KUNDAN SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application has been filed against the judgment and order dated 10th April, 2000 passed by the Joint District Judge, Panchmahals at Godhra. ( 2 ) REGULAR Civil Suit No. 75 of 1985 was pending between the parties in the court of the Civil Judge (J. D.), Santrampur. In that suit, compromise decree was passed on 30th March, 1999. The petitioner being defendant no. 8 in that suit, had engaged his counsel Mr. Dani who appeared and signed the compromise on behalf of the petitioner also. Accordingly, the compromise decree was passed on 30th March, 1999. The petitioner-defendant no. 8 filed an appeal against the said judgment and compromise decree alongwith the application to condone the delay of 160 days. The appellate court rejected the application for condonation of delay against which the petitioner-defendant no. 8 has filed the present revision application. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned advocate for the petitioner and the learned advocate Mr. Y. M. Thakkar for the respondents and perused the relevant record. The application for condonation of delay has been reject ed mainly on two grounds that the petitioner had not explained the delay properly in his application in filing the appeal after the prescribed period. The other ground is that the appeal does not lie against the decree passed on consent terms/compromise arrived at between the parties. The court below has considered that section 96 (3) of Civil Procedure Code provides no appeal where decree has been passed by the court below with consent of the parties. In case any fraud had been committed, then a separate suit is to be filed, but appeal does not lie against it. The lower appellate court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala vs. Union Bank of India reported in AIR, 1991 SC, 2234 wherein it has been held that the words " in writing and signed by the parties" inserted in Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code by the C. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 necessarily mean and include duly authorised representative and counsel. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and in executable even if the compromise relates to matters concerning the parties, but ext ending beyond the subject mater of the suit. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out right. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. Order 23, Rule 1 includes counsel and agent of party. Compromise decree signed by counsel and not by parties in person is binding, executable and operates as res judicata even if it extends beyond subject matter of suit. Counsels power to enter into comprmise is not curtailed even impliedly, by Amending Act, 1976. It is binding on the client. ( 4 ) IN the present case, pursis was filed and it is signed by Mr. Dani, learned advocate for th petitioner on behalf of his client with a special power to compromise. It is clear that he could sign the compromise. Hence that compromise decree passed on the compromise will be effective. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that an application can be moved by the parties concerned if he had any grievance under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code before the same court who passed the compromise decree for the review of that order, but in the present case, no such application was moved by the petitioner. ( 5 ) I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other relevant papers. The petitioner was a party in the earlier suit in which the compromise was arrived at between the parties and that compromise application pursis was signed on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel with special power who had special power to sign the compromise on behalf of his client. The petitioner could have filed an application before the Court concerned under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for the review of the order, but he has not filed such application. The compromise signed by Mr. Dani on behalf of the petitioner is a valid one and compromise decree not signed by the petitioner in person will not vitiate it. The petitioner could have filed an application before the Court concerned under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for the review of the order, but he has not filed such application. The compromise signed by Mr. Dani on behalf of the petitioner is a valid one and compromise decree not signed by the petitioner in person will not vitiate it. I am in agreement with the lower appellate courts judgment that the compromise decree is legal valid and binding on the petitioner. Section 96 (3) clearly lays down that no appeal lies against the decree passed on the basis of compromise. The lower appellate court was fully justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay wherein the petitioner has not disclosed the explanation for the condonation of delay and the compromise decree on the basis of the compromise signed by the counsel on behalf of the petitioner is justified and legal one even an appeal from order lies under Order 43, Rule 2a (2) Civil Procedure Code. The lower appellate court has not committed any error in refusing the prayer for condonation of delay in the application moved by the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate for the respondents informed the court that as some observation was made that suit is maintainable against the compromise decree. Hence, the petitioner has filed Regular Civil Suit No. 9 of 2000 for setting aside the compromise decree. He has also moved an application for interim injunction. That application was rejected by the trial court on 17. 4. 2000. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents moved an application for execution of the compromise decree. The Executing Court passed the order for recovery of the possession after hearing the parties on 17. 4. 2000. He draft ed the revision application and sworn the affidavit on 24. 4. 2000. The Revision application has been filed in this Court on 24th April, 2000. In case the facts regarding the order passed on the interim injunction in Regular Civil Suit No. 9 of 2000 and the order passed by the Executing Court in Execution Application NO. 1 of 2000, would have been brought to the notice of this Court, this Court may not have issued Rule and passed the interim order staying the executing of the decree for possession till returnable date on 4. 5. 1 of 2000, would have been brought to the notice of this Court, this Court may not have issued Rule and passed the interim order staying the executing of the decree for possession till returnable date on 4. 5. 2000 by the order dated 26. 4. 2000. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any reasonable ground to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of Revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, this Revision Application is dismissed. Rule is dischasrged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated. .