( 1 ) THIS is an application for leave to appeal under Section 260a (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made by the Department against an order of the Tribunal dated January 17, 2000, refusing to condone the delay of some eight days made by the Department in preferring the appeal. ( 2 ) MR. Mullick appearing in support of the application sought to raise a point that in fact, there was no delay, because service of the order on the appropriate Commissioner was not made at all as required by Section 253, Sub-section (3), of the said Act ( 3 ) WE do not decide the case on this point, and we do not even permit it to be argued, because the Tribunal had no chance even to consider this argu-ment. ( 4 ) SECTION 260a (1) reads as follows : "an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. " ( 5 ) WE were in some doubt about the order of the Tribunal being at all an order in appeal. ( 6 ) MR. Bajoria, appearing for the assessee, however, punctiliously fair as he always is, showed us from the case of Melu Rum and Sons v. CIT that on the authority of that case it is to be taken to be an order in appeal, on the ratio that a refusal to condone has the effect of confirming in substance the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals ). ( 7 ) MR. Bajoria also argued that in the present appeal section has been drafted on the basis of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dealing" with second appeals. He pointed out the patent similarities between the several Sub-sections of the two sections in the two enactments. ( 8 ) HE gave us several Supreme Court cases for the proposition that, if the law of condonation of delay is properly appreciated by the Tribunal, then even if it fails to apply such law correctly to the facts of the case, its decision does not become appealable by giving birth to a different question of law. We make a reference, amongst all his cases, to the one in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar. ( 9 ) MR. We make a reference, amongst all his cases, to the one in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar. ( 9 ) MR. Mullick emphasised on the current legal trend of viewing departmental delays leniently. He gave us the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji which was noticed by the Tribunal and also the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani. ( 10 ) OF the questions sought to be agitated in appeal we set out the second one from paragraph 8 of the petition :" (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal refusing to condone the delay of eight days in filing the appeal by the Revenue is perverse ?" ( 11 ) IN interpreting Section 260a (1) in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Deputy CIT (ITA No. 344 of 2000) we have already opined that the words "substantial question of law" mean a question of law which affects the substance of the case, e. g. , money liability, and not merely those questions which the court thinks to be somehow specially serious. ( 12 ) ON this ratio an order refusing to condone delay under Section 253 (5), (but not one condoning it) is a substantial question of law, because if the point is decided differently, a confirmed order becomes unsettled and still subject to appeal. ( 13 ) SECTION 253 (5) of the Income-tax Act reads as follows :"253. (5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. " ( 14 ) THE satisfaction must be of the Appellate Tribunal, and not of the High Court, if the appeal is to be entertained out of time. ( 15 ) IF on the law stated or applied, and the facts appreciated, as apparent from the order of the Tribunal, it appears that its satisfaction, or the lack of it, has been reached under Section 253 (5), then the High Court cannot interfere with it. ( 15 ) IF on the law stated or applied, and the facts appreciated, as apparent from the order of the Tribunal, it appears that its satisfaction, or the lack of it, has been reached under Section 253 (5), then the High Court cannot interfere with it. If however, the appreciation of facts or the application of the law to such facts, is so patently insupportable as to be called perverse, then there is no finding in reality by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 (5), and in that event the High Court has to interfere. ( 16 ) AS a matter of law, and of policy decision too, we decide that this point of perversity can and should be taken up in the Section 260a (1) application and not in a separate writ. Points of perversity have been entertained by the reference Bench for a long time past, to which the appellate Bench is a successor. ( 17 ) WE are of the opinion that although the Tribunal set out the correct law that each day's delay is no longer to be explained, strictly by the Department, it failed to apply such law. It also failed really to notice the existence of some explanation, given by the Department, being the time taken for preparation of appeal papers. The Tribunal also sought to distinguish Katiji's case saying that the Supreme Court condoned "the delay as on the facts". These are all points of perversity in law. ( 18 ) WE, therefore, pass an order in terms of prayer (a ). We entertain the appeal on the question set out above. We have heard both the sides at length on facts and law, on two days. We treat the appeal as on the day's list dispensing with all formalities. We answer the question in favour of the Department. The Tribunal shall now deal with the Department's appeal in accordance with law. ( 19 ) PARTIES and alt others concerned to act on a signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertakings.`