JUDGMENT : R.J. KOCHAR, J. 1. The Petitioner having joined the Respondent Corporation in the year 1965 as a trainee apprentice, he reached the promotional post of Divisional Engineer (Electrical) from the preceding ppst of Junior Engineer (Electrical). By an order dated 1.7.1982 the Petitioner was promoted as Divisional Engineer (Electrical) in the pay-scale of Rs. 680-1250. By the said order his promotion was subjected to one year's probation from the date he was to take over the charge of the post of the Divisional Engineer (Electrical) at Aurangabad. Accordingly, he took charge on 1.7.1982. The probation period of the Petitioner was to expire on 30.6.1983. It appears that by an order dated 17.4.1984 the probationary period of the Petitioner was extended upto 31.7.1984. By a subsequent order dated 27.6.1985 the Petitioner was reverted to his original post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) in Class III State Cadre alleging that his work during the probationary period was not found satisfactory. The Petitioner appears to have joined the post of Junior Engineer on his reversion. However, being aggrieved by the said order of reversion he also filed a complaint of unfair labour practice under Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 complaining against the Respondents about the reversion order passed against him in violation of the service rules and regulations and the General Standing Orders prevailing in the Respondent Corporation as service conditions applicable to the employees and determining and defining the employer employee relationship between them. The Petitioner also challenged the order of reversion being in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation of the General Standing Orders as the reversion order was not preceded by a domestic enquiry as contemplated under the rules, as it was stigmatised, it amounted to be a punitive order and therefore, in breach of the service rules and regulations and General Standing Orders. Under all these circumstances the Petitioner complained of an unfair labour practice within the meaning of item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. In addition to the aforesaid grounds of challenge another specific ground of challenge was that the authority which passed the impugned order of reversion had no power to pass such an order as it was not prescribed competent authority under the rules. In addition to the aforesaid grounds of challenge another specific ground of challenge was that the authority which passed the impugned order of reversion had no power to pass such an order as it was not prescribed competent authority under the rules. The Respondent Corporation appeared before the Industrial Court and opposed the complaint by filing its written statement. The Respondents questioned the maintainability of the complaint itself as according to them the Petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, he could not file the complaint under the provisions of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. According to the Respondents the Petitioner was performing supervisory, managerial and administrative duties and therefore, he did not fall within the four corners of the definition of the workman given under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By the present impugned order the Industrial Court has held that the Petitioner was a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act on the basis of his duties and held that his complaint was maintainable under the provisions of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. There is no challenge to this order by the Corporation. After answering the aforesaid issue the learned Member of the Industrial Court proceeded to decide the complaint on its merits and dismissed the same by the impugned order. 2. The Petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the aforesaid order of the Industrial. Court dismissing his complaint. Shri Pradeep Shahane, the learned advocate for the Petitioner has challenged the judgment and order of the Industrial Court being totally illegal and improper and perverse. 3. According to him there is total non-application of mind to the facts and the law and therefore, he has drawn my attention to the foundational facts in this matter. He has challenged the order of the reversion on the following grounds: (i) The order was not passed by the competent authority. (ii) There is no power vested in the Corporation to issue any order of reversion after promotion of any employee. He has challenged the order of the reversion on the following grounds: (i) The order was not passed by the competent authority. (ii) There is no power vested in the Corporation to issue any order of reversion after promotion of any employee. (iii) The period of probation prescribed under the rules is one year and if it is required to be extended in that case it was mandatory for the competent authority to consider the material concerning the Petitioner to decide whether the probationary period should be extended or not. According to him the maximum period of probation prescribed was one year subject to the decision of the competent authority to extend the same on the basis of the material before him. There is no specific order passed by the competent authority to extend the probationary period of the Petitioner after the expiry of one year i.e. 22.6.1983. Having completed the period of probation of one year on 22.6.1983, the Petitioner stood confirmed in the employment of the Corporation and he ceased to be on probation as there was no specific order by the competent authority to extend the said period of probation before the expiry of the probationary period of one year. (iv) The impugned order of reversion was punitive as it was passed on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. There was no material to indicate that the work of the Petitioner was not satisfactory and there was no communication of any nature to him at any time and there was no enquiry held against him and that no opportunity of hearing was given to him before the impugned punitive order of reversion was passed. As against the aforesaid submissions of Shri Shahane, Shri P.K. Joshi, learned advocate for the Respondents has supported the judgment and order of the Industrial Court and has pointed out that since there was no specific order of confirmation passed by the Respondents, the Petitioner continued to be on probation even after the expiry of one year's period. He also pointed out the order dated 17.4.1984. He also pointed out the order dated 17.4.1984. According to him the probation period was deemed to have been extended and that the Petitioner was not deemed to have been confirmed and that his work was not found satisfactory, he was rightly reverted and there was no necessity of holding any Domestic Enquiry against him as his work was assessed by his superiors and they came to the conclusion that there were 11 deficiencies found in his work and therefore, he was rightly reverted. Shri Joshi, also submitted that the order of reversion was not punitive in the sense of inflicting any punishment but was only indicating that he was being reverted as his work was not found satisfactory. Shri Joshi, has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Mishra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 and Pratap Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1979) 4 SCC 263 . 4. I have heard both the learned advocates and I have carefully gone through the proceedings including the impugned judgment of the Industrial Court. As far as the issue of the Petitioner not being a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned the Respondents have accepted the findings of the Industrial Court as they have not challenged that part of the order of the Industrial Court. They have not filed any cross petition or cross objections. They have not filed any return or affidavit in reply before this court. 5. The complainant has examined himself before the Industrial Court while the Respondents preferred not to examine any witness before the Court nor did they produce any documentary evidence in support of their case to justify their action of reversion of the Petitioner to the post of the Junior Engineer and to prove the allegations of work during the probationary period being not found satisfactory though, they have whispered in their written statement that there were more or less 11 deficiencies found in the work of the Petitioner during the period after the expiry of the initial period of one year and from 17.4.1984 onwards. It is significant to note that the Respondents have not examined any witness before the Industrial Court to prove any alleged communication to the Petitioner about all or even one of the 11 deficiencies in the work of the Petitioner. It is significant to note that the Respondents have not examined any witness before the Industrial Court to prove any alleged communication to the Petitioner about all or even one of the 11 deficiencies in the work of the Petitioner. There is not only no evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondents to prove the alleged communication of the 11 deficiencies but also there is no iota of evidence about the so-called 11 deficiencies in the work of the Petitioner. 6. As far as the attack of Shri Shahane, on the competence of the authority which passed the impugned order of reversion, I find no substance in the submissions of Shri Shahane. Shri Joshi has rightly pointed out that the Deputy General Manager, who passed the order of reversion was duly empowered by a Resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Corporation empowering the Deputy General Manager to pass such orders on behalf of the Vice-Chairman and the Managing Director of the Corporation. I therefore, agree with Shri Joshi, that there is no infirmity or illegality in the order of the reversion passed by the Deputy General Manager. According to me he was well within his powers to pass the impugned order of reversion as against the Petitioner. 7. Shri Joshi, has further submitted that the Petitioner having not been specifically confirmed by any order of confirmation he continued to be on probation forever and since he was not confirmed, he was deemed to be on probation and therefore, he could be reverted even without holding any enquiry for his not satisfactory work for which the Petitioner was reverted. It was the contention of Shri Shahane, that under the rules the probation period prescribed was one year. He further points out that if the period was to be extended it was for the competent authority to consider the question of extension of the probation period and since in the present case the competent authority did not take any action till 17.4.1984 when his period of probation was extended upto 31.7.1984, the Petitioner was still continued to be on probation. According to Shri Shahane, this belated decision of the competent authority was simply arbitrary and unreasonable. The initial period of probation had expired on 22.6.1983 and the Petitioner continued in the promoted post without any specific order of extension required to be passed under the rules. According to Shri Shahane, this belated decision of the competent authority was simply arbitrary and unreasonable. The initial period of probation had expired on 22.6.1983 and the Petitioner continued in the promoted post without any specific order of extension required to be passed under the rules. In my considered opinion, the probation period having not been specifically extended for a period of more than 10 months, it cannot be held that the competent authority has acted in accordance with the rules for more than two reasons. The competent authority ought to have acted immediately after the expiry of initial period of one year. The competent authority should have taken decision expeditiously as possible and within a reasonable period. The competent authority waited for more than 10 months to decide to extend the initial period of probation. There is no reason brought on record why there was a delay of more than 10 months in deciding the question of extension of the probation period. The Petitioner or for that matter any employee or servant similarly situated cannot be kept under an animated position hanging for indefinite period. Such a situation of not confirming a probationer after the expiry of the initial probationary period of one year during which there was absolutely no complaint of any nature gives scope to infer even mala fides on the part of such an authority. In the present case during the initial period of one year there was not even a whisper of grievance or complaint against the working of the Petitioner. Had there been any such grievance or complaint that would have been found on record but the Petitioner was never communicated at any time, where he was lacking and what were his shortcoming and in what way he was to improve his working. Having waited for such a long period of 10 months after the expiry of the initial period of probation the competent authority appears to have woke up from its slumber to have extended the period of probation upto 31.7.1984. The rules required that the competent authority must record reasons for such extension of the probation period. There is nothing on record that the Petitioner's case was placed before the competent authority after the expiry of the probationary period of one year. The rules required that the competent authority must record reasons for such extension of the probation period. There is nothing on record that the Petitioner's case was placed before the competent authority after the expiry of the probationary period of one year. In view of the order dated 17.4.1984 even if we assume that the Petitioner's case was placed before the competent authority, it was incumbent on the part of the competent authority to have recorded reasons for his decision to order extension of probationary period. I am not able to agree with Shri Joshi, when he says that there is no time bound programme prescribed in the said rule and therefore, the competent authority was free to act in accordance with its whims at any time as it thought fit. Such a construction cannot be placed on the rule under consideration. It says that on the expiry of the initial probation period the case should be placed before the competent authority. Since there is no time prescribed it is assumed that the concerned officers must act as expeditiously as possible and as efficiently as they can. It would be in the interest of the administration to take such decisions as early as possible and at least within a reasonable period which according to me would not exceed one month. To place the construction which Shri Joshi, wants me would encourage lethargy and inefficiency in the functioning of the Public Corporations. The second reason for the arbitrary and unreasonable action of the competent authority in passing the order dated 17.4.1984 is that no reasons, there is not even a ghost of any reason in the said order why the extension period was extended upto 31.7.1984. The relevant rule 44 makes it abundantly clear that the competent authority if it decides to extend the period of probation, it must record reasons. In the present case, the competent authority has failed to record reasons not only for its delayed decision but also for extending the period of probation. There is another very crucial and pertinent aspect which also cannot be lost sight of. That even after the expiry of the so-called extension of the so-called period of probation upto 31.7.1984 even thereafter the competent authority and all other authorities have kept quiet. There is another very crucial and pertinent aspect which also cannot be lost sight of. That even after the expiry of the so-called extension of the so-called period of probation upto 31.7.1984 even thereafter the competent authority and all other authorities have kept quiet. After the expiry of the so-called period of probation also there is no whisper and there is no ghost of reason on record anywhere why he was not issued a specific order of confirmation till the order of reversion was passed after a period of about 11 months. Even in this order of reversion except stating that his work was not satisfactory, there is no other reason and particulars are found anywhere on record. If indeed, the work of the Petitioner was not satisfactory during the initial period of probation and even during the so-called extension of the probation period at least, one memo communicating the shortfalls or shortcoming or deficiencies of the Petitioner would have been placed on record. There is not even an iota of such evidence on the record. In such situation according to me any reasonable man would infer mala fides on the part of the competent authority particularly when there is absolutely no reason anywhere for its failure to extend the initial period of probation within a reasonable period, for its failure to record reasons anywhere for the first extension of the period and even thereafter the silence maintained by the competent authority according to me is disturbing, to say the least. This is not the way the public authorities and the competent authorities are expected to behave. Such lethargy and inefficiency on the part of the competent authorities are required to be firmly and sternly dealt with as it causes tremendous loss to the public Corporations and thereby to the public at large. In the present case if the competent authority had behaved efficiently or at least with reasonable efficiency the public Corporation would not have been required to sustain the avoidable loss which would be incurred in the present case. The decisions do not seem to be bona fide. In the present case if the competent authority had behaved efficiently or at least with reasonable efficiency the public Corporation would not have been required to sustain the avoidable loss which would be incurred in the present case. The decisions do not seem to be bona fide. In these circumstances, and in the peculiar situation of this case I hold that the initial probationary period of one year having not been specifically extended by a reasoned order as mandated by Rule 44 the Petitioner must be held to have been confirmed after the expiry of the probationary period. The subsequent delayed order dated 17.4.1984 purported to extend the probation is of no consequence at all. It appears that it was passed as a face saving step taken by the competent authority, otherwise it would have been required to explain the reasons for not extending the period of probation immediately. I repeat that there are absolutely no reasons and there is absolutely no evidence and material on record to substantiate the charge of the Petitioner's work not being satisfactory and that he had committed 11 so-called deficiencies. The so-called deficiencies which are put forward by the Corporation are classically vague and too general which could be levelled against anyone. There is not even a single instance for any of the 11 deficiencies committed by the Petitioner. Indeed if the Petitioner was so inefficient and incompetent at least one such memo or letter advising him to improve would have been on record. The order dated 17.4.1984 speaks volumes as in that order the competent authority has kept silence in respect of work of the Petitioner. The competent authority does not even whisper in that order that the work of the Petitioner was not satisfactory and therefore, the probationary period was extended. In that letter itself the competent authority could have referred to the so-called 11 deficiencies for which the competent authority was compelled to extend the probationary period. The whole action of the Respondent Corporation is therefore, vitiated when the Petitioner's probationary period was extended and after the expiry of the extended period there was lull for 11 months. According to me, therefore, under the rules the Petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed. According to me there is no quarrel with the decisions and ratios laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments (supra). According to me, therefore, under the rules the Petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed. According to me there is no quarrel with the decisions and ratios laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments (supra). In the case of Pratapsingh the Supreme Court has overruled its earlier judgment given in the case of Dwarkadas and has reiterated its decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, quoted in paragraph 3. From the said quotation it is clear that there were no specific rules in respect of probation and confirmation. In the case of Dharam Singh it appears that the initial period was specified and the incumbent continued in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation. In the absence of any rules as is reflected from paragraph 3 it is clear that there were no rules in respect of probation and extension of the probation period. It appears that in the case of Dharam Singh employee had contended that after the expiry of the specified period of probation in the appointment order he should be deemed to be confirmed. The Supreme Court has negatived the said contention. In the second judgment cited by Shri Joshi, in the case of A.K. Mishra (supra) the facts were quite different. The probationer was required to undergo successfully, two conditions precedent, one successful completion of the probation period and second passing of a departmental examination. If the incumbent were to be confirmed in that case he had to satisfy the aforesaid two conditions precedent. In the absence of satisfying any one of the conditions there was no right to get confirmed in the post after expiry of the probation period. In our case there is no such condition precedent, and therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable. According to me therefore, the Petitioner could not be held to have continued on probation till he was reverted. The interval between the two points is unreasonable and has not been explained by the competent authority. The inaction or omission on the part of the competent authority smacks of mala fides. The probation period must be in conformity with the rules to avoid any arbitrary and mala fide action on the part of the employer. It cannot be left to the whims of the employer. The inaction or omission on the part of the competent authority smacks of mala fides. The probation period must be in conformity with the rules to avoid any arbitrary and mala fide action on the part of the employer. It cannot be left to the whims of the employer. In the present case the Respondents have not acted in accordance with the rules and therefore, the Petitioner cannot be deprived of his legitimate right of getting confirmation in accordance with the rules. The consequence of arbitrary omission and inaction on the part of the Respondents made out by the Respondents in the present case is that the Petitioner was on probation and therefore, he could be reverted as his work was not found satisfactory during the probation period. It would be totally unreasonable to accept the construction of limitless period of probation and therefore, the rules of the Corporation required an expedient action on the part of the competent authority to decide the question of extension or otherwise of the probation period of any probation. By the inaction and omission on the part of the Respondents the Petitioner is seriously prejudiced as he was reverted during the so-called probation period without any opportunity of hearing and without getting any reasons for such reversion. The Respondent Corporation cannot take advantage of its serious wrongs whereby the Petitioner is seriously prejudiced. 8. As far as the merits of the reversion order is concerned the reason recorded in the reversion order is that the work of the Petitioner was not found satisfactory during the probationary period. The reversion order is not simpliciter, it carries stigma. Ex-facie the order is punitive warranting at least a semblance of opportunity of hearing to be afforded to the Petitioner. Not only the Petitioner was not given any memos, any letters regarding the so-called 11 deficiencies which were brought for the first time before the Industrial Court. The competent authority did not enter into witness box to substantiate the so-called 11 deficiencies amounting to the unsatisfactory work of the Petitioner. As I have already narrated the nature of the so-called 11 deficiencies enumerated by the Industrial Court in its order, all of them are classically vague by themselves and there is no substance produced anywhere to show the contents of such classically vague by themselves and there is deficiencies. As I have already narrated the nature of the so-called 11 deficiencies enumerated by the Industrial Court in its order, all of them are classically vague by themselves and there is no substance produced anywhere to show the contents of such classically vague by themselves and there is deficiencies. The order of reversion is, therefore, a punitive order which essentially necessitated a domestic enquiry or at least an opportunity of hearing to be given to the Petitioner. Had he been advised during his probation period, initial or subsequently extended, he would have tried to improve his work. It is well known that the purpose of the probation period is to give an opportunity to the incumbent to learn the work of a new post and to improve his working. There is not even single advisory letter issued to him. What he received was a final letter of reversion on the ground of his work not being satisfactory. In the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. 2000 AIR SCW 1816, the following head note of the judgment reflects the law reiterated: “The important principles which are deducible on the concept of “motive” and “foundation”, concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for the further retention in service or for confirmation, an enquiry is held and it is on the basis of that enquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an enquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that enquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the enquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against the employee. In this situation the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of “motive”. In this situation the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of “motive”. “Motive” is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, “motive” is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action. If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary enquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary enquiry.” 9. In that case the appellant employee was a probationer and his services were terminated in the background of alleged misconducts. He was terminated from employment without any enquiry. The Supreme Court has held that the action was punitive and that it was illegal as no enquiry was held against him before the order of termination was issued to him. The Supreme Court has referred to the whole case law from 1959 on this point. The principle reiterated is that if an order is stigmatic and is punitive, the concerned employee should be given an opportunity of hearing. In the present case there were 11 deficiencies alleged against the Petitioner and not even single letter or memo was issued to him at any time. Even before the Industrial Court none of the 11 deficiencies were tried to be substantiated by adducing any evidence. There are no details and there are no particulars and there are no reasons anywhere. The Respondents have acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. The Petitioner could not have been treated on probation for an indefinite period and then reverted on the ground of his unsatisfactory work. It was open to the Respondents to have justified their action by adducing cogent and sufficient evidence and material in the Court. The Respondents have failed at every stage. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order of the Industrial Court suffers from illegality, perversity and non-application of mind. It was open to the Respondents to have justified their action by adducing cogent and sufficient evidence and material in the Court. The Respondents have failed at every stage. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order of the Industrial Court suffers from illegality, perversity and non-application of mind. The Industrial Court has not given any reasons for its conclusions. The impugned order therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside and the same is quashed and set aside. The Petitioner succeeds. He is entitled to all the benefits including the difference in the salary of the two posts i.e. the Junior Engineer (Elec.) and the Divisional Engineer (Elec.). He also will be entitled to the revision in his terminal benefits which he must have received as if he was superannuated as a Junior Engineer. In fact, he would be entitled to the terminal benefits to be recalculated as if he was Divisional Engineer (Elec.) on the date of his superannuation. The Respondent Corporation shall compute the difference in the salaries and all other consequential benefits within a period of eight weeks from today and pay the same to the Petitioner. 10. Rule is made absolute. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.