Judgment :- The dispute is in regard to appointment to the post of Director of Institute of Management in Government, Thiruvananthapuram. Whether the Director of the Institute of Management is holding a public office and in issuing a writ of quo warranto his entitlement to act in the above office can be inquired into is the question which arises for consideration. The present incumbent in the above office is above 60 years of age and alleging that there is usurpation of the office of the Director of Institute of Management, writ of quo warranto is sought to be issued directing that the 4th respondent has no authority to continue in the post of Director of the Institute of Management in Government. Rule 44 of Ext. P 1 Rules reads as follows : "The Director of the Institute shall be the Academic Head and Chief Executive of the institute. The first Director shall be appointed by the State Government on such terms and remunerations and conditions of service as may be decided by the Government. Subsequent Directors shall be selected and appointed by the Board of Governors with the approval of the State Government. The first Director shall hold office for a period of five years, or till he attains the age of 60, whichever is earlier. Subsequent Directors shall hold office for three years. A Director whose term of office has expired is eligible for reappointment subject to restriction regarding age." It is not disputed that the 4th respondent who is the Director of the Institute of Management is above 60 years of age. The Institute of Management in Government is a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act. The authorities of the Institute are the Board of Governors, the Executive Committee and such authorities as may be constituted by the Executive Committee. The officers of the Institute are the Director, the Secretary and such other officers as may be appointed by the Executive Committee from time to time. The Executive Committee shall be comprised of not more than seven members including the Director who shall be the Chairman of the Committee.Where any person acts in an office to which he is not entitled, the Court may restrain him by injunction and if it is necessary may declare the office to be vacant. The Executive Committee shall be comprised of not more than seven members including the Director who shall be the Chairman of the Committee.Where any person acts in an office to which he is not entitled, the Court may restrain him by injunction and if it is necessary may declare the office to be vacant. Remedy by way of proceedings for a writ of quo warranto applies to usurpation of any substantive office of public nature and permanent character which has been created by statutory provisions or rules. Legality of the claim which a party asserts to an office or franchise and necessity to oust from its enjoyment if the claim is not well founded is being inquired into by the Court in proceedings for writ of quo warranto. As is observed by the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491. quo warranto proceedings affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty and if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of a writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. Procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. It also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. One of the essential conditions for issuance of a writ of quo warranto in respect of an office is that the office must be public and of a substantive character. It is also necessary that the person who holds the office is not legally qualified to hold or to remain in that office and hag not been appointed in accordance with law. In proceedings for writ of quo warranto, the person who approaches the Court with the request for issuing a writ of quo warranto does not week to enforce any right of his own. It is the right of the person against whom writ of quo warranto is sought to be issued to hold the office which is being agitated. In proceedings for writ of quo warranto, the person who approaches the Court with the request for issuing a writ of quo warranto does not week to enforce any right of his own. It is the right of the person against whom writ of quo warranto is sought to be issued to hold the office which is being agitated. What has to be considered in deciding whether a writ of quo warranto has to be issued is whether there has been usurpation of an office of a public nature and substantive in character.The case of the petitioner is that the 4th respondent has no authority to continue in the office of the Director for the reason that he is over 60 years of age. Rule 44 of Ext. P-1 Rules says that the first Director shall be appointed by the State Government on such terms and remuneration and conditions of service as may be decided by the Government. As per the above rule, the State Government will make appointment of the first Director of the Institute of Management and the subsequent Directors will be selected and appointed by the Board of Governors with the approval of the State Government. The first Director can hold office for a period of five years whereas the subsequent Directors can hold the office for three years. In respect of the first Director there is a provision which says that he can hold office for a period of five years or till he attains the age of 60 whichever is earlier. But in the case of subsequent Directors, there is no mention in Rule 44 that they cannot hold office after completing 60 years of age. Here, the 4th respondent is not the first Director of the Institute of Management. Whereas the petitioner says that the upper age limit of 60 years applies to subsequent Directors also the contention taken up by the respondents regarding subsequent Directors of the Institute of Management is that there is no such provision which says that they should not hold office after attaining the age of 60. Whereas the petitioner says that the upper age limit of 60 years applies to subsequent Directors also the contention taken up by the respondents regarding subsequent Directors of the Institute of Management is that there is no such provision which says that they should not hold office after attaining the age of 60. Before going into the allegations levelled against the 4th respondent that he is not qualified to hold the post of Director of the Institute of Management and hence a writ of quo warranto be issued, it is necessary to decide whether the office of the Director of the Institute of Management is a public office of substantive character. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent pointed out the definition of public officer in Section 2(17), C.P.C. and argued that an officer who is receiving pay of the Government can alone be said to be holding a public office. The definition of public officer given in Section 2(17), C.P.C. is intended for understanding the term of "public officer" used in the Code. What we are concerned here is regarding public office and the definition pointed out above is of "public officer". In Section 80, C.P.C., the term "public officer" is used when dealing with necessity of issuing notice under that Section. For understanding the meaning of the term "public officer" used in Section 80, C.P.C., the definition of "public officer" occurring in Section 2(17), C.P.C. may be helpful. But it may not be proper to understand what is meant by public office by referring only to the definition of public officer available in Section 2(17), C.P.C.The office which involves duties of public nature and vital interest to the public can be said to be a public office. It is not the mode of payment of remuneration to a person who holds the office that decide whether he is holding a public office. Payment of remuneration from public fund may be one of the facts which can be taken into consideration for deciding whether a person is holding a public office. But that is not the sole test for deciding whether an office is a public office. Hence the remuneration payable to the person who is holding that office is not the only thing which matters for deciding whether an office is a public office. But that is not the sole test for deciding whether an office is a public office. Hence the remuneration payable to the person who is holding that office is not the only thing which matters for deciding whether an office is a public office. Whether an office is a public office or not has to be decided by taking into consideration the duties which are being discharged by a person who holds that office. If the person who holds the office is discharging duties of public nature and that office is functioning mainly for the interest of the public, it can be said that that is a public office. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487, it was held that where a Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be held to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 and hence subject to the same basic obligation to obey the Fundamental Rights as the Government. The Supreme Court stated that it is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an authority whether the Corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The Supreme Court held that whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. In the above decision cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act can be said to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Here, the question is entirely different from the question which was considered by the Supreme Court in the above decision, the question being whether the office of the Director of Institute of Management is a public office of a substantive nature so that an enquiry could be conducted by the Court regarding the competency of the person who is holding the office. In case the appointing authority is making appointments contravening the statutory provisions and rules, the person appointed will not be having authority to be in the public office. Here, the appointment of Director is being made on the basis of the authority under Ext. P-1 memorandum of association and rules of the Institute of Management. Rule 44 gives powers to the Board of Governors to appoint Directors with the approval of the State Government. The appointment of Director of the Institute of Management is not being made by statutory provisions and rules. The Director cannot also be said to be holding a public office because a reading of the memorandum of Association and Rules will not go to show that the office of the Director of Institute of Management involves duties of public nature and vital interest to the public. Hence, the office of the Director of the Institute of Management cannot be said to be a public office of substantive nature. So, competency of the 4th respondent to hold the post of Director of the Institute of Management cannot be inquired into by this Court in proceedings of writ of quo warranto.The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.