D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is filed by the mother of the alleged Detenu B. Siva Prasad, seeking a writ of Hebeas Corpus to set at liberty the alleged Detenu, now detained in the Central Prison, Chanchalguda, and to quash the letter in Ref. No. 13/lando. II/a1/2000-1, dated 10-1-2000, passed by the first respondent. ( 2 ) THE allegations set out in the writ petition in brief are as follows :-THE alleged detenu B. Siva Prasad has been detained in pursuance of proceedings of detention dated 10-1-2000 passed by the first respondent in the capacity of specially empowered Officer under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (for short cofeposa ACT ). The grounds of detention were already enumerated in the said proceedings and since those grounds are not relevant for the purpose of deciding this case, they are not being reproduced. ( 3 ) FROM the affidavit, it is further clear that on behalf of the detenu, earlier his wife Smt. Vijaya Lalitha has sent seven copies of representations in the name of the detenu along with a covering letter addressed to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad, with a request to send the copies of representations to the authorities mentioned in the grounds of detention. The third respondent, Superintendent, appears to have despatched a copy of representation to the second respondent/state Government and the Government and the said representation has been rejected by the second respondent and the same has been served on the detenu on 12-2-2000. Much stress is laid by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri Sampath Kumar on the fact that when the first respondent is the specially Empowered Officer under the Act till this date, and who passed the order of detention, is duty bound to dispose of the representtaion to revoke that order of detention. According to him, though the second respondent disposed of the representation by way of rejection, the same is of no consequence and is vitiated, inasmuch as the representation was not considered and disposed of by the first respondent, the authority, who made the order of detention. It is further argued that the action of the first respondent in not considering the representation and not passing any order, renders the continued detention of the detenu invalid and unconstitutional. It is further argued that the action of the first respondent in not considering the representation and not passing any order, renders the continued detention of the detenu invalid and unconstitutional. It is also contended that the second respondent/state Government, is bound to satisfy this Court that the representation was considered and disposed of independently uninfluenced by any opinion of the first respondent, detaining authority. It is further stated that the consideration of representation by the second respondent is a dependant consideration and, therefore, the entire consideration of the representation and disposal by the second respondent is invalid and unconstitutional. ( 4 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, which is sworn in by Sri M. V. S. Prasad, Secretary to Government (Political), General Administration Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, who is the specially Empowered Authority under the Act. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the wife of the alleged detenu filed earlier Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000 questioning the order of detention dated 10-1-2000. The grounds raised in the present writ petition were already raised in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable. In the counter, an attempt was made by the first respondent to justify the action of making the order of detention of the alleged detenu mainly on the ground that the alleged detenu was reported to have been involved in smuggling activities by smuggling huge quantities of foreign currency out of the country. It was further stated that the first respondent received the representation sent by the detenu on 22-1-2000, the same was acknowledged by him on 27-1-2000 and parawise remarks were furnished on 29-1-2000. As 30-1-2000 being Sunday, the same was received by his office on 31-1-2000. After due process of the same, he forwarded the said representation on 3-2-2000 to the Chief Secretary/the second respondent. The second respondent on 7-2-2000 rejected the representation. A draft memo in that regard was prepared on 10-2-2000 and after approval on 11-2-2000, the said memo was despatched to the third respondent to serve on the detenu. Accordingly, the rejection memo was served on the detenu on 12-2-2000. The second respondent on 7-2-2000 rejected the representation. A draft memo in that regard was prepared on 10-2-2000 and after approval on 11-2-2000, the said memo was despatched to the third respondent to serve on the detenu. Accordingly, the rejection memo was served on the detenu on 12-2-2000. ( 5 ) THE learned Government Pleader, attached to the office of the learned Advocate General, submits that with regard to the representation, it was elaborately pleaded in the earlier Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000 and this Court after considering the same, has rejected it and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to raise the same question in the present writ petition and as such the present writ petition is not maintainable. ( 6 ) WITH regard to the maintainability of this writ petition, it is necessary to examine the effect of filing of the earlier Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000 and the judgment of this Court dated 13-3-2000 dismissing the same. ( 7 ) A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000 reveals that on behalf of the detenu, seven copies of representation were sent by registered post with acknowledgment due on 18-1-2000, with a covering letter addressed to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chanchaleguda, Hyderabad, requesting him to forward the same to the authorities mentioned in the grounds of detention. The main contention among the other contentions raised in the said writ petition was that it was incumbent upon the respondents to disclose when the disposal of the representation, if any, was communicated to the detenu. It was further contended that it was enjoined upon them to satisfy this Court that the representation was considered without any avoidable delay. We have gone through the judgment passed by this Court in the earlier Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000. It was pointed out in the said judgment by a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (RMB, J) was a party, basing on the counter-affidavit and also in view of the fact that the representation made by the detenu was rejected and intimated to him on 12-2-2000, it was held that there was no delay in consideration of the representation and eventually that writ petition was dismissed. Therefore, the issue with regard to the effect of non-consideration of representation by the first respondent had not fallen for consideration for this Court and there was also no occasion for this Court to consider that issue which is raised for the first time in the present writ petition and as such the preliminary question that falls for our consideration in this writ petition is whether the filing of earlier writ petition and dismissal of the same, would attract the principles of constructive res judicata or not. ( 8 ) IN the decision reported in Lallubhai Jogibhat Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427 : (1981 Cri LJ 286), the Apex Court held that the doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings and the principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution on fresh grounds, which were not taken in the earlier petition for the same relief. The ration has reiterated by the Apex Court in another judgment reported in Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436 : (1981 Cri LJ 1267 ). A Division Bench of this Court in Azam Ali v. Govt. of A. P. , (1992) 1 ALT 141 : (1992 Cri LJ 2597), also held that the doctrine of constructive res judicata which is based on the principle of public policy of avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings cannot be invoked in proceedings of habeas corpus wherein the question is one of personal liberty of a citizen which is a principle of paramount importance and the most cherished constitutional objective of all the civilized nation and, therefore, the doctrine should yield to the constitutional objective. It was further held that the doctrine of constructive res judicata does not apply to proceedings of writ of habeas corpus when the subsequent writ petition is based on a ground not urged in earlier writ petition. ( 9 ) NOW as referred to above, as the issue with regard to non-consideration of representation by the first respondent was not raised earlier, in the light of judgments referred to supra, we hold that the filing of the present writ petition is not hit by principles of constructive res judicata and it is perfectly maintainable. ( 9 ) NOW as referred to above, as the issue with regard to non-consideration of representation by the first respondent was not raised earlier, in the light of judgments referred to supra, we hold that the filing of the present writ petition is not hit by principles of constructive res judicata and it is perfectly maintainable. ( 10 ) NOW the admitted facts in the present case are that the first respondent/ specially Empowered Officer under the Act, passed the impugned order, dated 10-1-2000. The wife of the alleged detenu sent seven copies of representation in the name of the detenu to the third respondent and he forwarded the same to the second respondent. The second respondent served upon the alleged detenu the orders of rejection, dated 11-2-2000, on 12-2-2000. The counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent admits the said proceedings. It is important to note from the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent that after receipt of the representation, he forwarded the same to the Chief Secretary on 3-2-2000. By this statement, it can safely be understood that the first respondent did not consider the representation at all, but only forwarded the representation mechanically to the second respondent and it is the second respondent who passed the orders of rejection. From the judgment of this Court dated 13-3-2000, passed in the earlier Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000, it is clear that the Central Government filed a counter-affidavit stating that the representation made by the detenu was rejected and it was intimated vide memo dated 15-2-2000. Therefore, it is clear that the Central Government, which is the third respondent in the earlier writ petition and the second respondent herein, the State Government, had rejected the representations made on behalf of the detenu and communicated to the detenu on 15-2-2000 and 12-2-2000 respectively. It is also not in dispute that the first respondent/ specially Empowered Authority , under Section 3 of the Act instead of taking any independent decision on the representation, simply forwarded the same to the second respondent for consideration. In view of the above facts, the point for our consideration is what is the effect of non-consideration of the representation by the first respondent. In view of the above facts, the point for our consideration is what is the effect of non-consideration of the representation by the first respondent. ( 11 ) IN support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri Sampath Kumar relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Santosh Anand v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 420 . This is a case where the order of detention was passed by the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, acting as specially Empowered Officer under Section 3 of the Act. When a representation was made to the said detaining authority by the detenu, even before considering the said representation, the detaining authority forwarded the same to the Advisory Board for its consideration. Untimately, the detenu therein was informed that his representation has been considered by the Administrator, Delhi, and was rejected. In those circumstances, the said detention was questioned before the Apex Court mainly on two grounds viz. , (a) that it was obligatory upon the detaining authority (Administrator) to consider the representation before sending it to the Advisory Board; and (b) that in any event the detenu s representation ought to have been considered and rejected by the detaining authority itself, namely, by the Chief Secretary, but the same had been straightway considered and rejected by the Administrator, who under Section 2 (f) of the Act was the State Government for the Junior Territory, thus depriving the detenu of his remedy to approach the Administrator as a higher authority after the rejection of his representation by the detaining authority. In those circumstances, the Apex Court in the said judgment, observed as under :-"we are of the view that the continued detention of the detenu under the order dated 3/04/1979 is liable to be quashed on the second ground about which facts are clear and there is no difficulty in accepting the same. In those circumstances, the Apex Court in the said judgment, observed as under :-"we are of the view that the continued detention of the detenu under the order dated 3/04/1979 is liable to be quashed on the second ground about which facts are clear and there is no difficulty in accepting the same. Under Article 22 (5), as interpreted by this Court, as also under the provisions of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act it is clear that a representation should be considered by the detaining authority, who on a consideration thereof can revoke the detention order and if the representation is rejected by detaining authority it is open to the detenu to approach the State Government for revocation of the order and failing that it is open to him to approach the Central Government to get the detention order revoked. " ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India, 1995 SCC (Cri) 643. In this case also a representation was made to the detaining authority, the Central Government and the Advisory Board. The said representation was rejected by the Central Government and it was not considered and decided independently by the detaining authority himself. On these set of facts, the Hon ble Supreme Court observed as under :-"since the appellant had submitted a representation to the detaining authority, namely, the officer who was specifically empowered to make an order of detention, and the said officer did not consider the representation there has been a denial of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. As a result the detention of the appellant has to be held to be illegal and the said appeal has to be allowed. " ( 13 ) THEIR Lordships also referred the questions of Division Bench of Bombay High Court to a Full Bench which are as follows :- (1) Has the Specially Empowered Officer under the COFEPOSA Act also an independent power to revoke the order of detention in view of Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act read with Section 1 of the General Clauses Act? (2) Are observations in Amirshad Khan regarding the power of revocation of Specially Empowered Officer under the COFEPOSA Act not binding on this Court? (2) Are observations in Amirshad Khan regarding the power of revocation of Specially Empowered Officer under the COFEPOSA Act not binding on this Court? (3) Does failure to take independent decision on revocation of order of detention by the Specially Empowered Officer under the COFEPOSA Act and merely forwarding the same with recommendation to reject, result in non-compliance with constitutional safeguard under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution? ( 14 ) THE Full Bench of Bombay High Court answered the questions Nos. 1 and 2 in affirmative, but the question No. 3 was answered in negative by holding that the failure on the part of the officer making the order of detention to consider the representation made by the detenu was of no consequence because the representation of the detenu was in fact, in effect and in substance, considered by the Finance Minister which was an appropriate authority for the purpose of consideration of such a representation. While considering the above finding on question No. 3 of the Bombay High Court, their Lordships have also referred the decision in Santosh Anand s case ( 1981 (2) SCC 420 ) (supra), their Lordships have taken note of the fact that the Bombay High Court had distinguished the Santosh Anand s case (supra) taking into account the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sat Pal v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 12 : (1981 Cri LJ 1867) and Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 10 : (1983 Cri LJ 629), and observed by that the abovementioned 2 decisions which were relied upon by the Bombay High Court do not detract from the law laid down in Santosh Anand s case (supra) and held that :"we are therefore unable to uphold the answer given by the Full Bench to question No. 3, in our view, the said question should be answered in affirmative. On that basis it has to be held that since there is denial of constitutional safeguard provided to the detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. On account of the failure on the part of the officer who had made the order of detention to independently consider the representation submitted by the detenu against his detention and to take a decision on the said representation, the further detention is rendered illegal. On account of the failure on the part of the officer who had made the order of detention to independently consider the representation submitted by the detenu against his detention and to take a decision on the said representation, the further detention is rendered illegal. " ( 15 ) THEREFORE, it can safely be concluded that the principle laid down in Santosh Anand s case ( 1981 (2) SCC 420 ) (supra) holds good. ( 16 ) IN Kamleshkumar Iswardas Patel v. Union of India, 1995 SCC (Cri) 643 (supra), while dealing with the Special Leave Petition (Criminal W. P. No. 284 of 1994), their Lordships further held that :"one of the contention that has been urged on behalf of the appellant before this Court was that he had addressed a joint representation dated 14-9-1993 to the detaining authority, the Central Government and the Advisory Board, and the same was submitted through the Superintendent, Bombay Central Prison, and that the said representation was rejected by the Central Government and it was not considered and decided independently by the detaining authority himself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Since the appellant had submitted a representation to the detaining authority, namely, the officer who was specially empowered to make an order of detention, and the said officer did not consider the representation, there has been a denial of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and as a result of detention of the appellant has to be held to be illegal. " ( 17 ) NOW the scheme of the COFEPOSA Act envisaged under Sections 3 and 11 is abundantly clear by a combined reading of the decisions rendered in Santosh Anand s case (supra) and Kamaleshkumar Ishwardas Patel s case (supra) and the following would emerge. (A) An order of detention can be made by : (i) The Central Government; (ii) An officer specially empowered by the Central Government; or (iii) The State Government; or (iv) An officer specially empowered by the State Government. (A) An order of detention can be made by : (i) The Central Government; (ii) An officer specially empowered by the Central Government; or (iii) The State Government; or (iv) An officer specially empowered by the State Government. (b) An order made by the officer specially empowered by the State Government can be revoked by the State Government as well as by the Central Government; an order made by the State Government can be revoked by the Central Government and an order made by the officer specially empowered by the Central Government can be revoked by the Central Government. (c) The confirmation of this power on Central Government and State Government does not however detract from the power that is available to the authority i. e. , specially empowered that has made the order of detention to revoke it. (d) The power of revocation conferred on the Central Government and the State Government under Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of COFEPOSA Act, is an addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention. In the light of the very language used in sub-section (1) i. e. , "subject to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act", a representation against an order of detention made by an officer specially empowered by the State Government, can be made to the officer who has made the order as well as to the State Government and the Central Government who are competent to revoke the order. Similarly, the representation against an order made by the State Government can be made to the State Government as well as to the Central Government and the representation against an order made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government, can be made to the officer who has made the order as well as to the Central Government. (e) The primary duty to consider the representation is cast upon the detaining authority i. e. , Specially Empowered Officer and upon such consideration the order of detention can be revoked. Further, the non-consideration of such representation by such authority amounts to denial of constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. (e) The primary duty to consider the representation is cast upon the detaining authority i. e. , Specially Empowered Officer and upon such consideration the order of detention can be revoked. Further, the non-consideration of such representation by such authority amounts to denial of constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. However, if the representation is rejected by the detaining authority, it is open to the detenu to approach the State Government for revocation of the order and failing that it is again open for the detenu to approach the Central Government to get the detention order revoked. This would also avoid a contingency of divergent decisions being rendered, in the event of representations made simultaneously to all the competent authorities to revoke the order of detention under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. ( 18 ) COMING to the case on hand, it is admitted that the first respondent/specially Empowered Officer, is the authority who made the order of detention. Representations were made on behalf of the detenu simultaneously to the first respondent, the second respondent/state Government and the Central Government. The first respondent had simply forwarded the copy of the representation received by him through the second respondent to the State Government and the same was rejected by the second respondent. Therefore, the action on the part of the first respondent in simply forwarding the matter to the State Government without considering the representation and not passing an independent order, in our view, is denial of constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. ( 19 ) IT has also been brought to our notice about a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4678 of 1996, dated 25-4-1996 (reported in 1996 Cri LJ 4178), a case where the representation was referred to the Advisory Board which gave its report and in consonance with that report, the order of detention was confirmed by the State Government and it was contended that such order was illegal inasmuch as the Specially Empowered Officer did not pass any independent order. The Division Bench of this Court having relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamaleshkumar Iswardas Patel v. Union of India, 1995 SCC (Cri) 643 (supra), quashed the order of detention. The Division Bench of this Court having relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamaleshkumar Iswardas Patel v. Union of India, 1995 SCC (Cri) 643 (supra), quashed the order of detention. Therefore, in view of the foregoing reasons and the decisions given of the Apex Court in Santosh Kumar s case ( 1981 (2) SCC 420 ) (supra), as well as Kamaleshkumar Ishwardas Patel s case (supra), we hold that the inaction on the part of the first respondent in simply forwarding the matter without considering and passing an independent order and the consequent order passed by the State Government rejecting the representation of the detenu amounts to denial of constitutional right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the detention of the alleged detenu i. e. , B. Siva Prasad is illegal and accordingly, the order of detention, dated 10-1-2000 made by the first respondent/specially Empowered Officer is hereby quashed. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we also hold that the order of rejection made by the Central Government referred to in the earlier judgment in Writ Petition No. 1338 of 2000, dated 13-3-2000, is also liable to be set aside and, accordingly is set aside. Petition allowed.