JUDGMENT : K.K. Usha, J. 1. This is an appeal at the instance of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., which is impleaded as the respondent No. 3 in O.P. (M.V.) No. 696 of 1994. Petition was filed by the respondent herein u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The petitioner, who was injured in a motor accident on 26.5.1993, claimed an amount of Rs. 5,00,000 as compensation. The owner and driver of the offending vehicle were impleaded as respondent Nos. 1 and 2. They remained ex parte, Respondent No. 3 entered appearance and contended that the accident happened not due to negligence on the part of the offending vehicle, that the amount of compensation claimed is exorbitant and that the respondent No. 1 had violated the policy conditions. The respondent No. 3 further contended that it is entitled to raise all defences independently, including the one relating to the quantum of compensation, which are open to the insured against third parties in view of the reservation clause included in the policy. It was also stated therein that in addition to the right under the reservation Sub-, respondent No. 3 was entitled to avail the provisions u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Tribunal found that the respondent No. 2 was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner causing the accident. A total amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was granted as compensation to the petitioner with 12 per cent interest from the date of petition till realisation. In this appeal filed by the insurance company, challenge is against the quantum of compensation granted by the Tribunal. 2. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent. It was contended by the learned counsel that the appeal at the instance of the insurer challenging the quantum of compensation is not maintainable, since the insurance company has not obtained specific order u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in this regard. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (1998) 3 SCC 140 and Chinnama George and Others Vs. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (1998) 3 SCC 140 and Chinnama George and Others Vs. N.K. Raju and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 130 It was also contended that the insurance company cannot be permitted to produce copy of the insurance policy before this court for the first time as the circumstances would not satisfy the provisions contained under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Yet another objection raised by the respondent is that the appeal is not maintainable in the absence of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the original petition on the party array in this appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions relied on by the respondent has no application in the present case as there is a reservation Sub- in the policy. Even without taking recourse to Section 140 (Sic. 170) of the Motor Vehicles Act, it will be open to the insurance company to take up all the defences which are open to the insured under law. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in British India Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh 1958 ACJ 1 (SC) and also a Full Bench decision of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Celine and Others, (1993) 2 ILR (Ker) 653. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the petition were not made parties in the appeal since the Tribunal had passed the award only against the appellant insurance company. There was no occasion to produce the insurance policy before the Tribunal as the contention raised by the insurance company in its statement about the reservation Sub- was not challenged by the petitioner. 4. We do not find any merit in the objection raised by the respondent that the appellant insurance company cannot be allowed to produce the insurance policy for the first time before this court. On going through the written statement filed by the insurance company, we find that a specific contention regarding the reservation Sub- has been taken therein. 4. We do not find any merit in the objection raised by the respondent that the appellant insurance company cannot be allowed to produce the insurance policy for the first time before this court. On going through the written statement filed by the insurance company, we find that a specific contention regarding the reservation Sub- has been taken therein. The statement was neither denied by a replication nor in the oral evidence of the petitioner as PW 1. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for the insurance company to produce the insurance policy before this court also. But, in order to examine the contention raised by the appellant on the basis of the reservation Sub- in the insurance policy, we directed the appellant to produce copy of the insurance policy before this court. This court is perfectly justified in doing so in view of the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 27 (1) (b). 5. On going through the award, we find that the Tribunal has found only the respondent No. 3 insurance company liable to pay compensation to the petitioner. There is no finding making all the three respondents jointly liable. As a matter of fact, there is no finding at all against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 regarding the liability. Under these circumstances, it cannot be contended that the appeal is not maintainable for the reason that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the petition were not impleaded in this appeal. It is also relevant to note that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were made exparte before the Tribunal. 6. The third issue, which is really the main issue that remains to be considered, is whether the appeal at the instance of the insurer challenging the quantum of compensation is maintainable, in view of the reservation Sub- in the policy. This question was under direct consideration by a Full Bench of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Celine and Others, It was a case which arose under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. There is an elaborate consideration of the relevant provisions under the Act as well as the case-law on the subject by Chief Justice Jagannadha Rao (as he then was) in the above case. Ltd. Vs. Celine and Others, It was a case which arose under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. There is an elaborate consideration of the relevant provisions under the Act as well as the case-law on the subject by Chief Justice Jagannadha Rao (as he then was) in the above case. The Full Bench took the view that it was open to the insurer to reserve a right in the policy of insurance to defend the action in the name of the assured and in case there was such a reservation, all defences open to the assured could be urged by him. It was further held that even if the conditions contained under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C were not satisfied, the insurance company could raise all defences open to the insured against the third party, provided there was a reservation or assignment Sub- in the policy. In coming to the above conclusion, the Full Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Capt. Itbar Singh's case 1958 ACJ 1 (SC). In this decision, the question came up for consideration was whether the defences available to an insurer added as a party u/s 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are only those mentioned there. The Supreme Court took the view that the insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 96 (2) and no other grounds. What the legislature has done is to enumerate in Sub-section (2) the defences available to an insurer and to provide by Sub-section (6) that he cannot avoid his liability except by means of such defences. A contention was raised by the learned Solicitor General that before the Act came into force, an insured person has no right of recourse to the insurer and it was Section 96 (1) that made the judgment obtained by the injured person binding on the insurer and gave him a right against the insurer. That being so, it is only fair that a person sought to be made bound by a judgment should be entitled to resist his liability under it by all defences which he can in law advance against the passing of it. On the above calculation, the Supreme Court observed as follows: (16)... That being so, it is only fair that a person sought to be made bound by a judgment should be entitled to resist his liability under it by all defences which he can in law advance against the passing of it. On the above calculation, the Supreme Court observed as follows: (16)... The statute has no doubt created a liability in the insurer to the injured person but the statute has also expressly confined the right to avoid that liability to certain grounds specified in it. It is not for us to add to those grounds and, therefore, to the statute for reasons of hardship. We are furthermore not convinced that the statute causes any hardship. First, the insurer has the right, provided he has reserved it by the policy, to defend the action in the name of the assured and if he does so, all defences open to the assured can then be urged by him and there is no other defence that he claims to be entitled to urge. He can thus avoid all hardship, if any, by providing for a right to defend the action in the name of the assured and this he has full liberty to do.... 7. The above would make it clear that it is open to the contracting parties, viz., the insurer and the insured to include a reservation Sub- in the policy, which would enable the insurer to defend the action by taking recourse to all defences open to the insured. The Full Bench of this court has relied on the above dictum while holding that in cases where there is a reservation Sub- in the policy, it is open to the insurance company to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation granted in the award. 8. Now we will consider whether the later decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the respondent have taken a different view regarding the effect of reservation Sub- in the policy. In Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, the Supreme Court considered the question whether an appeal on the quantum of compensation by the insurance company in the absence of an order u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is maintainable. In Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, the Supreme Court considered the question whether an appeal on the quantum of compensation by the insurance company in the absence of an order u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is maintainable. Section 170 is the parallel provision to Section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which provides that the Claims Tribunal, if satisfied that there is collusion between the persons making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, may direct that the insurer shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. The Supreme Court took the view that even if the claimants themselves had impleaded the insurance company as party to the petition, unless there is a reasoned order passed by the Tribunal u/s 170, the insurance company is disabled from taking up all defences open to the insured and, therefore, an appeal at the instance of the insurance company on the merits of the quantum of the award is not maintainable. Same view has been taken in Chinnama George and Others Vs. N.K. Raju and Another, . 9. On going through the contentions raised by parties in the above two cases, it is seen that no reliance was placed by the insurance company on reservation Sub- in the policy. It is true that while the Apex Court rendered its decision in Capt. Itbar Singh's case 1958 ACJ 1 (SC), the provisions contained in Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C were not available in the statute book. But, according to us, it would not make any difference for applying the dictum laid down therein to cases which arose even after Sub-section (2-A) was added. The principle laid down in the above decision of the Supreme Court is that the limitation imposed by Sub-section (2) of Section 96 regarding the defences available to the insurer will not be applicable in cases where the insurer has reserved its right in the policy itself to defend the action in the name of the assured. The principle laid down in the above decision of the Supreme Court is that the limitation imposed by Sub-section (2) of Section 96 regarding the defences available to the insurer will not be applicable in cases where the insurer has reserved its right in the policy itself to defend the action in the name of the assured. In such circumstances, it will be open to the insurer to take up all the defences which were available to the insured. The right of the insurer to defend the claim on all grounds available to the insured is limited by the provisions contained in Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and in Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The provisions contained in Section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and those contained in Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are statutory provisions to release the insurer from such limitations under certain circumstances. In order to take advantage of such statutory provisions it is mandatory that the insurer satisfies all the conditions under those provisions. According to us, a reservation Sub- in the policy is outside the statutory provisions and, therefore, the conditions to be satisfied under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C or Section 170 have no application to such cases. The decision of the Supreme Court referred above has made it clear that it is a matter of agreement between the insurer and the insured and by inclusion of such a Sub- in the insurance policy, the insurer can be released from the limitations imposed u/s 96 (2) or Section 149(2). It is true that the observation made by the Full Bench of this court that the provision contained in Sub-Section (2) [Sic. (2-A)] of Section 110-C is procedural and, therefore, only an enabling provision may not be a good law in the light of the decisions in Shankarayya and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, and Chinnama George and Others Vs. N.K. Raju and Another, . But, as mentioned earlier, we find that the Supreme Court, in these decisions, had no occasion to consider the policy containing a reservation Sub- and, therefore, the decision in Capt. Itbar Singh's case 1958 ACJ 1 (SC), regarding the effect of a reservation Sub- in the policy on the limitation imposed has to be taken as good law even now. But, as mentioned earlier, we find that the Supreme Court, in these decisions, had no occasion to consider the policy containing a reservation Sub- and, therefore, the decision in Capt. Itbar Singh's case 1958 ACJ 1 (SC), regarding the effect of a reservation Sub- in the policy on the limitation imposed has to be taken as good law even now. We, therefore, hold that the present appeal filed by the insurance company challenging the quantum of compensation is maintainable, in the light of the reservation Sub- in the policy. 10. Now, coming to the merit of the appeal, we find that as against a claim for Rs. 5,00,000, Claims Tribunal has granted Rs. 2,00,000 as compensation to the petitioner. The petitioner was an Assistant Director of Industries Department in the service of State of Kerala at the time of accident. The evidence in this case would show that as a result of the accident, the main injury sustained by him is a closed depressed fracture of lateral tibia condyle (R). Exh. A-16 is a disability certificate produced by him, which would show that as a result of the injury, he had suffered disability to the extent of 13 per cent. According to the petitioner, he was on leave for four months for treatment and had suffered loss of earnings. As against his claim for Rs. 19,000, the Tribunal has granted Rs. 16,000, which is not under challenge in this appeal. An amount of Rs. 10,000 has been granted towards medical expenses, etc., which is also not challenged before us. The petitioner has claimed compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 for pain and suffering. Tribunal, after considering the nature of the injuries sustained, granted Rs. 40,000 for the physical and mental pain which he may have to suffer till his death. In his application, the petitioner had not claimed any compensation for mental pain. Apart from the above, we are of the view that the amount of compensation granted by the Tribunal for pain and suffering is exorbitant, in the nature of the injuries sustained by the petitioner. Going by the evidence in this case, apart from the fracture injury mentioned above, the other injuries are only abrasions. The maximum that could be granted in the nature of the injury sustained by the petitioner is only Rs. 25,000. 11. Going by the evidence in this case, apart from the fracture injury mentioned above, the other injuries are only abrasions. The maximum that could be granted in the nature of the injury sustained by the petitioner is only Rs. 25,000. 11. It has come out in evidence that the petitioner has not lost his job and there had not been any diminution in his monthly income. Apart from his oral statement as PW 1 there is no evidence adduced in this case to show that the injury sustained by him had affected his promotion chances. On the other hand, it is seen that he had been promoted as Deputy Director of Industries. Tribunal also found that there is no loss of income caused to the petitioner. But, according to the Tribunal, the petitioner had intention to earn something after his retirement and the permanent disability would affect his future earning power. Tribunal granted an amount of Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation for permanent disability and for loss of earning power and for loss of amenities of life. According to us, the Tribunal has erred in the above finding. Petitioner's is a pensionable job. He was only 45 at the time of accident. There is no evidence adduced in this case regarding the nature of avocation which he intends to take ten years later, i.e., after his retirement. On what basis the Tribunal has assessed the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 is not discernible from the award. Even if it is taken that he will be able to earn an income at the rate of Rs. 2,000 p.m. after his retirement, taking into consideration his retirement age as 55 and the percentage of disability fixed under Exh. A-16, the amount of compensation for loss of earning power could never go above Rs. 25,000. It has come out in evidence that as a result of the injury, he has developed a limping and some difficulty in bending his knee. He may be entitled to certain amount towards loss of amenities of life. He can be granted an amount of Rs. 50,000 as compensation for loss of amenities of life. 12. Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs. 24,000 for disfigurement caused to the body of the petitioner. We find that no such claim has been put forward by the petitioner, either in his petition or in his evidence. He can be granted an amount of Rs. 50,000 as compensation for loss of amenities of life. 12. Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs. 24,000 for disfigurement caused to the body of the petitioner. We find that no such claim has been put forward by the petitioner, either in his petition or in his evidence. As a result of the fracture to his limb, he has suffered a disability which is assessed as 13 per cent, on the basis of which he has been granted compensation for loss of earning power as well as loss of amenities of life. There is no reason for giving a further amount of Rs. 24,000 under the head of disfigurement. Thus we modify the award by reducing an amount of Rs. 64,000 from the amount awarded by the Tribunal. The appeal stands allowed as above. No costs.