ORDER: The petitioner has filed the above two writ petitions praying to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in his proceedings dated 12.9.1992 in D.810/91 GIR 18 N87-88 and D.811/91 GIR 18 N/87-88 respectively and to quash the same. 2. In the affidavits filed in support of both the above writ petitions which are nothing but the same for all purposes, the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is an assessee under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’); that for the assessment year 1987-88 pertaining to the accounting year 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1987, the petitioner was subjected to final assessment and the order which was passed under Sec.17(3) of the Act by the first respondent on the income received from rubber amounting to Rs.1,16,50,391. While so, the first respondent by notice dated 12.9.1992 purporting to be under Sec.35 of the Act alleged that there was escape of Income-tax which was liable to be brought to tax further alleging that the second respondent had issued guidelines for the average yield per acre under rubber plantation in Kaniyakumari District to be 600 kg. per acre and the same has been fixed in consultation with the connecting departments including the rubber Board; that applying the said guidelines rate of yield, the first respondent has computed a shortfall of the income of Rs.38,63,424 and has proposed to levy agricultural income of Rs.25,11,226 and called upon the petitioner to file the correct returns within 30.9.1992 which is patently contrary to the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules. 3. 3. The further averments of the affidavits are that yet, another notice on the same date that is 12.9.1992 had been served on the petitioner, also purporting to be under Sec.35 of the Act for the same assessment year 1987-88 referring to the amalgamation of M/s.Greenham Estate Private Limited with that of the petitioner’s Estate and has been assessed that the expenditure incurred on M/s.Greenham Estate which ceased to exist having become part of the petitioner’s Estate, was erroneously allowed and that therefore, the same had to be withdrawn; that he has proposed to exclude the expenditure of the said estate incurred in earning that income relating to the non-existent estate thus proposing to determine to escaped income-tax at Rs.37,40,151 and has proposed to levy a further tax of Rs.24,31,098 arrived at short levy of tax amounting to Rs.8,38,598. In both the above notices, he has not attached the return form as claimed and in the former notice for this notice, time was fixed for filing objections by 30.9.1992 thus it is very clear that for one and the same assessment year 1987-88 under the act, the first respondent is invoking his power of revision under Sec.35 of the Act by means of two distinct and separate notices spelling out the so-called escape of income differently thus acting in utter disregard of the authority conferred on him as a quasi-judicial authority that the two notices impugned in the writ petitions are patently wrong and illegal and are liable to the quashed; that the two notices purporting to be under Sec.35 of the Act served by the first respondent on the petitioner in respect of the assessment year 1987-88 of the Act is ex facie and patently wrong and illegal and the same are liable to be quashed. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the respondents besides generally denying the allegations of the writ petitions would also specifically submit that the assessment of the petitioner was originally finalised under Sec.17(3) of the Act whereby the petitioner was determined at a net income of Rs.30,25,063 and tax levied to a tune of Rs.19,66,290.90 by the first respondent in his proceedings GIR.18 N/87-88, dated 19.3.1988; that subsequent to the said assessment, it was brought to the notice of the authorities that the total production of 6,01,225 kg. of rubber from 1331.03 acres worked out to 451.7 kg. of rubber from 1331.03 acres worked out to 451.7 kg. per acre and that the production rate was very much below the guidelines issued by the second respondent viz., 600 kgs. per acre and this difference had resulted in a short levy of tax of Rs.25,11,226 and hence the first respondent had issued a notice under Sec.35 of the Act so as to enable the petitioner to give his objection and it is only challenging the said notice, the petitioner filed the first of the above writ petitions. 5. The respondents would further submit in the counter that during the accounting year 1986-87, the petitioner company filed returns for the assessment year 1987-88 and the same was finalised under Sec.17(3) of the Act; that during enquiry, the value of 6,01,229 kgs. of rubber was worked out to Rs.1.16,50,391 and the same was finalised; that as per the guidelines of the second respondent, the average yield per acre is 600 kgs. per year and it has been fixed in consideration of various aspects and in consultation of the concerned department including the rubber Board; that in view of the short levy of tax, notice under Sec.35 of the Act was issued to the assessee so as to enable them to give their objections fixing the time till 30.9.1992; that the time was considered to be short, the petitioner was at liberty to pray for some more time, but now the petitioner has approached this Court in spite of having alternate remedy. 6. The counter affidavit would further state that the petitioner has shown the production value at Rs.98,58,164 from 1331 acres of rubber which works out to Rs.7,400 per acre. But the expenditure for the production of rubber has been shown exorbitantly at Rs.7,000 without assigning any convincing reason; that it was under such circumstances, a notice had been issued; that it is more than the guidelines fixed at 600 kg. But the expenditure for the production of rubber has been shown exorbitantly at Rs.7,000 without assigning any convincing reason; that it was under such circumstances, a notice had been issued; that it is more than the guidelines fixed at 600 kg. per acre; that the writ petitions would not lie since there is an efficacious alternative remedy provided under the statute as concluded by the Apex Court in its decision reported in Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 53 S.T.C. 315, that by way of reply to notice issued under this Sec.35 of the Act, the petitioner could have filed his objections before the authorities; that it is also relevant to point out that the Greenham Estate Divisions have been amalgamated by the petitioner with effect from 1.4.1986; that in the notice issued, the petitioner was asked to give his explanation as to how the company has claimed two different expenditures under two different headings, “Head office (common)” and “Head office (Agriculture)” when the Head office of the petitioner is located at Madras. But instead of giving explanation to the notices, the petitioner has chosen to file the above writ petitions. On such and other grounds offered in the counter affidavit, the respondents would ultimately pray to dismiss the writ petitions with costs. 7. Assessing the facts and circumstances of the case from the pleadings of parties and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what comes to be known is that merely based on the two notices issued by the first respondent under Sec.35 of the Act which are impugned herein, offering certain reasons that those notices have been issued in an irregular manner, the petitioner has come forward to file the above two writ petitions at one and the same time, each petition connecting to one notice in spite of an appeal provided under the provisions of the Act for such matters. So far as the respondents are concerned, they do not come forward to argue that the petitioner cannot testify the validity of such notice issued whether it is on escaped assessment or for any other reason. But the simple question that is posed is which is the immediate forum for remedy. So far as the respondents are concerned, they do not come forward to argue that the petitioner cannot testify the validity of such notice issued whether it is on escaped assessment or for any other reason. But the simple question that is posed is which is the immediate forum for remedy. According to the respondents, the remedy lies before the appellate authority who is fixed by the statute and not by means of writ jurisdiction. 8. Whatever be the grievance of the petitioner, the respondent’s case is that it should be projected before the appropriate statutory authority first and after exhausting their remedies, the petitioner company should have ultimately resorted to the writ jurisdiction before this Court. Thus with scant regard for the legal provisions which are open for remedy the petitioner with the view to stall further proceedings has come before this Court by means of the writ petition. 9. From the manner in which the petitioner has rushed to this Court in respect of all what he has stated in the writ petition that a remedy is provided for the petitioner to submit before the regular appellate authority under appeal provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1995. But knowingly, the petitioner without referring to such statutory remedy has come forward to seek the extraordinary constitutional remedy thus by-passing the legal remedy available under the statutes. In spite of the avenues open for remedy for matters of such nature, the petitioner has resorted to file the writ petition probably to get interim orders of stay of such proceedings initiated on the part of the Agricultural Income-tax authorities thus crippling the case at the notice stage itself and to shelve it in the cold storage and his request for such an interim stay having been answered in the affirmative by this Court at the admission stage, the petitioner for the last eight years, has been successfully evading further proceeding by the department. 10. 10. The respondents are also lethargic in the sense that they did not initiate any measure to vacate the interim stay granted, showing to this Court that regular statutory remedy is available; that after four years of the institution of the writ petition and the stay granted in the W.M.Ps., the respondents have moved for vacating the stay in the year 1996 and the learned single Judge who dealt with that rightly opining that it was not the proper time to vacate the stay and it was fit to hear the writ petition itself early has disposed the said petition. But in spite of such opinion offered, again the system has cooperated with the petitioner for four more years to carry out the said direction since the main writ petitions have not at all been brought to the list for consideration. 11. In the above circumstance, the only course open for the petitioner not only now but also even at the time of filing of the above writ petitions, is to prefer a regular appeal under the relevant provisions of the Act before the appellate authority having jurisdiction to entertain such appeals. Nowhere the petitioner has stated that his remedy does not lie before the regular statutory appellate authority and only lies before this writ Court under judicial review, nor any material has been brought forth to that effect on the part of the petitioner. None of the circumstance also favour this Court to go into the merit of the case for passing any order regarding the facts alleged. 12. On the contrary, since a statutory appeal is open for the petitioner to exhaust his remedy and since it is fit and proper for the appellate authority and then the revisional authority who are provided for by the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 to deal with the subject matter freely, it is also not proper on the part of this Court to offer opinions or remarks since it is susceptible to affect the free and fair manner in which the said appellate and revisional authorities are expected to arrive at their own conclusions on facts and circumstances that are revealed in the case. 13. 13. For all the above discussions held, the only course open for this Court in both the above writ petitions so far as the contents and prayers of the same are concerned, is to dismiss the writ petitions. 14. In result, the above writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. The petitioner, if he is aggrieved in any manner regarding the impugned notices issued by the respondents, is at liberty to refer to a statutory appeal remedy and thereafter the revisional forum under the relevant provisions of the Act. 15. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 21426, 21427 of 1992, 26374 and 26375 of 1996 are also dismissed.