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2000 DIGILAW 460 (BOM)

Nathuram Posu Thakur & others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & another

2000-07-05

R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR

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JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHADEPARKAR, J.:---In all these revision applications a common question of law arises and hence they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent. 3.In all these revision petitions, the reference applications under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act") were filed before the Land Acquisition Officer. However, the same were filed beyond the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of notice under section 12(1) of the said Act. The said applications having been filed beyond the prescribed statutory period of limitation as specified under section 18 of the said Act, the Land Acquisition Officer rejected the same. Hence the present C.R.A. 4.The learned Advocate for the petitioner, while placing reliance upon unreported decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court passed on 31st March, 2000 in C.R.A. No. 599 of 2000 in the matter of (Shri Suresh Marutrao Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra and another)1, submitted that in view of amendment to section 18 of the said Act by way of incorporation of sub-section (3) read with the amendment to section 3(d) in relation to the expression "Court" and bearing in mind the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of (Bhupal Premchand v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1994 Mh.L.J. 1558, these revision petitions are required to be referred to the larger bench as was done by the learned Single Judge in the said C.R.A. 599 of 2000. 5.The expression "Court" has been defined in section 3(d) of the said Act as under :--- "The expression "Court" (except in sub-section (3) of section 18) means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act, and in relation to any proceedings under this Act, include the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), to which the principal Civil Court may transfer any such proceedings." The expression "Collector" has been defined in section 3(c) as under :--- "The expression "Collector" means Collector of District and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer or person specially appointed by the appropriate Government or by the Commissioner to perform functions of Collector under this Act." Sub-section (3) of section 18 which was incorporated by Maharashtra Act of 38 of 1964 as applicable to the State of Maharashtra read as under :--- "Any order made by the Collector on an application under section 18 shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 6.There is no doubt that the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Bhupal Premchand (supra) has held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 including section 5 thereof apply to the application made to the Collector under section 18 of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act, (38 of 1964). However, the Apex Court in the matter of (Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal)3, 1996(9) S.C.C. 414 has clearly held that the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer acting under the Land Acquisition Act is not a Court but a statutory authority and section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso of section 18(2) of the said Act. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 clearly provides that an application under section 18(1) shall be made, (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, then within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 clearly provides that an application under section 18(1) shall be made, (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, then within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period shall first expire ; Bearing in mind the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Officer on Special Duty v. Shah Manilal (supra) clearly holding that the provisions of Limitation Act cannot be applied for extention of period of limitation prescribed under the proviso of section 18(2) of the said Act, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Bhupal Premchand (supra) cannot be considered as good law. 7.Section 18(3) undoubtedly provides that any order by the Collector on an application under section 18(1) shall be subject to revision of the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, sub-section (3) of section 18 of the said Act makes an order by the Collector on an application under section 18 of the said Act a revisable one under section 115 of the C.P.C. It does not specify about applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to the order passed under section 18 of the said Act. It classifies the order under section 18(1) of the said Act to be of the nature which is subject to the revision application under section 115 as if it is passed by a Court. That by itself does not give the Collector the status of Civil Court or the powers of the Civil Court. It is for a limited purpose of making the order revisable under section 115 that the order passed under section 18 of the said Act by the Collector is made to be considered as passed by a Court. This is further clear from the definition of the expression Court as is to be found in section 3(d) which is quoted above. This is further clear from the definition of the expression Court as is to be found in section 3(d) which is quoted above. The expression Court has accordingly been defined to mean a principal Civil Court of the Original Jurisdiction except for the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 18. In other words, except for the purpose of section 18(3) the expression "Court" in the said section has to be interpreted as defined in section 3(d) to mean judicial Officer. As already seen above, sub-section (3) of section 18 of the said Act deals only with an order passed by the Collector and not with the powers of the Collector as such. It nowhere provides that the Collector is bestowed with the powers of the Civil Court. 8.At this stage one can advantageously refer to two more decisions of the Apex Court on the point in issue. They are, in the matter of (State of Punjab and another v. Satinder Singh)4, reported in 1995(3) S.C.C. 330 and in the case of (Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai)5, reported in 1997(9) S.C.C. 710 . In the case of Satinder Singh it was held by the Apex Court that the limitation for filing application for reference begins to run from the moment the notice under section 12(2) is received and statutory operation of limitation does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of the notice in any particular form. In the case of Shivabai it was held by the Apex Court that under section 12(2) of the said Act, the Collector is required to give notice of the award and it is not necessary to receive copy of the award along with the said notice and that the limitation should begin to run from the date of receipt of said notice. It is well established that an award under the said Act by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is only an offer and not a judgment. The application under section 18(1) of the said Act is not an appeal against such award. The Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer entertaining such application do not deliver judgment or order. It is well established that an award under the said Act by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer is only an offer and not a judgment. The application under section 18(1) of the said Act is not an appeal against such award. The Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer entertaining such application do not deliver judgment or order. It is rather ministerial act of verifying whether the application is within the time prescribed under the law, whether it is filed by the person who had received the compensation under protest and whether it refers to any of the ground enumerated in section 18(1). It is not an judicial adjudication of rights of the parties relating to the subject matter for reference thereunder. 9.In the circumstances and considering the law laid down by the Apex Court on the point in issue being very clear, I do not find any justification for referring the matter to the larger Bench on the point as to whether the Collector exercising the powers under section 18 of the said Act in the dealing with the applications filed by the parties under the said provisions would be a Court for the purpose of application of the provisions of Limitation Act so as to extend the statutory period prescribed under the proviso of section 18(2) of the said Act. 10.There being no other ground made out for interference, the revision applications fail and the same are dismissed. Rule is discharged in all the three applications with no orders as to cost. Revision applications dismissed. -----