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2000 DIGILAW 508 (BOM)

BHAURAO KADAM v. NANDED ZILLA PARISHAD

2000-07-19

R.J.KOCHAR, V.K.BARDE

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JUDGMENT : R.J. Kochar, J.—By this petition, the petitioner is seeking to quash and set aside the order of suspension dated July 27, 1984 and the subsequent orders passed by the respondent No. 3 who had by his order dated June 29, 1987, confirmed the impugned order of suspension passed by the respondent No. 1. The Petitioner is also praying for all consequential benefits, such as, full pay during the period of suspension. 2. The facts are in a very narrow compass. The petitioner was in the employment of the respondent No. 1 as a Primary teacher from October 4, 1962 with meritorious service record. The respondent No. 1 is a statutory body incorporated under the provisions of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961. 3. It appears that there was some family dispute in respect of the land pursuant to which a criminal complaint appears to have been filed against the brother of the petitioner and also against the petitioner. The criminal complaint was filed on May 8, 1984. All the concerned parties have been also litigating before the Civil Court about their property rights. 4. The Education Officer of the respondent No. 1 passed an order on July 27, 1984 placing the petitioner under suspension with effect from May 8, 1984 on the ground that he was involved in criminal case lodged in the Court of law, under Sections 44-84-147, 148-149-324 & 323 of Indian Penal Code, in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the District Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964. 5. The petitioner challenged the said order of suspension by filing a review petition before the Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad. The learned Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad, by his order dated June 29, 1987, upheld the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent No. 1. The learned Additional Commissioner observed that the period of suspension was rightly treated as leave admissible to the petitioner. The learned Additional Commissioner also observed that the Zilla Parishad was, in no way, concerned with the petitioner's detention as per the rules, as it was purely private dispute regarding the family property. For the aforesaid reasons; the learned Additional Commissioner declined to interfere in the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer. 6. The learned Additional Commissioner also observed that the Zilla Parishad was, in no way, concerned with the petitioner's detention as per the rules, as it was purely private dispute regarding the family property. For the aforesaid reasons; the learned Additional Commissioner declined to interfere in the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer. 6. It is the case of the Petitioner that after his acquittal he should have been granted full salary of the suspension period as the petitioner was finally acquitted by judgment and order dated July 30, 1985 by the Joint Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Nanded. We have perused the judgment of the learned Magistrate and we find that the learned Magistrate has observed on the basis of the evidence before the Court, that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner came to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 7. Since the petitioner was suspended on the ground that he was involved in the aforesaid criminal case, as a result of his acquittal, he was reinstated by the respondent No. 1, but without treating the period of suspension, as above, on duty, and without making payment of his salary for the period of suspension. According to us, the Petitioner is entitled to full salaries of the period of suspension. The petitioner has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him and there is no other ground to deny him the benefit of full salary. 8. Shri P.G. Godhamgaonkar, learned advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, reported in 1984 Maharashtra Law Journal, page 406, between Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni v. Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and Ors. The facts in that case were also, more or less, similar. In that case, the petitioner was kept under suspension for misappropriation of the Government money and he was prosecuted for the same. However, he was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. The petitioner, in that case, claimed full salary for the period of suspension which was denied to him by the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent. In that case, the petitioner was kept under suspension for misappropriation of the Government money and he was prosecuted for the same. However, he was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. The petitioner, in that case, claimed full salary for the period of suspension which was denied to him by the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent. While; allowing the petition and directing to pay full salary of the suspension period, the learned Judges have held as under: "That the observation in the judgment of the High Court that "the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt" could not be read in isolation but had to be read with the infirmities pointed out by the High Court in the prosecution case. Thus, it was an acquittal on merits and not giving benefit of doubt to the accused. Further, the concept of "honorable acquittal" or "full exoneration" was inappropriate qua the result of a criminal prosecution. The period of suspension of the accused should be treated as being the period spent on duty and the accused was entitled to the full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. Special C. A. No. 209 of 1968 decided on November 27, 1974 by TULZAPURKAR and shimpi, JJ. Madhukar Baburaoji Dhote v. State of Maharashtra Rel." 9. In the present case, the petitioner was kept under suspension as he was allegedly involved in a criminal case and was finally acquitted of the charges levelled against him. In view of the acquittal, the petitioner has become entitled to get full salary of the suspension period in view of the decision of the Division Bench (Supra). 10. In our view, the suspension order was passed as the investigation and criminal trial was going against the petitioner. It resulted in the petitioner's acquittal. Since the petitioner was acquitted, he is entitled to full salary for the period of his suspension. 11. Hence, the order passed by the respondent No. 3 is quashed and set aside, and the respondent No. 1 is directed to treat the suspension period of the petitioner as the period on duty entitling the petitioner to get his full salary and all other consequential benefits which would accrue to him. 11. Hence, the order passed by the respondent No. 3 is quashed and set aside, and the respondent No. 1 is directed to treat the suspension period of the petitioner as the period on duty entitling the petitioner to get his full salary and all other consequential benefits which would accrue to him. The respondent No. 1 shall compute the salary after adjusting the subsistence allowance and leave salary, if any, paid to him, and pay the same to the petitioner, within a period of 8 weeks from today. 12. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause "a". No order as to costs.