Judgment : This second appeal has been directed against the judgment an decree, dated 22. 1988 passed in A.S.No.104 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur reversing the judgment and decree of the Court of the District Munsif, Perambalur dated 17. 1986 made in O.S.No.1809 of 1981. .2. Theshort facts are: .The husband of the vendor of the respondent/ plaintiff and the appellants/defendants are brothers. The vendor of the respondent is one Geetha, who is the wife of Kabeerdos. Geetha sold the suit property to the respondent/plaintiff claiming that a partition took place even during the lifetime of her husband and after the death of her husband, she was enjoying the properties. The respondent/plaintiff purchased suit property under Ex.A-2, dated 27. 1981. The respondent/plaintiff claimed after his purchase, he was enjoying the suit property as house by paying the house tax, but during the year 1981, the appellant/defendant attempted to trespass into the suit property, which compelled him to file the suit for a declaration of his title and for a permanent injunction. .3. The appellants/defendants resisted the suit stating the document, Ex.A-1, dated 4. 1979 is not a memorandum of agreement and the same required registration. Geetha was married to her maternal uncle before she was married to Kabeerdos. The marriage between Geetha and her maternal uncle was subsisting and she married Kabeerdos, his brother and, therefore, she is not the legally wedded wife of Kabeerdos. In short, it is alleged that under the document, Ex.A-1 Geetha, the vendor of the plaintiff did not get any right to the suit property and, therefore, she cannot convey any title to the plaintiff and the suit has to be dismissed. 4. On the above pleadings of the parties, the learned District Munsif, Perambalur formulated the necessary issues. On a consideration of the evidence placed before him, the trial judge reached the conclusion that Ex.A-1 is not the memorandum of agreement, but it is a partition deed under which, rights flowed to the parties and it required registration. As Ex.A-1 has not been registered, the same is not admissible in evidence and ultimately dismissed the suit without costs. 5. The respondent/plaintiff who was aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court preferred A.S.No.104 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur. As Ex.A-1 has not been registered, the same is not admissible in evidence and ultimately dismissed the suit without costs. 5. The respondent/plaintiff who was aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court preferred A.S.No.104 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur. The learned Subordinate Judge, on a reappraisal of the evidence, by his judgment dated 23. 1988 and for the reasons assigned by him, concluded that Ex.A-1 is only a record of transaction which took place earlier and it is only a memorandum of agreement, which did not require registration. Therefore, he reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with the costs throughout, the correctness of which is being challenged in this second appeal. 6. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration is whether the First Appellate Judge applied the principles of law, relied on by him in the judgment, wrongly without ascertaining the facts of the present case fit into the principles of law and, therefore is perversee 7. Thepoint: The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants strenuously contended the First Appellate Judge had committed a grave error of law in upsetting the judgment of the trial court. It was argued that the recitals in the document, Ex.A-1 or the evidence of the plaintiff P.W.1 and his vendor, P.W.2 does not show that the division of the properties was effected among Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons sometime prior to the date of the document and that Ex.A-1 had been written to record the division of properties already taken place among them. A reading of the recitals in the document, Ex.A-1 would show that he declared an interest in immovable property mentioned that in on the very date it was written, namely, on 4. 1979 and not earlier. In short, it was submitted that the document, Ex.A-1, the execution of which is admitted by both the parties is not a partition list, but is an partition deed, which is compulsorily registerable, as the value of the properties allotted to each of the sharers exceeds more than Rs.100. 1979 and not earlier. In short, it was submitted that the document, Ex.A-1, the execution of which is admitted by both the parties is not a partition list, but is an partition deed, which is compulsorily registerable, as the value of the properties allotted to each of the sharers exceeds more than Rs.100. The learned First Appellate Judge has taken only one sentence from the notice, Ex.A-7 issued by the defendant for reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court without going to the root of the matter, namely, without ascertaining whether division between the sharers took place earlier to the document, Ex.A-1 and it had been written only to make a record of the partition already effected between the sharers and, therefore, it is perverse. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff invited the attention of this Court to the last line of the preamble portion which if translated in English would mean, “partition list is as follows:” and submitted that partition of the properties took place already and Ex.A-1 had been written only to make a record of the past transaction effected earlier and division did not take place on 4. 1979. I have carefully read the judgments of both the courts below and considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both. It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the vendor of the plaintiff P.W.2 and the plaintiff P.W.1 nowhere in their evidence had stated that the division of the properties between Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons including Kabeerdos, the husband of the vendor of the plaintiff took place sometime earlier to the date of the document, Ex.A-1 namely, before 4. 1979. As a matter of fact, P.W.2 in her cross-examination had stated that she had sold to the plaintiff an undivided one-third share in the properties and she cannot give the four boundaries of the properties sold. The above evidence makes it clear without any doubt that P.W.2 had sold not a specific property with four boundaries, but and undivided one-third share in the joint family properties of Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons. The purchaser from P.W.2, namely, the plaintiff, in the cross-examination was unable to assert that he had purchased specific properties from his vendor. The above evidence makes it clear without any doubt that P.W.2 had sold not a specific property with four boundaries, but and undivided one-third share in the joint family properties of Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons. The purchaser from P.W.2, namely, the plaintiff, in the cross-examination was unable to assert that he had purchased specific properties from his vendor. On the other hand, he had the deposed he did not make enquiries about Ex.A-1 and he had purchased one-third share in the properties and in respect of the third item in his sale deed, it is recited that undivided one-third share has been sold, which also leads to the conclusion that an undivided one-third share had been sold to the plaintiff and the case put forward by the plaintiff/respondent that Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons divided the joint family properties sometime prior to 4. 1979 and Ex.A-1 had been written to make a record of the division of the properties is unacceptable. Therefore, I find it difficult to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff that Ex.A-1 is only a partition list and not a partition deed. On the other hand, I am inclined to hold that the recitals in Ex.A-1 and the evidence on record shows that the division of the properties took place only on the very same date of Ex.A-1 and not earlier and the value of the property allotted to each of the sharers exceeds more than Rs.100 and is compulsorily registerable and the same cannot be admitted in evidence for want of registration as stipulated under Secs.17(1) and 49 of the Registration Act. In the decision reported in Sironmani v. Hemkumar Sironmani v. Hemkumar Sironmani v. Hemkumar , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1299 in paragraph 4 it has been held: “The first question to be considered in this appeal is whether the deed, Ex.D-4, dated December 27, 1943 is admissible in evidence. On behalf of the appellants Mr.Gupta put forward the argument that the document is in admissible in evidence as it effected the partition of the properties of the value of more than Rs.100 and it was not registered. It was argued that there was allotment of specific properties to individual coparceners in this document and its registration was therefore compulsory under Sec.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. It was argued that there was allotment of specific properties to individual coparceners in this document and its registration was therefore compulsory under Sec.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must be accepted as correct. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the document was not necessary to be registered because there was only severance of joint status of the members of the coparcenery and there was no partition of the properties by metes and bounds. It is not possible to accept this argument as correct.” In my opinion, the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision applies to the facts of the present case in all fours. In the above circumstances, I am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants/ defendants that the first appellant judge without analysing the evidence deeply and without going to the root of the matter had wrongly applied the principles of law in the decision reported in Velusami v. Velusami Konar , (1961)2 MLJ. 20 and Kannaiyan v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise , (1969)2 MLJ. 277 . The above decisions lay down that if division of properties had been effected earlier and a document is written to make a record of the division already effected on a later date, then only it will become a partition list and it does not require registration and is admissible in evidence. Conversely, if the division of properties took place on the very same date of the document declaring the rights and obligations of the parties to the document, it is not a partition list but is a partition deed, which is compulsorily registerable and is not admissible in evidence without registration if the value of the properties allotted to each of the sharers exceeds Rs.100. The judgment of the learned First Appellate Judge is clearly erroneous as he had applied the principle of law in the above two decisions without ascertaining that the facts of the present case fits in with the principles of law enunciated therein and, therefore, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Judge had to be reversed. 9. . The judgment of the learned First Appellate Judge is clearly erroneous as he had applied the principle of law in the above two decisions without ascertaining that the facts of the present case fits in with the principles of law enunciated therein and, therefore, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Judge had to be reversed. 9. . Though in the written statement it has been alleged that the vendor of the plaintiff P.W.2 had been married to her maternal uncle before she was married to Kabeerdos, the brother of the defendant and the marriage with her maternal uncle was subsisting on the date when she married Kabeerdos and she is not a legally wedded wife of Kabeerdos and evidence also had been adduced, no argument had been put forward during the time the second appeal was heard and, therefore, it is unnecessary to go into that question by this Court. 10. For the aforestated reasons, I find the judgment and decree of the first appellate court is erroneous and are liable to be set aside. 11. Inthe result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court are restored. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs.