JUDGMENT :- MRS. PRABHA SRIDEVAN J. 1. Whether the Conciliation Officer has commenced the conciliation proceedings, is the question that arises for consideration in this appeal. 2. The third respondent, a resident of Chennai was appointed in its service by the appellant herein, by the appointment letter dt. 19.12.1979, issued from its Head Office at Industrial Estate, Shiroli, Kolhapur. His services, it is said, was terminated on 11.6.82. He later raised an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Labour Officer-11 at Madras. 3. According to the third respondent, the appellant has a branch at Madras and upon his termination from service on 11.6.1982, he filed a suit before the City Civil Court at Madras viz., O.S. 3088 of 1984 challenging the termination. Thereafter, he withdrew the suit with liberty to proceed under the Industrial Disputes Act because he felt he could get a better remedy there and hence the petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed. 4. According to the appellant/Management, the third respondent was appointed and worked only at Kolhapur and there was no termination of his service. On the contrary, the third respondent submitted his resignation for reasons of his own by his letter dated 11.6.1982. According to the appellant, the third respondent was not a workman and since there was no discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of his service, the petition under Section 2(k) was not maintainable. The respondent also stated that since the entire cause of action arose at Kolhapur, any dispute pertaining to the alleged non-employment could only be raised at Kolhapur. Also according to the appellant, the third respondent had filed a petition under Section 2(k) about eight years after the alleged termination and therefore, the claim was stale. 5. The third respondent filed the petition dated 21.3.1990 before the Labour Officer. The appellant submitted its reply. Thereupon the Labour Officer by proceedings No: 655 of 1990 dated 25.6.1990 held that the Labour Officer had no jurisdiction to try this matter, since the appointment and the alleged termination took place only at Kolhapur. The third respondent therefore was directed under these proceedings to file his petition before the proper forum which had jurisdiction. 6. Aggrieved by this, the third respondent filed W.P. No. 17007 of 1990. The third respondent therefore was directed under these proceedings to file his petition before the proper forum which had jurisdiction. 6. Aggrieved by this, the third respondent filed W.P. No. 17007 of 1990. After setting out his case, he stated that the Labour Officer ought not to have adjudicated on legal issues. On the other hand all that he ought to have done was to submit the failure report. The third respondent prayed for issue of writ of certiorari mandamus to quash the proceedings dated 25.6.1990 and to direct the Labour Officer to submit the failure report. 7. The main question that arose for consideration before the learned single, Judge was whether the conciliation proceedings had commenced at all. The records of the case were not produced before the learned single Judge, but the learned Judge was of the opinion that since there is a reference in the counter affidavit to the petition under Section 2(k) of the Act as being numbered as 655 of 1990 and since it is also stated in the counter that both parties were requested to appear before the Labour Officer to offer their remarks, it would be idle to contend that the conciliation proceedings had not commenced. The learned single Judge therefore held that it was only after the Conciliation Officer had commenced proceedings and the appellant had filed its reply that the officer proceeded to render his finding on certain disputed question of facts. It was held by the learned single Judge, that he had no jurisdiction to do so. His only duty was to proceed under Rule 22 to 25(b) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Rules). So saying, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition directing the Labour Officer to submit his report. Aggrieved by this order, the Management has filed the present appeal. 8. According to the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Dwarakanathan, the finding of the learned Single Judge that conciliation proceedings had commenced was not based on records. In fact it had not been pleaded or shown by the third respondent that the Labour Officer had given a formal intimation declaring his intention to commence conciliation proceedings as per Rule 23 of the Rules. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the conciliation proceedings had not even commenced. In fact it had not been pleaded or shown by the third respondent that the Labour Officer had given a formal intimation declaring his intention to commence conciliation proceedings as per Rule 23 of the Rules. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the conciliation proceedings had not even commenced. For better appreciation of the matter on hand, it is necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. “Sec. 12. Duties of Conciliation Officers (1). Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the Conciliation Officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.” Rules Conciliation “R. 22……. R. 23. Conciliation proceedings in non-public utility service :— (t) Where the Conciliation Officer receives any information about an existing or apprehended industrial dispute which does not relate to a public utility service and he considers it necessary to intervene in the dispute, he shall give formal intimation to the parties concerned declaring his intention to commence conciliation proceedings with effect from such dale as may be specified therein. (2) The Conciliation Officer may hold a meeting of the representatives of both the parties jointly or of each party separately. (3) The Conciliation Officer shall conduct the proceedings expeditiously and in such manner as he may deem fit. R. 24. Parties to submit statements: The party representing workmen involved (or the workman or workmen concerned) in an industrial dispute in respect of which no notice has been given under Rule 59 shall forward to the Conciliation Officer concerned before such date as may be specified by him for commencing the conciliation proceedings a statement in duplicate setting forth- (a) the parties to the dispute; (b) the nature and cause of the dispute including any demands made by either party on the other to which exception is taken by the opposite party: (c) an estimate of the number of persons affected or likely to be affected by the dispute; and (d) the efforts made by the parties themselves to settle the dispute. A copy of the statement shall also be furnished simultaneously by registered post to the employer. Within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement, the employer may file his reply statement before the Conciliation Officer.” 10. A copy of the statement shall also be furnished simultaneously by registered post to the employer. Within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement, the employer may file his reply statement before the Conciliation Officer.” 10. Under Section 12 of the Act extracted above, it is clear that discretion is given to the Conciliation Officer to hold the conciliation proceedings, where the industrial dispute which exists or is apprehended relates to a non-public utility service. Admittedly the appellant is a nonpublic utility service. The procedure where the dispute relates to a public utility service is distinct and different and where once a notice under Section 22 of the Act has been given, the Officer has no option but to hold conciliation proceedings and the word used is “shall”. On the other hand, when the dispute relates to a non-public utility service, the word used is “may” signifying that the Conciliation Officer first has to decide whether there is an industrial dispute for him to assume jurisdiction. Sect. 12(3) and (4) deal with the course to be adopted in a case where settlement of the dispute is arrived at and in a case where it is not. In both the cases, the report that the Conciliation Officer has to send, is to the Appropriate Government. Therefore, the question who or what is the Appropriate Government with reference to the dispute raised is important. As per Sec. 2(a) (ii) of the Act the Appropriate Government is the State Government. 11. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the establishment of the appellant was situate only in Kolahpur. The appointment order was issued from Kolahpur. The third respondent worked at Kolahpur and the third respondent submitted his resignation letter at Kolahpur. Therefore, viewed at from any angle, the Labour Officer at Chennai had no jurisdiction. 12. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that, apart from the fact that the interview was held at Chennai, there was no nexus between the alleged dispute and the State of Tamil Nadu for the Labour Officer at Chennai to assume jurisdiction. The learned counsel referred to the decision reported in Workmen of Sri Ranga Vilas Motors v. S.R.V. Motors (1967) II L.L.J. 12), where the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with what factors confer jurisdiction on the authorities under this Act. The learned counsel referred to the decision reported in Workmen of Sri Ranga Vilas Motors v. S.R.V. Motors (1967) II L.L.J. 12), where the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with what factors confer jurisdiction on the authorities under this Act. And the Supreme Court says: “Where did the dispute arise? Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment, and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there would clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Company, Ltd v. Its Workmen (1962-1 L.LJ. 409) held as follows: “The Act contained no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagia. C.J., observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills, Ltd. v. VIN (D.M.J and others (1956-1 L.L.J. 557 at 558): ‘But what we are concerned with to decide is, where did the dispute substantially arise. Now the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction, upon the labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction a court or tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. In our opinion, those principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under S. 10 of the Act. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it is quite clear that the subject matter of the dispute in this case subsequently arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government”. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant would also submit hat this is a factor which the first respondent viz., the Labour Officer should consider before exercising his discretion to initiate conciliation proceedings. The learned counsel also referred to Rules 23 and 24 extracted above. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant would also submit hat this is a factor which the first respondent viz., the Labour Officer should consider before exercising his discretion to initiate conciliation proceedings. The learned counsel also referred to Rules 23 and 24 extracted above. According to Rule 23(1) when the dispute relates to non public utility service, where the Conciliation Officer considers it necessary to intervene, he must give a formal intimation to both the parties declaring his intention to start proceedings with effect from such date as may be specified therein. (Emphasis supplied). So according to the learned counsel unless and until there was a formal intimation from the officer stipulating a date from which the proceedings shall commence, there can be no commencement of conciliation proceedings as per Rules. This phrase viz., “such date” is again repeated in Rule 24. A reading of Rule 24 also indicates that the statement of both the parties are filed before the Officer prior to the crucial date. So according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Conciliation Officer had declined to exercise his discretion and had not commenced the proceedings at all. 14. To this, the learned counsel for the third respondent would state that the Conciliation Officer had commenced the proceedings and after having considered the materials produced before him, had no authority to decide the merits of the matter or disputed questions of fact. All that he had to do if he found there was no scope for settlement is to forward a failure report. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, Sec. 12(4) relating to duties of Conciliation Officer is mandatory and therefore, if no settlement is arrived at, the only course open to the Conciliation Officer is to send to the Appropriate Government his report setting out the reasons why a settlement could not be arrived at. 15. We have only got to look to the Rules to ascertain what is the date from which conciliation proceedings commence, because Sec. 20 which deals with commencement of conciliation proceeding refers to Sec. 22 which refers to public utility service. So where the dispute relates to nonpublic utility service the date of commencement of conciliation proceedings can be ascertained from Rule 23 alone. So where the dispute relates to nonpublic utility service the date of commencement of conciliation proceedings can be ascertained from Rule 23 alone. Therefore we see that the Conciliation Officer has a duty to first decide the jurisdictional issue as to whether there is an industrial dispute at all before the commencement of the conciliation proceedings. What is industrial dispute is defined in Sec. 2 (k) of the Act: “industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person”. He has to bear in mind that if there is an industrial dispute, which requires intervention, he must forward a report to the Appropriate Government, after conclusion of the conciliation proceedings whether the conciliation effort succeeds or fails. So the nexus between the dispute and the appropriate government is one of the factors that will weigh with him to decide whether to commence the conciliation proceedings. In this case, the first respondent has done precisely that. The third respondent filed a petition before the Conciliation Officer alleging wrongful termination. To this the appellant filed a reply stating that the Labour Officer had no jurisdiction since the entire dispute arose only in Kolhapur and also that this was not a question of wrongful termination but one of the voluntary resignation and therefore there is no dispute at all and also that the claim was belated. On receiving both these statements the first respondent found that in the event there really was an industrial dispute the Appropriate government was not the State of Tamil Nadu, but the State of Maharashtra and therefore, he refused to exercise his discretion to intervene in this matter. 17. It is also clear from the pleadings before this Court that there is no averment to the effect that the Conciliation Officer had given an intimation fixing a date for commencement of the conciliation proceedings. The language of Rule 23 is unambiguous and a duty is cast upon the Conciliation Officer to give a formal intimation of his intention to commence the proceedings and also to set down the date from which such proceedings will commence. In the absence of such notice, the conciliation proceedings cannot be deemed to have commenced. 18. The language of Rule 23 is unambiguous and a duty is cast upon the Conciliation Officer to give a formal intimation of his intention to commence the proceedings and also to set down the date from which such proceedings will commence. In the absence of such notice, the conciliation proceedings cannot be deemed to have commenced. 18. The learned single Judge concedes that there is a dispute as to whether the Conciliation Officer issued notice to the authorities to submit the statements and admittedly the records had not been produced before the learned Single Judge. While so, the learned single Judge ought not to have held that merely because a number had been given to the proceedings, the proceedings had commenced. Even assuming that the management had been called upon to offer their remarks on the petition filed by the employee that would not mean that conciliation proceedings had commenced. As argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Act clearly gives the Conciliation Officer a wide discretion as to whether he should intervene in matters relating to non-public utility service. For this purpose, he can even hold a meeting of the representatives of both the parties either jointly or separately. He can adopt all means that are proper to satisfy himself as to the existence of industrial dispute. Unless a date is specified by him for commencement of proceedings, we cannot assume that the proceedings have commenced. In fact Rule 23(1) states that it is only with effect from that date, that the proceedings will commence. If, in fact such date had been given, the third respondent viz., the worker, would have brought to the notice of this Honble Court that a date has been specified by the Conciliation Officer for commencement of proceedings. It has not been done in the instant case. When the Rules are clear, that the Conciliation Officer has a duty to set down a date for commencement of Conciliation proceedings, it is neither possible nor correct for this Court to assume that the Conciliation proceedings have commenced. Before commencement of Conciliation proceedings, the Conciliation Officer has on a perusal of the records before him found that he had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, since the Appropriate Government was not the State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore even at the threshold the matter had ended. 19. Before commencement of Conciliation proceedings, the Conciliation Officer has on a perusal of the records before him found that he had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, since the Appropriate Government was not the State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore even at the threshold the matter had ended. 19. The course adopted by the Conciliation Officer in our opinion is correct and cannot be assailed. 20. In the result, the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs.