JUDGMENT - D.D. SINHA, J.:---Heard Shri Haq, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Shri Zha, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4. 2. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 31-12-1998 passed by the Chairman, Grievances Committee, Nagpur University whereby the grievance made in appeal by the respondent No. 4 before the Grievances Committee in respect of not permitting him to resume his duties without any suspension or termination came to be allowed. 3. Shri Haq, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent No. 4 was appointed on 1-7-1985 in the post of Accountant By Mr. J.D. Altekar, who was then Officiating Principal of the College run by the petitioner institution. The learned Counsel contended that the alleged action of the petitioner in regard to not permitting the respondent No. 4 to resume duties without any suspension or termination by the respondent No. 4 was challenged by filing Writ Petition No. 1929/1991 before this Court. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the preliminary objection was raised by the present petitioner in respect of the maintainability of the above referred writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy available before the College Tribunal under section 42-B of the Nagpur University Act. It is further contended that since there was alternate remedy available before the College Tribunal, the respondent No. 4 sought permission to withdraw the above referred writ petition in view of the alternate remedy available to him. The order dated 10-1-1999 passed by the Division Bench of this Court is reproduced as below : "Shri R.G. Deshpande, learned Counsel for Chanda Education Society has raised a preliminary objection that there is an alternate remedy before College Tribunal. In view of that statement, petition allowed to be withdrawn since alternate remedy exists." 4. Shri Haq, learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the respondent No. 4 did not approach the College Tribunal under section 42-B of the Nagpur University Act but filed the proceedings before the Assistant Charity Commissioner as well as Joint Charity Commissioner. However, the outcome of the proceedings before the Joint Charity Commissioner is not known. It is further contended that the respondent No. 4, for the first time, after a lapse of more than 6 years, filed the appeal before the Grievances Committee on 25-9-1997. However, the outcome of the proceedings before the Joint Charity Commissioner is not known. It is further contended that the respondent No. 4, for the first time, after a lapse of more than 6 years, filed the appeal before the Grievances Committee on 25-9-1997. It is contended that the proceedings before the Grievances Committee instituted by the respondent No. 4 are not maintainable on two counts;--(i) the Grievances Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the respondent No. 4 in view of section 57 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, and (ii) that the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 4 after 6 years suffers from delay and laches, and therefore, the Grievances Committee should not have entertained the same. 5. Shri Haq, learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that in the year 1991 the Nagpur University Act, 1974 was in force and there was no provision for constitution of Grievances Committee, therefore, no Grievances Committee then was in existence. The only remedy available to the respondent No. 4 was to approach the College Tribunal. It is therefore contended that the impugned order passed by the Grievances Committee under Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 is without jurisdiction in view of bar of section 57 of the Act and hence not sustainable in law. 6. Shri Zha, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 supported the impugned order passed by the Grievances Committee. It is not disputed that the above referred writ petition was withdrawn by the respondent No. 4 on 10-9-1991 and the above referred order was passed by the Division Bench. However, it is contended that the respondent No. 4 was pursuing the other alternate remedies and ultimately approached the Grievances Committee of the Nagpur University under section 57 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 by filing appeal. It is contended by the learned Counsel that since there is no order of termination/suspension, the case of the petitioner is not covered by the provisions of section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act and, therefore, the Grievances Committee is the only competent body having jurisdiction to deal with the issue in question. It is further contended that since the respondent No. 4 was pursuing the matter before the authorities, there was some delay on the part of the respondent No. 4 to approach the Grievances Committee. It is further contended that since the respondent No. 4 was pursuing the matter before the authorities, there was some delay on the part of the respondent No. 4 to approach the Grievances Committee. However that by itself cannot be a ground for disallowing the legitimate claim of the respondent No. 4. 7. I have considered the contentions raised by the learned Counsel. A short question which falls for my consideration in the present writ petition is whether the action of the petitioner management not permitting the respondent No. 4 to resume his duties without any suspension or terminating would fall within the ambit of otherwise termination contemplated under section 59 of the Act and, therefore, whether the Committee can be said to have jurisdiction to consider this issue under section 57 of the Act. 8. It is not in dispute that in the year 1991 the respondent No. 4 filed a Writ Petition No. 1929/1991 before this Court challenging the action of the petitioner management not permitting the respondent No. 4 to resume his duties without any suspension or termination. Since the petitioner was alleged to have been prevented from resuming his duties in signing the muster roll, this act of management squarely falls within the concept of otherwise termination contemplated under section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act as well as section 42-B of the Nagpur University Act. It is also not in dispute that the writ petition was withdrawn by the respondent No. 4 on 10-9-1991 on the ground of alternate remedy before the College Tribunal and the Division Bench of this Court passed the order referred to hereinabove. It is also not in dispute that at the relevant time Nagpur University Act, 1974 was in force and there was no Grievances Committee in existence under the provisions of that Act. Since the petition was withdrawn by the respondent No. 4 with the specific understanding to avail the alternate remedy available before the College Tribunal provided under section 42-B of the Nagpur University Act, it was imperative on the part of respondent No. 4 to approach the College Tribunal since that was the only legitimate remedy which was available under the provisions of the Nagpur University Act to the respondent No. 4 at the relevant time. It is not in dispute that no such appeal was preferred before the College Tribunal by the respondent No. 4. It is not in dispute that no such appeal was preferred before the College Tribunal by the respondent No. 4. Maharashtra Universities Act, for the first time came into existence in the year 1994. Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act provides a right of appeal to any employee of any University, affiliated college or recognised institution, who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the University or management and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and any appeal against any such order will lie to the Tribunal. It is therefore clear that if the employee serving in the University, affiliated college or recognised institution, whose services are otherwise terminated, shall have a right of appeal against such order before the Tribunal. In the instant case, the alleged action of the petitioner falls within the category of otherwise termination contemplated in section 59 of the Act and, therefore, the only legitimate forum available to such employee is to file an appeal against such action before the Tribunal in view of section 59 of the Act. The Grievances Committee is constituted under section 5 of the Maharashtra Universities Act. The relevant portion of section 57 is incorporated as follows: "1. There shall be a Grievances Committee in each university to deal with the grievance of teachers and other employees of the university, colleges, institutions and recognised institutions and to hear and settle grievances as far as may be practicable within six months, and the committee shall make a report to the Management Council. 2. It shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints which are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and report to the Management Council to take such action as it deems fit and the decision of the Management Council on such reports shall be final. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 10. Sub-section (2) of section 57 makes it clear that it shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints which are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 10. Sub-section (2) of section 57 makes it clear that it shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints which are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That means the grievance against dismissal, removal, otherwise termination or reduction in rank by the university or management of the employee is required to be considered by the Tribunal in view of section 59 is obviously beyond the purview of Grievances Committee constituted under section 57 of the Act and same therefore cannot be considered by the Grievances Committee. I have already held, the action of the petitioner falls within the purview of otherwise termination and, therefore, the Grievances Committee, in my opinion, cannot consider the same for want of jurisdiction and the only competent forum is the College Tribunal in this regard. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Grievances Committee is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained and, therefore, the acceptance by the Management Council also cannot be sustained. 11. Since the impugned order is quashed and set aside only on the ground of jurisdiction, it is not necessary for me to consider the other contentions raised by the respective parties on merits. However, it is open for the respondent No. 4 to approach the appropriate forum if otherwise permissible in law. 12. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order passed by the Grievances Committee on 31-12-1998 as well as its acceptance by the Management Council is quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----