ORDER: This revision petition is filed under Sec.25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act by an obstructor whose obstruction petition was dismissed and decree holder was allowed to take possession of the property. 2. First respondent herein filed eviction petition in R.C.O.P.1645 of 1995 on the file of 16th Court of Small Causes, Madras and obtained an order of eviction against second respondent herein Ravichandran. Only ground on which eviction was ordered was that tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent. Even though notice was served on Ravichandran, during trial, he did not contest and believing the evidence of landlord, order of eviction was passed. 3. Nearly one year after order of eviction, landlord filed E.P.No.310 of 1996 to get possession of property. When bailiff visited the property to deliver possession, revision petitioner herein filed obstruction petition alleging that he has entered into rental arrangement with decree holder from May 1996 onwards, and he has paid Rs.5,000 as advance apart from monthly rent of Rs.1,000. According to him, judgment-debtor already vacated the property and he is in independent possession of property and not liable to be dispossessed in execution of decree. 4. First respondent filed an application under O.21, Rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure to remove the obstruction. Decree holder contended that there is no rental arrangement with the obstructor and he is claiming only under judgment-debtor. Executing Court took evidence and on the side of decree holder Exs. A1 to A4 were marked and on the side of Obstructor, Exs. B1 to B4 were marked. Both decree holder and Obstructor got themselves examined as P.W.1 and D.W.1, respectively. 5. After discussing entire evidence, Executing Court held that Obstructor has no right over the property and his claim that he is in independent possession of building is not true. It is further found that he is not tenant of decree holder as alleged by him nor he paid any rent or advance. Executing Court further held that even after eviction was ordered, Ravichandran continued in possession of the building and that is clear from Exs.A1 to A3. Ex.A1 is the letter admittedly written by Ravichandran admitting that he is in default whereby he made part payment and requested further time to pay rent. Executing Court further held that even after eviction was ordered, Ravichandran continued in possession of the building and that is clear from Exs.A1 to A3. Ex.A1 is the letter admittedly written by Ravichandran admitting that he is in default whereby he made part payment and requested further time to pay rent. On receipt of letter, decree holder replied on 10.3.1996 evidenced by Ex.A2 through his counsel informing about the decree, but at the same time agreed to provide some time to surrender vacant possession. Ex.A3 is postal acknowledgment receipt where Ravichandran had signed the same. Ex.A4 shows that landlord is in the habit of issuing receipts whenever amount is received from his tenants. In respect of adjoining building also receipt was issued by landlord and that was spoken by him as P.W.1 and evidenced by Ex.A4. Obstruction was directed to be removed and application of landlord was allowed and directed the bailiff to remove the obstruction by handing over possession to landlord. 6. Against the said order, obstructor filed R.C.A.No.280 of 1998. Appellate Authority also confirmed the finding of Executing Court and dismissed the appeal. It is against the concurrent judgment, this revision petition is filed by the Obstructor under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act. 7. Since caveat was entered by respondents, I heard the revision petition itself at the stage of admission. 8. Learned counsel for respondents raised preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the revision petition. According to learned counsel, appeal before Appellate Authority itself is not maintainable and consequently revision also cannot be entertained. Learned counsel submitted that Executing Court under Rent Control Act is Civil Court for all purposes and any order passed in execution is to be challenged only as provided under Code of Civil Procedure. If it is a case of adjudication of rights in an obstruction petition, it will be deemed to be decree and consequently regular appeal alone is maintainable and not Rent Control appeal. If appeal before Appellate Authority is not maintainable, he being statutory authority, revision before this Court is also not maintainable. 9. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, I feel that the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for respondents is only to be accepted, though maintainability of the appeal was not challenged before Rent Control Appellate Authority. If appeal before Appellate Authority is not maintainable, he being statutory authority, revision before this Court is also not maintainable. 9. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, I feel that the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for respondents is only to be accepted, though maintainability of the appeal was not challenged before Rent Control Appellate Authority. Law is well settled that mere consent will not confer jurisdiction on authority if in case he has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appellate Authority under Rent Control Act is only to hear appeals from the orders of Rent Controller and not against any order passed by the Civil Court. Both Rent Controller and Appellate Authority are notified authorities under the Act. When Rent Control Appellate Authority is a notified authority for the purpose of hearing Rent Control appeals, merely because an appeal is entertained and disposed of on merits cannot be a ground to hold that it has jurisdiction to decide the matter. 10. Regarding maintainability of appeal, in Pathima Automobiles v. P.K.P.Nair, A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 318, a Division Bench of this Court held that an appeal is maintainable against the order under O.21, Rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure, passed by Executing Court. The scope of the said provision came for consideration before this Court in the decision reported in Pathuma Beevi v. Pathamuthu Joharan, 1991 L.W. 233, rendered by Justice Srinivasan (as his Lordship then was). Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the judgment are relevant for our purpose, which read thus, "4. Learned counsel submits that under Sec.18 of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act an order for eviction shall be executed by the Munsif having jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him. According to learned counsel, the appeal against the order of the Munsif shall be only to the Appellate Authority under Sec.23, if an appeal lies. But, according to him, under the provisions of Sec.18 of the Pondicherry Act, an appeal does not lie but a revision would lie under Sec.25. It is therefore, contended thus the remedy of the appellant was to file a revision against the order of the Principal District Munsif and not an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. 5. I do not agree with this contention. It is therefore, contended thus the remedy of the appellant was to file a revision against the order of the Principal District Munsif and not an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. 5. I do not agree with this contention. Sec.18(1) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act contains similar language but the authority under the said sub-section to execute the orders is the Controller himself. Under the said Sub-section the controller shall execute the order as if it is an order of a civil Court and for that purpose, he shall have all the powers of the Civil Court. Under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.18, an order passed in execution under Sub-sec.(1) shall not be subject to any appeal or revision. The question whether an order removing obstruction or dismissing an application to remove obstruction passed under O.21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an order under Sec.18(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act arose for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Pathima Automobiles v. P.K.P.Nair, A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 318. The Division Bench held that an order under O.21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not fall within the scope of Sec.18(1). The reasoning of the Division Bench is that it is an order passed by the Rent Controller in exercise of the powers of a Civil Court as an independent order passed under the Code of Civil Procedure and not the Rent Control Act. The Bench proceeded to hold that the order being passed by Rent Controller, an appeal would lie under Sec.23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, as under the said Section any order passed by the Rent Controller is appealable. If the reasoning of the Bench is applied to the provisions of the Pondicherry Act, it is clear that the order passed by the Principal District Munsif, Karaikal, is one under O.21, Rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure and not under Sec.18 of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Consequently, the proviso to Sec.18 will not apply. If an order is passed under Sec.18, then only, the proviso will come into play and a revision would lie under Sec.25. Consequently, the proviso to Sec.18 will not apply. If an order is passed under Sec.18, then only, the proviso will come into play and a revision would lie under Sec.25. As the present order is an independent order under O.21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proviso will not apply and the provision for appeal or revision under the Pondicherry Rent Control Act cannot be invoked. The only remedy available to the party is to file an appeal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as the order is an appealable one. 6. In fact, the relevant provision in the Code of Civil Procedure is found in Rule 103 of O.21. Under that rule, an order made under Rule 98 or 100 shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Here, the order has been passed by the District Munsif. The authority, who is competent to entertain an appeal against the order of the District Munsif under the Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly the Subordinate Judge, Karaikal." (Italics supplied) It is clear from the above decision that the only remedy available to a party who is affected by an order under O.21, Rule 97 is to file an appeal under Code of Civil Procedure and not as Rent Control Appeal. 11. In V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab Ali, (1998)3 S.C.C. 148 , a case arising under our Act, their Lordships considered the scope of Sec.18 Rent Control Act. As per the said Section, if an execution petition is filed before Rent Controller, Rent Controller shall have all the powers of Civil Court and eviction order is to be executed as an order of Civil Court. In that case, their Lordships considered what is meant by the words "as if an order of the Civil Court". In paragraphs 19 to 21 of the judgment, their Lordships considered what is the meaning of “as if” which read thus, “19. Inasmuch as the words”as if“have been used in Sec.18 the eviction order, in our opinion, is to be deemed to be an order of a civil Court and the execution petition has to be treated as an execution petition filed in the civil Court for execution of an order of a civil Court. Inasmuch as the words”as if“have been used in Sec.18 the eviction order, in our opinion, is to be deemed to be an order of a civil Court and the execution petition has to be treated as an execution petition filed in the civil Court for execution of an order of a civil Court. If Sec.18 were not there, the orders of eviction under Secs. 10, 14, 15, 16 and 17 could not be treated as orders of a civil Court and were to be treated only as orders passed by the Rent Controller under the Act. But, because of the fiction, they are to be treated as orders of a civil Court. The effect of Sec.18 is that the orders of the Rent Controller under Secs. 10, 14, 15, 16 and 17 will cease to be orders passed”under the Act“by the Rent Controller” when they reach the stage of execution. Lest objection be raised that the Rent Controller cannot execute an order of a Civil Court, Sec.18 further clarifies that “for this purpose” the Rent Controller shall also have all the powers of a civil Court - which civil Courts have, while dealing with execution petitions filed to execute orders of the civil Courts. What is the effect of the fiction created by use of the words “as if”? 20. In Dargah Committee v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 574 the words “as if” fell for consideration. The case arose out of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation 1925, which by Sec.93 provided for appeals against the levy of any tax. Under Sec.222(4) it was stated that any money recoverable by the Committee under Sec.222(1) shall be recoverable “as if it were a tax levied by the Committee”. The question was whether an appeal could be filed under Sec.93 against a claim of money by the Municipal committee under Sec.222(1). It was held by this Court that an appeal lay in view of the fiction created by the words “as if”. The question was whether an appeal could be filed under Sec.93 against a claim of money by the Municipal committee under Sec.222(1). It was held by this Court that an appeal lay in view of the fiction created by the words “as if”. It was observed: “If by the fiction introduced by Sec.222(4), the amount in question is to be deemed as if it were a tax, it is obvious that full effect must be given to this legal fiction; and in consequence, just as a result of the said fiction the recovery procedure prescribed by Sec.234 (for taxes) becomes available to the Committee, so would the right of making an appeal prescribed by Sec.93 (1) be available to the appellant.” [Italics supplied] 21. If therefore “full effect” is to be given to the fiction and if the eviction orders under Secs. 10, 14, 15, 16 and 17 are to be deemed to be orders of the civil Court and if the rent Controller is to be deemed to be a civil Court, then the execution petition, already filed in the Rent Controllers Court, (within the time limited for filing execution petition) in our opinion becomes by force of the fiction, execution petition under the Code of Civil Procedure and not under the Act. Death of decree-holder or judgment-debtor does not result in abatement of the execution petition. If it does not abate, it remains pending. Then what we have said in regard to the execution proceedings, under the heading “powers of Civil Court” is equally applicable to execution proceedings filed in the Rent Controller’s Court. That appears to us the logical result of the fiction.“ (Italics supplied) From the above decision it is clear that while executing an order of Rent Controller, Rent Controller is exercising the powers of Civil Court and not of Rent Controller. 12. I have already referred to the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Pathima Automobiles v. P.K.P.Nair, A.I.R. 1985 Mad. 318. In that case, in para 5 of the Judgment, the Division Bench held thus, ”.... The order passed by the Rent Controller in an application under O.21, Rule 97 cannot, in our view, be taken to be an order passed under Sec.18(1) of the Act. That should be taken to be an independent order passed under the Civil Procedure Code and not under the Rent Control act. The order passed by the Rent Controller in an application under O.21, Rule 97 cannot, in our view, be taken to be an order passed under Sec.18(1) of the Act. That should be taken to be an independent order passed under the Civil Procedure Code and not under the Rent Control act. Though the order is actually passed by the Rent Controller in an application under O.21, Rule 97, C.P.C. that should be taken to have been passed by him in exercise of the powers of civil Court as provided in Sec.18(1) of the Act...." 13. From the above decisions it is clear that the appeal before Rent Control Appellate Authority is not maintainable. Consequently, the revision petition under Sec.25 of the Act is also could not be entertained. 14. Once I hold that revision petition itself is not maintainable, under normal circumstances I should not consider the merits of the revision petition. But both counsel placed their arguments and wanted this Court to pass final orders also. In view of the fact that this Court can exercise its powers under Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure suo motu also, I feel the question of correctness and legality of the order also could be considered especially when both parties wanted a decision on merits. 15. Except the interested testimony of D.W.1, there is no evidence to show that there is direct rental arrangement between decree holder and himself. Documents produced by him are all after the application filed by decree holder for removal of obstruction. Naturally, Executing Court did not give much importance to those documents. According to D.W.1, he has paid Rs.1,000 as rent and Rs.5,000 as advance. There is no evidence to support the same. 16. As against the said evidence, we have the evidence of decree holder and Exs.A1 to A4. Even after eviction order was passed, second respondent herein was in physical possession of building is clear from Ex.A1. It is the letter written by him admitting default in payment of rent and making part payment. Landlord received the same under protest and advocate notice was issued under Ex.A2. The same is received under Ex.A3 postal acknowledgment wherein second respondent has signed. Ex.A4 shows that landlord is in the habit of issuing receipts for the amount received by him from various tenants. Landlord received the same under protest and advocate notice was issued under Ex.A2. The same is received under Ex.A3 postal acknowledgment wherein second respondent has signed. Ex.A4 shows that landlord is in the habit of issuing receipts for the amount received by him from various tenants. If in fact there was any direct rental arrangement between petitioner and landlord taking into consideration Ex.A4 that also could have found place in Ex.A4. Executing Court considered the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the claim of the obstructor is not bona fide and his attempt is only to prevent the decree holder from taking possession of the building. From the circumstances stated above, this Court is also of the same view. 17. In the result, I do not find any illegality in the order of Appellate Authority, and consequently, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. C.M.P.No.4825 of 2000 is also dismissed.