chief Judge, City Small Causes Court dated 10-12-1996 passed in R. A. No. 223 of 1993 confirming the order of eviction passed in r. C. No. 450 of 1985 on the file of the additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad. ( 2 ) FACTS leading to the filing of this revision petition are briefly set out as hereunder: The respondent-landlord herein filed the eviction petition under section 10 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960 (Act 15 of 1960) (for short "the act") against the petitioner-tenant seeking eviction of the petitioner from the premises bearing No. 2-12-66/3/4/5 situate at Nehru nagar, West Marredpally, Secunderabad on the ground of wilful default. It is the case of the respondent-landlord that the petitioner-tenant was irregular in payment of rent and he was due in a sum of Rs. 2,000-00 for the period from 1-6-1985 to the end of October 1985 for five months and failed to pay the same in spite of repeated demands. The petitioner-tenant resisted the petition and denied the allegation of wilful default and contended that it was the practice of the respondent-landlord to come and collect the rent from him and since the respondent-landlord failed to collect the rent for the month of June 1985 it was sent by M. O. and the same was returned and subsequently the petitioner-tenant sent a draft for rs. 1,200-00 which was not encashed and the respondent-land lord filed R. C. No. 450 of 1985 for eviction. The trial Court addressed itself to the issue of maintainability of the eviction petition by the President of the land-trust and whether the tenant committed wilful default. The trial Court based on oral and documentary evidence has held that the eviction petition is maintainable and that the petitioner-tenant committed wilful default. The tenant carried the matter in appeal and the appellate Court confirmed the order of the trial Court in R. A. No. 223 of 1993 by its order dated 10-12-1996. Hence the present revision petition by the petitioner-tenant. ( 3 ) SRI K. Subrahmanya Reddi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-tenant confined his arguments to the issue of wilful default and contended that there is no wilful default on the part of the petitioner-tenant.
Hence the present revision petition by the petitioner-tenant. ( 3 ) SRI K. Subrahmanya Reddi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-tenant confined his arguments to the issue of wilful default and contended that there is no wilful default on the part of the petitioner-tenant. He submitted that it was the practice for the respondent-landlord to come and collect the rent from the petitioner-tenant and used to pass receipt. Since the landlord did not come to collect the rent for June 1985, the rent of rs. 600-00 was sent by M. O. on 10-7-1985 (Ex. R. 3) which was refused and once again rs. 1200-00 was sent by cheque. The landlord without encashing the cheque filed eviction petition on the ground of wilful default. It is also contended that the landlord is having three months rent as advance. In short, it is the contention of the petitioner-tenant that there is no wilful default. ( 4 ) SRI M. V. Ramana Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord has contended that this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act may not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact given by both the Courts below. The learned senior Counsel further contended that non-payment of rent by the revision petitioner-tenant is apparent from the record and no explanation is forthcoming for non-payment of rent even after filing the eviction petition. He drew my attention to the filing of I. A. No. 124 of 1989 for recovery of arrears of rent for the period subsequent to the filing of the eviction petition. He drew my attention to the failure on the part of the revision petitioner-tenant to pay rent, for 45 months i. e. , till the landlord filed i. A. No. 124 of 1989 under Section 11 (1) ot the Act which clearly establishes the wilful default on the part of the petitioner-tenant and both the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have rightly ordered eviction. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the respondent-landlord should have initiated independent proceedings under Section 11 of the Act and placed reliance on the judgment of a division Bench of this Court reported in p, Ramanaiah Chetty vs. Ramalingaiah Chetty. The Division Bench has held that the landlord is entitled to seek eviction for subsequent default although he deposited rent in the earlier proceedings.
The Division Bench has held that the landlord is entitled to seek eviction for subsequent default although he deposited rent in the earlier proceedings. In other words, it was held that dismissal of an earlier proceeding would not constitute res judicata disentitling him to file a second application for the period of subsequent defaults. The judgment of the Division bench has no application to the facts of this case. In the present case admittedly the tenant failed to pay rent for 45 months after the filing of the eviction petition by the landlord. A Single Judge of this Court, dealing with the question whether subsequent event can be taken into consideration in a pending proceeding, has held that subsequent defaults committed by the tenant can be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining wilful default. this Court has held that subsequent defaults during the pendency of the eviction proceeding do not provide fresh and independent cause of action and therefore the landlord is entitled to take recourse to Section 11 read with Sec. 10 (2) (1) of the Act. Following the aforementioned judgments, I hold that the tenant-petitioner has committed wilful default and is liable to be evicted on that ground. ( 5 ) IN Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy the Apex Court had an occasion to examine the scope and ambit of revisional powers under Section 25 of the tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1960. The language of section 22 of A. P. Act 15 of 1960 is in pari materia with Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu act. Both appeal and revision are employed in the statute. The expression revision is meant to convey the idea of much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression appeal . Under the revisiona] jurisdiction the High Court calls for and examine the record of the appellate authority to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding. The dominant idea conveyed under Section 22 of Act 15 of 1960 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 22 the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact merely because it does not agree with subordinate authority.
The dominant idea conveyed under Section 22 of Act 15 of 1960 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 22 the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact merely because it does not agree with subordinate authority. Therefore, the High court with all concern and caution has to examine the facts and circumstances to warrant interference in its revisional power under Section 22 of the Act. The Apex Court has held that the High Court should not interfere with concurrent findings of lower tribunals while exercising revisional jurisdiction. The Apex Court has held thus:"section 23 of the Tamil Nadu buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act, 1960 enables any person aggrieved by an order passed by the controller to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. Section 25 proves that the high Court may on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority, call for and examine the record of appellate authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the high Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration it may pass orders accordingly. The language of Sec. 25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstance that both the expressions appeal and revision are employed in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression revision is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression appeal . In fact it has to be noticed that under Section 25 the High Court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy itself under Sec. 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority.
Therefore, despite the wide language employed in section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under section 25 of the Tamil Nadu buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure but in the words of untwalia, J. , in Dattonpant Gopalvarao vs. Vithalrao Marutirao ( (1975) 2 SCC 246 ) ( AIR 1975 SC 1111 ) it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal. " ( 6 ) FOLLOWING the judgment of the Apex court and considering the case on merits, I do not find any ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below for satisfying myself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety. ( 7 ) THE Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The petitioner-tenant is given six months time to vacate the premises.