T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is challenging the order passed by the Educational appellate Tribunal, Belgaum, which confirmed the order of termination by the management. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner was that he was serving as lecturer in homeopathy at Homeopathic Medical College, Belgaum. He was initially appointed as lecturer in Biology. He further stated that he was appointed as lecturer in the first respondent-college on 12-9-1967. He is a graduate in Homeopathic Medicines and Surgery. He has worked to the entire satisfaction of his superiors. But, however, all of a sudden on 18-12-1979, he was communicated by an order under the signature of respondent 2 that his services as lecturer were terminated with immediate effect and that he should be considered as relieved on 18-12- 1979. He alleged that the order of termination was served on 19-12-1979. The order contained in No. GC/274, dated 19-11-1979 is violative of the mandatory provisions of Section 8 of the Act No. 10 of 1975. The second respondent has no authority to terminate the services of the petitioner. The termination amounts to dismissal under Section 8 of the said Act. The petitioner has executed a bond while joining the services. The petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed by virtue of his having put in over "340" days of continuous service with the respondent. The bond on which the order of termination based was executed in 1972 when the appellant came to be appointed as a lecturer in Biology in the college and thereafter when he ceased to be a lecturer in Biology, he was reappointed in another post and hence the bond has become unenforceable. ( 3 ) IT is the case of the respondents that the services of the appellant were purely temporary in nature and are liable to be terminated at any time without notice and without assigning any reasons. The services of the petitioner were terminated on 24-1-1979. The petitioner filed appeal in KPEI A No. 1 of 1979 to the Tribunal and later he withdrew the same. While the appeal was pending, the Government has appointed the divisional Commissioner, Belgaum as the Administrator of the first respondent -Society for six months. The Divisional Commissioner acting as the Administrator has continued the services of the petitioner as per the resolution No. 19, dated 26-6-1979. While the appeal was pending, the Government has appointed the divisional Commissioner, Belgaum as the Administrator of the first respondent -Society for six months. The Divisional Commissioner acting as the Administrator has continued the services of the petitioner as per the resolution No. 19, dated 26-6-1979. The first respondent challenged the order of the Government and appointment of an Administrator in W. P. No. 6991 of 1979. This Court by its order dated 12-7-1979 has quashed the order dated 19-4-1979, as a result the first respondent again assumed the management of the college. The resolution No. 19, dated 26-6-1979 passed by the Divisional Commissioner in his capacity as the administrator of first respondent-Society continuing the services of the appellant is illegal. In lieu of three months' notice, the petitioner was paid three months' salary in advance. The petitioner did not challenge this order. The first respondent-Society has not recalled or cancelled the original order of termination dated 24-1-1979 and as such the petitioner cannot claim that he is still in service on the strength of the order of the divisional Commissioner acting as the Administrator. Since the petitioner has withdrawn the appeal, the original order of termination of services of the petitioner still holds good. As the petitioner was appointed on a temporary basis and in terms of the bond executed by him, respondent 1 had the right and authority to terminate the services as per the terms of the bond executed by the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE first respondent is an unaided institution not receiving any grants. As such the respondents are not governed by the Grant-in-Aid code. Hence, the service conditions of the parties would be regulated by the appointment order or by the bonds executed by the employees. The order of termination does not cast any stigma on him. It is simply an order of termination of services in terms of the bond executed by the appellant. The termination is not inflicted by way of punishment. He continues to be a probationer temporary servant till the confirmation of his services by a regular order by the first respondent. ( 5 ) THE above resolution is attacked on the ground that there is no proper enquiry. The order of dismissal was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal holding that "there was no agreement between the petitioner and the society under which his services could be terminated. ( 5 ) THE above resolution is attacked on the ground that there is no proper enquiry. The order of dismissal was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal holding that "there was no agreement between the petitioner and the society under which his services could be terminated. He has also admitted that at the time of termination of services, a cheque for three months' salary was also sent and he had encashed the said cheque. . . ". It is clear that the petitioner has encashed the cheque for three months' salary. Therefore, I do not find any force in the said argument. The appellant has also admitted in the course of cross-examination that his appointment is purely on temporary basis. The Tribunal also relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural gas Commission and Others v Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali, and Union of india and Others v P. S. Bhatt, and ultimately held that the termination is proper and dismissed the appeal. ( 6 ) IN the revision, Sri Sridhar, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the real question was not decided by the Tribunal. In the light of the events narrated in the order which clearly show that the petitioner was more or less a permanent employee, he cannot be construed as a temporary employee at all. The conclusion of the Tribunal that the petitioner was a temporary employee is wholly untenable in the light of the events mentioned above. It is wholly impermissible for the management to remove him from the services. The procedure followed by the tribunal is opposed to Section 10 of the Act and also against the ruling in President, Golden Valley Education Trust, Oorgaum, Kolar Gold fields v District Judge and Educational Appellate Tribunal, Kolar and others, and Kalpatharu Vidya Samithi v Educational Appellate Tribunal. The learned Counsel also relied upon the dictum of the Supreme court in Madan Gopal v State of Punjab , which is as follows:"where an enquiry made by the officer is made with the object of ascertaining whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Government servant for his alleged misdemeanour, it is an enquiry for the purpose of taking punitive action including dismissal or removal from service if the servant is found to have committed the misdemeanour charged against him. Such an enquiry and order consequent upon the report made in the enquiry does not fall within the principle of the State of Orissa v Ram narayan Das4. In such a case it is not correct to say that the enquiry was made by the officer for the purpose of ascertaining whether the servant who is a temporary employee should be continued in service or should be discharged under the terms of the employment by giving one month's notice. Where the employment of a temporary Government servant, even though liable to be terminated by notice of one month without assigning any reason, is not so terminated, but instead the superior officer chooses to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. And as the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution applies as much to a temporary public servant as to permanent public servants, by virtue of Article 311 the Government servant is not liable to be dismissed or removed from service until he has been given reasonable opportunity against the action proposed to be taken in" regard to him". ( 7 ) IN the above case, it is seen that the Supreme Court has observed that "even though liable to be terminated by notice of one month without assigning any reason, where the employee is a temporary Government servant". This observation is certainly against the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel also relied upon a dictum of this Court in basavaraj Patil v Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society, Gulbarga, which is to the following effect:"to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary and proper to refer to the relevant rules in the Manual. In Chapter II 'permanent' is defined to mean, the post is permanent, the term of probation has been satisfactorily completed and confirmation of the employee in the post has been communicated to him in writing. 'on probation', which means the employee, while being appointed to a permanent post, or a temporary post is required to fulfil conditions of probation as prescribed in the 'probation Rules' before being confirmed in his appointment. 'on probation', which means the employee, while being appointed to a permanent post, or a temporary post is required to fulfil conditions of probation as prescribed in the 'probation Rules' before being confirmed in his appointment. 'temporary' means the employee is engaged specifically for fixed or limited period, on terms and conditions specified in his letter of appointment". ( 9 ) IN the above decision, it is clear that the word 'temporary' means the employee is appointed on the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment. Therefore, the terms and conditions loom large in the matter of appointment. In any event, that was a case concerning with the rules of the particular society and that is not the case in hand. The learned Counsel also relied upon the dictum of the Calcutta High court in Dr. Anisur Rahman Khan v Indian Institute of Technology and others, for the proposition that a temporary employee who worked for long cannot be deprived of his employment by termination and he could have been adjusted in any other employment under the institution. There again the person is governed by the Central Service Rules, 1965 and he was a Government employee which again is not the case before me. The relevant passage reads thus:"the guidelines and the procedure adopted by the sponsoring authorities of different schemes in the IIT stand against the principles of natural justice and fair play and deprives one from his most legitimate rights and acts in a most whimsical and arbitrary way by depriving one or rather kicking out one from his livelihood. The authorities like the sponsorers of the schemes under the control of the IIT must not behave like private ruthless employers and must look after the welfare of citizens, particularly their employees. A person cannot be denied his livelihood after being in service for ten years or so in the garb of ad hoc or temporary service and after the closure of the session of the service or the scheme as in the instant case be thrown into wilderness". ( 10 ) IN Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another v Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, which was a case under the central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited, wherein the Supreme court held that there can be no termination without notice. ( 10 ) IN Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another v Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, which was a case under the central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited, wherein the Supreme court held that there can be no termination without notice. Here again the question is that the employee is governed by certain service rules framed. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Nepal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the following passage was relied upon:"an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant and ex facie innocuous in that it does not cast any stigma on the Government servant or visits him with penal consequences must be regarded as effecting a termination simpliciter, but if it is discovered on the basis of material adduced that although innocent in its terms the order was passed in fact with a view to punishing the Government servant, it is a punitive order which can be passed only after complying with Article 311 (2)". Firstly, Article 311 is not applicable to the facts as the petitioner is not a government employee and secondly, even that it is clearly an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant which is innocuous is maintainable. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel also relied upon the dictum in Anoop jaiswal v Government of India and Another, which is as follows:"the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311 (2 ). Where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee". ( 12 ) HEARD the learned Counsel. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee". ( 12 ) HEARD the learned Counsel. ( 13 ) THE issues involved in the above CRP are: 1. Whether the petitioner is a temporary employee? 2. Whether he is bound by the undertaking given at the time of the appointment? 3. Whether the order is innocuous or carries some stigma? ( 14 ) THE fact that the petitioner has been a temporary employee is not in dispute; though the principle that the continuous employment though not permanent amounts to permanent employment is adumbrated. In oil and Natural Gas Commission's case, supra, which is held as follows:"a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained. In the case of the probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, termination of his service, finding him unsuitable for the post is valid and does not attract Article 311. In the present case the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma on the respondent-probationer who had no right to service. Even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influenced the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, as under the terms of the appointment such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishment. The institution of the departmental enquiry, which was subsequently dropped was therefore inconsequential. Nor the assessment roll went to show that the intention of the appointing authority was to proceed against the respondent by way of punishment. The remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his probation should be extended. These remarks make out a strong case for the Supreme Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishment. These remarks make out a strong case for the Supreme Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishment. If the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned. The order thus did not attract Article 311". The dictum in P. B. Bhatt's case, supra, is to the following effect:"the law in relation to termination of service of an employee on probation is well-settled. If any order terminating the service of a probationer be an order of termination simpliciter without attaching any stigma to the employee and if the order is not an order by way of punishment, there will be no question of the provisions of article 311 being attracted. The respondent was appointed as an announcer in the All India Radio. He was selected by direct appointment for the post of producer and was appointed as such on probation. While he was on probation he was reverted to the post of Announcer. The respondent alleged that the motive behind the order was that he had indulged in loose talk and had used filthy language against his superior which was tape-recorded and sent to the Station Director. Held that the order was an order of termination of the employment on probation simpliciter and reversion to the old post without attaching any kind of stigma". ( 15 ) THE principle enunciated above is applicable to the facts of the present case. It is seen from the chronological events that the petitioner was earlier terminated on 24-1-1979 and he was reappointed on 16-4-1979 by the Administrator in charge during the period when the society was superseded by the order of the Government. We are concerned with the development after 16-4-1979 till the termination was made on 8-9-1979, within a period of five months. If really the petitioner was reap- pointed, as on 15-4-1979 he should have asked for a permanent appointment order instead of allowing him to continue on temporary basis only. Therefore, so long as the temporary employee is not confirmed, or he has not taken any steps to get confirmation, I am afraid he cannot be a permanent employee at all. I do not want to go into the allegation made in 1978 prior to the Society being superseded. Therefore, so long as the temporary employee is not confirmed, or he has not taken any steps to get confirmation, I am afraid he cannot be a permanent employee at all. I do not want to go into the allegation made in 1978 prior to the Society being superseded. The fact remains that there is a bond executed by the petitioner along with two other employees. That in case their services is not required, three months' notice should be given to him. This was relied upon in Annexure A when a resolution was passed by the Governing Council of the society. It was also mentioned in the said Annexure-A that similar cases of appointments of Sri G. N. Mayur, Smt. Mehaboobbai Mogal, Smt. Nasibi Babu Malik and Smt. Jaharbi Pattewala of the hospital, totally 12 persons, were terminated on the same day. They did not question the termination at all except the petitioner. In fact, even the petitioner admits the fact that on 8-7-1980 he was asked by the Chairman to apply again to the post of Lecturer which he declined and he was interested only in pursuing the remedy in the Court of law and he was finding for the last over 20 years. ( 16 ) IN view of the bond as well as their appointment order, I am inclined to agree with the Tribunal's finding that the petitioner is only a temporary employee whose services can be terminated without assigning any reason. In fact, the order Annexure-A does not speak of any stigma and there is no question to go deeper into the matter and find out what exactly the motive of the order, as nothing is brought out acceptable to this Court or to the Tribunal. ( 17 ) THEREFORE, both on the ground that the petitioner is a temporary employee and he is certainly bound by the bond executed by him, I find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed, confirming the order of the Tribunal. --- *** --- .