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2000 DIGILAW 491 (MAD)

A. Ramakrishnan, Proprietor, Sri Bharathi Enterprises v. V. Panchanathan and another

2000-04-26

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body2000
ORDER: A.Ramakrishnan, Proprietor, Sri Bharathi Enterprises, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff has also filed an application for leave to sue under O.14, Rule 8 of the High Court Original Side Rules and under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 2. According to the plaintiff/applicant, though the plaintiff entered into a contract with the second defendant, the power agent of the first defendant, to purchase the suit property at Madras and the entire consideration was paid to the second defendant within the City of Madras and the property was delivered to the plaintiff at Madras, he has filed this application for leave to sue, since the first defendant who is the owner of the property resides in United States. 3. The plaint and the application for leave to sue were presented in the Original Side Office on 13.3.2000. The Officer even without numbering the application for leave to sue straightaway numbered the suit as C.S.No.232 of 2000 on 27.3.2000. 4. When the matter came up before this Court, on noticing the same and on being pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant, this Court on 17.4.2000 directed the officer to give explanation as to why the Office has numbered the suit without allowing the plaintiff/applicant to get the leave to sue from this Court. 5. The Office by the note dated 18.4.2000 has submitted the explanation, which is as follows: “It is most respectfully submitted that the plaint in D.No.11508/2000, which is numbered as C.S.No.232 of 2000, has been filed with an application for leave to sue. The suit is in respect of immovable property and the same is situated within the jurisdiction of this Forum. The suit is admitted and numbered under Cl.12 of Letters Patent which reads.”....in case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated .... within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court ...“ Sec.120, C.P.C. excludes High Court from the applicability of Sec.20, C.P.C. Therefore, the Office ignored the application for leave and numbered the suit. Most respectfully submitted.” 6. Regarding the contents of the explanation, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/applicant would submit vehemently that the explanation given by the Original Side Office is not only wrong but also misleading the Court. Most respectfully submitted.” 6. Regarding the contents of the explanation, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/applicant would submit vehemently that the explanation given by the Original Side Office is not only wrong but also misleading the Court. According to him as per Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and the various decisions, the plaintiff/applicant has to necessarily obtain leave to sue before numbering the suit, as one of the defendants is not residing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. 7. The counsel would also submit that the Office has no authority to ignore his application for leave to sue, thereby depriving the liberty of the plaintiff/applicant to maintain the suit in accordance with the law. He would further submit that in the event of this Court ordering notice in the main suit without granting leave to sue, the defendants/respondents would certainly file a petition for rejecting the plaint on the ground that no leave was obtained and in such a situation, this Court has to necessarily dismiss the suit by rejecting the plaint, thereby causing serious loss and hardship to the plaintiff/applicant. 8. In short, according to the counsel for the plaintiff/applicant, because of the mistake of the Office a great injustice has been done to the plaintiff/applicant by numbering the suit and the said illegality committed by the Office has to be cured by cancelling the number given to the suit and to direct the office to number the leave to sue application to enable the plaintiff/applicant to move the suit after following the procedures contemplated under law. 9. At the outset, I shall mention that the Office of the Original Side has exceeded its limit by not numbering the application for leave to sue by taking suo motu decision on the ground that the leave to sue application is unnecessary. 10. When the counsel for the plaintiff/applicant has given reasons in the application for leave to sue as to why it is necessary for him to file the said application, the Office, in my view, has no business to take a view that it is unnecessary to number the same. 10. When the counsel for the plaintiff/applicant has given reasons in the application for leave to sue as to why it is necessary for him to file the said application, the Office, in my view, has no business to take a view that it is unnecessary to number the same. Even if such a view to be taken by the Office, the counsel for the applicant must be put on notice by the Office in order to enable him to explain to the officer or by making necessary endorsement as to why the application for leave to sue has to be maintained before the suit is moved. Or in the alternative, the Officer must have placed the papers before the court with regard to the maintainability of the leave to sue application. 11. Without adopting any one of the courses indicated above, the Office by way of usurping the jurisdiction of this Court, took arbitrary decision of number the suit straightaway without numbering the application for leave to sue. This course, in my view, is highly condemnable. 12. To make the matter worse, it is noticed that the Office in the explanation has stated: Therefore, the Office ignored the application for leave and numbered the suit.“ The words ”Office ignored the application“ not only depicts the ignorance of law on the part of the Office but also shows impertinence and disrespect to this Court. This is also highly reprehensible. 13. Under these circumstances, before dealing with the question posed by the learned counsel for the applicant, I deem it appropriate to direct the Registrar General of this Court to take appropriate disciplinary action against the official concerned who is responsible for the above said commission and omission and accordingly directed. 14. Now, let us come to the issue raised by the counsel for the plaintiff/applicant. 15. The question involved is, whether in a suit for specific performance when one of the defendants resides outside the jurisdiction of this Court, leave of this Court has to be obtained or not, even though the property situated and the agreement entered into within the original jurisdiction of this Court? 16. 15. The question involved is, whether in a suit for specific performance when one of the defendants resides outside the jurisdiction of this Court, leave of this Court has to be obtained or not, even though the property situated and the agreement entered into within the original jurisdiction of this Court? 16. The learned counsel would emphatically submit that under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, it is a must for the plaintiff/applicant to obtain the leave of this Court, when one of the defendants resides in United States, that is, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In order to substantiate the said submission, he has cited the following authorities:” 1. Bank of Madurai Ltd. v. M/s.Balaramadass and Brothers, (1984)97 L.W. 485 . 2. M/s.Ram Bahadur Thakur (P) Ltd. v. A.Velliangiri, (1989)2 L.W. 529 3. Velliangiri.A and others v. M/s.Ram Bahadur Takur (P) Ltd. and others, (1998)1 L.W. 762 . 4. K.Murugesan v. Seethalakshmi, (1992)1 L.W. 277 (D.B.). 17. On a careful scrutiny of the above decisions and on consideration of the various propositions laid down by the Division Bench and single Judge of this Court, it is clear that even though the property which is the subject matter of the suit for specific performance is situated at Chennai, it shall be necessary for the plaintiff to obtain the leave to sue under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent irrespective of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including Secs.16, 17, 20 and 120. 18. While dealing with the Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Bank of Madurai Ltd. v. M/s.Balaramadass and Brothers, (1984)97 L.W. 485 , has held that this Court has jurisdiction, whatever be the nature of the suit, in case the defendant resides within its territorial jurisdiction. 19. There are three parts in the Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The first part relates to suit for land. The second part relates to suit in which cause of action has arisen either wholly or partly, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The third part relates to suit in which the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of this Court. 20. The second part relates to suit in which cause of action has arisen either wholly or partly, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The third part relates to suit in which the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of this Court. 20. It is clearly held by the Division Bench that if the suit is one for land, then it can be instituted in this Court if the property is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. In cases, where the property is partly situated within the limits of this Court, leave of the court should be obtained first. The second part of the clause, according to the Division Bench, deals with all other cases, if the cause of action has arisen either wholly or partly within the jurisdiction of the local limits of this Court. In cases where the cause of action has arisen partly within the limits of this Court, then leave of this Court should be obtained first. The third part of the clause relates to cases where the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit resides within the limits of this Court. While dealing with this clause, the Division Bench has held that in a case where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of this Court, the suit can be instituted in this Court even if it is a suit for land situated beyond its local limits. 21. Thus, it is seen that in the first two parts, the jurisdiction is determined with reference to the subject matter, whereas in the third part the jurisdiction is indicated with reference to the parties to the suit independently from the first two parts. 22. In other words, the first two parts has application only when the third part is not pressed into service. This third part in clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, makes an exception to the Universal principle of granting jurisdiction in respect of immovable property to the court within the jurisdiction of which the immovable property is situate. 23. In the third part it is stated: “If the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits”, no leave is necessary“. 23. In the third part it is stated: “If the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within such limits”, no leave is necessary“. This means, if one of the defendants resides outside, then leave of the court is essential. 24. The rule of forum loci has been deliberately omitted in respect of the High Court. This has been confirmed by the provisions of Sec.120 of the C.P.C. stating that the provisions of Secs.16, 17 and 20 shall not apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. 25. The Chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras are having the original jurisdiction as found in Clause 12 of our Letters Patent. They have to find before a suit is entertained on original side that it is satisfied the requirements of the land in the case of suit for land that the land is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court and in all other cases whether the cause of action wholly arises within the local limits of Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, or in case the leave of the court is asked for, whether the cause of action arises in part within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the Court or not. Besides this, there is no difficulty in entertaining a suit under Clause 12, if the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, resides or carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. If there is one defendant in a suit and he resides within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, the suit would be maintainable. But, in case where there are more than one defendant, but some of them are residing within the jurisdiction of this Court and some of them are residing outside the jurisdiction, then the suit is maintainable only after the leave is granted. This is clearly held in the judgment of the Division Bench reported in K.Murugesan v. Seethalakshmi, (1992)1 L.W. 277 . 26. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench referred the earlier decision of the Division Bench in P.H.Parameswara Pattar v. Vivatha Mahadevi, 1992 M.W.N. 641. This is clearly held in the judgment of the Division Bench reported in K.Murugesan v. Seethalakshmi, (1992)1 L.W. 277 . 26. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench referred the earlier decision of the Division Bench in P.H.Parameswara Pattar v. Vivatha Mahadevi, 1992 M.W.N. 641. The Division Bench would also refer to the observation of the Hon’ble Srinivasan, J. (as he then was), who took notice of the commentary on the Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877) by Broughton in which it is stated: ”The word ‘defendant’ includes the plural. So that if one defendant dwells within the jurisdiction and another does not, the suit cannot be maintained under that head or jurisdiction without an order of court.“ 27. It is specifically held in the said decision that when cause of action is common to all the defendants it would be fair to say that the institution of the suit against a defendant not residing within the jurisdiction of this Court with the leave of the court is not vitiated. 28. In view of the clear finding given by the various decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, the explanation given by the Office has to be rejected and in order to correct the mistake committed by the Office, it would be appropriate for this Court to give suitable directions. 29. In this context, it would be relevant to refer two judgments with reference to the nature of the directions to be given to the office by this Court, which are as follows: (1) Union of India v. K.K.Goswami, A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 231 (D.B.), (2) Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1631 (F.B.). 30. The principle laid down in the above decisions by referring the maxim ”actus curiae neminem gravabit“ is that the act of the Office or Court should do no harm to the litigant and if any mistake committed due to the error on the part of the office of the court, the said mistake should be rectified by the court. The party should be restored or relegated to the position he occupied on the date when the error was committed by the Office. 31. In a similar situation, the Calcutta High Court in Union of India v. K.K.Goswami, A.I.R. 1974 Cal. The party should be restored or relegated to the position he occupied on the date when the error was committed by the Office. 31. In a similar situation, the Calcutta High Court in Union of India v. K.K.Goswami, A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 231 (D.B.), would hold as follows: ”No litigant should ever suffer due to any mistake or fault of the court is the law laid down in the cases of Rodger v. Comtoir d’ Escompte de Paris, L.R. 3 P.C. 465 at 475; Jai Berham v. Kedarnath Marwari, 49 I.A. 351 at 355, 356: A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 269, Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 832 at 836. Further, in the case of Jang Singh v. Brijlal, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1631 at 1633, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) says this: “There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim, actus curiae neminem gravabit.” 32. That is a case where leave to sue under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was filed along with the plaint. But, the Judge by mistake did not sign the order in the leave to sue application. It was argued that in the absence of leave to sue, the suit was not maintainable. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court while dealing with the said situation, would hold that the mistake of the Judge or the officer of the Court should not harm the plaintiff and he should be restored to the position where he would have occupied but for the mistake, on the principle of the maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit.‘ This observation, in my view, squarely applies to the present facts also. 33. 33. For the reasons mentioned above, I deem it fit to direct the Office to cancel the number given to the suit and to number the leave to sue application first and post the matter before the court immediately in order to put the plaintiff/applicant to the original position he occupied on the date when the error was committed by the Office, that is, on 27.3.2000 and accordingly directed.