A. K. SIKRI, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER in this case was working as Sanitary Inspector/health Inspectorwith the respondent- Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to asmcd, for short) On 17/11/1992 he was placed undersuspension as hewas arresed for allegedly committing an offence u/ss. 7 and 13 (2) of the Preventionof Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for short ). Chargesheet wasfiled in the Court and trial took place which resulted in order/judgment dated 30thoctober, 1995 delivered byspecial Judge u/ss. 7 and 13 (2) of the Act. Vide orderdated 1/11/1995 Special Judge sentenced the petitioner to two yearsrigorous imprisonment and Rs. 15. 000. 00 as fine u/ss. 7 and 3 of the Act plus half yearrigorous imprisonment and Rs. 2000. 00 as fine u/s. 13 (2) of the Act. Petitioner filedappeal against the conviction and sentence to this Court vide Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1995 which was admitted on 28/11/1995 and order of convictionand sentence was suspended. Petitioner was admitted on bail on furnishingpersonal bail bond with one surety to the tune of Rs. 5000. 00. ( 2 ) ON the basis of cosnviction and sentence passed by Special Judge, showcause notice dated 3/04/1996 was served upon the petitioner asking him toshow cause as to why punishment of dismissal be not imposed upon him. Petitionersubmitted his reply dated 25/04/1996. He also filed writ petition being Civilwrit Petition No. 1685 of 1996 in this Court challenging the issuance of such showcause notice, inter alia, on the ground that the conviction of sentence passed by Special Judge was suspended by the High Court in appeal and therefore, MCD had no right to take action at that stage and till the said conviction becomes final. The writpetition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 30/04/1996 observing asunder-in view of the decision in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education Vs. S. Nagoor Meera: reported in JT 1995 (3) SC 32, the learned counsel forthe petitioner does not press this petition, which is accordingly dismissed assuch. "thereafter representation of the petitioner was considered and impunged orderdated 28/10/1996 was passed dismissing the petitioner from service. ( 3 ) PETITIONER in this writ petition states that after the passing of the aforesaidorder he paid several visits to the respondent-MCD authorities to withdraw theorder but when no heed was paid on the requests of the petitioner. "thereafter representation of the petitioner was considered and impunged orderdated 28/10/1996 was passed dismissing the petitioner from service. ( 3 ) PETITIONER in this writ petition states that after the passing of the aforesaidorder he paid several visits to the respondent-MCD authorities to withdraw theorder but when no heed was paid on the requests of the petitioner. He made arepresentation dated 1/12/1998 requesting that the order be modifiedand petitioner be atleast given pension and gratuity. As no response was received,present petition was filed on 27/02/1999. It may be stated that petitioner in the writ petition did not disclose that he had earlierfiled Civil Writ Petition No. 1685 of 1996. Infact at page 20 the writ petition,petitioner, in cleverly worded language, as mentioned :- "that no other appeal or writ is pending in this hon ble Court or any othercourt against the withholding of the pension, gratuity, leave salary etc. , ofthe petitioner by the respondent. " ( 4 ) IT is only in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that it is disclosed thatthe petitioner had earlier filed the writ petition which was dismissed by order dated 30/04/1996 and a copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure A - E to the writpetition on the basis of which the respondent have taken the plea that the presentwrit petition is an abuse of the process of law, misconceived hence not maintainable. ( 5 ) ALTHOUGH in para 20 of the writ petition the petitioner has alleged that no writpetition is pending against withholding pension, gratuity, etc, the claim to the reliefprayed for in this petition is on the ground that dismissal order is bad in law andtherefore in the prayer clause of the writ petition, petitioner has prayed for quashingof the impugned order of dismissal also. In these circumstances, in all fairness,petitioner should have disclosed the factum of filing earlier petition which wasdirectly on the point and was dismissed by this Court following the judgment of Supreme Court as is referred to in the order dated 30/04/1996. Petitioner istherefore guilty of "supressio veri and suggestio faisi" and has not come to thiscourt with clean hands. Suppressing of the aforesaid material facts itselfdisentitles the petitioner to get any relief. ( 6 ) PETITION is also barred by principles of res judicata/constructive res judicata. Petitioner istherefore guilty of "supressio veri and suggestio faisi" and has not come to thiscourt with clean hands. Suppressing of the aforesaid material facts itselfdisentitles the petitioner to get any relief. ( 6 ) PETITION is also barred by principles of res judicata/constructive res judicata. Nodoubt the petitioner had approached this Court earlier at a stage when showcause notice was issued and the present petition is filed after dismissal order ispassed, however his earlier petition was not dismissed on the ground that it ispremature having been filed at show cause stage when no final order is passed. Itwas dismissed on merits following the judgment of Supreme Court in Deputydirector of Collegiate Education Vs. S. Nagoor Meera reported in JT 1995 (3)SC 32. ( 7 ) THE contention of the petitioner was that since the conviction and sentencepassed by Special Judge was suspended by this Court in appeal preferred by thepetitioner, action could not have been taken on the basis of said conviction andsentence and show cause notice was bad in law. This very contention is specificallyanswered in the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Supreme Court holdingthat departmental/disciplinary action can be taken and the services of the concernedemployee can be terminated by way of dismissal etc. on the basis of convictionorder passed by criminal court even if such conviction order is suspended in appealfiled by the convicted employee. This is what the Court observed in the said case:- "we need not, concerns ourselves any more with the power sof theappellate court under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason thatwhat is relevant for clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) isthe "conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge" andthere can be no question of suspending the conduct. We are, therefore, ofthe opinion, that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal,removal or reduction in rank of a government servant who has beenconvicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentenceor order is suspended by the appellate court or on the ground that the saidgovernment servant-accused has been released on bail pending the appeat. xxxxxxwhat is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servantwhich has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, therespondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. xxxxxxwhat is really relevant thus is the conduct of the government servantwhich has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, therespondent has been found guilty of corruption by a criminal court. Untilthe said conviction is set aside by the appeltate or other higher court, it maynot be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated, above, if hesucceeds in appeal or other proceedings, the matter can always bereviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice ( 8 ) THUS, the writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 30/04/1996 on thebasis of aforesaid pronouncement of the apex Court holding that respondent couldtake disciplinary action and issue show cause notice on the basis of conviction andsentence passed by Special Judge, notwithstanding the fact that in appeal, thesaid conviction and sentence was suspended. Therefore, filing the present writpetition, may be after the order of dismissal which was not passed at that timewhen the order dated 30/04/1996 was passed in the earlier writ petition, on thesame ground and also challenge to the dismissal order on the same ground onwhich show cause notice was challenged and failed, is clearly barred by principlesof resjudicata/constructive res judicata. Even when the matter is considered on merits, position in law remains thesame. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court holding thatdepartmental action is permissible in such circumstances, petitioners challenge tothe imposition of dismissal on the basis of conviction and sentence is clearlymisconceived. It is the contention of the petitioner that he has challenged thedismissal order in the present petition as because of dismissal order petitoiner isderued pension and gratuity, etc. He further contends that the punishment ofdismissal was disproportionate to the charge levelled against him and because ofthis severe punishsment petitioner was denied pension, gratuity, etc. It wassubmitted that the respondent could have imposed lesser punishment likereduction in rank or removal to enable him to get some terminal dues. In support ofhis submission, petitioner has relied upon the following judgments:- I. Rameshwar Dutt Sharma Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi and anotherreported in ATR 1992 (1) CAT 460. II. P. S. Gunasekaran (Dr.) Vs. Union of India and others reported inatr 1992 (1) CAT 464. III. State Bank of India Vs. A/v. Gupta reported in 1997 VIII AD S. C. 141. ( 9 ) I am not convinced with this argument of the petitoner. Lt. Governor, Delhi and anotherreported in ATR 1992 (1) CAT 460. II. P. S. Gunasekaran (Dr.) Vs. Union of India and others reported inatr 1992 (1) CAT 464. III. State Bank of India Vs. A/v. Gupta reported in 1997 VIII AD S. C. 141. ( 9 ) I am not convinced with this argument of the petitoner. The charge against thepetitioner for which he is convicted and sentenced is a serious charge namely thatof demanding and accepting bribe. Perusal of the judgment of Shri V. B. Gupta,special Judge shows that charge proved against him was that he came to Shrilekh Raj and demanded Rs. 200 to be paid to him every month as bribe asotherwise he would cease his "rehri". Trap was laid and petitioner was caught redhanded while accepting Rs. 200. 00from Shri Lekh Raj. This charge is proved beforethe criminal Court for which he is given the punishment as aforesaid. The chargeis of a very serious nature and it cannot besaid that the punishment of dismissal issuch that it would shock the conscience of the Court and justify intereference whileexercisisng extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. In fact going by the gravity of offence committed by the petitioner the punishmentgiven to the petitioner is reasonable and warranted in the circumstances of thecase. The judgment cited by the petitioner are not applicable in the present case. Inthe case of Rameshwar Dutt Sharma (supra) order of dismissal from servicebased on conviction, was non-speaking order passed in a mechanical way and itwas held that such an order was not sustainable. Still considering the sentence oflife imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner, Central Administrative Tribunalheld that impugned order could not be set aside or quashed. Liberty was grantedto him to make detailed representation bringing out the extenuating circumstances ifany and his grievance about the quantum of punishment and on making suchrepresentation respondents were directed to consider the same and pass speakingorder on this representation. As far as payment of G. P. F. amount payable to thesaid petitioner was concerned it was held that since charge was not in any wayconnected with his official conduct the claim of petitioner for GPF and leaveencashment was tenable in law. In the present case speaking order has beenpassed after due application of mind. Moreover, the offence is connected with theofficial conduct of the petitioner. Therefore, this judgment is of no help to thepetitioner. In the present case speaking order has beenpassed after due application of mind. Moreover, the offence is connected with theofficial conduct of the petitioner. Therefore, this judgment is of no help to thepetitioner. In the case of Jesuralnam versus Union of India and others (supra) Supremecourt was concerned with a situation where there was no legal provision empoweringthe authority to forfeit the gratuity payable to employee and it was held that orderpassed by the government forfeiting the gratuity payable to the appellant was bad inlaw. No such case is made out in the instant petition. The case of State Bank of India Vs. A. N. Gupta (supra) relied by thepetitioner, deals with altogether different situation. That was a case where pensionwas withheld even after after superannuation and interpreting rule 11 of the Pensionrules of the bank it was held that in such circumstances pension could not bewithheld. The Court held that it was rule 10 of the Pension Rules which provided forforfeiture of all claims of pension if the employee is dismissed from service of thebank for wilfull negligence or fraud and when rule 10 specifically provides forforfeiture of pension it could not be said that under Rule 11 again the pension of anemployee could be withheld on this or similar grounds. Thus in that case also if anemployee is dismissed from service for wilfull negligence or fraud, pension could beforfeited under Rule 10. However, on the facts it was found that it was not a caseunder Rule 10 but a case under Rule 11 as the concerned employee had retired onreaching the age of superannuation. In the instant case, petitioner is dismissedfrom service and it is not a case of retirement of superannuatiuon. ACCORDINGLY, this writ petition is hereby dismissed. Rule stands discharged. THERE shall be no order as to costs.