JUDGMENT - Dr. PRATIBHA UPASANI, J.:---These three criminal writ petitions involve a common question of law, and can be therefore disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The petitioners in all these three petitions are the same, who are the original accused before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji. Respondent No. 1 Jugalkishore Kothari/original complainant in all these writ petitions is also the same. 3. The complainant Jugalkishore filed three private complaints in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Ichalkaranji under sections 403, 406, 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the present petitioners. These were separate complaints which came to be numbered as Criminal Case No. 93/90, Criminal Case No. 91/92 and Criminal Case No. 92/90 respectively. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class issued the process against the accused. The petitioners are the residents of Pali (Marvar) and it took considerable time to serve the summons upon the accused. In fact, since summons could not be served, bailable warrants and thereafter, non-bailable warrants also came to be issued against the accused. Thereafter, accused appeared and applied for cancellation of non-bailable warrant issued against them. Considerable time was thus lost in just securing the presence of the accused/petitioners. Thereafter, it seems that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class himself was absent, as he was sent for training. This was in the year 1988. Then the accused made application praying for exemption from appearance under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which came to be granted. This was in the year 1989. Thereafter, on 7th February, 1990, the complainant was absent. When the complainant was absent, his complaints came to be dismissed for default on 7th February, 1990 for want of prosecution, and the accused came to be discharged. 4. Thereafter, it appears that the complainant filed fresh complaints against the accused on the same set of facts in the month of March, 1990. Being aggrieved by the filing of second complaint by the complainant on the same set of facts, the petitioners/original accused have approached this Court, praying that the second complaints, which are filed by the complainant/respondent No. 1 on the same set of facts, be dismissed as they are not maintainable. 5. I have heard Mr. S.M. Oak, appearing for the petitioners, so also, Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent No. 2. 5. I have heard Mr. S.M. Oak, appearing for the petitioners, so also, Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent No. 2. I have also perused the proceedings, including the Roznama recorded in the Lower Court. 6. Mr. Oak, appearing for the petitioners/original accused vehemently argued that once the complaint is dismissed for default, second complaint on the same set of facts is not maintainable, and that, entertaining second complaint by the Magistrate after the dismissal of the first complaint, wherein, he had observed that the complainant was not interested in the matter, would amount to reviewing his own order when he was not empowered to do so. 7. In my opinion, the submission made by Mr. Oak is misconceived. First of all, it has to be stated that the legal position is that when a complaint is dismissed for default under section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the accused is discharged, second complaint is not barred on the same set of facts. Reference may be conveniently made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 876 (Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan)1, wherein, Supreme Court has observed that entertainment of a second complaint when first complaint is dismissed, is not barred, though, this has to be done only in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish, or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. The Supreme Court also has held that the second complaint on the same set of facts should not be entertained when decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, and that, in such a case, the complainant should not be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into. 8. Thus, it can be seen that once the complaint of a private complainant is dismissed for default, the Magistrate has no inherent power to review his order of dismissal and restore the case. However, a second complaint is permissible in law if it could be brought within the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar's case (supra). 9. However, a second complaint is permissible in law if it could be brought within the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar's case (supra). 9. In the present case at hand, the petitioners/original accused are aggrieved by the filing of the second complaints by the respondent No. 1, which were dismissed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji, for default, since the complainant was not present. In his order, he has also recorded that on five other occasions also, the complainant was absent, and that, it showed that complainant had no interest in proceeding with the matter. The learned Magistrate then dismissed the complaints for want of prosecution and discharged the accused. This was on 7th February, 1990, and shortly thereafter, second complaints on the same set of facts came to be filed by the complainant against the petitioners on 23rd March, 1990. Now the petitioners have approached this Court by filing these criminal writ petitions, praying that the said complaints be quashed and set-aside. 10. Having heard Mr. Oak, appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P., appearing for the State, and after going through the proceedings and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath's case (supra), in my opinion, no interference is called for. Firstly, it is a settled legal position that the second complaint, on the same set of facts, after the first complaint is dismissed for default, is not barred. In fact, there is no reason effectively shown by Mr. Oak why the second complaint should not be entertained and how it is not within the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar case (supra). In fact, Mr. Oak's submission that entertainment of the second complaint by the learned Magistrate amounted to review of his own order, is a submission which has to be mentioned only to be rejected. No doubt, many years have passed since the time cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate of the first complaint, its dismissal, and filing of the second complaint, however, the delay cannot be attributed to the complainant. As the Roznama will reveal and as discussed in the beginning, much time was lost in securing the presence of the accused. No doubt, many years have passed since the time cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate of the first complaint, its dismissal, and filing of the second complaint, however, the delay cannot be attributed to the complainant. As the Roznama will reveal and as discussed in the beginning, much time was lost in securing the presence of the accused. Thereafter, the petitioners obtained interim stay of the proceedings in the Lower Court, from this Court on 17th July, 1994, and thus, succeeded in stalling the entire proceedings for a period of almost six years. Therefore, complainant cannot be faulted for the judicial delay, which in fact is the bane of our judicial system. Hence, the following order : Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 1202 of 1994, 1233 of 1994 and 1222 of 1994 are dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim orders dated 17th October, 1994 in all the three writ petitions are hereby vacated. Criminal writ petitions dismissed. -----