V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: Petitioner herein challenges the order dated 9.6.1999, passed by the first respondent, under the provisions of Section 3 of COFEPOSA Act, directing his detention for preventing him from taking part in the smuggling activities. 2. The grounds suggest that the petitioner arrived on 10.2.1999 at Tiruchy Airport by Flight No.IC 968, which came via. Kuwait-Sharjah and the officer concerned at the metal detector frame got suspicious and, therefore, the petitioner was sent to counter No.9 for detailed examination wherein, he disclosed his name as Baluchamy, son of Karuppiah and produced a briefcase for examination. He had declared textiles, toilet items and VC tapes valued at Rs.1,000 and when asked whether he was carrying any gold or silver or dutiable goods, the petitioner replied in negative and, therefore, he was physically examined in the presence of independent witnesses during which, it was found one cloth pouch tied around the petitioner’s waist and it was stitched with nylon zip with fifty inner chambers and ultimately it was found that those inner chambers contained fifty gold metal bars with markings “Emirate Good Gold 10 Tolas 999.0”. The Petitioner admitted that he was not carrying any valid documents for it. In the suitcase of the petitioner there was one brown colour rexin bag in which some currency in U.S. Dollars was found, which was totalling US $ 56000 equivalent to Rs.2,35,200. The gold bars as well as the foreign currency, for which there were no valid documents, were seized on the ground that they were being tried to be smuggled into India. The other items were also seized. The gold bars as well as the foreign currency, for which there were no valid documents, were seized on the ground that they were being tried to be smuggled into India. The other items were also seized. It is pointed out that the petitioner gave a voluntary statement on 10.2.1999 and stated that the petitioner was having a passport which was issued at Indian Consulate at Dubai and that he was doing fishing work for the last seven months and that he got acquaintance with one Kili of Tiruchy at a Dubai hospital where he was sick and he offered gold bars to the petitioner and asked him to hand over to one Gunasekaran outside the Tiruchy Airport without the knowledge of the Customs Officers and offered to give flight tickets form Sharjah to Tiruchy; he got the xerox copies of the passport of the petitioner and gave the cloth pouch containing fifty gold bars which he had asked the petitioner to tie around his waist; he was also instructed that he should declare the goods viz., toilet items, textiles and VC Tapes alone and not the gold bars. It was pointed out in the grounds to Kili and Gunasekaran could not be apprehended. The petitioner was produced before the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tiruchy and he was remanded to judicial custody till 25.2.1999 and his house was also searched. Thereafter, the petitioner tried to move the bail applications, etc. and ultimately he was ordered to be released on bail by order dated 11.3.1999 on some conditions which conditions also came to be ultimately modified directing the petitioner to appear before the authorities concerned on every Monday and Thursday. From these grounds, it was deduced that the petitioner was involved in the smuggling activities as defined in Sec.2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962. It was also apprehended that the petitioner would continue to indulge in smuggling activities unless he was prevented from doing so by detaining him under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. 3. Before us, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner pointed out that though this incident had taken place on 10.2.1999, it was only after about four months that the concerned order came to be passed against the petitioner on 9.6.1999, after a delay of four months. 3. Before us, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner pointed out that though this incident had taken place on 10.2.1999, it was only after about four months that the concerned order came to be passed against the petitioner on 9.6.1999, after a delay of four months. The learned counsel points out that all the gold bars were seized on or about the same day and so much so that the petitioner was also released on bail on 11.3.1999 and, therefore, there was no reason for the authorities to pass an order by the delay of four months. He also pointed out that the bail applications made by the petitioner was not seriously opposed and the bail plea was made on the ground that the investigation was over which remained uncontroverted. The learned counsel, therefore, points out that there would really be no question of any live link remaining between the act committed and the order and such a live link had been snapped because of the voluminous delay of four months. 4. In support of his argument, the learned counsel has relied on number of cases. The first authority relied on by the learned counsel is reported in Ahamed Mahaideen Zabbar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 Crl.L.J. 3488, wherein, the incident of seizure of the gold bars had taken place on 8.12.1997 on which date itself the detenu had admitted his guilt but, the order of detention came to be passed only somewhere on 23.11.1998 that is, after eleven months and fifteen days. The Supreme Court did not accept the explanation offered by the State Government that the authorities were waiting for the show cause notice which was eventually issued on 4.5.1998 and that the adjudication proceedings were over on 9.1.1998 and that the State Government was waiting for these two proceedings and chose to proceed with the proposal only after that. In that case it was not explained as to why the State Government had thought it necessary to wait till the adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court eventually allowed the petition and quashed the detention order. 5. We are afraid firstly the delay in Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar’s case, 1999 Crl.L.J. 3488, is much more as compared to the present case. In our case, the delay is four months which also stands explained as we would point out. The Supreme Court eventually allowed the petition and quashed the detention order. 5. We are afraid firstly the delay in Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar’s case, 1999 Crl.L.J. 3488, is much more as compared to the present case. In our case, the delay is four months which also stands explained as we would point out. The question of delay has been dealt with in the counter in paragraph 8 where it is pointed out that the investigation and the subsequent follow-up of the matter continued till May, 1999 and the proposal sent was considered by the Central Screening Committee in its meeting held on 17.5.1999 and the further documents were also called for by the Detaining Authority from the sponsoring authority on 26.5.1999, which was submitted to the Detaining Authority on 27.5.1999. These documents were right upto 25.3.1999 and it was thereafter on 9.6.1999 that the detention order came to be passed. Even otherwise, the learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government pointed out to us that even in the grounds supplied to the detenu in paragraph 6 the bail application filed by the advocate on behalf of the petitioner dated 16.2.1999 was considered. It is pointed out in that paragraph that a further bail application was made on 22.2.1999 through advocate wherein the petitioner had claimed innocence to which, the objections came to be filed by the Department on 24.2.1999 and even this bail application was dismissed on 1.3.1999 and the remand was further extended upto 11.3.1999. However, by order dated 11.3.1999, the court, on the basis of another bail application in Crl.M.P.No.851 of 1999 granted bail to the petitioner. Therefore, the period upto 11.3.1999 stands explained. The learned counsel also pointed out that the bail order was conditional wherein the petitioner was directed to appear before the authorities concerned everyday and, therefore, the petitioner was under the control of the authorities. Even these bail conditions were challenged by a fresh application on 8.4.1999 for the modification of the conditions and though the objections were filed on 13.4.1999, the conditions were modified thereby reducing the appearance of the petitioner before the authorities concerned only on two days in a week i.e., on every Monday and Thursday, which order was passed on 6.5.1999. Even these bail conditions were challenged by a fresh application on 8.4.1999 for the modification of the conditions and though the objections were filed on 13.4.1999, the conditions were modified thereby reducing the appearance of the petitioner before the authorities concerned only on two days in a week i.e., on every Monday and Thursday, which order was passed on 6.5.1999. The learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government therefore wanted us to show that this explains the period upto May, 1999 in which month the proposal sent earlier was mooted in the third week. We feel completely satisfied by this explanation. 6. In the decision reported in T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, (1989)4 S.C.C. 71 , on the basis of the incidents in November 30, 1986 and December 9, 1986, a detention order came to be passed on October 7, 1987. This delay was not brooked by the Supreme Court as this delay remained unexplained. In paragraph 12, the Supreme Court held that this is a long delay and there was a delay in securing the arrest of the petitioner also which remained unexplained. The learned counsel for the petitioner very heavily relied on this case but, we find that the factual panorama is entirely different. This case would, therefore, be of no assistance to the learned counsel. 7. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1255. However, there also the factual scenario was entirely different apart from the fact that in Rajendrakumar’s case, the detention order was not under the provisions of COFEPOSA Act. In that case itself the Apex Court explained that the rule as to the unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible and that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making an order of detention under a law relating to Preventive Detention like COFEPOSA Act and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The Apex Court explained that a mere delay in passing the order under a law like COFEPOSA Act, the courts should not merely on the account of the delay assume that such delay is not satisfactorily explained. We are of the opinion that this case would be more helpful to the respondents than the petitioner. 8. The Apex Court explained that a mere delay in passing the order under a law like COFEPOSA Act, the courts should not merely on the account of the delay assume that such delay is not satisfactorily explained. We are of the opinion that this case would be more helpful to the respondents than the petitioner. 8. In another decision reported in P.N.Patrukar v. Ramamurthi, 1994 Crl.L.J. 620, which was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the factual situation is entirely different. This was a case where the order was passed under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act and the basis of the order was registration of some criminal cases and the statements of some witnesses. The order in this case was passed after five months and eight days from the registration of the last case and more than four months from submission of proposal. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to accept the explanation. This case, therefore, cannot be considered in favour of the petitioner. 9. The Supreme Court has also accepted the explanation of the delay in a decision reported in M.L.Jose v. Union of India, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 661. There, the Supreme Court accepted the explanation that the detenu had come to India only in the end of October, 1990 that too, after the passing of the impugned order. Of course, even this case has no factual similarity. However, the fact remains that the law is now crystallized and the Apex Court suggests the examination of the explanation. It has also accepted the principle that the courts would have to take into account as to. Whether such delay has resulted in snapping the live link between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the detention order. Considering it from this angle, we are of the clear opinion that it cannot be said that there is any unreasonable delay in this case and the period of four months between the incident and the passing of the order stands aptly explained. The first contention by the learned is therefore rejected. 10. The learned counsel secondly submitted that the detenu had submitted a representation on 22.7.1999 by which nine copies were sent on his behalf. The learned counsel points out that this was rejected by the Central Government on 12.8.1999. The first contention by the learned is therefore rejected. 10. The learned counsel secondly submitted that the detenu had submitted a representation on 22.7.1999 by which nine copies were sent on his behalf. The learned counsel points out that this was rejected by the Central Government on 12.8.1999. The main thrust of the argument is that the Detaining Authority was the joint Secretary and he had rejected the representation sent to him on 5.8.1999 and it is only then that the fresh file was opened before the Central Government and the Central Government rejected the same on 12.8.1999. The learned counsel, therefore, says that the file with the Central Government remained unattended and was unnecessarily lying without being considered by the Central Government. According to him, the process of consideration of the representation by the Joint Secretary, who was the Detaining Authority, and the Central Government should have been simultaneous and there was no reason for the Central Government to unnecessarily wait till the representation was disposed of by the Joint Secretary. 11. By way of explanation, the learned Standing Counsel invited our attention to paragraph 16 of the counter wherein it has been explained that the representation in English, addressed to the Joint Secretary of Government of India which was received by the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi on 26.7.1999 on which date, the Joint Secretary directed to call for the comments from the Sponsoring Authority by letter dated 27.7.1999 and the said letter was received by the Sponsoring Authority, viz., the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Tiruchy on 29.7.1999; comments were sent to the Joint Secretary on 30.7.1999, which comments were received in the office of the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi on 3.8.1999; they were diarised on 4.8.1999; the file was processed and placed before the Joint Secretary who considered the representation and rejected the same on 5.8.1999. There is no doubt that in the said counter it is averred: “Another file for independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the Central Government was opened and put up. The same was received in the office of the Secretary (Finance) on 6.8.1999; 7.8.1999 and 8.8.1999 were holidays being Saturday and Sunday. There is no doubt that in the said counter it is averred: “Another file for independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the Central Government was opened and put up. The same was received in the office of the Secretary (Finance) on 6.8.1999; 7.8.1999 and 8.8.1999 were holidays being Saturday and Sunday. On 9.8.1999, the Secretary (finance)...” Ultimately it is clarified that the file was placed before the Finance Minister on 10.8.1999 as the concerned Secretary was on leave and, therefore, the Finance Minister considered and rejected this representation and the memo intimating the rejection was issued on 12.8.1999. 12. From this, the learned counsel wanted to suggest that the fresh file was opened only after the Joint Secretary has disposed on the representation. We are afraid by the sentence, which we have quoted, such inference is not possible. There is no admission that the file before the Central Government was opened and put up only after the Joint Secretary disposed of the same. In fact, the sentence “Another file for independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the Central Government was opened and put up” does not give rise to any such inference that the file was opened only after the representation was disposed of by the Joint Secretary on 5.8.1999. We have seen the files ourselves and are satisfied that an independent action had already began on the basis of the copy received by the Central Government which was marked for the Central Government by the Jail Superintendent where the petitioner was detained. On that, initially, it was decided to call for the comments but, subsequently it was realised that such comments would not be necessary and that took place somewhere on 29th/ 30th of July, 1999. Ultimately when the comments already called for by the other officers became available, they came to be considered by the Central Government. We are quite satisfied that this was not a case where the Central Government slept over the matter. The files suggest that the representation was being worked over. 13. Ultimately when the comments already called for by the other officers became available, they came to be considered by the Central Government. We are quite satisfied that this was not a case where the Central Government slept over the matter. The files suggest that the representation was being worked over. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to a reported case in Sajitha Banu/Nazam Banu v. Joint Secretary to Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi and another, (1995)1 L.W. (Crl.) 356 and suggested that in that case also it was held that there should be a continuous consideration by the authorities and that the representations made to different authorities should be simultaneously considered. We have no reason to take any different view but, the facts themselves suggest that there was actually an action taken on the representation even before the representation was finally disposed of by the Joint Secretary. Even otherwise, the Central Government has taken barely on week’s time after the representation was rejected by the Joint Secretary and considering the insignificance of that period, we are of the opinion that this cannot be said to be a delayed consideration on the part of the Central Government. In our view, the delay has been well explained. It has also been asserted in the counter that the representation addressed to the Joint Secretary and the Central Government were independently considered without being influenced by the opinion of each other. In our opinion, therefore, there is really speaking no delay much less the delay which would be fatal to the further detention of the petitioner. 14. The learned counsel also pointed out that we should not look into the files. However, the court could also probe into the files in the interest of justice to satisfy its conscience where it finds ambiguities in the Government’s stand in the counter though such exercise cannot be viewed as an alternative for the duty on the part of the respondent to explain the delay. That is the settled law (See: Rajindra v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and others, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1706). 15. The learned counsel also relied on the Supreme Court decision reported in B.Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 224. That is the settled law (See: Rajindra v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur and others, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1706). 15. The learned counsel also relied on the Supreme Court decision reported in B.Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 224. We, however, find that in that case there was a delay on the part of the Jailor in dispatching the representation received by him to the Central Government In that case it was found that though the petitioner therein had applied specifically and requested in a covering letter that his representation should be sent to all the other authorities, the said representation was not sent expeditiously to the Central Government and was sent only after about eleven days. The Supreme Court viewed this delay as fatal and unexplained one. Such is not the case before us. Here we find a proper explanation for the delay. 16. The learned counsel also took us through the oft-quoted decision reported in Sat Pal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2230, where the Supreme Court has held that if the simultaneous representations are sent to the State and Central Government, the State Government is duty bound to forward the same to the Central Government without any delay and that the said representation must be dealt with by the appropriate Government at the same time and that there was no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. There can be no question about the law stated by the Apex Court, more particularly in paragraph 8 of this judgment. However, we have already shown that the facts in this case speak otherwise and more particularly do not speak as if there was any dereliction of duty on the part of the Jail authorities or the State Government in forwarding the representation to the authorities concerned - in this case to the Joint Secretary and to the Central Government. In view of what is stated above, we are of the clear opinion that the delay stood well explained. 17. Lastly, the learned counsel pointed out that a show cause notice was issued under Sec.124 of the Customs Act on 12.5. 1999 to which, a reply was given by the detenu on 23.5.1999. The learned counsel points out that a further detailed reply was later on sent on 2.7.1999 and it was only thereafter that the Advisory Board meeting took place on 28.8.1999. 1999 to which, a reply was given by the detenu on 23.5.1999. The learned counsel points out that a further detailed reply was later on sent on 2.7.1999 and it was only thereafter that the Advisory Board meeting took place on 28.8.1999. Learned counsel points out that the second reply, which was a detailed reply, was never placed before the Advisory Board though it was available to the Central Government. The learned counsel very heavily relied on some observations made in the reported decision in Raverdy Mare Germain Jules v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 311. Our attention was more particularly drawn to paragraph 9. There the submission made before the Apex Court was that the letter retracting the confessional statement was not considered by the Advisory Board and as such the further detention had become vitiated. This contention was tried to be met by the respondents therein by stating that all the documents featured before the Detaining Authority were also placed before the Advisory Board and that since the Advisory Board examines the question of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on the material placed before the Detaining Authority and as the retraction was not placed before the Detaining Authority, it is immaterial that the Advisory Board did not take the same into consideration. Our attention was drawn towards the following observations made by the Apex Court: “This stand may not be very satisfactory and may necessitate our deeper examination but for the fact that the detenu himself was before the Advisory Board. He is a highly qualified, highly placed person and it is unthinkable that he would not have informed the Advisory Board that he had retracted his confessional statement. Therefore, nothing turns on the letter retracting the confessional statement being not placed before the Advisory Board and the contention must be negatived.” Mr.Jabbar very strenuously urged that the Supreme Court had clearly shown its disapproval to the stand taken by the Central Government that it was not necessary for the Advisory Board to take the subsequent retraction into consideration. Therefore, nothing turns on the letter retracting the confessional statement being not placed before the Advisory Board and the contention must be negatived.” Mr.Jabbar very strenuously urged that the Supreme Court had clearly shown its disapproval to the stand taken by the Central Government that it was not necessary for the Advisory Board to take the subsequent retraction into consideration. However, the Supreme Court in that case, as a special circumstance, found that the concerned detenu was a highly qualified person and that he had appeared himself before the Advisory Board and on that ground alone the Supreme Court did not view the failure on the part of the Advisory Board to consider the subsequent retraction very seriously. According to the learned counsel such was not the position here and here, in fact, the concerned detenu was not a very highly qualified person. 18. There can be no dispute and it is now a settled law be the decision of this court reported in K.V.Jesudasan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1989 Crl.L.J. 637, that a subsequent document to the detention order has to be placed before the Advisory Board if it is relevant and material. However, it must first be established that such document is material and relevant. We shall now examine as to whether the authorities were duty bound to place the subsequent reply dated 2.7.1999 before the Advisory Board. Now it is an admitted position here that the first reply of the detenu to the show cause notice was dated 23.5.1999 and it is also an admitted position that the said reply was very much before the Advisory Board. However, the learned counsel earnestly argues that the said reply was very much before the Advisory Board. However, the learned counsel earnestly argues that the subsequent reply, which was more in detail, was bound to be placed before the Advisory Board. The learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government argued before us that, in fact, there is virtually no difference in the two replies though undoubtedly, the subsequent reply was a more detailed one. However, in both the replies there was essentially retraction on the part of the detenu to the allegations made. He also pointed out that in both the replies it was specifically stated by the detenu that his confessional statement was not voluntary and was a result of coercion and force. However, in both the replies there was essentially retraction on the part of the detenu to the allegations made. He also pointed out that in both the replies it was specifically stated by the detenu that his confessional statement was not voluntary and was a result of coercion and force. According to the learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government therefore once the first reply was placed before the Advisory Board, there would be no necessity of placing the second reply which was virtually the repetition though in details of the first reply. We have examined both the replies and we are of the opinion that though the second reply is full of details and is lengthy one, it is a substantial reproduction of the first reply wherein the detenu had retracted the confession and had denied the whole story attributed to the detenu in the grounds. The learned counsel, however, states that in the second reply he had given an explanation as to why he had not made an early retraction of the confessional statement dated 10.2.1989. In our view, that cannot be a new point and to consider it as a new and independent point would be stretching the matters too far. In our opinion, there is no substantial difference in the two replies. Again one more significant factor would demolish this argument and that is as it happened in the earlier referred case of Raverdy in this case also the detenu was represented by the very counsel before the Advisory Board who had drafted the second reply. It is an admitted position that the learned counsel who drafted the Second reply himself argued the matter before the Advisory Board as the Delhi Advisory Board permitted representation of the detenu by a counsel. The learned counsel very fairly admitted this fact. In that view, there would be no reason for us not to take that course which the Apex Court had taken in Raverdy’s case, cited supra. The situation is more or the less identical. There it was a highly qualified detenu who appeared before the Advisory Board and here it is a highly qualified lawyer who appeared for the detenu who was himself the author of the subsequent reply. On this ground also, we are of the clear opinion that non-placing of the subsequent reply before the Advisory Board would be of no consequence. 19. On this ground also, we are of the clear opinion that non-placing of the subsequent reply before the Advisory Board would be of no consequence. 19. In short, for all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the petition has no merit and must be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed.