JUDGMENT Koshy, J. 1. Both these writ appeals relate to awarding of contract for running pantry car/mobile catering service in Train No. 6635/6636 (Ernakulam-Kuria) Netravathi Express by Southern Railway. Hence both appeals are heard together and disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. First, we may consider the fact in Writ Appeal No. 732/99 filed from O. P. No. 1822/99. By Ext. P-1 public notice, dated 22nd September 1998 published in newspapers, dated 26th September 1998 Chief Commercial Manager invited applications from experienced professional caterers belonging to Scheduled Caste community for issue of licence for running the pantry car/ mobile catering service. Conditions mentioned in Ext. P-1 notice were: "1. Applicants should belong to Scheduled Caste community; 2. Applicants should be experienced and professional caterers; 3. Contract is for five years from November, 1999; 4. Licence fee payable per annum is Rs. 9,95,000; 5. Earnest money deposit is Rs. 24,875; 6. Last date of application was 22nd September 1998; 7. Successful applicant shall pay a security deposit equal to 10 per cent of the amount of annual licence fee; 8. The entire amount of licence fee of Rs. 9,95,000 shall be deposited before licence period." petitioner who belong to Scheduled Caste (as per Ext. P-3 community certificate) and who has got about seven years experience in the catering field out of which more than five years in supervisory capacity (as per Ext. P-2 certificate) did not apply because he was unable to pay huge amount of licence fee and security amount which together will come to more than Rs. Ten lakhs. 3. It is averred that without issuing a public notice or fresh notification railway amended the terms of the notification with ulterior motives and respondents split the contract to four and awarded to Respondents 4 to 7 so; that none of the licensees is required to pay more than Rs. 3,00,000 as licence fee or security deposit. Had it been known that one need pay less than Rs. 3,00,000 as licence fee and security, petitioner and many others who did not apply in pursuance to Ext. P-1 tender notification as they cannot afford to pay more than Rs. 10,00,000 together before starting the licence period would have applied. As per Clause.704 of the Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial) Department catering licences can be awarded only after calling applications from professional and reputed caterers through press adertisement. P-1 tender notification as they cannot afford to pay more than Rs. 10,00,000 together before starting the licence period would have applied. As per Clause.704 of the Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial) Department catering licences can be awarded only after calling applications from professional and reputed caterers through press adertisement. Under Clause.705 of the Code Zonal Selection Committee shall consist of two principal HoDs (one being the C.C.M.) and Principal/Professor or recognised catering institute. But, here, no selection was conducted as per Ext. P-1 notice and selection committee who selected Respondents 4 to 7 consisted of C.C.M./P.S./M.A.S., C.M.M./G./P.E.R. and F.A. and C.A.O./G./M.A.S. (See Annexure I to writ appeal). According to the appellant, none of them were Heads of Departments, the C.C.M., who should have been necessarily included, was excluded and no Principal/Professor of a recognized catering institute was included in the Selection Committee. The appellant further stated that the second respondent hand picked these officers who would succumb to his dictates so that he could award the licences to whomsoever pleased him for extraneous, consideration and mala fide motives. In Ground B of the original petition it was contended as follows: "B. Had the petitioner known that the licence was going to be awarded to four different persons and that if successful he would not have to deposit more than Rs. 3 lakhs per year, he would certainly to have applied for the licence. Now, the decision could break up the licence into 4 different licences has been done without public notice and without public knowledge. It is understood that it has been so done by Respondents 2 and 3 with a mala fide motive in order to promote vested interests. The denial of equal opportunity to the petitioner to apply for the licence as now awarded, resulted in violation of his rights under Art.14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and has also violated the principles of natural justice." 4. A detailed counter was filed in the original petition by Respondents 1 to 3. Publication of Ext. P-1, notice is admitted. It is stated as follows: "Notice regarding it was published in English, Malayalam and Tamil dailies. It was Indicated in the notices that the annual licence fee tentatively fixed is Rs. 9,95,000 which is to be paid in advance on issue of licence. Publication of Ext. P-1, notice is admitted. It is stated as follows: "Notice regarding it was published in English, Malayalam and Tamil dailies. It was Indicated in the notices that the annual licence fee tentatively fixed is Rs. 9,95,000 which is to be paid in advance on issue of licence. In addition to that an additional 10 per cent of it will have to be paid as security deposit." The word 'tentatively' was underlined by us to show that such a word is not appearing in Ext. P-1 notice. It is submitted that 21 persons submitted applications in pursuance to Ext. P-1 notice. A screening committee of 3 Junior Administrative Grade Officers has recommended 16 out of them. A selection committee consisted of three Senior Administrative Grade Officers has selected four persons for issuing licence instead of one as can be seen from Ext. R-1A. In paras 4.2 and 4.3 of Ext. R-1A minutes of the selection committee it is stated as follows: "4.2 As per the directive cited above, since then licence would be awarded to S.C. candidates, it is appropriate that we split the licence into convenient lots of days to enable them to handle it with ease, in view of their limitations. This was, however, not envisaged while the tender was floated and offers invited. 4.3 The Committee would, therefore, recommend that our decision to split the duration of the licence - covering as few days of the week - be communicated to the selected parties by way of counter offer(s) indicating proportionate licence fee for acceptance by them, before award of the licence." Policy directive noticed in the minutes is only a note of the General Manager Shri N. Krithivasan, dated 25th November 1998 and not from the Railway Board. In Ext. R-1A minutes of the selection committee it is also stated at para 5.2.4 as follows: "..... .Against this background, it is suggested that initially the licences be awarded for a minimum period of say-one year. Subject to their performance being found satisfactory later, a decision could be taken to extend the duration further." General Manager Shri Krithivasan accepted the recommendation with a rider that application can be accepted for the full term with right to terminate the contract at the end of one year as can be seen from the endorsement given at the last page of Ext. R-1A. R-1A. Contracts were accordingly decided to be issued. In view of the interim stay order, licencee did not start operation till disposal of the original petition. It is submitted that immediately after the disposal of the original petition, even though notice was issued in the writ appeal and stay petition, licensees commenced operation. 5. Learned Single Judge dismissed the original petition on the ground that persons selected are more experienced and petitioner had not even applied for licence. It is submitted by the appellant that learned Single Judge did not consider the main contention that contract was awarded in contravention of Ext. P1 notice and in awarding the contract, there is violation of principles of natural justice and Art.14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 6. Main contention of the petitioner is that petitioner and many others did not apply for licence as on the terms of Ext. P-1 notice published in various newspapers in different languages as a person who is awarded contract as per condition in Ext. P1 notice has to pay more than Rs. 10 lakhs as licence fee and security before licence is granted. But contract was awarded to four persons splitting the above by which each person need pay only below Rs. 3 lakhs. If a policy decision is taken for the reason stated in para 4.2 on the ground that contract is being awarded to Scheduled Caste candidates, etc., and this was not envisaged while tender was invited as admitted in para 4.2 or Ext. R-1A, fresh notice should have been issued so that more people like the petitioner could have applied for the same to avoid allegation of favouritism and arbitrariness. It is also contended that while splitting the contract Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial) 714 was also violated. The above Code 714 provides as follows: "As far as possible only one licencee should be therefor one station/train." Even when the provisions in the Code was decided to be deviated and a change in the terms in Ext. P-1 public notice was decided to be made, admittedly, no fresh public notice was issued. Ext. P-1 notice is in terms of Code 714. But when that was challenged, a public notice inviting fresh applications was necessary. 7. P-1 public notice was decided to be made, admittedly, no fresh public notice was issued. Ext. P-1 notice is in terms of Code 714. But when that was challenged, a public notice inviting fresh applications was necessary. 7. We are of the view that facts of the case are similar to one that is considered by the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram v. International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628 . In that case, tender was called for from registered second class hoteliers having at least five years' experience for running a second class restaurant and two snack bars at the airport for three years. Fourth respondent in that case who was not a second class hotelier was awarded the contract. Fourth respondent had experience of only running canteens of banks, public sector undertakings, clubs, messes and banks and: who claimed accordingly experience equivalent to that of a second class or even first class hotelier. Since fourth respondent was not a registered second class hotelier, Apex court held that awarding of the contract against the terms of the public tender notice is illegal. But, since writ petition was filed after five months of acceptance of tender no relief was granted. Here, writ petition was filed before actual granting of contract. Writ petition was filed on 22nd January 1999. Decision to split the contract and award it to four persons was taken only on 5th January 1999 (Ext. R-1A). Awarding of contract and calling upon the licencees to pay the licence fee, etc., was sent only on 18th January 1999 (Ext. R-1D). Immediately on knowing about this, petitioner filed the original petition. Standing Counsel for the Railways took notice on 22nd January 1999 itself and interim stay of further proceedings was also granted on 22nd January 1999 itself. Only after disposal of the original petition licence was granted. Immediately on receipt of copy of Judgment Writ Appeal was filed. It is submitted that only after receiving the notice by the respective advocates for respondents, pantry car was started in the train in question. 8. For convenience sake we may quote few observations of the Supreme Court in Airport Authority's case AIR 1979 SC 1628 (supra) which are applicable in this case: "9. It is submitted that only after receiving the notice by the respective advocates for respondents, pantry car was started in the train in question. 8. For convenience sake we may quote few observations of the Supreme Court in Airport Authority's case AIR 1979 SC 1628 (supra) which are applicable in this case: "9. That takes us to the next question whether the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondents was invalid and liable to be set aside at the instance of the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the first and the fourth respondents that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition since no tender was submitted by him and he was a mere stranger. The argument was that if the appellant did not enter the field of competition by submitting a tender, what did it matter to him whose tender was accepted, what grievance could he have if the tender of the fourth respondents was wrongly accepted. A person whose tender was rejected might very well complain that the tender of someone else was wrongly accepted, but, it was submitted, how could a person who never tendered and who was at no time in the field, put forward such a complaint? This argument, in our opinion, is misconceived and cannot be sustained for a moment. The grievance of the appellant, it may be noted, was not that his tender was rejected as a result of improper acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondents, but that he was differentially treated and denied equality of opportunity with the fourth respondents in submitting a tender. His complaint was that if it were known that non fulfilment of the condition of eligibility would be no bar to consideration of a tender, he also would have submitted a tender and competed for obtaining a contract. But he was 21 precluded from submitting a tender and entering the field of consideration by reason of the condition of eligibility, while so far as the fourth respondents were concerned, their tender was entertained and accepted even though they did not satisfy the condition of eligibility and this resulted in inequality of treatment which was constitutionally impermissible. But he was 21 precluded from submitting a tender and entering the field of consideration by reason of the condition of eligibility, while so far as the fourth respondents were concerned, their tender was entertained and accepted even though they did not satisfy the condition of eligibility and this resulted in inequality of treatment which was constitutionally impermissible. This was the grievance made by the appellant in the writ petition and there can be no doubt that if this grievance were well founded, the appellant would be entitled to maintain the writ petition." Here also, merely because petitioner did not apply it will not non suit him as according to him if he was aware that contract will be splitted up and he need pay an amount below Rs. 3,00,000 instead of Rs. 10,00,000 before licence started, he would have also applied. 9. The Supreme Court approved the dissenting opinion of Mathew, J. in the Full Bench decision in V. Punnen Thomas v. State of Kerala AIR 1969 Ker. 81 where it was observed as follows: "The Government, is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largess. Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal." Again, the Apex Court referred to the Judgment quoted from their own earlier decision in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West-Bengal AIR 1975 SC 266 as follows: "..... .the democratic form of Government demand is equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions..... .The activities of the Government have a public element and therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure." The Supreme Court held that: "This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure." The Supreme Court held that: "This proposition would hold good in all cases of dealing by the Government with the public, where the interest sought to be protected is a privilege. It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant." After referring to various authorities, it was held as follows: "21. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art.14. It is now well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [ AIR 1974 SC 555 ] and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ AIR 1978 SC 597 ] that Art.14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non discriminatory. ...... It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. It must therefore follow as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Art.14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non 'discrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non discriminatory ground." It was also held as follows: "22. It is interesting to find that this rule was recognised and applied by a Constitution Bench of this Court in a case of sale of kendu leaves by the Government of Orissa in Rasbihari Panda v. State of Orissa [ AIR 1969 SC 1081 ].. .... The Court rejected the contention of the Government that by reason of S.10 it was entitled; to dispose of kendu leaves in such manner as it thought fit and there was no limitation upon its power to enter into contracts for sale of kendu leaves with such persons it liked. The Court held that the Government was, in the exercise of its power to enter into contracts for sale of kendu leaves, subject to the constitutional limitation of Art.14 and it could not act arbitrarily in selecting persons with whom to enter into contracts and discriminate against others similarly situate." Here also, if the railway considered the applicant being a scheduled caste candidate having some limitations and considering the capacity of persons applied, decided that contract should be split up 'in convenient lots of days to enable to handle' as stated in Ext. R-1A, fresh tender should have been invited to escape from the allegations of arbitrariness and discrimination. 10. Again, in Asok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar 1997 (4) SCC 18 , Apex court held as follows: "An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan [1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168]. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan [1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168]. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the fact of the record." 11. In Sterling Computers Limited v. M and N Publications. Ltd. 1994 (1) SCC 445 also it was held that though public authorities have some discretion in contracts having commercial elements, discretion is not absolute and governed by some norms and procedures in public interest and for public good. It was held that decision making process is open to judicial review. Though court cannot act as an appellate authority, if the process is violative of Art.14, court can strike down the decision and action taken thereto. There, execution of supplemental contract without inviting fresh tender was held to be violative of Art.14 and hence void. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in District Collector v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi 1990 (3) SCC 655 a Division Bench of this Court in Sunu v. Union of India 2000 (2) KLT 747 held as follows: "....when an advertisement mentions a particular qualification and an appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is not a matter only because the appointing authority and the appointee concerned. The aggrieved are all those who had similar or even better qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had not applied for the post because they did not possess the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. The aggrieved are all those who had similar or even better qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had not applied for the post because they did not possess the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. Supreme Court held that it amounted to a fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications in such circumstances unless it is clearly stated that the qualifications are relaxable.......It may be noted that as far as the qualification prescribed for the pest of Junior Engineer (Civil) is concerned, it is open to the department to entertain applications from candidates who possess Diploma in Civil Engineering or its equivalent qualification." We are of the view that the same is applicable on the facts of this case. Department has full authority to make any reasonable terms or stipulate any necessary valid conditions while issuing public notice in inviting applications for licences and can select anybody who is the best among them and this Court will not interfere in such decision unless there is mala fide or illegality therein. But, if it deviates from the terms of the public notice or delete the stipulations without disclosing to the public to benefit a view it is violative of Art.14 and hit by arbitrariness and discrimination. Here, when selection committee decided to relax conditions and reduce the amount of licence fee, fresh notification should have been issued and no serious public interest would have affected by delay of three more weeks. 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents 4 and 6 based on the observation in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 argued that Government has got freedom of contract and select best and judicial review is not equal to appellate powers. Only best among the applicants was selected. We are not going to the merits of the decision. In para 74 and 77 of the above Judgment it was held as follows: "74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. * * * * 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. * * * * 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. Abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under- (i) Illegality. This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-.making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind [ (1991) 1 AC 696 ], Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention'." Here, there is clear procedural imparity in not inviting fresh application when a decision was taken for deviation from the procedure prescribed in Ext. P1 public notice resulting in benefitting few and avoiding others even from applying. After considering the applications, even though four were selected, it was found out by the selection committee itself that they may not be able to carry out the contract efficiently if the entire work is given considering that they are scheduled caste candidates and they have no previous experience in serving food in train etc. 13. In Asia Foundation and Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and others 1997 (1) SCC 738 also it was held that a lowest tender need not be accepted always. 13. In Asia Foundation and Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and others 1997 (1) SCC 738 also it was held that a lowest tender need not be accepted always. In the absence of exercise of power for collateral purpose, Government selecting a contract cannot be interfered and if contract is executed in larger public interest, it shall not be interfered. Here, we are not going to the question which of the 21 applicants are best and whether selection of four contractors are correct as an appellate authority but also considering violation of Art.14 and procedure infirming it that equal opportunity was not given to similarly placed persons. No public interest is served by continuing the contract entered without giving equal opportunity to others and contract given against the terms of the public notice. In Raunag International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and others AIR 1999 SC 393 also Supreme Court held the same view. The petitioner was not qualified and Supreme Court held that there is no benefits to the petitioner. Here, petitioner was fully qualified to apply in terms of Ext. P-1 notice but he and many others did not apply because it was unaffordable to them to deposit more than Rs. 10 lakhs before licence period started whereas without informing public, behind the back, it was decided to split up so that a licencee need pay only below Rs. 3 lakhs. 14. Finally, learned Senior Counsel cited the decision of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others 2000 (2) SCC 617 . There, the Supreme Court held as follows: "7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ 1979 (3) SCC 489 ], Fertilizer Corporation, Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ 1981 (1) SCC 568 ], C.G.E. v. Dunlop India Ltd. [ 1985 (1) SCC 260 ], Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ 1994 (6) SCC 651 ], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra [ 1997 (1) SCC 134 ] and Raunag International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. [ 1999 (1) SCC 492 ]. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract, It is fret, to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to f all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Art.226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that in overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." Unlike Air India case, here, there was no mention in Ext. P-1 notice of relaxing the conditions or possibility of awarding the contract to different persons for different days by splitting up the contract by which reducing the licence fee payable by each licencee. Here, there is clear procedural illegality by which many similarly placed eligible persons were denied opportunity to apply as term of Ext. P-L notice inviting applications were diluted without disclosing it to the public. No public interest is served by allowing to continue such licence issued violating Art.14 of the Constitution as it is a fraud on the public. Here, there is clear procedural illegality by which many similarly placed eligible persons were denied opportunity to apply as term of Ext. P-L notice inviting applications were diluted without disclosing it to the public. No public interest is served by allowing to continue such licence issued violating Art.14 of the Constitution as it is a fraud on the public. If such licences are allowed to continue, merely because contract was already granted, it will amount to putting a premium to such practices and Government largesse cannot be allowed to be distributed indiscriminately violating equal opportunity principle. Principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority of India's case in contractual matters were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Style (Dressland) v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and another 1999 (7) SCC 89 and held that judicial review is possible in contractual matters also and non arbitrariness is a necessary concomitant of law. Here, some conditions in Exit. P-1 public notice was altered to benefit a few while awarding the contract without disclosing to the petitioner. There is clear arbitrariness and discrimination and violation of Art.14 of the Constitution of India as pointed out earlier and therefore licence awarded to Respondents 4 to 7 violating the conditions in Ext. P-1 public notice without issuing fresh notice is void and is liable to be set aside. 15. It is contended by the appellant with respect to the argument that persons selected were more experienced etc. and that even though a policy decision was taken to consider experience in non railway mobile catering service also to include fresh conditions, persons with such experience were totally omitted to be considered. It is submitted that experience of fifth respondent was experience as Catering Inspector for 20 years whereas one Sivanandan who has 35years of such experience was not considered. As far as 6th respondent is concerned, his experience is only that he worked in a hotel. As regards fourth respondent, unlike the name, it is a proprietary concern and petitioner had similar or better experience. We are not sitting in appeal over the decision of the selection committee. Therefore, we are not looking to that contentions. In any event, petitioner's ability etc. were not considered vis-a-vis the applicants as he did not apply for justifiable reasons already stated. 16. We are not sitting in appeal over the decision of the selection committee. Therefore, we are not looking to that contentions. In any event, petitioner's ability etc. were not considered vis-a-vis the applicants as he did not apply for justifiable reasons already stated. 16. Additional contention in Writ Appeal No. 731/2000 is that reservation for SC/ST in awarding commercial contracts is against commercial interest and against Chapter VII section A of the Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial) Department. Clause.709 of the above Code is as follows: "709. There shall be no reservation or preference for any category in award of contracts and the basic criteria should be capability, reputation, experience and track record of the party to give requisite standard of food and service to the passengers. However, in case of small and roadside stations, preference will be given to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates. Zonal Railways should make out a list of such stations and send a copy of the same to the Board." According to the appellant, the above clause was violated while issuing Ext. P-1 notice. The learned Single Judge brushed aside the above contention on the ground that Code is not binding. We are unable to find out how the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Code is not binding. The Code published is for the general guidance of the railway authorities and contains the policy of the Railway and officers cannot change the same on their own without changing the policy stated in the Code. However, in Writ Appeal No. 731/99, Annexure B1 was produced by the Department showing that the provisions in the Code were changed in 1997. How Codes can be changed by Ext. B-1 order is a different issue. The following clause was mentioned in Ext. B-1 order, dated 24th June 1997: "2. I There will be reservation of 20 percent in favour of S.C. candidates and 10 per cent in favour of S.T. candidates for award of catering/vending licences including pantry cars and refreshment rooms." However, it is not explained how the above principle is applied when the contract is split up into four, whether all four contractors can be Scheduled Caste candidates etc. 17. We are not going into the above questions as we have already held that awarding of licence to Respondents 4 to 7 in Writ Appeal No. 732/1999 against the terms in Ext. 17. We are not going into the above questions as we have already held that awarding of licence to Respondents 4 to 7 in Writ Appeal No. 732/1999 against the terms in Ext. P-1 notice is invalid in view of violation of Art.14 of the Constitution and arbitrariness. Therefore, other contentions need not be looked into. Fresh contract has to be entered into. 18. Even though there is no public interest in continuing a contract awarded violating Art.14 of the Constitution and no considerable loss of revenue will be caused in cancelling the contract, we are concerned with the question of public inconvenience. Now, after the dismissal of the writ petition, pantry car was attached to Netravathi Express in question and Respondents 4 to 7 are conducting catering service. An abrupt stoppage of the same will cause inconvenience to the public. Even though after writ appeal was filed they started operation and they were doing the same for more than one year and even though several requests were made, due to pendency of large number of cases, the writ appeal was heard only now. In the above circumstances, until fresh contract is granted, the present licencee may continue for a period of three more months or upto 31st December 2000, at the maximum. Immediate steps should be taken for awarding new licences. Refund of the excess proportionate licence fee should be granted to the present awardees. All reasonable conditions as it thinks fit without violating Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial) Department in the matter of appointing licencees for running catering service can be mentioned in the public notice inviting applications and the Railway will have freedom to choose anyone who is qualified as per the terms of the contract if the above exercise is not vitiated by mala fides. Fresh selection process should start immediately and public notice in that respect should be issued without wasting any time and, in any event, the present licencee shall not run the canteen beyond 31st December 2000 and all formalities regarding awarding of fresh licence should be completed before 31st December, 2000 so that from 1st January 2001 new licencee can run the catering service. Both writ appeals are allowed in the above terms.