Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records resulting in the order dated 15-7-1998 passed by the 3rd respondent in No. V-11014/17/97/AD-II/98-8670 removing the petitioner from service by suo motu revising the order dated 30-9-97 passed by the 4th respondent in No. Y.15014/6/97/AD-II/771 and quash the same as illegal. Heard Mr. M. Ajmal khan for the writ petitioner and Mr. V. Vaidyalingam, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents. The writ petitioner, a member of the Central Industrial Security Force, who was holding the post of Lance Naik was placed under suspension on 19-5-1997 by the Commandant CISF Unit ONGC Jorhat. On 28-5-1997 a charge memo was issued which was acknowledged and a reply had been submitted by the petitioner on 5-6-1997 denying the charge. The disciplinary authority appointed an enquiry officer to conduct the enquiry. The enquiry officer had submitted his report along with findings on 11-7-1997 holding that the charges framed against the petitioner stands substantiated. The enquiry report was communicated to the writ petitioner calling upon to submit his representation with respect to the findings. The petitioner submitted his representation on 5-8-1997. The disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 1060/- to 1040/- for a period of one year which will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of pay by proceedings dated 30-9-1997. The petitioner had not preferred any appeal as against the said proceeding. Thereafter the Deputy Inspector-General, CISF, North East Zone, Head Quarters Calcutta reviewed the penalty suo motu under Rule 49(1) of the CISF Rules 1969 and issued a show cause notice on 22-4-1998 calling upon the petitioner to state as to why the punishment should not be enhanced to that of removal from service as against the punishment of reduction of pay imposed by the disciplinary authority. The writ petitioner received the said show cause notice on 27-5-1998 and submitted his objections.After considering the objections, the Deputy Inspector General, North East Zone confirmed his proposal and imposed the penalty of removal from service by proceedings dated 15-7-1998. Being aggrieved the writ petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the proceedings of the 3rd respondent. The writ petitioner received the said show cause notice on 27-5-1998 and submitted his objections.After considering the objections, the Deputy Inspector General, North East Zone confirmed his proposal and imposed the penalty of removal from service by proceedings dated 15-7-1998. Being aggrieved the writ petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the proceedings of the 3rd respondent. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the suo motu review and enhancement of penalty is without jurisdiction, arbitrary and the 3rd respondent has no authority or power to review nor the rules provide for the same. It was also contended that the 3rd respondent is not the appointing authority and therefore, the petitioner cannot be removed from service. It is further contended that when the penalty imposed has already been suffered by the petitioner and the period of stoppage of increment had been completed, it is not open to the 3rd respondent to impose the punishment of removal from service, which is violative of Article 21(2) of the Constitution. The learned counsel also pointed out illegalities, violation of statutory provisions as well as principles of natural justice with respect to the conducting of the disciplinary proceedings. It was specifically contended that the petitioner had been denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and in particular the complainant. According to the petitioner, the impugned orders of the 3rd respondent is without jurisdiction and in any event, the initiation of suo motu review and enhancement of punishment is barred by limitation. Further it is contended that in any event the impugned imposition of penalty of removal from service on the amputations and charge memo against the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate, arbitrary and it is liable to be quashed by this Court. It was also the case of the writ petitioner that the petitioner had been appointed by the Director General of the force and not by the 3rd respondent and therefore, the dismissal or removal could be passed only by the said authority and not by the 3rd respondent.It is to be pointed out that as against the order imposing the penalty by reduction of pay by one stage for a period of one year, the petitioner had accepted the same and had not preferred any appeal nor he had challenged the same by initiating any other proceedings. It is the contention of the respondents that the 3rd respondent DIG, Central Industrial Security Force, North East Zone Head Quarters had reviewed the case of the petitioner suo motu under Rule 49 after issue of show cause notice dated 22-4-1998 proposing to enhance the punishment and after considering the objections imposed the punishment of removal from service on 15-7-1998. According to the respondents, the 3rd respondent is the competent authority to exercise the suo motu powers of review as well as to impose the punishment of dismissal or removal of the petitioner. Rule 49 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules is being relied upon by the respondents to sustain the impugned order of removal and according to the respondents, the gravity of the charges warranted enhancement of penalty to removal. The departmental enquiry was conducted fairly and in fact the petitioner did not challenge either the penalty nor the procedure nor he had any grievance till the penalty of removal was passed by the 3rd respondent. Though the petitioner had contended that he had not suffered any other penalty, the respondents while admitting that the petitioner was promoted to cadre of Lance Naik with effect from 7-3-1996 it was pointed out that the punishment of three days pay cut was imposed on the petitioner and therefore, it is clear that the claim of the petitioner that he had clean record of service is not correct. It is contended by the respondents that four prosecution witnesses were examined by the enquiry officer and on the basis of their statement and circumstantial evidence as well as documentary evidences on record the charge was held substantiated by the enquiry officer. The enquiry was conducted in terms of the rules governing the disciplinary proceedings and there are no procedural irregularities in the conduct of the departmental enquiry. The petitioner had been afforded sufficient opportunities to defend.According to the respondents, the petitioner had created nuisance under the influence of alcohol in public place at A.T. Road in front of Jorhat Court on 17-5-1997 at 12.20 hrs. and with respect to which reduction of pay by one stage was ordered, which punishment the petitioner had not challenged and accepted. It is incorrect to contend that the 3rd respondent Deputy Inspector-General, North East Zone is not the appointing authority and he has no authority or jurisdiction to impose the punishment of removal. and with respect to which reduction of pay by one stage was ordered, which punishment the petitioner had not challenged and accepted. It is incorrect to contend that the 3rd respondent Deputy Inspector-General, North East Zone is not the appointing authority and he has no authority or jurisdiction to impose the punishment of removal. It is claimed that the petitioner was appointed by the Assistant Inspector-General (R and T) of the office of the Director General CISF Head Quarters, New Delhi and not by the Director-General himself and as such the Deputy Inspector-General who has got the authority imposed the major punishment of dismissal. There is no violation of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India, Rule 49 of the CISF Rules 1969 had been followed while exercising the suo motu powers and the petitioner had been afforded sufficient opportunity. The respondents further contend that a preliminary enquiry was conducted and a prima facie case was established against the petitioner and thereafter the departmental enquiry was conducted under Rule 34 of the CISF Rules, while admitting that the Sub-Inspector of Police who had registered the crime and who had investigated the crime was not examined in the enquiry it is pointed out that nothing prevented the petitioner from examining the said Sub-Inspector of Police and the petitioner had not asked for examination of the said Sub-Inspector of Police. According to the respondents, there were eye-witnesses to the incident. It is true that the respondents also admitted that the Doctor who had examined the petitioner had not been examined but it is claimed that the enquiry officer had conducted the enquiry in accordance with the provisions of CISF Act and Rules and there is no procedural irregularity or lacuna or there is no violation of principles of natural justice.The question of past record is neither relevant nor important in the present case. As the petitioner had indulged in creating nuisance in public place under the influence of liquor which is grave and serious in nature for which the petitioner was awarded the punishment of removal of service. The imposition of penalty of removal from service is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct committed by the petitioner. In terms of Rule 49(1) of the CISF Rules the 3rd respondent is competent to review the case of the petitioner suo motu within a period of one year from the date of order. The imposition of penalty of removal from service is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct committed by the petitioner. In terms of Rule 49(1) of the CISF Rules the 3rd respondent is competent to review the case of the petitioner suo motu within a period of one year from the date of order. The penalty order was passed on 30-9-1997 and the show cause notice was issued on 22-4-1998 proposing the penalty of removal from service and the penalty of removal was passed on 15-7-1998 within a period of one year. The contention that the action is barred by limitation prescribed under Rule 49(1) cannot be sustained. The imputations with respect to the charge was framed are grave and serious in nature and therefore the punishment of removal from service was imposed. As the punishment was not commensurate with the gravity of misconduct, the suo motu power was exercised by the 3rd respondent which is well within the authority and the jurisdiction and in conformity with the statutory rule. It is contended that no interference is called for with respect to the impugned proceedings imposing the penalty of removal from service. Before taking up the points for consideration it is not only relevant but also essential to set out the charge framed against the petitioner as well as the imputations. "CHARGE": "That the said No. 833250098 L/Naik A. S. Moorthy of CISF Unit ONGC Jorhat created nuisance under the influence of alcohol in public place at A.T. Road in front of Jorhat Court, on 17-5-1997 at about 12.20 hrs and thereby tarnished the image of the Force. The act of the individual exhibits gross indiscipline and misconduct being a member of the force."" STATEMENT OF IMPUTATIONS": " No. 833250098 L/Naik A. S. Moorthy of CISF Unit ONGC Jorhat while riding on bicycle under the influence of alcohol at A.T. Road on 17-5-97, at about 1220 hrs fell down before a motor-cycle No. AS-05-0714 in front of Jorhat Court. However, the motor cyclist managed to stop his vehicle without serious incident. On interrogation by local police L/Naik A. S. Moorthy refused to disclose his identity and tried to catch the collar of the Uniformed Police Person. Then he was brought to Police Station and examined by the Medical Officer of Health and Family Welfare Department, Assam. However, the motor cyclist managed to stop his vehicle without serious incident. On interrogation by local police L/Naik A. S. Moorthy refused to disclose his identity and tried to catch the collar of the Uniformed Police Person. Then he was brought to Police Station and examined by the Medical Officer of Health and Family Welfare Department, Assam. After examination, the Medical Officer found No. 833250098 L/Naik A. S. Moorthy under influence of alcohol. Thus, he created nuisance in public place under the influence of alcohol thereby committed an act of gross indiscipline and misconduct being a member of the Force." As seen from the Annexure to the memo of charge, the disciplinary authority indicated that the charges would be substantiated by producing the following documents. "(1) Report of SI of Police, Jorhat Police Station, (ii) GD Extract of Control room. GD entry Nos. 1430, 1437 dated 17-5-1997. (iii) Medical Report of Health and Family Welfare Dept. Assam. Any other documents may be examined if found necessary during the course of enquiry". As seen from the charge memo the following witnesses were examined to substantiate the imputations against the petitioner : "1. 764500079 Insp/Exe Hemant Singh. 2. 724510168 HC/GD K. G. Ravi Kumar. 3. 833200224 L/Naik T. Mashahary. 4. 904480535 HC/DVR P. V. Sudhakaran. All the four are CISF personnel. PW 1 was performing the duties of the Company Commander Jorhat at the relevant point of time and after receiving the information from the Control Room he had proceeded to the Police Station along with PW 2; K. G. Ravikumar PW 3; T. Mashahary; PW 4 : P. V. Sudhakaran. All the witnesses examined were produced by the CISF force.According to PW 1 he had met the Officer Incharge of Jorhat Police Station. Inspector H. K. Borahl and Sub-Inspector (Traffic) M. Goswamy stated that on 17-5-1997 at about 12.20 hrs when the Traffic Sub-Inspector of Police along with the staff were on law and order duty one man was going on his bicycle through AT Road in front of Jorhat Court who had no control over motor cycle bearing Regn. Inspector H. K. Borahl and Sub-Inspector (Traffic) M. Goswamy stated that on 17-5-1997 at about 12.20 hrs when the Traffic Sub-Inspector of Police along with the staff were on law and order duty one man was going on his bicycle through AT Road in front of Jorhat Court who had no control over motor cycle bearing Regn. No. AS-05-0714 who was coming from the opposite direction tried to save the cyclist and applied sudden brake and fell down with his motor cycle causing slight impact on the front wheel of the bicycle as a result of the said impact, the front wheel of the cycle was bent and damaged. The said traffic Sub-Inspector and their staff who had noticed the incident made enquiries. The cyclist refused to disclose his identity and tried to get hold of the collar of the traffic Sub-Inspector, who was in uniform. Thereafter the cyclist was brought to the police station where he had disclosed his particulars as Lance Naik A. S. Moorthy of CISF residing at Jail road Jorhat. It was further claimed that the said Moorthy was drunk and he was taken to Health and Family Welfare Department, for medical check up. The Doctor certified that the petitioner was under the influence of alcohol. The traffic Sub-Inspector had sent the written complaint against Lance Naik Moorthy enclosing a photostate copy of the medical certificate issued by Health and Family Welfare Department. Thereafter the petitioner was taken to CISF control room and PW 1 made G.D. entry at Control room and reported the matter to the Assistant Commandant. It is also admitted during the relevant point of time, the delinquent was not on duty and he was not in uniform. The delinquent was also residing in a rented house at Jail Road, Jorhat. PW 2 K. G. Ravikumar also confirmed the said statement of PW 1. So also PW 3 T. Mashahary and PW 4 P. V. Sudhakran. It is also admitted during the relevant point of time, the delinquent was not on duty and he was not in uniform. The delinquent was also residing in a rented house at Jail Road, Jorhat. PW 2 K. G. Ravikumar also confirmed the said statement of PW 1. So also PW 3 T. Mashahary and PW 4 P. V. Sudhakran. It is clear that all the witnesses examined to substantiate the imputations and the charge were not eye-witnesses at the scene of occurrence nor they were present but they went to the Police Station much subsequent to the alleged incident.To the contra, the writ petitioner while denying the charges has stated that while he was proceeding on his cycle from his quarters for the purpose of shopping a scooterist came from the opposite direction hit against him, a cyclist throwing him down on the road and smashing the front wheel of his bicycle and as a result of which the delinquent had sustained injuries on both his knees and hands. At that stage the delinquent gathered strength and stood up and at that stage, as the scooterist was attempting to drive away the charged official shouted the police man to stop the scooterist as according to the delinquent, the negligence on the part of the scooterist had caused damage to his bicycle. The policeman stopped the scooterist and had some discussion on the road, but the Policeman freed the scooterist to leave. The delinquent who had sustained pain over the injuries and he was slowly losing his senses. In the mean time, the Policeman came to the charged official started asking questions in Assamese language which the delinquent did not understand as he was not acquainted to the local language of Assam. The delinquent had lost his sense and he did not know what had happened. Subsequently, the delinquent was brought to the Police Station and where only he regained conscious. Thereafter he was taken to CISF control room. The delinquent denied that he had consumed liquor nor he was under the influence of liquor and if he was under the influence of Alcohol, he would not have driven 4 kms distance through a road with heavy traffic in a drunken stage. Thereafter he was taken to CISF control room. The delinquent denied that he had consumed liquor nor he was under the influence of liquor and if he was under the influence of Alcohol, he would not have driven 4 kms distance through a road with heavy traffic in a drunken stage. It was further stated that the scooterist being the local man, who had driven the scooter rashly caused the accident and he should have been taken to the police station but instead the petitioner had been taken to the Police Station and the scooterist was let off.It is contended by the delinquent that it was a mere accident and it is neither gruesome offence nor it is a misconduct nor there is any reason to initiate any disciplinary action against the petitioner. The delinquent stoutly denied the allegation of his consuming Alcohol at the material point of time and that he was under the influence of Alcohol and he had misbehaved. The enquiry officer himself had recorded the following facts as admitted by both the sides : (i) On 17-5-97 between 1100 hrs to 1230 hrs, the charged official was on off duty and in civil dress. (ii) On 17-5-97 between 1100 hrs to 1230 hrs, the charged official was riding a bicycle in A.T. Road in front of Jorhat Court. (iii) On 17-5-97 between 1100 hrs to 1230 hrs, the charged official was hit by a Scooterist/motor cyclist in his front wheel of bicycle and the charged official fell down on the road. (iv) On 17-5-97 between 1100 hrs to 1230 hrs. the charged official was taken in Jorhat Police Station, Medically examined by a Doctor. (v) On 17-5-97, between 1100 hrs to 1400 hrs. the charged official was taken from Jorhat Police Station by Insp. Hemant Singh (PW 1). The enquiry official noticed the following factual controversy : (i) Whether the charged official was riding a bicycle on 17-5-97 at about 1220 hrs under the influence of alcohol at A.T. Road or not ? (ii) Whether the charged official fell down before a motor cycle No. AS-05-0714 in front of Jorhat Court or not ? (iii) Whether the charged official refused to disclose his identity to local police on interrogation or not ? (iv) whether the charged official was medically examined and found under the influence of alcohol or not ? (ii) Whether the charged official fell down before a motor cycle No. AS-05-0714 in front of Jorhat Court or not ? (iii) Whether the charged official refused to disclose his identity to local police on interrogation or not ? (iv) whether the charged official was medically examined and found under the influence of alcohol or not ? (v) whether the charged official created nuisance in public under the influence of alcohol or not ?Before the enquiry officer, apart from the said four witnesses no other witness had been examined nor the Sub-Inspector of Police who had sent the complaint to the Commandant had been examined nor the Medical Officer who had examined the petitioner had been examined as a witness. The complaint of the Sub-Inspector of Police Thiru Goswami was marked as Ex. P-1. The complaint of Goswami reads thus :" I have the honour to report that, the below noted personnel of your unit was found moving in an uncontrolled manner with influence of alcohol at A.T. Road in front of Jorhat Court today on 17-5-97 at about 1220 hrs. He fell down on the A.T. Road in front of a Motor Cycle without serious incident. On interrogation at the spot he refused to give his identity and he tried to catch the uniform of my staff. Somehow he was brought to the P.S. and medically examined. "Despite the non-examination of material witnesses, namely, the complainant the enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge. As already pointed out PWs. 1 to 5 were not eye-witnesses to the occurrence, but they arrived at the scene much later. Action was taken on the basis of the report received from the Sub-Inspector (Traffic) Goswami who claimed that he was a witness to the occurrence, besides other police man. None of them had been examined to show as to how the accident occurred and whether the petitioner fell down due to drunkenness nor the Doctor had been examined to speak about the drunkenness or contents of his report. Despite that the enquiry officer had found the petitioner guilty of the charges. None of them had been examined to show as to how the accident occurred and whether the petitioner fell down due to drunkenness nor the Doctor had been examined to speak about the drunkenness or contents of his report. Despite that the enquiry officer had found the petitioner guilty of the charges. The Commanding Officer, though it was pointed out that the version of PW 1 and the complainant Goswami are contradictory however, accepted the findings reported by the enquiry officer and came to the conclusion that the petitioner had created nuisance in public place under the influence of liquor and in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 29A read with Schedule II of CISF Rules imposed the punishment of reduction of pay scales by one stage for a period of one year with effect from the date of the order namely 11-6-1997.It is true that the petitioner had not preferred an appeal nor he had challenged the penalty imposed by his Commandant, though appeal is provided for under the Rules. On 22nd April, 1998, a show cause notice was issued on the premise that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is not commensurate with the gravity of misconduct committed by him and that it is proposed to enhance the penalty to that of removal from service. The petitioner submitted his objections, besides pointing out his family conditions and age of the children and pointing out that this is the only incident during his 15 years career and requested that action be dropped. The 3rd respondent by the impugned order dated 15-7-1998 imposed the punishment of removal from service while recording thus :" It is evident from the statement on records, i.e. statement of PW 1 (Insp/Exe Hemant Singh) PW 2 (HC/GD K. G. Ravikumar) and PW 3 L/Naik T. Mashahary) and medical certificate issued by the Doctor, Civil Hospital, Jorhat (Health and Family Welfare Department, Assam) that the delinquent L/NK A. S. Moorthy had consumed liquor and created nuisance in Public place i.e. in front of Jorhat Court under the influence of liquor which is a serious offence. The delinquent L/NK A. S. Moorthy performing duties more than 15 years in CISF, he should have known how to behave with others and (should/have) not (should/have) indulged in creating nuisance in Public place under influence of liquor. The delinquent L/NK A. S. Moorthy performing duties more than 15 years in CISF, he should have known how to behave with others and (should/have) not (should/have) indulged in creating nuisance in Public place under influence of liquor. It is obvious on the part of a member of the Force to be loyal, honest and disciplined. I find that the delinquency indulged in by delinquent is grave and serious in nature for which the delinquent deserved exemplary punishment. The punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct committed by the delinquent. The representation of the delinquent against enhancement of the punishment is not convincing. "In the light of the above averments, the various contentions are being advanced raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel contended that there are no merits in the contentions raised by the counsel for the writ petitioner. The following points arise for consideration in this writ petition. 1. Whether on the evidence available the petitioner could be held to be guilty of the charge and whether the conclusions of the enquiry officer as accepted by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority are vitiated by illegalities or misdirections or perversity ? Whether the enquiry is vitiated and violative of principles of natural justice ? 2. Whether the 3rd respondent is the appointing authority and whether he has got the authority to dismiss the petitioner from service ? Whether the order of dismissal is liable to be interfered as violative of Article 311 ? 3. Whether the 3rd respondent has authority and jurisdiction to exercise the powers of suo motu revision ? 4. Whether the exercise of powers of suo motu revision is barred by limitation ? 5. Whether the punishment of dismissal imposed after the petitioner suffering the punishment of reduction to lower scale would amount to double jeopardy ? POINT No. 1. It is well settled that in disciplinary proceedings the technicalities of criminal case cannot be invoked nor proof prescribed by the Evidence Act could be applied. Yet in disciplinary proceedings, the charge framed must be held to be proved before any punishment could be imposed. In a disciplinary proceeding the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and it is not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Yet in disciplinary proceedings, the charge framed must be held to be proved before any punishment could be imposed. In a disciplinary proceeding the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and it is not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries nor the charges could be sustained on mere conjectures in the absence of evidence. At the same time, it is essential that the conclusion of the enquiry officer should be based on some evidence and in the absence of evidence the charge cannot be sustained on mere conjectures. In the State of Assam v. Mohan Chandra Kalita, it has been held thus :" Where in an enquiry against the Sub-Deputy Collector on a charge of illegal collection of money from the villagers while distributing compensation amount due to them, some evidence was let in respect of matters extraneous to the charge prejudicing the enquiry officer against the delinquent and the enquiry officer based his conclusions on conjectures and there was no evidence to show that any amount as alleged as realised by the delinquent himself or at his instance or even by his connivance, the charge could not be sustained. "At the same time where there is some evidence, which the authority has accepted and which evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that the delinquent is guilty of improper conduct or a misconduct it is not the function of this Court sitting under Article 226 to review the evidence and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This Court shall be justified in interfering only if it is demonstrated that the respondent had committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. But this Court has to enquire whether the order is justified. If the whole of the evidence led into enquiry accepted as true. This Court also will decline to reappreciate the evidence and it has to find out as to whether the conclusion of the disciplinary authority or the reviewing authority are based on evidence or not. It is also well settled that in the matter of major punishments such as dismissal the delinquent should be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity as contemplated under Article 311 and the individual should be afforded proper opportunity to cross-examine the witness who deposed against him. It is also well settled that in the matter of major punishments such as dismissal the delinquent should be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity as contemplated under Article 311 and the individual should be afforded proper opportunity to cross-examine the witness who deposed against him. It is relevant to refer to few of the pronouncements of the Apex Court on this issue. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishapayan, a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court held thus at Page 1629 :" It cannot be denied that when an order of dismissal passed against a public servant is challenged by him by a petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 it is for the High Court to consider whether the constitutional requirements of Art. 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirmities on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide but that does not mean that the discretionary orders passed by him are final and conclusive. Whenever it is urged before the High Court that as a result of such orders the public officer has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity it would be open to the High Court to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of Art. 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules, whether or not the officer in question has had a reasonable opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in Courts of Law. As Venkatarama Aiyar J. has observed in Union of India v. T. S. Varma, "stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice.In Union of India v. H. C. Goel, a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court while considering the scope of Judicial review with respect to disciplinary matters under Article 311(1) and (2) held thus at Page 369 : "It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order, never the less, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him or in the nature of quasi judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusions of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this position of law." In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour), Desai, J. speaking for the Bench held thus at Page 1812 : "It is thus well settled that where the findings of misconduct are, based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would come, the arbitrator appointed under See. 10-A or this Court in appeal under Art. 136 can reject such finding as perverse. Holding that the findings are perverse does not constitute re-appraisal of evidence though we would have been perfectly justified in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 11A to do so." " It is equally well settled that where a quasi judicial tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity or non-application of mind and stands vitiated. The industrial tribunal or the arbitrator or a quasi judicial authority can reject not only such findings but also the conclusion based on no legal evidence or if it is merely based on surmises and conjectures unrelated to evidence on the ground that they disclose total non-application of mind. The industrial tribunal or the arbitrator or a quasi judicial authority can reject not only such findings but also the conclusion based on no legal evidence or if it is merely based on surmises and conjectures unrelated to evidence on the ground that they disclose total non-application of mind. Viewed from either angle, the conclusion of the enquiry officer as well as of the arbitrator Mr. Kakkar are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence." The same position is reiterated by K. Ramasamay, J. as he then was, in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K. S. Gandhi, and it has been held thus at Page 907-908; of AIR SCW. - "It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. The grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inference in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred, as much as is practical, as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inferences fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inferences fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries." Their Lordships of the Apex Court in B. C. Chturvedi v. Union of India, (1996 Lab IC 462) administered the word 'caution' with respect to exercise of powers of judicial review in respect of departmental enquiries and held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. In that respect it has been held thus at Page 465-466 of Lab IC : "Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions axe based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/ Tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." It is not necessary to burden this order by cataloguing with any further citations the legal position is well settled. In the present case it is the specific case of the delinquent official that the incident is a mere accident and as it is being pointed out by the delinquent that the scooterist after hitting the delinquent tried to leave and the delinquent had to seek the aid of police to stop the scooterist, besides the delinquent had sustained injury. In the present case it is the specific case of the delinquent official that the incident is a mere accident and as it is being pointed out by the delinquent that the scooterist after hitting the delinquent tried to leave and the delinquent had to seek the aid of police to stop the scooterist, besides the delinquent had sustained injury. It is the specific case of the delinquent that he had neither created nuisance nor he was under the influence of Alcohol nor he had tarnished the image of the force and the accident as admitted will not prove either gross indiscipline or a misconduct as a member of the force. Ex. R-13 is the report sent by Sub-Inspector of Police which has already been extracted above. It is admitted that the said Sub-Inspector of Police has not been examined as a witness though his report has been marked as an exhibit. It is admitted that witnesses namely PWs 1 to 4 are not eyewitnesses to the occurrence but they came to the Police Station long after the alleged incident and saw the delinquent sitting on a bench inside the police station. Mere presence of the delinquent inside the Police Station where PWs 1 to 4 saw him will not substantiate the alleged incident nor they have spoken in support of the contents of the Ex. R-I the report sent by the Sub-Inspector of Police. PWs 1 to 4 are all CISF personnel who came to the Police Station after 3/4 hrs.It is also admitted that the delinquent had neither been taken into custody nor a crime been registered nor been prosecuted by the Police for the alleged accident and the incident which followed the accident. Whether the delinquent is guilty of the misconduct as detailed in the complaint has to be considered. The report of the Sub-Inspector of Police based upon which charge has been framed, this Court is of the considered view that it has not been established. Whether the delinquent was under the influence of Alcohol as to how the accident had occurred and as to the manner in which the delinquent official had behaved at the scene of accident, there is no evidence at all. Merely because the delinquent was sitting inside the Police Station when seen by PWs 1 to 4. It cannot be assumed that the delinquent is guilty of the charge. Merely because the delinquent was sitting inside the Police Station when seen by PWs 1 to 4. It cannot be assumed that the delinquent is guilty of the charge. There is no material at all before the enquiry officer or before the disciplinary authority to hold that the petitioner is guilty of the charges. The evidence of PWs 1 to 4 CISF personnel and the conclusion of the enquiry officer are based on mere surmises and conjectures. The report sent by the Sub-Inspector of Police had not been furnished to the delinquent. Be that so, none had been examined to speak about the contents of the said report nor any eye-witnesses had been examined to speak about the behaviour or conduct on the part of the delinquent official at the scene of occurrence nor any one had been examined to speak about the conduct of the petitioner at the scene of accident and there is also nothing to show that the delinquent was under the influence of Alcohol. The Sub-Inspector of Police had not been examined to substantiate his complaint. PWs 1 to 4 were under a misconception and their evidence is not only hearsay but it will not prove the alleged misconduct nor the contents of Ex. P-1 could be substantiated. It is incorrect to contend that the delinquent was under the Police Custody when it is not even the case of anyone that the delinquent had been taken to custody by arrest. Had the Police been satisfied that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent act on the part of the delinquent they would have definitely registered a crime and prosecuted the delinquent official. This is not so.At the risk of repetition it has to be pointed out that PWs 1 to 4 not being eye-witnesses to the scene of occurrence nor being present at the time of occurrence and they have arrived at the Police Station after 3/4 hours are not competent to speak about the contents of the complaint or the alleged conduct or misconduct on the part of the delinquent. The enquiry officer had also incidentally found that the delinquent had caught the Sub-Inspector of Police and other Constable in uniform by their collar. The enquiry officer had also incidentally found that the delinquent had caught the Sub-Inspector of Police and other Constable in uniform by their collar. This is also not supported by any evidence as neither the Police whose collar it is alleged that the delinquent had caught has been examined nor PWs 1 to 4 were eye-witnesses to such an incident. Ex. P-2 medical certificate had been merely produced as exhibit. Mere production of the certificate is not sufficient and without examination of the authority who had issued the certificate or the authority to whom if has been issued and in the absence of any corroboration it would be too much on the part of the enquiry officer to assume that the delinquent was under the influence of Alcohol and he had misbehaved or he had committed nuisance in a public place under the influence of Alcohol. Merely because the local police had sent a complaint it cannot be assumed that the delinquent is guilty of the amputations based upon such report the solitary charge had been framed. It is also to be noted that the report of Sub-Inspector of Police G. D. entry at CISF control room, G. D. Extract and Medical report were being relied upon to substantiate the charges. None had been examined to prove the said contents nor there is any material to substantiate the amputations alleged against the petitioner. In other words the findings or conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer as accepted by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority are based on no evidence. It is equally well settled that neither technical rules of evidence nor proof of fact nor evidence as provided in Evidence Act shall apply to the disciplinary proceedings. This Court would be justified in interfering with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer against the delinquent as the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence.Without examination of the Station House Officer who sent the report or the other constable who was present at the scene of occurrence or for that matter the medical officer and when there is none to speak about the contents of the report forwarded by the Sub-Inspector of Police or the certificate issued by the Medical Officer this Court holds that no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion or a finding. In fairness and to comply with the requirements of principles of natural justice the disciplinary authority should have examined the Sub-Inspector of Police who had sent the report or other constable who was present at the house of occurrence or the Medical Officer who had examined the delinquent and they should have been allowed to be cross-examined. If there is some evidence or if someone who has spoken about the contents of the complaint or the alleged conduct at the scene of occurrence or the delinquent being under the influence of alcohol or his misconduct or misbehaviour with the Police, this Court would not venture to interfere with such conclusion. In a disciplinary enquiry proof of legal evidence and findings are not relevant. So also adequacy of evidence or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed under Article 226. On the facts of the case, the findings recorded or conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer in the absence of any material evidence is vitiated and suffer from patent error on the face of the record. Further it is based on no evidence at all. Hence this Court would be justified in issuing a writ of certiorari. Merely because the delinquent had admitted that he was riding a bicycle he had met with an accident and he was taken to Police Station would not mean that the delinquent is guilty of the amputations or the charge. There is nothing to show that the delinquent was under the influence of Alcohol and PWs 1 to 4 were not at all competent to speak about the alleged influence of Alcohol or the delinquent had created nuisance in public under the influence of Alcohol and so he had misbehaved with the local police. Hence this is a case of no evidence and the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer cannot be sustained at all.At the risk of repetition it has to be pointed out that in the present case, the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would arrive at. The findings recorded are based on conjectures and surmises and therefore the enquiry suffers. The evidence let in by the disciplinary authority had not substantiated the charge. The findings recorded are based on conjectures and surmises and therefore the enquiry suffers. The evidence let in by the disciplinary authority had not substantiated the charge. There has been denial of opportunity also and the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police has been accepted as Gospel of Truth without his being subjected to cross-examination by the delinquent official. So also the Medical Report of the Doctor who had issued the Certificate. The following aspect cannot be lost sight of it is to be pointed out that no eye-witness to the occurrence had been examined nor the complainant namely Sub-Inspector Goswami had been examined nor the report of the Medical Officer had been marked or produced by the Medical Officer. The complaint of the Goswami on which action was taken has already been extracted above. Curiously the charge framed being that the petitioner had created nuisance under the influence of Alcohol in a public place on 17-5-1997 at A.T., Road and thereby tarnished the image of the force. The complaint of Goswami is that the petitioner was moving in an uncontrolled manner with the influence of Alcohol; he fell down on the A.T. Road at about 12.20 hrs and there was collision between the cyclist and the motorist (scooterist) and that the cyclist not only refused to disclose his identity but also tried to catch the collar of the said Sub-Inspector, but he was some how brought to the Police Station and medically examined. The said complaint is silent about the result of the medical examination by the Doctor nor the complainant Sub-Inspector Goswami (Traffic) had been examined. The charge memo being committing nuisance while what has been complained of by Goswami being that the petitioner refused to disclose his identity and tried to catch the uniform of his staff whose uniform the petitioner tried to catch or attempted to catch is silent. Nor the said Goswami had been examined nor the said staff whose uniform the petitioner had tried to catch had been examined nor been disclosed nor been substantiated by examining either the said Goswami or the staff whose uniform the petitioner tried to catch.It should not be forgotten that the alleged incident took place at A.T. Road, in front of Jorhat Court at about 1220 hrs and the petitioner was not in his uniform but he was proceeding on a cycle. It was also admitted by PWs 1 to 4 that damage has been caused to the cycle and the petitioner had also sustained injuries. There is no explanation either for the injury or for the damage caused to the cycle. It is clear on facts that there was an accident and as a result of which the petitioner had sustained injury besides damage had been caused to his cycle. The report of the Sub-Inspector is also silent about the contents of the medical examination or expert opinion given by the Medical Officer. On the basis of Ex. P-2 which was marked, it was made out according to the enquiry officer that the petitioner was under the influence of Alcohol. As already pointed out neither the complainant Traffic Sub-Inspector had been examined nor the Medical Officer who had issued the Medical Certificate had been examined. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 will only disclose that the petitioner was smelling alcohol and that he was under normal condition. So also the evidence of other witnesses. None of the local police official had been examined to substantiate the alleged drunkenness or the alleged influence of Alcohol or the alleged mis-behaviour in that the petitioner tried to catch the uniform of the local police. The motor cyclist/scooterist had not been examined nor the investigation report had been produced nor the petitioner been prosecuted and convicted. Hence it is clear that it is a case of no evidence and the findings being perverse cannot be sustained. Incidentally, it was also pointed out that the petitioner had not preferred an appeal challenging the findings when he had been imposed with the punishment of reduction to lower scale. It is true this would not mean that the petitioner had accepted the guilty or the amputations or charges when there is no evidence at all. Merely because, the petitioner had accepted the imposition of punishment of reduction to lowest scale, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner cannot challenge the findings recorded when a major punishment of dismissal from service is imposed. The petitioner, a member of the disciplinary force about whom the Commanding Officer knew and had imposed the minimum punishment, he had to accept the same as there was an incident and had to bear as the lowest level member in the force and instead of fighting or raising the issue. The petitioner, a member of the disciplinary force about whom the Commanding Officer knew and had imposed the minimum punishment, he had to accept the same as there was an incident and had to bear as the lowest level member in the force and instead of fighting or raising the issue. But when it comes to deprivation of livelihood, it is well open to the petitioner to challenge the entire findings. Hence on the first point this Court holds that on the materials placed before the enquiry officer, the petitioner cannot be held to be guilty of the amputations or the charge and the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are vitiated by illegalities and misdirections besides it is an error apparent on the face of the record. This is a case of no evidence. The first point is answered in favour of the writ petitioner.The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions that the punishment imposed is highly shocking and arbitrary relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Kishan v. Union of India, and Mehnga Singh v. Inspector General of Police, and Rama Kant Misra v. State of U.P., 1982 SC 1552 : (1982 Lab IC 1790). Taking into consideration the allegations or amputations and there is nothing to show that the delinquent had misconducted himself and there is nothing to show that the delinquent had conducted himself in an unbecoming manner as member of the disciplined force the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service deserves to be interfered or at least a direction could be issued to the respondent to reconsider the punishment as has been held by the Apex Court. As the petitioner was not on duty and it is a mere traffic accident between two groups on a public road during day time and the petitioner was neither armed nor he was in uniform, but he was driving his bicycle and a scooterist had dashed against him. As the petitioner was not on duty and it is a mere traffic accident between two groups on a public road during day time and the petitioner was neither armed nor he was in uniform, but he was driving his bicycle and a scooterist had dashed against him. However, as this Court on the first point had concluded that the petitioner is not guilty of the amputations or the charge it would be sufficient to hold that the punishment in the present case is shockingly disproportionate and there is no reason at all for the appellate authority to initiate suo motu proceedings and moreso when the Commanding Officer who had knowledge about the individual and his earlier conduct as a member of the force for a considerable period had rightly imposed the punishment of reducing him to lower scale. This point also deserves to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner. Taking up the points 3 and 4 together for consideration, it was contended that the 3rd respondent has no authority or jurisdiction to exercise the powers of suo motu revision and that exercise of such powers of suo motu revision is barred by limitation.In this respect it is to be pointed out that on 30th of September, 1997, the 4th respondent disciplinary authority had imposed the punishment of reduction of pay for one year. On 22-4-1998, the 3rd respondent had issued the show cause notice suo motu calling upon the petitioner to state his objections as to why the punishment of removal from service should not be imposed. It is contended that the 3rd respondent has no power of revision or review muchless a suo motu review with respect to the punishment imposed by the 4th respondent as there was no rule. In this respect, the counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court. To sustain the contentions and also it was pointed that no power has been conferred under the CISF Act, 1968 conferring the powers of suo motu revision. Section 9 of the CISF Act, 1968 is relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner as there is no provision enabling the 3rd respondent to exercise suo motu powers of revision. To sustain the contentions and also it was pointed that no power has been conferred under the CISF Act, 1968 conferring the powers of suo motu revision. Section 9 of the CISF Act, 1968 is relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner as there is no provision enabling the 3rd respondent to exercise suo motu powers of revision. Per contra, the counsel for the contesting respondent relied upon Section 9(2A) and (2B) of the CISF Act as amended by the CISF (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1999 (Act 40 of 1999). This amendment received the assent of the President on 29th December, 1999 and it was gazetted on 29th December, 1999, The said enactment is a validating enactment and amendment is deemed to be and to have always been made under the principal Act as if the principal Act as so amended had been in force at all material times before the commencement of the amending Act. Hence it is clear that but for the amendment Act 40 of 1999 the suo motu proceedings initiated by the 3rd respondent will be without jurisdiction and an illegality. The Central Act 40 of 1999 amending the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968 is deemed to have been amended from its inception and the suo motu powers had been conferred on the appellate authority. Hence it cannot be held that the order is without jurisdiction. This contention fails.Nextly it was contended that even assuming that the amendment act applies such suo motu exercise of powers should have been exercised within the time prescribed under the rules. Per contra, the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel while referring to the CISF Rules contends that one year is the period of limitation and initiation of suo motu powers had been completed before the expiry of the limitation period and therefore, the action of the 3rd respondent is not barred. This contention put forward by the Central Government Standing Counsel on the plea of limitation deserves acceptance. One such contention that had been raised is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In this respect, it has to be pointed out that such an objection had been raised by the respondent only at the time of hearing. One such contention that had been raised is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In this respect, it has to be pointed out that such an objection had been raised by the respondent only at the time of hearing. In the present case, the writ petitioner had initiated the proceedings bona fide and no objection had been raised by the respondent with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the writ petition. But it has to be pointed out that against the respondents 1 and 2 this Court would have definitely the jurisdiction but as part of the cause of action has arisen and as the petitioner after removal is not in a position to move the concerned High Court and having failed to raise objection as to jurisdiction in the counter, this Court is not inclined to entertain such an objection at this point of time. Hence this Court holds that this writ petition is not liable to be dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. On points 3 and 4 this Court holds that the 3rd respondent has jurisdiction to exercise suo motu powers of revision and such exercise of powers is not barred by limitation. The last of the points is taken up. It is true that in the present case, the punishment of reduction to lower scale was ordered by the original authority namely, the 4th respondent. The petitioner had undergone the penalty. But however on that score it cannot be held that the order of the 3rd respondent is illegal or it amounts to double punishment. If the punishment of removal or dismissal is to be imposed by the appellate authority by exercising suo motu powers on that score it cannot be said that it would mean double jeopardy and such a contention cannot be sustained. This point has to be answered against the writ petitioner.When the action of the 3rd respondent is held to be within time and he has got powers of suo motu revision it follows automatically that the imposition of the punishment of removal is not a double jeopardy and if the dismissal is to be given effect then the petitioner will be entitled to the difference in the scales of pay, which would have been paid but for the reduction of time scale as ordered by the original authority. The order of dismissal or removal could be prospective only and till the order of dismissal or removal, the petitioner would be entitled to full wages but for the imposition of punishment of reduction by the original authority. Once the order of original authority is set aside by the appellate authority it follows automatically that it to not a double punishment and the arrears of pay if any shall be paid out to the petitioner. Hence this point is also answered against the writ petitioner. It was nextly contended that the order of dismissal or removal had not been passed by the appointing authority and therefore there is violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and on that score, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. It is the contention of the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel that the 3rd respondent is the appointing authority. In terms of Rule 49(1) of the Rules what is sought to be contended is that the order of appointment has been passed by the first respondent on 25-2-1983 and the petitioner had been selected and appointed by the orders of the Director General of CISF. The learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel points out that the order of appointment has been passed by Assistant Inspector General, who had signed the proceedings and it is not as if the Director General Central, Industrial Security Force had appointed the petitioner nor he is the appointing authority. The 3rd respondent is the competent authority and he could always impose the punishment of dismissal or removal from service. The first respondent had by a circular intimated the selection and he had not appointed the petitioner. The order of dismissal has been passed by the Deputy Inspector General, who is higher than the authority who had actually appointed the petitioner.In this respect the attention of this Court was drawn to the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Binod Bihari Behera, (1996 Lab IC 626). The Apex Court held thus at Page 627-628; of Lab IC : "In our opinion, there is a clear fallacy in the view taken by the High Court. The Apex Court held thus at Page 627-628; of Lab IC : "In our opinion, there is a clear fallacy in the view taken by the High Court. The status of a rule framed by the Central Government in exercise of the nower conferred by Section 22 of the Act for carrying out purposes of the Act, which in particular and without prejudice to the generality of that power enables to provide by rules for regulating the conditions of service of members of the Force, cannot have lesser efficacy in law or be treated as not satisfying the requirement of an order of the Central Government contemplated by the proviso in Section 5. The fallacy in the view taken by the High Court is that it has assumed that the mode described by the proviso in Section 5 of the conferment of this power on a supervisory officer by the Central Government is not satisfied by Rule 11 framed in exercise of the rule making power of the Central Government under Section 22 of the Act or that a mere executive order sans the power conferred on the Central Government by Section 22 of the Act is different and the only manner of exercise of this power given by the proviso in Section 5 of the Act. It is this fallacy which has led to an erroneous application of the principles mentioned in the impugned judgment to the facts of this case. We have no doubt that Rule 11 of the Central Industrial Rules, 1969 framed by the Central Government in exercise of the rule-making conferred on the Central Government by Section 22 of the Act fully satisfies the requirement of the proviso in Section 5 of the Act; the DIG of the Force was duly empowered in the manner prescribed by law to exercise the power of appointment of Inspector in the Force; and, therefore, the DIG of the Force was competent to accept the resignation submitted by the respondent. Accordingly, acceptance of the respondent's resignation by the DIG on 17-10-1984 was valid and it could not be withdrawn by the respondent subsequently on 4-12-1984. The attempt made by the respondent to withdraw his resignation after it has been duly accepted by the DIG was ineffective. Accordingly, acceptance of the respondent's resignation by the DIG on 17-10-1984 was valid and it could not be withdrawn by the respondent subsequently on 4-12-1984. The attempt made by the respondent to withdraw his resignation after it has been duly accepted by the DIG was ineffective. The first contention of the respondent was, therefore, erroneously accepted by the High Court." In the said judgment, the Deputy Inspector General of the Force is held to be the appointing authority in respect of an Inspector in the force. This judgment squarely applies to the facts of the present case and the contention that the 3rd respondent is not the competent authority and there is violation of Article 311 cannot be sustained at all. This point also falls. In the light of the above pronouncements and in the light of the statutory provisions governing the service, the point No. 1 is answered in favour of the writ petitioner and against the respondents. The point Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are answered in favour of the respondents. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the 3rd respondent is quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all attendant and consequential benefits and disburse all the arrears of salary, as if he had been in service continuously but the orders of the 4th respondent imposing the punishment of reduction to lower scale alone is sustained and be given effect. The impugned proceedings of the third respondent is quashed and the writ petition is allowed as prayed for. The parties shall bear their respective costs. Consequently, the connected W.M.P. is closed.