JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Heard Counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendants. By way of this motion the petitioner sought two reliefs. (i) The leave granted by this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on 22nd June, 1999 be revoked. (ii) The Receiver appointed by this Court shall not take possession of the subject matter of the suit. 2. Since the first question relates to or touches upon the jurisdiction of this Court, I have to first decide that question. Rule 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court was granted on the basis of the pleadings in para 14 of the plaint, which says that the part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The leave of this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, is required if only a part of cause of action arises in the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Counsel for the defendant submits that no part of cause of action arose within the local limit of this Court. Therefore leave granted has to be revoked. 3. Normally I would have gone into this question and examined the pleadings and the documents and if necessary directing the parties to adduce evidence. But a statute has intervened and even taken away the general jurisdiction of this Court to deal with this matter. Admittedly it is a suit filed by the bank, and the subject matter is beyond Rs. 10 lakhs. The parliament enacted Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter called the Act) and sections 17 and 18 intervened and takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain or deciding the suit. 4. It this context it is necessary to note that every Court of Tribunal has got two kinds of jurisdictions. One is, for convenience, I may call it, general jurisdiction. It means it has got the power to adjudicate on the subject matter of the dispute. If similar authorities or Tribunals of courts are established, having the power to deal with the similar nature of the subject matter of the suit, then statute will have to prescribe a territorial jurisdiction of such similar Court. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code gives this Court the power to adjudicate upon all the nature of suits, which is of a civil nature. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code gives this Court the power to adjudicate upon all the nature of suits, which is of a civil nature. For facilitating further discussion it is necessary at this point to extract section 9. 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.---The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 5. Therefore this Court has conferred jurisdiction to deal with the subject matter of the suit by virtue of section 9 of the C.P.C. Since the dispute involved is of civil nature, the Parliament and the Legislature, as the case may be from time to time taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and entrust it to some other Tribunals or quasi judicial authority to adjudicate upon even the cases of civil nature. For example Industrial Disputes Act, Co-operative Societies Act, Rent Control Act and the Family Court Act etc. were enacted for that purpose. Depending upon the nature of the dispute the Parliament or Legislature, as the case may be, has to take away the general jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which is conferred otherwise an ordinary Civil Court under section 9 for speedy adjudication of the dispute involved. Therefore section 9 of C.P.C. itself enables that it is the Parliament to make law, to take away the general jurisdiction of this Court to deal with a particular class of cases. The above Act of 1993 is also enacted for that purposes. The Parliament in its wisdom has carved out certain disputes to be decided by an independent Tribunal and it has been taken away from the general jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore a general jurisdiction is a prominent jurisdiction of the Court and if the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute the result is the dismissal of that proceedings. But here in this case the question is not of general jurisdiction. As I pointed out in the opening paragraph of this order, the decision taken by this Court in deciding the place of suing and granted leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Therefore the territorial jurisdiction is always secondary vis-a-vis the general jurisdiction as I discussed above. But here in this case the question is not of general jurisdiction. As I pointed out in the opening paragraph of this order, the decision taken by this Court in deciding the place of suing and granted leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Therefore the territorial jurisdiction is always secondary vis-a-vis the general jurisdiction as I discussed above. If the courts lack in general jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject matter of the dispute then it is unnecessary for this Court to go into the question whether the Court which lacks general jurisdiction had territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, if Court is not having any territorial jurisdiction the result is not the dismissal of the suit itself as in the case lack general jurisdiction. If a Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, that Court cannot dismiss the suit but the Court must advice the client or litigant to go to a particular Court having territorial and general jurisdiction, as is spelt out under Order 7, Rule 10 in the C.P.C. also. Order 7, Rule 10 stipulates that if a litigant approach the Court but it is having no territorial jurisdiction but for a general jurisdiction the Court has to return the plaint for represent the case before the proper Court having territorial jurisdiction. But that is not the case where the courts lacks general jurisdiction. If the Court lacks general jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the dispute itself, the Court did not have any option except to dismiss the suit. It is in this context I find that the territorial jurisdiction is always a secondary jurisdiction. 6. In this context, we have to examine at this juncture whether particularly in the light of sections 17 and 18 of the Act whether it is necessary on the part of this Court to decide whether the leave granted by this Court was proper or not, since, according to me as on today this Court lacks jurisdiction even to entertain the subject matter of the suit. 7. As I indicated earlier the power of this Court to entertain this case has been taken away by the intervening statute and given to D.R.T. In that context it is unnecessary for me to examine whether the leave granted by this Court under Clause 12 of the Letter Patent was correct or not. 8. 7. As I indicated earlier the power of this Court to entertain this case has been taken away by the intervening statute and given to D.R.T. In that context it is unnecessary for me to examine whether the leave granted by this Court under Clause 12 of the Letter Patent was correct or not. 8. The learned Counsel for the defendant brought to notice an enactment of 1936 which is called the Decrees and Orders Validating Act, 1936. The learned Counsel drew my attention to the particular section 2 which reads as follows : 2. Certain decrees and orders not to be called in question.---No decree passed or order made by the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, the High Court, of Judicature at Madras or the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction under Clause 12 of its Letters Patent, or by the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon, in the exercise of its Original Civil jurisdiction under Clause 10 of its Letters Patent, shall be called in question in any proceedings before any other Court on the ground that the High Court passing the decree or making the order had no jurisdiction to pass or make the decree or order. 9. The learned Counsel strenuously argued in view of this provision that only this Court can go into the question of jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the Letter Patent. The answer to this argument is already contained in paragraph mentioned above. Clause 12 is dealt with only territorial jurisdiction and the light of section 17 and 18 of the above Act even the general jurisdiction had enable the Court to grant Clause 12 of the Letter Patent, has been taken away. Therefore in the light of this provision section 2 has become practicably redundant. 10. At this context the learned Counsel for the plaintiff brought to my notice the over riding effect of section 34 of the Act which says that notwithstanding anything inconsistent herewith contained in any other law for the time being in force has taken away all the powers of this Court even powers conferred by this Act 5 of 1936. 10. At this context the learned Counsel for the plaintiff brought to my notice the over riding effect of section 34 of the Act which says that notwithstanding anything inconsistent herewith contained in any other law for the time being in force has taken away all the powers of this Court even powers conferred by this Act 5 of 1936. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff also brought to my notice the effect of section 34 giving overreading effect in the Family Courts Acts which was dealt with by a Full Bench of this Court in (Romila Jaidev Shroff v. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff)1, Notice of Motion No. 3254/99 in Suit No. 5885/99 reported in 2000(4) Bom.C.R. (F.B.)122. The Full Bench was examining the scope of section 20 of the Family Court Act which a verbatim reproduction of section 34 of this Act. In that judgment in paragraph 27 the Full Bench observed thus : 27. Letters Patent would be included in expression any law for the time being in force, and would certainly be covered the expression instrument. The overriding effect given to the Act is thus confined not only to the Code of Civil Procedure but also to the Evidence Act. The Evidence Act is also an instrument having effect by virtue of law. Looking to the provisions of the restricted right of an advocate to appear in matter obviously, the Advocates Act of 1961 also has effect to that extent". 11. In view of the above discussion, I find that this Court lacks general jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the suit and it has to be transferred to D.R.T. In view of the finding of question No. 1 the consideration of the question No. 2, issuing the direction to the Receiver does not arise at all. 12. In this context the learned Counsel for the defendant submits that a difficult situation arose where he cannot raise the aspect of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal also. I do not think the apprehension entertained by the learned Counsel for the defendant is genuine because section 19 of the Act provides the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 12. In this context the learned Counsel for the defendant submits that a difficult situation arose where he cannot raise the aspect of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal also. I do not think the apprehension entertained by the learned Counsel for the defendant is genuine because section 19 of the Act provides the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. On transfer of the suit to the D.R.T. of Bombay the defendant can very well raise the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal to which it was transferred, and the Tribunal can very well decide that question under section 19 of the Act. 13. In view of the matter I dismiss the Notice of Motion and direct the office to transfer the suit forthwith to the D.R.T. P.A. to issue ordinary copy of this order authenticated by the Associate of this Court. -----