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2000 DIGILAW 486 (MAD)

Maya Thevar v. Tirumangalam Badrakali Mariamman Devasthanam, represented by its Hereditary Trustee P. P. P. C. Soundararajan at Tirumangalam Town, Madurai District

2000-04-25

B.AKBAR BASHA KHADIRI

body2000
Judgment : The defendant before the trial court has come forward with the instant appeal. 2. This appeal has arisen in this way: The plaintiff-Devesthanam instituted suits against several persons for declaration of title and for possession of certain properties. The appellant is the defendant in O.S.No.54 of 1981. According to the plaintiff/respondent, the suit property is temple property known as Kaluvetra pottal. and the defendant/appellant has committed encroachment in a portion of this property. He is denying the plaintiffs title. Therefore, the suit is for declaration of title and possession. 3. Thedefendant/appellant herein contended that the property is not ‘kaluvetra pottal’, but kollar thidal; that he had put up a pucca tiled construction in ‘kollar thidal’, regarding which the plaintiff cannot seek relief. Both the trial court and appellate court have concurrently held that the document referred to by the defendant is not the suit property that the suit property is ‘kaluvetra pottal’, that the defendant is in possession of the area marked by the Commissioner in Ex.C-2 that his possession is wrongful possession and that he had not perfected the title to this property. Accordingly, they have passed judgments in the favour of the plaintiff/respondent herein. 4. The two points raised by the appellant in this appeal are that the suit is not maintainable without a prayer for mandatory injunction, and that the defendants claim for adverse possession has not been properly appreciated. 5. So far as adverse possession is concerned. the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nac-vi, nec-clam and nac-precario, that is that it should be peaceful, upon and continuous. The possession must be actual, visible, exclusive hostile and continued for the statutory period. It pre-supposes admission of the defendant that the property is that of the plaintiff, but he has been in possession for the statutory period to the knowledge of the plaintiff asserting his right to remain in possession of the property. But, in the instant case, the defendant/appellant had pleaded that the suit property does not at all belong to the plaintiff/respondent. When that is the case, it cannot be said that his possession is adverse to that of the plaintiff for him to set up adverse possession. But, in the instant case, the defendant/appellant had pleaded that the suit property does not at all belong to the plaintiff/respondent. When that is the case, it cannot be said that his possession is adverse to that of the plaintiff for him to set up adverse possession. Further possession is a question of fact and the extent of the possession is an inference of the fact having regard to nature of the subject and the possession of which it is susceptible. Whether possession in a particular case is adverse or not depends upon the particular circumstances proved in the case. I do not think that the defendant/appellant can agitate the same as question of law much less substantial question of law because substantial question of law refers to such question which is of general importance or of public interest. In the instant case, the question whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession is neither proved nor it can be considered as a question of law in the instant case. 6. The next point urged by the defendant/appellant is that the plaintiff/respondent ought to have prayed for mandatory injunction for removal of the superstructure. Even this point does not give room for a question of law. It is fairly a question of fact whether or not there is a superstructure in the suit premises. In the plaint, the suit premises is described as a vacant site. According to the defendant/appellant herein he has put up a superstructure in the property. As rightly pointed out by the courts below, the document filed by the defendant/appellant herein relates to a mud-walled tiled house put up in Survey No.10/21/B in an extent of one cent, where as the suit property is Survey No.10/3, the total extent of which is 33 cents. There is no room for any doubt that the superstructure referred to by the defendant/appellant herein is in a different property. Therefore, mandatory injunction need not be sought for. Whether or not the plaintiff should seek mandatory injunction, is not a substantial question of law to be considered in second appeal under Sec.100, C.P.C. 7. In the result, this second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgments of the courts below, with cost of the respondent.