Judgment :- The petitioner was working as Revenue Inspector in the Land Revenue Department of the State. He was due to retire from service on superannuation on 31-12-1996. On 9-12-1996, about 22 days before his retirement, he was arrested by the police in a criminal case. Consequent on the registration of a crime case. Case No. 7/96 under S. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the Vigilance Police Station, Palakkad, the District Collector placed him under suspension by an order dated 12-12-1996. The case against the petitioner was that he, while working as special Revenue Inspector, Land Tribunal, Mannarkad by misusing his position, demanded a sum of Rs. 1, 000/- from one Sri C. M. Varghese as illegal gratification in connection with the issue of Pattayam for an extent of 1.09 acres of land. The Special Judge, Vigilance, Kozhikode convicted the petitioner for charges under S. 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by judgment dated 21-10-1998. He was sentenced to undergo punishment of rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 10, 000/- was imposed. The petitioner filed appeal against the said judgment before this Court as Crl. A. 884/1998 and got the sentence suspended pending appeal While so, the appointing authority, namely the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Thiruvananthapuram by order dated 29-9-1999 (Ext. P1) dismissed the petitioner from service with effect from the date of suspension on the ground that his conduct which led to his conviction on a charge made it undesirable to his retention in service. It is this order which is impugned in this Original Petition. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that Ext. P1 order is passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, in that, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against the imposition of maximum penalty of dismissal from service. In support of the said contention, he relied on the decision of the Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Mohanan 2000 (1) KLT 129 (2000 Lab. IC 635). The counsel further submitted that the petitioner was suspended for the alleged offence on 9-12-1996 when he had only 22 days more to retire from service on superannuation. In support of the said contention, he relied on the decision of the Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Mohanan 2000 (1) KLT 129 (2000 Lab. IC 635). The counsel further submitted that the petitioner was suspended for the alleged offence on 9-12-1996 when he had only 22 days more to retire from service on superannuation. He further submitted that if an opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against the imposition of the maximum penalty, he would have certainly brought to the notice all these facts to the authority, who issued Ext. P1 and requested for a lesser punishment. He accordingly submitted that Ext. P1 is non est in law. Smt. P. V. Asha, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that it is not the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case but the conduct of the petitioner which led to the conviction which is decisive in the matter and that since the offence which led to the conviction is a serious matter involving moral turpitude it is undesirable to keep the employee in service and therefore, even if an opportunity is to be given it is only an empty formality. The Government pleader relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kumaran v. State of Kerala 2000 (1) KLJ 247 and also the decisions of the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1999 (5) JT SC 114, (AIR 1999 SC 2583), Trikha Ram v. V. K. Seth AIR 1988 SC 285 (1988 Lab. IC 383) and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 (1985 Lab. IC 1393).As already noted, the main contention taken by the petitioner is that the dismissal order (Ext. P1) is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. Contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that since the petitioner was due to retire on 31-12-1996, the question of continuation in service was only for a period of 22 days but for the suspension based on the alleged offence committed by the petitioner. His further submission is that even if some moral turpitute is involved, since the petitioner was due to retire after 22 days, certainly it would have been a matter for consideration by the authorities as to whether the maximum penalty of dismissal from service should be imposed. His further submission is that even if some moral turpitute is involved, since the petitioner was due to retire after 22 days, certainly it would have been a matter for consideration by the authorities as to whether the maximum penalty of dismissal from service should be imposed. In other words, if an opportunity was given to the petitioner, he would have been in a position to pursuade the respondents by way of written submissions to impose a lesser punishment so as not to deprive the petitioner of the retirement benefits. So, the question that has to be considered is as to whether there was an obligation on the part of the respondent to afford an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before issuing the dismissal order. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the said question in State of Kerala v. Mohanan 2000 (1) KLT 129 (2000 Lab IC 635). That was a case in which a lower Division Clerk in the Officer of Chief Engineer, IDRB was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Trivandrum and sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine Rs. 1, 01, 000/- for an offence under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Chief Engineer, considered the conduct of the said person, which led to the conviction, found that his retention was undesirable and issued the order dismissing him from service. The dismissal order was challenged on the ground that execution of sentence has been suspended in appeal and that no opportunity was granted before order of dismissal was passed. The stand of the employer was that in view of the order of conviction, further retention of respondent in service was undesirable in public interest. The learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petition, held that since no show cause notice was issued in order to enable the employee to putforth his objections and explanations, order of dismissal is bad. Accordingly direction was issued to reinstate the employee in service. In appeal, the Division Bench considered the matter in the light of the provisions of rule 18 of the Kerala Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 and found that the said rule did not specifically provide for grant of any opportunity but observed that that per se would not rule out application of principles of natural justice. In appeal, the Division Bench considered the matter in the light of the provisions of rule 18 of the Kerala Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 and found that the said rule did not specifically provide for grant of any opportunity but observed that that per se would not rule out application of principles of natural justice. The Division Bench then considered the matter in the light of the decisions of the English Courts as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court and observed as follows :- (at Page 637-638, of Lab. IC)."6. the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute, what particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression civil consequences encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life." The Division Bench confirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It was observed that the appropriate authority can pass such order as deemed proper under relevant statutory provisions taking into account conviction recorded by learned Magistrate. The same Division Bench considered an identical situation in Kumaran v. State of Kerala 2000 (1) KLJ 247. The appellant in that case was convicted by the Special Judge, Trichur in C.C. No. 9 of 1998 in respect of offences relatable to Ss. 7 and 13(2) read with S. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The same Division Bench considered an identical situation in Kumaran v. State of Kerala 2000 (1) KLJ 247. The appellant in that case was convicted by the Special Judge, Trichur in C.C. No. 9 of 1998 in respect of offences relatable to Ss. 7 and 13(2) read with S. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In criminal appeal this Court passed an order that in the light of the submission that the petitioner faces a dismissal order, there will be a stay of operation of the judgment of the trial Court and the order convicting the accused also will stand suspended for a period of six months. The appointing authority removed the petitioner from service. This was challenged in the writ petition. Initially an interim order was passed which was later vacated. The appeal is filed against the interim order vacating the stay. The Division Bench considered the question as to whether the appellant can be allowed to continue in service on the basis of the order suspending the sentence passed in the criminal appeal. The Division Bench, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera AIR 1995 SC 1364 (1995 Lab. IC 1615) held that the relevant fact is the conduct of a government servant, who had been convicted of a criminal charge and that since the appellant has been found guilty of corruption by the criminal Court until the said conviction is set aside by the appellate or higher Court, it may not be advisable to permit him to continue in service. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 (1985 Lab. IC 1393) considered the question in the context of Article 311(2) second and the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. In that case, the High Court held that no opportunity had been afforded to the respondent before imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on him and further held that the impugned order was defective inasmuch as it did not indicate the circumstances which were considered by the disciplinary authority except the fact of conviction of the respondent. The Supreme Court did not agree with the two reasonings of the High Court for setting aside the order of compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court did not agree with the two reasonings of the High Court for setting aside the order of compulsory retirement. The Court observed that it was not necessary to give to the respondent any opportunity of hearing before imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on him. It was also held that the circumstances which were taken into account by the disciplinary authority have been sufficiently set out in the order of compulsory retirement, they being that the respondent's conviction under s. 332 of the Indian Penal Code and the nature of the offence committed which led the disciplinary authority to the conclusion that the further retention of the respondent in the public interest was undesirable.The question as to whether or not a person, who was convicted for a criminal offence, should have been heard by the disciplinary authority before imposing the punishment, again came up before the Supreme Court in Trikha Ram v. V. K. Seth AIR 1988 SC 285 (1988 Lab. IC 383) where the Supreme Court relying on its earlier decision in Tulsiram Patel's case mentioned supra, held that no such opportunity is contemplated. The Supreme Court in Municipal Committee v. Krishnan (C.A. No. 4120/96 dt. 19-12-1996) 1996 (2) KLT SN 28, Case No. 26 (1996 Lab. IC 1056) held that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any punishment other than dismissal and that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India 1999 (5) JT SC 114 (AIR 1999 SC 2583) held that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice and that the Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order, if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law. It was further held that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice. It was further held that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice. From the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that in a case where an employee is convicted for a criminal offence the disciplinary authority before imposing the punishment on the ground that the continuance of the said employee in service is undesirable, is not obliged to afford the said employee an opportunity of being heard. It is all the more so in a case where the conviction is on charges involving corruption. The Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohanan 2000 (1) KLT 129 (2000 Lab. IC 635) did not consider the matter in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned earlier and had gone on the principles regarding the requirement of complying with the principles of natural justice even in cases where the statute does not provide for such an opportunity.The present is a case where the petitioner was convicted for offences involving corruption. As such, there cannot be a punishment other than sending out the petitioner from service, for the continuance of such a person in service will be opposed to public interest. If that is the only punishment, that can be given no useful purpose will be served even if an opportunity is granted to the petitioner in which case the decision of the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta's case mentioned supra will apply and no prejudice will be caused to the petitioner in such circumstances. In the instant case, as already noted, the petitioner was due to retire from service on 31-12-1996. He was suspended from service on a crime case being charged by the Vigilance Police for offences under S. 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and he was later dismissed from service on his conviction for the said charges. In such circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner is such that it is undesirable to retain him in service. There are different methods of sending a person out of service. Rule 11 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Clauses (vi) to (viii) provide for the same. In such circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner is such that it is undesirable to retain him in service. There are different methods of sending a person out of service. Rule 11 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Clauses (vi) to (viii) provide for the same. Clause (vi) provides for compulsory retirement; Clause (vii) provides for removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment unless otherwise directed specifically and clause (viii) provides for dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. One of the three punishments mentioned above must be awarded to a person, who is undesirable to be continued in service, is certainly a matter for consideration by the disciplinary authority. The gravity of the offence which led to the conviction which has got a relation to the conduct of the employee, his past conduct in service which has been rendered by the petitioner, the remaining period of service, are all relevant matters which have to be considered by the disciplinary authority in the matter of awarding anyone of the three punishments mentioned above provided in Rule 11 of the Rules. Though the rules, namely Rule 11 of the Rules does not provide for an opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the punishment, is being imposed as held by the Division Bench in 2000 (1) KLT 129 (2000 Lab. IC 635), fairness demands that an opportunity should be given to the person before taking a decision as to which among the three punishments should be awarded. It is seen that the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel's case was concerned with a case of complusory retirement for an offence of the nature involved in the present case. Trikha Ram's case considered by the Supreme Court was a case of a Government servant who was awarded the punishment of dismissal from service which would disqualify him from future government service. The dismissal was on the ground of conviction in a criminal offence. Trikha Ram's case considered by the Supreme Court was a case of a Government servant who was awarded the punishment of dismissal from service which would disqualify him from future government service. The dismissal was on the ground of conviction in a criminal offence. The Supreme Court considering the provisions of S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which provided that an offender who has been released on probation shall not suffer disqualification attaching to a conviction of the offence for which he has been convicted notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, observed that instead of dismissing him from service he should have been removed from service so that the order of punishment did not operate as a bar and disqualification for future employment with the Government. The Supreme Court accordingly converted the order of dismissal into an order of removal from service. I have referred to the said two decisions in this context only to point out that a discretion is vested in the disciplinary authority to award any one of the three punishments mentioned above having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.The fact that the conviction of the petitioner for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act has been confirmed is not disputed. The petitioner was also kept out of service from 9-12-1996 i.e. the date on which the Vigilance Police registered the case, is also not disputed. However, 22 days' service more remained for the petitioner to retire from service on superannuation. In the above circumstances, it is for the disciplinary authority to consider certainly taking into account the petitioner's past conduct and other relevant matter to decide as to whether the ends of justice would be met, if the punishment of compulsory retirement or removal from service alone is warranted. Awarding any of the said two punishments will not affect the public interest, for, the public interest only demands that such a person should not be retained in service. Awarding any of the said two punishments will not affect the public interest, for, the public interest only demands that such a person should not be retained in service. Thus, though the Government servant, who is convicted on a criminal charge has no right for being heard by the disciplinary authority before awarding the punishment as held by the Supreme Court, since a discretion is vested in the disciplinary authority in awarding any one of the three major punishments mentioned above, I am of the view that fairness demands that the respondents should be directed to consider the limited question of choosing the one from the three punishments provided in Clause (vi), (vii) and (viii) of rule 11 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 afresh. Accordingly, there will be a direction to the second respondent to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the directions contained herein above. The petitioner will be afforded an opportunity to make his representations in that regard and the second respondent will decide the matter after considering the said written representations.The original petition is allowed to the limited extent mentioned above. Petition allowed.