MUKUL MUDGAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Arbitration andconciliation Act, 1996. The petitioner has prayed that interim orders be passedrestraining the respondents from selling, parting with possession or transferring thewaste Heat Recovery System Equipment, leased by the petitioner to the respondentsand has further sought relief due to the defaults of the respondents in repayment oflease rentals and, therefore, sought permission for the Receiver to be appointed bythis Court to take over the possession of the said equipment which was given onlease to the respondents under Lease Agreement dated 24/03/1993. Thisapplication has been resisted by the respondents/lessees by stating in their reply thatthe appointment of a Receiver is hit by the provisions of Section 22 of the Sickindustrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as thesaid Act ). ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in M/s Credit Capital Finance Corporation Vs. M/s Foremost Industries Limited reported as AIR 1996 Delhi 310. Construing the judgment of Chamundi Mopeds (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court held:- "this provision shows that it is attracted only when the proceedings are with respect to any of the properties of the industrial company. In the present case, the leased equipment cannot be said to be the property of thecompany. The lease agreement between the parties shows that the ownershipof the equipment subject matter of lease throughout remains with the lessor,in the present case the plaintiff. When the ownership of the equipmentsubject matter of the lease agreement remains vested with the plaintiff, itcannot be said that the present proceedings relate to property of theindustrial company. "the learned Single Judge further held as follows:- "ln taking this view, I find support from a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Limited Vs. Church of South India Trustassociation, AIR 1992 SC 1439 . This was a case of lease of a property infavour of a company which was under the SICA. It was held that lease-holdrights in a property cannot be said to be a property of the sick industrialcompany. The application is dismissed. Church of South India Trustassociation, AIR 1992 SC 1439 . This was a case of lease of a property infavour of a company which was under the SICA. It was held that lease-holdrights in a property cannot be said to be a property of the sick industrialcompany. The application is dismissed. " ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in GE Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Dee Pharma Limited reported as 76 (1998) DLT 273 to contend that in case of ownership of machinery which vested with the financial company by which the equipment has been leased out, the provisions of Section 22 would not apply because such provisions only apply to the property of the lessee company and the equipment which was leased could not be said to be the property of the company. The learned Single Judge has after construing the Clauses of the lease of the equipment held as follows:- "perusal of these Clauses show that the ownership of the machinery of thesame was with the respondent. Merely putting the possession of the machineryat the disposal of the respondent by no stretch of imagination would meanthat the ownership of the property vested in the respondent company. Sincethe respondent company is not the owner of the machinery in question,therefore, mere registering of the case by BIFR would not disentitle this Courtto pass an order as prayed by the petitioner because the property does notbelong to the respondent company. In this regard, I am supported by thedecision of this Court in the case of Credit Capital Finance Corporation Vs. Foremost Industries Limited, 1996 Co. Cases Vol. 87 page 251. In thatcase, the plaintiff had entered into an agreement of lease of certain equipmentin favour of the defendant company and filed a petition under Section 20 ofthe Arbitration Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. Receiver was appointedin respect of the leased equipment Defendant company filed two applications- one was a petition under Section 446 of the Companies Act and secondwas an application contending that under Section 22 of the SICA Receivercould not have been appointed. This Court after interpreting Section 22 ofthe SICA came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 22 would beattracted only when the proceedings were in respect of any of the propertiesof the industrial company. This Court after interpreting Section 22 ofthe SICA came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 22 would beattracted only when the proceedings were in respect of any of the propertiesof the industrial company. Since ownership of the equipment subject matterof lease through out remained with the petitioner in that case, therefore,appointment of Receiver was upheld because Section 22 was not attracted. " ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that these observations which were upheld by the learned Division Bench in Company Appeal No. 29/98 by the Order dated 9/10/1998 apply with full force to the facts of the presentcase. The petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge incase M/s Kotak Mahendra Finance Limited Vs. M/s. Deve Paints Limitedreported as AIR 1997 Bombay 401 to contend that Section 22 would not apply to thefacts of the present case. The Bombay High Court held that financed vehicles whichare not owned by the sick company do not fall within the purview of Section 22. Thelearned Single Judge held as follows:-The answerable question, therefore, is tether the properties which are notowned by the sick industrial undertaking, are covered under Section 22 (1) ofthe Act 1985 ? If the finance company resons to recovery of its properties viz. its vehicles which have been given on lease to the lessee company, it cannotbe said that it is property of lessee company (sick industrial undertakings) orit is covered under Section 22 (1) or such recourse can be equated with thekind of proceedings contemplated under Secton 22 (1 ). The expression "against the properties" occurring in Section 22 (1) is not without significance because it implies that action of winding up or for execution, distress or such like proceedings must be against the property of the sick industrial company. it is true that by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Amendment Act, 1993 Section 22 (1) was amended and, "and no suit for the recovery of money or for the instrument of any security, against the industrial company or guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company" was inserted after, "no proceedings fur the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of receiver in respect thereof. " But the said amendment cannot be of any help to the lessee company because as observed above, so far as finance. company is concerned it has not filed any suit against the lessee company of recovery of money against the industrial company or for enforcement of any security against the lessee company of any loans given to the lessee company or for any advance granted to the lessee company. " ( 5 ) THE bar contemplated by the relevant portion of Section 22 of the Act reads asunder:- "no proceedings for the winding up of the compary or for execution ordistress or like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a Receiver in respect thereof. "thus even Section 22 of the Act in terms refers only to theproperties of the company. ( 6 ) THE plea of the respondents, if accepted, would defeat the very purpose of leasing out the equipment by the petitioner as the leased equipment was purchased initially by the petitioner company from its own funds and was then leased out to the respondent company. Such a construction would affect unfairly the rights of a company which the owner of the leased equipment. Such a construction, is, therefore, not warranted as the lessee company would in such an event will rot merely deprive thelessor company from receiving the instalments due, but also deprive it from taking steps to secure/possess its own equipment in respect of which the sick company has defaulted in making the payments. ( 7 ) IN similar circumstances in the case of Jindal Menthol and Investments Ltd. Vs. Prakash Industries Ltd. in OMP. No. 323/99, this Court has already appointed areceiver by the Judgment dated 8. 5. 2000. 8. In this view of the matter, I am satisfied that the ownership of the leasedequipment in the present case in accordance with of the agreement between theparties clearly remained with the petitioner financing company. The provisions ofsection 22 would, therefore, not apply to the facts of the present case. The otherobjection raised by the respondents that the equipment is immoveable property isfallacious as the equipment was leased out as moveable property. The respondenthaving affixed it to the ground would not make it immoveable property. In any eventthe lease period having expired on 23. 3. 98, the said objection does not survive. The otherobjection raised by the respondents that the equipment is immoveable property isfallacious as the equipment was leased out as moveable property. The respondenthaving affixed it to the ground would not make it immoveable property. In any eventthe lease period having expired on 23. 3. 98, the said objection does not survive. Inthis view of the matter, the appointment of the Receiver to secure the leasedequipment cannot be resisted by the respondents and it is, therefore, directed thatthe Receiver will take possession of the said leased equipment. The Receiver wouldbe free to store/use the equipment at his discretion. ( 9 ) THE counsel for the petitioner has informed me that the arbitration proceedings in this case are already going on before the Arbitrator, Mr. Ved Jain. Arbitrator to give his award preferably within four months from today. The petition is thus disposed of accordingly.