JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Kolhapur dated 26-6-1987 in Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1984. 2. The petitioner took over a running business of Dr. Gune in the suit premises situated at property bearing House No. 167, Shribhavan, B Ward, Kolhapur and continued the printing press business therein in the name and style of SEVA MUNDRANALAY. The suit premises consist of 2 halls admeasuring 30' x 40'. The respondent gave a suit notice on 13-1-1978 claiming arrears of rent for a period from 1-10-1976 to 31-12-1977, total claim of Rs. 2250/-, at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. There is no dispute that suit notice was duly served upon the petitioners. Nevertheless, the petitioner did not tender the demanded amount nor raised a dispute regarding standard rent within a period of one month from the receipt of the suit notice as required under the provisions of Bombay Rent Act. In other words, it appears that on 14-3-1978, for the first time the wife of the petitioner No. 1 sent a letter to the respondent requesting for grant of time to make the payment of arrears of rent. Eventually, the respondent instituted a suit for recovery of possession and for arrears before the Court of the Civil Judge, J.D., Kolhapur being Regular Civil Suit No. 568 of 1978. The said suit was filed on 16-6-1978. The petitioners-defendants filed written statement in the said suit on 2-4-1980. For the first time, in the written statement, a defence was taken by the petitioners that practice between the parties had been that the respondent used to place orders for printing of stationery with the printing press run by the petitioners and the amount which was due and payable towards the said job was adjusted towards the monthly rent of the suit premises. According to the petitioners there was no fixed period when the amount was to be paid, but as and when demand was made by the respondent, the petitioners requested the respondent to adjust the amount from the outstanding bills. 3. The trial Court after having considered the rival contentions and evidence adduced by the parties was pleased to decree the suit preferred by the respondent and ordered handing over of possession as well as payment of arrears. 3. The trial Court after having considered the rival contentions and evidence adduced by the parties was pleased to decree the suit preferred by the respondent and ordered handing over of possession as well as payment of arrears. Against the said decision, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the District Court at Kolhapur being Regular Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1984. The Appellate Court reappreciated the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the petitioners were liable to be evicted within the meaning of section 12(3)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the aforesaid concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that demand made in the suit notice was excessive. According to the petitioner, the agreed rent was only Rs. 140/- per month and not Rs. 150/- as demanded in the notice. He contends that if the demand is bad the suit instituted by the respondent should fail on that count alone. It is further contended that having regard to the past conduct of the parties it would be more than evident that there was implied practice of adjustment regarding the amount of rent from outstanding bills, and since at the relevant time the amount which was due and payable to the petitioners was about Rs. 4500/-, thus it cannot be said that the petitioners were negligent in offering the rent to the respondent. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent points out that two courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the petitioners were in default and as such no fault can be found with the decree passed by the courts below under section 12(3)(a) particularly having regard to the well established principle enunciated in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2005 (Harbanslal Jagmohandas and another v. Prabhudas Shivlal)1. It is further contended that courts below have considered all the points raised on behalf of the petitioners and have eventually held that taking any view of the matter the petitioners were in default and thus liable to be evicted. 5. It is further contended that courts below have considered all the points raised on behalf of the petitioners and have eventually held that taking any view of the matter the petitioners were in default and thus liable to be evicted. 5. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the record of the case, I am afraid, the first point argued by the petitioners that the demand was excessive and therefore there was no cause of action to institute the suit is only stated to be rejected. It is well settled position that even if the demand is excessive it is the duty of the tenant to offer atleast the agreed rent within a period of one month from the receipt of the suit notice or atleast raise a dispute regarding the standard rent to save himself from the rigors of section 12(3)(a). In the present case, the petitioners have neither offered the agreed rent nor raised any dispute regarding the standard rent within one month from the suit notice and have thus made themselves liable for eviction within the meaning of section 12(3)(a) of the Act. With regard to the second point argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there was implied practice of adjustment, the Courts below have carefully considered the said matter and recorded concurrent findings of fact that the petitioners have raised the said defence for the first time in the written statement. The trial Court in para 12 of the judgment has considered this aspect and has rightly recorded that the petitioners having failed to request the respondent to adjust the amount from the outstanding bills cannot claim any protection, but are bound to suffer the decree of eviction for having failed to tender the demanded rent or even make a request to respondents to adjust the amount. The Appellate Court has confirmed the said finding recorded by the trial Court. The Appellate Court has also referred the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2005 and held that in the facts of the present case no other conclusion can be reached but the decree as made by the Court below was right. 6. The Appellate Court has confirmed the said finding recorded by the trial Court. The Appellate Court has also referred the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2005 and held that in the facts of the present case no other conclusion can be reached but the decree as made by the Court below was right. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon decision of the Apex Court reported in 1989(1) Bom.C.R. 610 : 1989 Mh.L.J. page 207 (Rashik Lal and others v. Shah Gokuldas Waghajibhai)2, and contend that having regard to previous practice between the parties the landlords cannot be permitted to suddenly prosecute for eviction on the ground of default. In my view, reliance placed on this decision is totally misplaced for the simple reason that the said decision deals with the provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949. No doubt, the Apex Court has considered the effect of the past practice between the parties in the said case to hold that the landlord cannot spring surprise on the tenant by suddenly starting proceedings for eviction. However, in the present case the facts would reveal that whenever the petitioners were in arrears the respondents bank demanded the arrears and on such demand being made the petitioners offered the bank to adjust the amount, but when the suit notice was served on the petitioner, albeit through an Advocate, no such attempt was made by the petitioners. The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision in para 8 has held that landlord can maintain the suit on the ground of arrears provided he has served notice demanding regular payment. In the present case no such plea was taken before the Court below. Further, the evidence which has come on record regarding adjustment was only for the period of 1963 and 1966 whereas the suit notice has been issued in the year 1978. There is absolutely no evidence as to what practice was being followed between the parties during 1966 to 1978. In other words, the petitioners have not established on evidence that the practice was not to pay rent monthly. In the circumstances, the said position the said decision relied upon by the petitioner will have no application to the facts of the present case. In other words, the petitioners have not established on evidence that the practice was not to pay rent monthly. In the circumstances, the said position the said decision relied upon by the petitioner will have no application to the facts of the present case. The other decision relied upon by the petitioners reported in 1975 U.C.R. 481 : 1976 Mh.L.J. 257 (Paras 11 to 18) (Bai Mohinibai Dharamsey v. Khimji Toksarshi Jivraj and another)3, to contend that there was no neglect by the petitioners in payment of rent and as such there was no question of instituting the suit within the meaning of section 12(3)(a) of the Act. From the evidence on record two courts below have concluded that there was absolutely no evidence to show that after the receipt of the suit notice the petitioners either offered rent as demanded or even requested to adjust the amount towards rent out of the outstanding bills nor raised any dispute regarding the standard rent within one month from which is a mandatory requirement. I find no infirmity in the ultimate decision recorded by two courts below, which is based on the well settled principle laid down by the Apex Court in Harbasanlal's case (supra). I find no force in the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner which warrant interference so as to reverse the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below that too in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227. In the circumstances the writ petition is devoid of merits and deserves to be rejected as such. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, writ petition is dismissed. Rule stand discharged. 8. At this stage the learned Counsel for the petitioner prays time to enable the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. The learned Counsel for the respondent has no objection provided the petitioners to deposit the entire arrears in this Court forthwith. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents the petitioners are in arrears from 1-7-1989 onwards and the amount would work out to about Rs. 43,000/-. The learned Counsel for the petitioners on the other hand states that he has no instructions in this behalf. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents the petitioners are in arrears from 1-7-1989 onwards and the amount would work out to about Rs. 43,000/-. The learned Counsel for the petitioners on the other hand states that he has no instructions in this behalf. Nevertheless, interim stay granted by this Court on 27-8-1987 is extended for a period of 6 weeks from today subject to the petitioner's filing usual undertaking in this Court and also depositing the entire arrears within a period of 2 weeks from today. On such deposit being made, the respondent shall be entitled to withdraw the said amount without prejudice to their rights and contentions. Certified copy expedited. Parties to act on the copy of the order duly authenticated by Sheristedar of this Court. Writ petition dismissed. -----