Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : This judgment shall govern two writ petitions viz., W.P. Nos. 20267 and 20268 of 1994 as the subject is common and the learned Counsel have presented common arguments therein. Writ Petition No. 20267 of 1994 is filed by one P. Raja, who was working as a constable in the Railway Protection Force. He was ordered to be removed by an order dated 31-8-1992 passed by the Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force. His appeal against that order also failed and was disposed of by the order dated 'nil' communicated to him by the second respondent vide : letter dated 12-3-1993. The original order of removal as also the order by which his appeal was dismissed are challenged by the petitioner in the aforementioned petition. In W.P. No. 20268 of 1994, the petitioner is one E. Thulasi, who was working as a Head Constable at the Integral Coach Factory. He was ordered to be removed by an order No. ICF/X/DAR/5/92 dated 31-8-1992 and even his appeal was dismissed by the second respondent and he was informed about the dismissal by the second respondent vide : letter dated 12-3-1993. The writ petition challenges the original order of removal as also the subsequent dismissal of his appeal. It is a common ground that the above two petitioners were involved in an incident dated 21-3-1992 wherein when they were on duty as Security Guards, it was found that on that day, they failed to prevent the stealthy removal of two members of insulated copper cables with railway marks and about five kgs. of peeled copper wire from inside the Furnishing Factory which was done by one other railway employee viz., Edwin Gunaseelan. It was an admitted position that the said Edwin Gunaseelan was chased immediately after he was allowed to go unchecked by the two petitioners and was caught red-handed along with the aforementioned railway materials presumably stolen from the railway factory. A panchanama was recorded therefor by other personnel on duty seizing the said materials. The matter was reported to the Police and on the same day, both the petitioners made a confession of their guilt at about 7 O'clock in the evening before a responsible officer who was incharge of the said Police Station and thereafter, both the petitioners came to be suspended by separate orders dated 23-3-1992 by the second respondent. The matter was reported to the Police and on the same day, both the petitioners made a confession of their guilt at about 7 O'clock in the evening before a responsible officer who was incharge of the said Police Station and thereafter, both the petitioners came to be suspended by separate orders dated 23-3-1992 by the second respondent. A charge-sheet thereafter was served against both of them which was dated 16-4-1992 and the following charges, which were common, were framed against the said two petitioners. The charges against the petitioner Raja were :-"Charge I :" While functioning as Constable 191/Fur and while on duty from 13.00 hrs. to 21.30 hrs on 21-3-92 at Counter No. 1 of Time Office Gate/Furnishing, he failed to prevent the stealthy removal of 2 numbers of insulated copper cables with Railway marks and about 5 kgs. of peeled copper wire from inside the Furnishing Factory and allowed the Railway employee by name Edwin Gunaseelan to go out from Furnishing Factory with the above materials for pecuniary benefits which amounts to wilful and gross negligence. Charge II : During the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the above employee has also indulged in corrupt and improper practice by placing himself under a pecuniary obligations to another person in a manner as to affect the proper discharge of his lawful duties and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty thus violating Rule 146.7 of RPF Rules 1987 R/W Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of Railway Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966. "The charges against the petitioner Thulasi were : "Charge I :" While functioning as HC. 23/FUR during the period, he has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty wherein while he detailed for 13.00 hrs to 21.00 hrs duty at TOG Incharge on 21-3-92 failed to prevent the stealthy removal of 2 nos. of insulated copper cables with railway marks and about 5 kgs. of peeled copper wire from inside the Furnishing Factory and allowed one Railway employee by name Edwin Gunaseelan to go out from Furnishing Factory with the above materials for pecuniary benefits which amounts to wilful and gross negligence. of insulated copper cables with railway marks and about 5 kgs. of peeled copper wire from inside the Furnishing Factory and allowed one Railway employee by name Edwin Gunaseelan to go out from Furnishing Factory with the above materials for pecuniary benefits which amounts to wilful and gross negligence. Charge II : During the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office the above employee has also indulged in corrupt and improper practice by placing himself under pecuniary obligations to another person in a manner as to affect the proper discharge of his lawful duties and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty thus violating Rule 146.7 of RPF Rules 1987 R/W Rule 3(1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of Railway Services (Conduct) Rules 1966." After this, a full-fledged enquiry proceeded on day-to-day basis wherein both the petitioners took a stand that they were not guilty. The prosecution examined the witnesses and the petitioners also examined certain other witnesses in defence. After the witness enquiry was closed, the Enquiry Officer felt certain doubts and, therefore, recalled one witness and examined him who was allowed to be cross-examined by the petitioner's side. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report wherein he found both the petitioners guilty. Therefore, a punishment order came to be passed on 31-8-1992 as mentioned above. The petitioners filed appeals almost immediately on 4-10-1992 and the appeals came to be dismissed and the dismissal of their appeal was communicated by letter dated 12-3-1993. They, therefore, filed revisions to the third respondent and again represented after about one year by way of representation that the revisions should be disposed of and ultimately filed the above writ petitions on 28th November, 1994. The learned Counsel Mr. N. G. R. Prasad appearing on behalf of the petitioners to begin with, submitted very forcefully that the enquiry was most unfair and trampling all the principles of natural justice. In this behalf, he pointed out that in fact there should have been no enquiry at all and in keeping with the spirit of Rule 153.3.3 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules', the matters should have been handed over to the Police for being decided judicially. In this behalf, he pointed out that in fact there should have been no enquiry at all and in keeping with the spirit of Rule 153.3.3 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules', the matters should have been handed over to the Police for being decided judicially. The second contention in this behalf is that even while holding the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer acted unfairly by recalling some witnesses and by examining one K. P. James as a fresh witness. According to the learned Counsel, this was not permissible at all under Rule 153 of the Rules. The second limb of the learned Counsel's argument was that on merits, the prosecution had completely failed to bring home the guilt on the part of the petitioners and the so-called confession, which was heavily relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, could not have been used against the petitioners. According to the learned Counsel, the prosecution had completely failed to prove that the petitioners had acquired any pecuniary benefit. It was the main ingredient of the charge against the petitioners. The learned Counsel suggested that if the confession is ignored then, there was no evidence on record to suggest that the petitioners had gained any unfair pecuniary benefit for not checking the said Edwin Gunaseelan and allowing him to go out of the security gate with the railway property. According to the learned Counsel, if this aspect of the unfair pecuniary gain remained unproved, then, both the charges must necessarily fail.Even about the appellate order, the learned Counsel strenuously urged that the appellate authority had misread the evidence and the order of the appellate authority showed confusion on the part of the appellate authority about the role of both the petitioners. The learned Counsel also tried to rely about the so- called admissions made in the counter which are allegedly filed by the respondents and more particularly in paragraph 13 thereof. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, this was a case where there was total injustice meted out to the petitioners and the petitioners deserved to be exonerated from the enquiry and reinstated in their service with backwages. The learned counsel also pointed out that the petitioners were without jobs and had before them their whole life which was at stake. As against this, the learned Standing Counsel Mr. The learned counsel also pointed out that the petitioners were without jobs and had before them their whole life which was at stake. As against this, the learned Standing Counsel Mr. V. R. Gopalan, pointed out that firstly the enquiry was completely justified and in fact the railway administration had taken soft stand against these two delinquents by not deciding to hand them over to the Police for being prosecuted judicially. According to the learned Counsel, the petitioners were trying to completely misread the provisions of Rule 153 of the Rules. Mr. Gopalan further submitted that while holding the enquiry, the petitioners were given full protection and opportunity to cross-examine each and every witness and that the Enquiry Officer had a perfect justification and jurisdiction to recall some witnesses as also to examine some fresh witnesses in order to clear his doubts. So far as the merits of the matter is concerned, the learned Counsel pointed out that this Court could not now go into the merits particularly where the Enquiry Officer, on the basis of the evidence available, has come to the conclusion about the guilt of the delinquents and the findings of the Enquiry Officer are confirmed by the appellate authority. The learned Counsel pointed out that as per the recent Apex Court judgment, where the incriminating materials were available on record, the Court could not go into the question of appreciation of evidence and go to the contrary findings particularly while the Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel has relied on few judgments in support of his argument. As regards the merits, the learned Counsel pointed out that the user of the confession was perfectly justified and merely because the aforementioned confession was not countersigned by the other witnesses, it could not be left totally out of consideration, though the confessions could be put to the deeper scrutiny and according to the learned Counsel, even after such deeper scrutiny, the confessions were rightly relied on. The learned Counsel, therefore, urges that reading the confessions along with the said evidence of other witnesses, there was voluminous material available on record suggesting the guilt on the part of the petitioners and as such interference was not possible on merits. The learned Counsel, therefore, urges that reading the confessions along with the said evidence of other witnesses, there was voluminous material available on record suggesting the guilt on the part of the petitioners and as such interference was not possible on merits. The learned Counsel also pointed out the appellate order was also perfectly justified and while appreciating the same, this Court could not go into the task of fresh appraisal of evidence. The learned Counsel pointed out that the petitioners were part of the Railway Protection Force and as such were expected to act with sense of discipline and high integrity and when their integrity itself came to be questioned because of their murky activities, there was no question of keeping them in service and, therefore, the quantum of punishment of removal also is justified.On the backdrop of these conflicting arguments, it will have to be seen as to whether the authorities were justified in holding the departmental enquiry at all. Mr. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, very heavily relied on the language of Rule 153.3.3. The Rule is as follows :- "153.3.3. On receipt of complaint or otherwise, the disciplinary authority on going through the facts alleged or brought out shall decide whether it is a case for major or minor punishments. No attempt shall be made to convert cases punishable under S. 16-A or S. 17 into disciplinary cases nor divert cases in respect of which major punishments are imposable to the category of cases where minor or petty punishments are imposable." Section 16-A of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the Act for the purposes of the present subject, is not relevant; but Section 17 of the Act provides for the penalty for neglect of duty, etc. Sub-section (1) thereof is as under :- "17. Penalties for negliect of duty, etc. Sub-section (1) thereof is as under :- "17. Penalties for negliect of duty, etc. - (1) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Sec. 9, every enrolled member of the Force who shall be guilty of any violation of duty of wilful breach or neglect of any rule or lawful order made by a superior office, or who shall withdraw from duties of his office without permission, or who, being absent on leave, fails, without reasonable cause, to report himself for duty on the expiration of the leave, or who engages himself without authority for any employment other than his duty as an enrolled member of the Force, or who shall be guilty of cowardice may be taken into Force custody and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment which may extent to one year." Sub-section (2) of Section 17 has made this offence to be cognizable as non-bailable. Sub-sections (3) and (4) are not relevant for our purposes. From these sections, the learned Counsel fervently appeals that if the petitioners were guilty of violation of duty as contemplated in Section 17(1) or were even guilty of neglect, then, the petitioners should have been tried in terms of Rule 153.3.3 and the authorities concerned committed an error in converting these cases into disciplinary cases. The argument is plainly incorrect. What the rule provides is that where the members of the Force are alleged to have engaged in misconduct, major or minor and deserve to be really tried by a Court of law, the authorities should not try to dilute the situation by avoiding to prosecute the delinquents, taking recourse of holding a departmental enquiry. It is obvious that a criminal prosecution is always treated to be harsher course than a departmental enquiry. In fact, Section 17 of the Act makes this offence cognizable as non-bailable and sub-section (1) provides the punishment of imprisonment of one year. That by itself is sufficient to show the deterrent and harsh nature of criminal prosecution in comparison to the departmental enquiry which may end in a minor consequences of removal, dismissal or any other major or minor punishment. That by itself is sufficient to show the deterrent and harsh nature of criminal prosecution in comparison to the departmental enquiry which may end in a minor consequences of removal, dismissal or any other major or minor punishment. It would be seen that a member of the Force convicted for the offence under Section 17 of the Act would certainly lose the job and in addition to that would also be liable to suffer a punishment of imprisonment, while in a department enquiry, all that may happen is that he may be either removed or even escape with some other punishments being able to retain his own job. Rule 153.3.3 has to be therefore, read in this context of severity of the consequences. The rule is more of a caution to the authorities not to let off the guilty delinquents only by holding enquiries and that where the prosecution is appropriate, the authorities should not deliberately convert such proposed prosecution into a departmental enquiry so as to let off the guilty delinquents with softer or minor punishments. Viewed in this spirit, the criticism of Mr. Prasad is clearly incorrect. This was a case where though initially the matters were reported to the Police, the authorities did not consider it fit to send the two delinquents to face a harsher reality of the prosecution before the Court of law; instead chose to hold a departmental enquiry. The authorities may have their own reasons to do so and there is no reason for me to go into those reasons, because that is quite beside the points. The learned Counsel almost sounds as if the holding of a departmental enquiry is a harsher route as compared to the prosecution which is quite contrary to the language of Section 17 of the Act as also to the language of Rule 153 of the Rules. The argument on that count being incorrect is rejected.Once it is found that the authorities were justified in holding the departmental enquiry, the argument that the said enquiry was unfair and contrary to the principles of natural justice would have to be tested. In that behalf the learned Standing Counsel for respondents points out that all the possible protection was given to the said delinquents and during the enquiry they have not averred even once that there was any bias shown by the Enquiry Officer. In that behalf the learned Standing Counsel for respondents points out that all the possible protection was given to the said delinquents and during the enquiry they have not averred even once that there was any bias shown by the Enquiry Officer. He further points out that indeed it is seen from the records that every witness was allowed to be cross-examined thoroughly and the Enquiry Officer has taken care of recording of the questions and answers of the witnesses and what Mr. Prasad found fault with was the recalling of certain witnesses and the examination of one K. P. James. One of the prosecution witnesses had stated that he was not on the scene as he was sent by James for a while and it was in that context that the Enquiry Officer got his doubt cleared as to whether James had permitted the witness to leave the spot. James was then examined and cleared the doubt that he had not sent the said witness. Mr. Prasad, in this behalf, pointed out relying on Rule 154(1) of the Rules that the witness could not be recalled or no new witness could be examined. I am afraid, the rule is being read in an incorrect manner. The rule runs as under :- "154.1 If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its own findings where it is itself Inquiry Officer or having regard to its decision on all or any of the findings of the Inquiry Officer, is of the opinion that the punishment warranted is such as is within its competence, that authority may act on the evidence on record. However, in a case where it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall the witness, examine him and allow the party charged to cross-examine him. After that, it may impose on the party charged such punishment as is within its competence according to these rules."My attention was also invited to Rule 153.17 which is as under :- " 153.17 Under no circumstances additional prosecution witnesses shall be examined after the defence has been let in unless supplementary defence witnesses have been allowed on that ground. After that, it may impose on the party charged such punishment as is within its competence according to these rules."My attention was also invited to Rule 153.17 which is as under :- " 153.17 Under no circumstances additional prosecution witnesses shall be examined after the defence has been let in unless supplementary defence witnesses have been allowed on that ground. However, if at any stage during the inquiry, it appears to the Inquiry Officer that examination of any witness who has not been produced by either party so far or recall of any witness who has already been examined is essential in the interest of justice or to clear any doubt, he may summon him for the purpose and examine him as a witness of the Inquiry Officer after recording his reasons for doing so. Such a witness may also be cross-examined by the party charged, if desired." Reading these two rules together, the learned Counsel earnestly submits that in fact the enquiry was closed and it was only after the closure of the enquiry that few witnesses were recalled. One additionally called witness James was examined afresh. He argued that this could not be done unless this was ordered by the disciplinary authority considering the report made by the Enquiry Officer. I am afraid, the reliance on Rule 154 is totally uncalled for in this case for the simple reason, that pertains to the action on enquiry report by the disciplinary authority. What was done in this case was done by the Enquiry Officer and that too under Rule 153.17 which Rule has been quoted above. In fact, the Enquiry Officer could certainly have recalled the witnesses and could have also examined the other witnesses in order to clear his doubt. We have it on record that the Enquiry Officer did precisely that. After all, the enquiry was still continuing when the Enquiry Officer, in order to clear his doubt, decided to recall a few witnesses and to examine James to clear the doubt created by the evidence of one other witness. The said decision was taken by the Enquiry Officer and was informed to the delinquents/petitioners by his letter dated 8-7-1992. In the said letter itself, he has said that he wanted to hold the enquiry for clarifying his doubts from one Dorairaj and James. The said decision was taken by the Enquiry Officer and was informed to the delinquents/petitioners by his letter dated 8-7-1992. In the said letter itself, he has said that he wanted to hold the enquiry for clarifying his doubts from one Dorairaj and James. It is for this purpose that Dorairaj, who was earlier examined, was recalled while James was examined as a fresh witness. This took place on 14-7-1992. Even the objection raised by the petitioners seems to have been taken on record which could be seen at page 69 of the Paper Book in W.P. No. 20267 of 1994. Not only this, but after Dorairaj was recalled, an opportunity for his cross-examination was also given. Same is the case with the evidence of James. He has been examined and he clarified that one Seetharaman, Constable No. 61, who was an erstwhile witness in the enquiry, was not sent by him for purchasing cigarette on 21-3-1992. In fact, Seetharaman has made a claim while acting as a witness for a prosecution that he was sent by James for purchasing cigarette, James also clarified the presence of Dorairaj and clarified further that the contention of Seetharaman, Constable that he was not present at the time of incident at the gate and he went for purchasing cigarette for James was not correct. Even this evidence was offered for cross-examination which cross-examination was declined to be done. So far, it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer had in any way acted unfairly in recalling the witness Dorairaj and examining witness James and on that Count, the enquiry suffered in any manner. The learned Counsel for the petitioners then pointed out that the Enquiry Officer, in terms of Rule 153.17, should have recorded his reasons for doing so. I find that in the communication itself, the Enquiry Officer has given a reason as to why he was calling upon the two witnesses. It is clearly mentioned in the letter at page 70 of the Paper Book that the Enquiry Officer wanted to clear his doubts. We would not expect any elaborate reasons which we normally expect in a judicial order for this purpose. In my opinion, the letter dated 8-7-1992 is self-sufficient and suggests that the Enquiry Officer has acted within the four corners of Rule 153.17. We would not expect any elaborate reasons which we normally expect in a judicial order for this purpose. In my opinion, the letter dated 8-7-1992 is self-sufficient and suggests that the Enquiry Officer has acted within the four corners of Rule 153.17. The argument by the learned Counsel on this count is, therefore, incorrect and is rejected.The learned Counsel for the petitioners then went on to point out that the confession was recorded under duress and could not be wholly relied upon. During the course of the argument, the learned Counsel filed a document which is dated 27-4-1960. It appears to be a circular to all the Divisional Superintendents. The circular tends to acquaint the Divisional Superintendents with the Board's letter bearing No. E(D&A) 59/RT-6-31 dated 15-3-1960 as regards the procedure for reporting cases of theft and reporting them to RRT in terms of Rule 1925. It suggests that after the confessional statement has been taken by the staff in continuation of the said statement, a question should be put to the apprehended employee and the answer should be obtained. The said question is : "As the above confessional statement may be used as evidence against you, can you say that force or theft was used by RPF staff to obtain the above confessional statement from you or you gave it voluntarily ?" The communication then goes to say that a certificate signed by the witnesses should be obtained in the following form :- " We certify that the above is a statement given by Sri ................ voluntarily and has been accepted by Sri ................ himself. No threat or force has been used by the RPF staff in obtaining this confessional statement. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has invited my attention to paragraph 6 of the affidavit, wherein a complainant has been made that the said confessional statement was not attested by the Inspector of Police of Protection Force nor was it in the presence of the two independent witnesses. The learned Counsel has pointed out that though the incident took place in the day time, the said confession was obtained which was first dictated by the Inspector of Police of Protection Force himself. Even in the other petition, similar complaint has been made. The confession statements were translated and put before the Court very fairly by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Even in the other petition, similar complaint has been made. The confession statements were translated and put before the Court very fairly by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. There can be no doubt that in the confession statements, the delinquents have made a clean breast of their guilt. They also got the pecuniary benefit for their agreeing not to check the concerned persons coming out of the Factory. What is significant to be found is that both the delinquents have claimed that they were contacted by one Mani and for a pecuniary consideration, they had agreed to let Mani and his friend to go without checking. It is also admitted that the said Mani and his friend were not checked and that it was accidentally found by Dorairaj who was also present and on suspicion, shouted and that is how Edwin Gunaseelan, who was friend of Mani was apprehended. They have also stated that this was going on for quite sometime. Therefore, there can be no dispute about the guilt having been accepted by the two delinquents In their confessional statements. What is more significant, however, is that at the end of the statement, there is a clean admission that the statement was with full knowledge and intention without threat or torture. Both the confessional statements bear the signatures of the delinquents. Therefore, what is really missing is the counter-signature of the two witnesses. The learned Counsel, therefore, said that the confession should have been totally left out of consideration. These confessions seem to have been given before one K. V. Babu, who has been examined as PW 1. He also spoke orally about the confession having been given before him. He also pointed out in his evidence that these delinquents had committed such offence even earlier. Confessions of Raja and Thulasi, the petitioners herein, were proved by this witness. The claim of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that because the two confessional statements do not have the counter-signature of the witnesses, these confessions must be outright rejected and left out of consideration. I am afraid, that would not be a correct approach. Though the letter dated 27-4-1960 does recommend that a confessional statement should be so countersigned by the witnesses, that would be only by way of abundant caution. I am afraid, that would not be a correct approach. Though the letter dated 27-4-1960 does recommend that a confessional statement should be so countersigned by the witnesses, that would be only by way of abundant caution. The failure on the part of the concerned officer to obtain the counter-signature of the two witnesses would not have the effect of throwing the said confession and completely being left out. At the most, under such circumstances, it would be for the Enquiry Officer and the concerned authorities to scrutinize the confessional statements more carefully. It seems from the Enquiry Report that even independently of these confessions, the fact that Edwin Gunaseelan was caught along with the railway materials on him, has been found by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence and the other eye-witnesses in whose presence the said Edwin Gunaseelan was chased and caught. The evidence of the witnesses is available that these two delinquents did not check the said Edwin Gunaseelan at all. In the Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Officer has considered the effect of this letter dated 27-4-1960 and has also taken stock of the argument on the part of the delinquent that the said confessions were not countersigned. Therefore, it is not as it the Enquiry Officer was not aware of this fact and it is clear that he has taken into consideration the confession in the light of the abovementioned letter. The Enquiry Officer has chosen to rely upon the evidence of K. V. Babu, who had recorded the confessions and on appreciating the evidence of Babu, he had chosen to accept that evidence along with the confessions. The learned Counsel for the petitioners very earnestly argued that the Enquiry Officer expected delinquents to examine the witnesses to prove that the confession was not voluntarily given. It is found that the Enquiry Officer has considered the confession Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 in the light of the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 and that it was without any threat. Such approach could not be said to be perverse approach and it could not be said that merely for the reasons of the two witnesses were not countersigned, the whole confession could be left out of consideration. 1, 2, 3 and 4 and that it was without any threat. Such approach could not be said to be perverse approach and it could not be said that merely for the reasons of the two witnesses were not countersigned, the whole confession could be left out of consideration. The Enquiry Officer has taken the most reasonable view and has chosen to accept the confession on the basis of the oral evidence therefor. Mr. Prasad also argued that in Edwin Gunaseelan's confessional statement, he had not made any reference to his being in tow with the two delinquents. That may be so. Here, the learned Counsel is clearly trying to argue the questions of appreciation of evidence. This Court will not go into the appreciation of evidence, but even if Edwin Gunaseelan's statement does not refer, we find good explanation having been given by the first witness Babu. That apart, even in the absence of any such explanation, the mere fact that Edwin Gunaseelan has not referred to the fact of being in tow with the two delinquents would be of no consequence, particularly when the delinquents have made a clean breast of their being in tow with Mani and Edwin Gunaseelan. In short, it cannot be said that there was any error on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to consider, while giving the findings as they did, once the confession becomes available. That would be a complete answer to the criticism by the learned Counsel that the pecuniary aspect was not proved.Much was said against the order of the appellate authority also that the said order was without any good reasons. A bare perusal of the appellate authority's order suggests that the appellate authority has considered all the points raised in the appeal. Much was tried to be made before the appellate authority that Edwin Gunaseelan had not stated in his confessional statement about these two delinquents. The appellate authority seems to have taken stock of the argument and has held that the statement of Edwin Gunaseelan in the prosecution would be of no consequence. I do not find any illegality in the appellate Order. The appellate authority seems to have taken stock of the argument and has held that the statement of Edwin Gunaseelan in the prosecution would be of no consequence. I do not find any illegality in the appellate Order. The appellate order has also chosen to stamp its approval of the evidence of PW 1, who had stated that the confession was recorded in the presence of his immediate officers and was forwarded to his superiors and that the whole statements were in the hand- writing of the delinquents only. That would be the behest of fraud that the confession was not voluntary and was forced. The appellate authority has obviously acted within limits of its jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on number of decisions to suggest that the authorities had acted beyond their powers. The first judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel is the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram. I am afraid, the judgment could be of no consequence, as it is entirely different on facts. The observations in paragraph 30 of this judgment are tried to be relied upon by Mr. Prasad. It was tried to be suggested by relying on those observations that the enquiry was not feasible. It am afraid, the judgment will not apply at all for the simple reason that in the aforementioned judgment, the Apex Court was considering the Police Regulations specifically and those Police Regulations have no semblance whatsoever with the rules under the Railway Protection Act, 1957. I have already discussed the abovementioned rules and I find that the reliance on this judgment is totally uncalled for. The Apex Court has recently held in the decision in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police (1999 Lab IC 437) that the findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterised as perverse as the High Court under Art. 226 and the Supreme Court under Art. 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Apex Court has clearly cautioned that the Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. The Apex Court has clearly cautioned that the Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. Though it has state that under some circumstances the Court may interfere even in these aspects the Court then goes to suggest that if there is no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded are such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings are perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority, there would be a scope of interference even by this Court. The Apex Court has taken stock of the decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1978 Lab IC 1106) and State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao, and the latest decision in Rajindra Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1986 Lab IC 374) and has held that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would come, the findings could be rejected as perverse. It has also been held that normally the High Court and the Supreme Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry, but if the finding of guilt is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. Tested on these principles, this cannot be said to be a case where no evidence is available. After all, evidence is available in shape of oral evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as also the confessions which have been tested. In Kuldeep Singh's case, cited supra, the Supreme Court found that there was a bias in favour of the department and it had so badly affected the Enquiry Officer's whole faculty of reasoning. Such is not the case here. There does not appear to be any case made out either on bias or on the basis of any non-compliance with the rules. The learned Counsel was unable to show any such perversity on the part of the Enquiry Officer actuated out of malice or bias.A Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1972 1 Mad LJ 374 (State of Madras v. M. Kandawamy) was also cited before me to suggest that the Tribunal can have no barrier against the scrutiny of the evidence. In that case, the learned single Judge had quashed the dismissal order and the Division Bench was considering the merits of the order of the learned single Judge, wherein the learned Judge had ventured to appreciate the findings and to reach the findings contrary to that of the Tribunal. The judgment was relied upon by Mr. Prasad to suggest that even this Court would go into the evidence. I have gone through the evidence myself and found out that here was a case where the two delinquents, who were clothed with the duty to examine each and every person coming out of the factory, had completely failed to do so, so much so, that a person, who was allowed to go without being checked, was caught red-handed by others and was found with some railway materials of no mean value. Everything appeared in the day time. Nothing has been stated about the witnesses and nothing has been shown that they had any grudge against these delinquents. The fact of the delinquents in not checking the said Edwin Gunaseelan has not only been stated independently by the witnesses present and whose presence could not be doubted, but the delinquents have also made a clean breast thereof in their confessions. I have already shown that the confessions could not be just left out of consideration as K. V. Babu has really no reason to record a false confession. The confession has again been in the own hand writing of the delinquents. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any perversity by either the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority and it cannot be said that there was any perversity in the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, and that the punishment of removal is in any manner incorrect or not commensurate with the guilt.In short, the writ petitions have no merits and are ordered to be dismissed without any order as to costs. W.M.P. Nos. 14638 and 14448 of 1995 are dismissed.