K. S. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) IN this suit for possession and injunction etc. the plaintiffs have filed I. A. 2217/93under Order 12, Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC, inter alia, alleging that thedefendant was inducted in property bearing No. D-29, S. M. A. Industrial Area, G. T. Karnal Road under an agreement dated 12/06/1987. In Para No. 3 of the writtenstatement the defendant has admitted that it was inducted in the suit property byplaintiffs. The plaintiffs terminated lease/licence of the defendant by a notice dated 7/12/1994 which was duly received by it. In Para No. 16 of the writtenstatement, on merits, the receipt of said notice is admitted by defendant. It is furtheralleged that defendant cannot challenge the title of plaintiffs to the suit property underthe provisions of Evidence Act. In view of the admissions made in written statementthe plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession of the suit property. It is prayedthat a decree for possession of the suit property may be passed in favour of theplaintiffs and against the defendant. ( 2 ) DEFENDANT has contested the application by filing reply. It is alleged that plaintiffshave deliberately omitted to state the defence taken in written statement by thedefendant. In Para No. 2 of the preliminary objections of written statement the defendanthas denied that plaintiffs are the owners of suit property. In Para No. 16 of writtenstatement it is pleaded that the lease/licence was not validly terminated by the noticedated 7/12/1994 and that notice was later on waived when the plaintiffsmade application for enhancement of rent by 30% after every 35 months. Defendanthas also made a counter claim which is yet to be decided. It is emphatically deniedthat the plaintiffs under Order 12, Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code are entitled to the possession of suitproperty at this stage. ( 3 ) I have heard Sh. J. P. Sengh for plaintiffs and Sh. Sandeep Aggarwal fordefendant and have also been taken through the record. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the defendant was inducted in the suit property under a Leave andlicence agreement dated 12/06/1987, photostat copy whereof is placed a\pages 2 to 7 on Part III file. clause 10 and 14 of this agreemant which arerelevant, read as under: "1) That the licensor have undertaken to pay a sum of Rs. 16. 500. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the defendant was inducted in the suit property under a Leave andlicence agreement dated 12/06/1987, photostat copy whereof is placed a\pages 2 to 7 on Part III file. clause 10 and 14 of this agreemant which arerelevant, read as under: "1) That the licensor have undertaken to pay a sum of Rs. 16. 500. 00 permonth excluding consumption charges for industrial power, commercial lightand water charges on or before the 7th day of each English calendar month. The payment for industrial power, commercial light and water charges shallbe paid by the licensee. 10) That the licensee can terminate this licence/ agreement and vacate thelicensed premises after serving one month notice in writing to the licensor,14) Afer the completion of 35 months the licensor shall terminate the licenceand stop the licencee to use the premises. It (ought to have been if) the licensor (ought to have been licencee ) prefersto use the premises for next 35 months i. e. for 36th to 70th month, they cando so only with increase of 30% in licence fee. That the licence shall be renewed at the option of licencee for a furthersuccessing (ought to have been succeeding) period of 35 months at increasedlicence fee by 30% over the last licence fee paid. " ( 5 ) IT is alleged in the written statement that said agreement in fact is a leaseagreement. The plaintiffs also treating the defendant as tenant terminated the leaseby the notice dated 7/12/1994 (copy at pages 28 to 30) got issued througha counsel. In terms of this notice the lease of defendant was terminated on themidnight of 11/06/1995 and if the defendant thought that its lease starts from 1 stday of August then in that event on the midnight of 31st day of June, 1995. Receipt ofthis notice is admitted by the defendant in written statement. ( 6 ) IT was contended on behalf of defendant that the notice dated 7/12/1994 was waived by plaintiffs. In support of the submission my attention was drawn tothe order dated 15/12/1994 (copy at pages 12 to 18) passed by a Divisionbench of this court in Company Appeal No. 7/94 and C. W. P. 3665/93. ( 6 ) IT was contended on behalf of defendant that the notice dated 7/12/1994 was waived by plaintiffs. In support of the submission my attention was drawn tothe order dated 15/12/1994 (copy at pages 12 to 18) passed by a Divisionbench of this court in Company Appeal No. 7/94 and C. W. P. 3665/93. It was furthercontended that under Clause 10 of the agreement dated 12/06/1987 the right toterminate lease is given only to defendant and thus the lease could not have beenvalidly terminated by the said notice dated 7/12/1994 by plaintiffs. As apart of the submission it was also urged that plaintiffs are not the owners of suitproperty and the option to renew lease as per said agreement could not be exercisedby defendant for the reasons mentioned in written statement. ( 7 ) AS is manifest from the said order dated 15/12/1994 C. W. P 3665/93was filed by the defendant against MCD and its Licensing Department seeking toquash the order dated 18/05/1993 of MCD and for direction to its Licensingdepartment to grant licence for running factory, to the petitioner. The order dated 18/05/1993 was issued by the MCD raising objection that suit property wasregistered with the DDA in the name of M/s. Starlite Traders and more than 50% areathereof could not be sublet to any other person including the petitioner. In theapplication made to the MCD by the petitioner it was mentioned that the licenceewas M/s. Lala Plastics. As is further evident from the said order in Company Appealno. 7/94 which was also taken up alongwith said C. W. P 3665/93 the counsel forappellants (plaintiffs in this case) stated before the Division Bench that his client willnot raise any objection before the MCD with regard to lawful possession of theproperty under the licence/lease deed nor will any objection be raised by M/s. Lalaplastics or by Atma Ram. Accordingly, the MCD was directed to process theapplication of petitioner for grant of license on that basis and the case was adjournedto 3/02/1995 to await the decision of MCD in the matter. Accordingly, the MCD was directed to process theapplication of petitioner for grant of license on that basis and the case was adjournedto 3/02/1995 to await the decision of MCD in the matter. Observations towhich my attention was drawn appearing on internal page No. 5 of the said orderread as follows :- "in the meantime, the petitioner M/s. Puran Chand Packaging Pvt. Ltd. , willcontinue to deposit the rents payable to the landladies i. e. Sona Devi andbimla Devi in the Company Petition No. 116/90 and the company will not raiseany objection to the said landladies withdrawing the rents as and when theyare deposited. " ( 8 ) IT was pointed out that the rent deposited pursuant to said direction had beenwithdrawn in Company Petition No. 116/95 by the plaintiffs and those withdrawalsamount to waiving of the said notice dated 7/12/1994. Admittedly, saidcompany petition was dismissed as withdrawn pursuant to the statement madebefore the Supreme Court on behalf of plaintiffs on 23/02/1996. It may benoticed that the scope in said C. W. P 3665/93 was limited to the issue of licence todefendant and if pursuant to direction/under taking extracted above the plaintiffs hadwithdrawn rents deposited by defendant, the same would not constitute waiver of thesaid notice within the meaning of Section 1 13 of Transfer of Property Act. A waivermeans abandonment of a right which may be either express or implied from conductand basic requirement of such abandonment is that it must be an intentional act withknowledge which element is missing in the present case. ( 9 ) THIS brings me to yet another limb of argument that under the aforesaid agreementthe right to terminate lease is available only to the defendant. As is evident fromaforementioned clause 1 of the agreement the defendant had undertaken to pay Rs. 16,500. 00 per month excluding the consumption charges of industrial power, commerciallight and water charges on or before 7th day of each English calandar month to theplaintiffs. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the rights andilabilities of the lessor and lessee. Clause (c) of this section provides that the lessorshall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the later pays the rent reserved bythe lease and performs the contract binding on the lessee, he may hold the propertyduring the time limited by the lease without interruption. Clause (c) of this section provides that the lessorshall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the later pays the rent reserved bythe lease and performs the contract binding on the lessee, he may hold the propertyduring the time limited by the lease without interruption. Clause (i) thereof further saysthat the lessee is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premiumor rent to the lessor or his agent in this behalf. Under the aforesaid agreement suitproperty was given to the defendant initially for a block of 35 months which period atthe option of defendant could be extended by another block of 35 months each twiceon payment of 30% increase in licence fee. In my view, under aforementioned clause10 the defendant was given a right to terminate the lease/license if it so desired evenduring the subsistence of the initial or extended block (s) of 35 months by giving onemonth s notice. This clause thus cannot come in the way of plaintiffs in terminating thelease of defendant in the event of non payment of rent by it as stipulated in aboveclause (1 ) of the agreement. ( 10 ) AS regards the last limb of argument referred to above, suffice it to say thathaving admitted that defendant was inducted into suit property by the plaintiffs, it isnot open to the defendant to deny the title of plaintiffs to the suit property undersection 116 of Evidence Act. ( 11 ) IN Surjit Sachdev Vs. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , 66 (1997) DLT 54 (DB) it was held by this Court that the factors which deserve to betaken into consideration in order to enable the Court to pass a decree under Order12, Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code in a suit for possession are (a) existence of relationship of lessor andlessee or entry in possession of the suit property by the defendant as tenant, and (b)determination of such relation in any of the contingencies as envisaged in section111 of Transfer of Property Act. Unequivocal admission of these two factors willentitle the plaintiff to a decree on admission . Unequivocal admission of these two factors willentitle the plaintiff to a decree on admission . Apart from the determination ofrelationship of lessor and lessee between the parties by the said notice dated 7/12/1994, even the period of two extensions which are permissible under thesaid agreement dated 12/06/1987 has come to an end in the month of April,1996 and the defendant thus is not entitled to retain the possession of the suitproperty now. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, a decree of possession deserves to be passed under Order 12, Rule6 Civil Procedure Code in favour of the plaintiffs and against defendant leaving the balance reliefs asclaimed in the suit as also the counter claim to be decided on merit on the basis ofevidence to be led by the parties. ( 13 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the application is allowed and a decree of possession in respectof suit property No. D-29, S. M. A Industrial Area, G. T. Kamal Road, Delhi, as shown inred in the site plan attached to the plaint is passed in favour of the plaintiffs andagainst defendant. Defendant is, however, allowed one month time to deliver thevacant possession of property to the plaintiffs.