B. S. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THE Assistant Director of Sericulture, shadnagar filed this writ petition questioning the award of the Labour court-Ill, Hyderabad in I. D. No. 512/92, dated 28-7-1993 wherein the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the 1st respondent without back wages having recorded a finding that the termination of the 1st respondent is in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 2 ) IN the normal course, I would have adjudicated this matter on merits and passed the order. But because of the events that have taken place in this case and the way the public monies are squandered away at a time when the State is starving of funds. I may refer to the events that have taken place so that the Hon ble Chief minister may try to take necessary steps to safeguard the public monies without wasting them in this manner. ( 3 ) THIS Court admitted the writ petition on 19-1-1994 and in W. P. M. P. No. 528/94 the award of the Labour Court was suspended by the order of even date. Subsequently, the 1st respondent filed w. V. M. P. No. 185/94 seeking vacation of the interim order passed in W. P. M. P. No. 528/94 dated 19-1-1994 and the said petition was disposed of by this Court on 27-4-1994 in the following terms:-"in the circumstances, the interim suspension dated 19-1-94 is made absolute, subject to the condition that the writ petitioner pays the last drawn wages to the 1st respondent from the month of May, 1994. The amount shall be paid by 10th of each English calendar month commencing from the next month. If the said amounts are not paid regularly as stipulated, the suspension stands vacated. "in other words, this Court made the interim suspension absolute on condition that the writ petitioner deposits the last drawn wages on or before 10th of every succeeding month under Section 17-B of the Industrial disputes Act whereunder a mandatory duty was cast on the employer to pay the last drawn wages if the management is not willing to reinstate the employee to duty after adjudication of the dispute by the tribunal. This Court also made it clear that if the order is not complied for any month, the suspension stands vacated. But it is seen that this order was not complied with by the petitioner. This Court also made it clear that if the order is not complied for any month, the suspension stands vacated. But it is seen that this order was not complied with by the petitioner. In those circumstances, the 1st respondent filed E. P. No. 33/95 for execution of the award. At that stage, the petitioner filed W. P. M. P. No. 15102/96 seeking modification of the order dated 27-4-1994. That petition was dismissed by this Court on 10-7-1996. Even then, the petitioner did not choose to comply with the orders of this Court passed in W. P. M. P. No. 185/94 dated 27-4-1994. Once again perhaps, suppressing the facts of the case, the writ petitioner filed W. P. M. P. No. 18948/96 seeking stay of all further proceedings in the E. P. and this Court by the order dated 5-3-1997 granted interim stay of until further orders. Thereafter the 1st respondent seemed to have filed w. V. M. P. No. 3601/97 seeking vacation of the said order These two petitions were disposed of by this Court on 4-12-1997 on the basis of a statement made by the learned counsel, observing that certain amounts were deposited pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 27-4-1994 in W. V. M. P. No. 185/94 and it is open to the 1st respondent to withdraw the amounts deposited in pursuance of the order dated 5-3-1997 without furnishing any security and directed to post the Writ Petition for final hearing in the second week of february, 1998. ( 4 ) I have my own doubts with regard to the correctness of the order as this Court has already observed by order dated 27-4-1994 that the petitioner has to deposit the last drawn wages by the 1st respondent every month on or before 10th in default the suspension stands vacated, and in fact the order itself has worked out by the time the order dated 4-12-1997 is passed. In other words, I have no hesitation to hold that there was no suspension granted by this court. The interim direction dated 19-1-1994 was not in force and it has worked out itself due to the failure on the part of the petitioner in complying with the order dated 27-4-1994. In other words, I have no hesitation to hold that there was no suspension granted by this court. The interim direction dated 19-1-1994 was not in force and it has worked out itself due to the failure on the part of the petitioner in complying with the order dated 27-4-1994. Be that as it may, perhaps, as the writ petition was not coming up for hearing inspite of the order dated 4-12-1997, the 1st respondent filed w. P. M. P. No. 42023/98 to dismiss W. P. M. P. No. 528/94 filed by the petitioner seeking suspension of the award. When the matter came up before me, after having surveyed the entire background, I dismissed the said application and directed the matter to be posted for final hearing on 1-11-1999. Now the Writ Petition is posted before me for final hearing. ( 5 ) COMING to the merits of the case, it is an admitted fact that the 1st respondent was appointed as a Reeler on 2-2-1981 and she applied maternity leave from 14-3-1984 to 19-6-1984. Thereafter, she seemed to have reported to duty, but the petitioner refused to take her back into service. Thereafter, the 1st respondent seemed to have made several representations and when there was no response from the petitioner, she moved the Labour Court-I in I. D. No. 109/91, which was subsequently transferred to Labour court-Ill and was renumbered as I. D. No. 512/92. The Labour Court having perused the evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties and the records, passed the award on 28-7-1993 stating that the action of the petitioner is in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and directed reappointment of the 1st respondent without back wages. Questioning the said award, the present writ petition is filed. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the 1st respondent was not a regular employee and during those four years, she worked actually for one year and two months only and she was always irregular in attending to her duties. This issue was not raised before the Labour Court by the petitioner and as such the petitioner herein cannot be allowed to raise this issue in this writ petition. This issue was not raised before the Labour Court by the petitioner and as such the petitioner herein cannot be allowed to raise this issue in this writ petition. Further, it is not the case of the petitioner that the services of the 1st respondent were terminated on the ground that she was irregular in attending to her duties. In fact, the case of the 1st respondent is that she worked from 1981 to 1984 and from 14-3-1984 to 19-6-1984 she applied for maternity leave. When she reported back to the duty on 20-6-1984, the petitioner refused to take her back into service. The Labour court having appraised the evidence, applied its mind to the facts of the case and directed reinstatement. Hence, I cannot reappraise the evidence sitting under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the first contention of the petitioner is rejected. ( 7 ) NEXTLY, the Counsel for petitioner contended that the 1st respondent was in gainful employment from 1988 to 1998 in child Development Project and was drawing a salary of Rs. 425 - per month and therefore she is not entitled for back wages even assuming what the learned Counsel for petitioner contends is correct, the labour Court has rightly rejected the back wages. Hence, this contention will also not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Consequently, I do not find any substance in both the contentions of the petitioner against the Award and they are rejected. The petitioner is bound to pay, back wages to the 1st respondent from the date of the award till she is reinstated into service. The petitioner is given four weeks time to reinstate the 1st respondent into duty and twelve weeks for payment of arrears payable to her from the date of the Award till the date of reinstatement. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ( 8 ) BEFORE parting with the case, I would like to impress upon the authorities concerned that the public monies cannot be squandered away in this manner, when dayin and dayout, the executive is crying at the top of the house that the State is starving of funds. In my considered view, section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act can be pressed into service by a private employer, but not by the State. In my considered view, section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act can be pressed into service by a private employer, but not by the State. If the State relies upon Section 17-B of the Act, the result is very much evident, as to what happened to the public funds in this case. Now, the State is forced to pay through its nose the salary to the 1st respondent for seven long years without taking her services at all. Had the petitioner reinstated the 1st respondent into service, they would have not only been saved from the embarrassment, but would have also extracted work from the 1st respondent. If the State wants to contest the correctness of the Award passed by the Labour Court, it is always open to the State to give appointment to the workman, subject to the result of the writ petition, so that atleast this situation of draining away of the public monies could be prevented to some extent. It is not the first case of this sort that came to the notice of this Court. It is happening in almost every case where the State is questioning the awards of Labour Courts. Now, it is for the authorities to take a decision whether to squander away the public monies in this manner or to obey the orders of the competent Courts, subject to the orders that would be passed by the writ courts as and when assailed by the authorities concerned.