JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner was in the employment of the Bank of Maharashtra at Pune as a clerk. He was suspended from employment by an order, dated 16 March, 1973, as there was cash shortage of Rs. 369 on 15 March, 1973 and that he had confessed such shortage of cash. He had also further confessed that he had utilised the said money for his own domestic use. The petitioner was finally dismissed, without any domestic inquiry, and without any opportunity of hearing, by an order, dated 22 September, 1973. The petitioner appears to nave approached the bank management for reinstatement but it was in vain. It appears from the record that he had raised an industrial dispute and had approached the Labour Commissioner under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but the file was closed on 7 December, 1973. It appears that the petitioner did nothing, thereafter, as required under the law. Sri Pradeep Shahane, advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that he was approaching the bank authorities and other authorities such as Chief Minister, Finance Minister and Prime Minister. Except approaching the High Court he appears to have approached all other dignitaries in power and he failed even there. He did not get any relief from any corner. Finally, it appears that, on 9 May, 1991 the petitioner approached the Central Labour Commissioner for the relief of reinstatement with full back-wages and continuity of service. The said authority, after conciliation proceedings had failed, submitted his report to the Central Government and by an order, dated 9 December, 1991, the Central Government refused to refer the dispute for adjudication on the ground that the dispute was raised belated. Sri Shahane could show me only one hand written line on the back of the said order. Sri Shahane submitted that this is the only order which the petitioner had received from the Central Government. The petitioner has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a direction to the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. I have heard Sri Shahane. The petitioner has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a direction to the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. I have heard Sri Shahane. He has submitted that though the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation, i.e., 60 years on 30 October, 1998 he wants to remove the stigma of loss of confidence and, therefore, he prays for a direction to the Central Government for a reference to adjudicate his industrial dispute against the bank management. Sri Shahane has relied on three judgments of the Supreme Court, i.e., in the case of— (1) Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society. Ltd. [ 1999 (2) L.L.N. 674 ]; (2) In the case of Nedungadi Bank, Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty [ 2000 (2) L.L.N. 21 ]; and (3) In the case of Mahavir Singh v. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, 1999 (3) L.L.N. 872 . The learned advocate has tried to get support from these authorities that there is no provision for limitation is referring the industrial dispute for adjudication. I am unable to agree with the said submissions of Sri Shahane in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There has been an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Central Labour Commissioner to raise an industrial dispute and to seek reference for adjudication of the same. He was terminated from employment on 22 September, 1973 and he approached the Labour Commissioner as late as on 9 May, 1991. The dispute has become totally stale and there has been an inordinate delay in approaching the Central Labour Commissioner for reference. The Central Government has rightly refused to refer such a stale and old dispute for adjudication. It cannot be said that the delay is a reasonable delay. Moreover, the petitioner has lived for 18 years with the stigma and the time has wiped out such a stigma and the people must have forgotten the act that the petitioner was discharged from employment for “loss of confidence”. According to me, the delay from 1973 to 1991 cannot be said to be a reasonable period of delay. Moreover, the petitioner has lived for 18 years with the stigma and the time has wiped out such a stigma and the people must have forgotten the act that the petitioner was discharged from employment for “loss of confidence”. According to me, the delay from 1973 to 1991 cannot be said to be a reasonable period of delay. Even if there is no limitation provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is the expediency part of the provision under S. 10(1) of the Act which must be construed in the right perspective. To refer such stale and old disputes for adjudication is not found expedient as during this period the employers arranged their affairs in accordance with their needs. There is reshuffling in the management and after such a long period, if “such old and stale disputes are referred, the industrial peace also gets disturbed. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court in the following cases has held that the Government has discretion not to refer the old and stale disputes for adjudication. In the case of Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their workmen [A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1217], three-Judges Bench has observed as under: “It is true that there is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale, as in this case”. In the case of Inder Singh and Sons, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1961—II L.L.J. 89] another three-Judges Bench observed, as under: “It is true that laws of limitation which might bar any civil Court from giving remedy in respect of lawful rights are not and should not be applied by the Industrial Tribunals. On the other hand it is well accepted principle of adjudication that overstate claims should not generally be encouraged or allowed unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after a long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect this is likely to have on the employer's financial arrangements. Whether a claim has become too stale or no will depend on the circumstances of each case”. (emphasis supplied) 3. Apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after a long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect this is likely to have on the employer's financial arrangements. Whether a claim has become too stale or no will depend on the circumstances of each case”. (emphasis supplied) 3. It is also significant to note that in the latest case of Nedungadi Bank [ 2000 (2) L.L.N. 21 ] (vide supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under, in Para. 6, at pages 24 and 25: “Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under S.10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under S. 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under S.10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. (emphasis supplied.) 4. According to me, in the present case, the dispute has become absolutely stale as the petitioner was dismissed in the year 1973 and he raised an industrial dispute in 1991. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. (emphasis supplied.) 4. According to me, in the present case, the dispute has become absolutely stale as the petitioner was dismissed in the year 1973 and he raised an industrial dispute in 1991. Another test that can be applied when there is no statutorily prescribed limitation is the doctrine of “delay and laches” which is always applied in the writ petitions filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. If the present petitioner were to file such a Writ Petition under Art. 226 directly in the High Court to challenge the order of his termination of 1973 in the year 1991, I am sure the doctrine of laches would have been attracted and the petition would have been rejected in limine at the stage of admission itself. According to me the same principle should apply in the present case and the Central Government was fully justified in refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. I find absolutely no justification for the petitioner to have sought a reference after lapse of 18 years. Approaching politicians and even the Prime Minister/s or the Chief Minister/s if not empowered statutorily to entertain any representations cannot be treated as a ground to justify such an in ordinate delay and laches in approaching the Law Courts. 5. He has also reached the age of superannuation in the year 1998. According to me, no useful purpose would be served by referring such an old and stale dispute for adjudication. I, therefore, do not think that the order of the Central Government suffers from any illegality or infirmity. The Central Government was fully justified in refusing to refer the industrial dispute of the petitioner for adjudication on the ground of delay of more than 18 years. There is no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.