Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. Whether Mrs. sumita Misra Singh, the them Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad had the jurisdiction to review/re-call, directly or indirectly, the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by her predecessor vide which he had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of resumption is the issue that arises for consideration in this petition filed by the petitioner for quashing of the order dated 26.7.1999 passed by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Town and Country Planning Department vide which he allowed the revision filed by the Estate Officer, HUDA, Faridabad (respondent No. 3) and set aside the order passed by the Administrator. 2. The facts which are relevant to the decision of the aforementioned issue are that on the basis of the highest bid Rs. 2,33,500/- given by him, booth site No. 148, Sector 17, Faridabad was allotted to the petitioner on 18.12.1990 subject to the conditions stipulated in the allotment letter Annexure P.1. After obtaining possession of the site on 21.4.1991 and getting the building plan sanctioned, he constructed the building and leased out the same to third parties. However, he did not pay the instalments in accordance with para 5 of the allotment letter leading to the initiation of proceedings under Section 17 of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (for short, the Act)- After issuing notice to him respondent No. 3 passed order dated 1.2.1994 for resumption of the site and forfeiture of the amount deposited by him. He did not challenge that order by filing appeal within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 17(5) of the Act, but on receipt of the issued by respondent No. 3 under Section 18 of the Act for vacation of the site, he filed appeal on 10.4.1995 before the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad (exercising the power of the Chief Administrator, HUDA), which was dismissed on 31.7.1995 by Shri T.C.Gupta (who was then holding the post of the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad) as barred by time. For the next 2 years and 3 months, the petitioner kept total silence. But, when he found that the post of Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad was occupied by an officer who could help him out of no win situation, he submitted application dated 31.10.1997 (Annexure P.6) for re-calling the order of resumption and Mrs. For the next 2 years and 3 months, the petitioner kept total silence. But, when he found that the post of Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad was occupied by an officer who could help him out of no win situation, he submitted application dated 31.10.1997 (Annexure P.6) for re-calling the order of resumption and Mrs. Sumita Mishra Singh, the then Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad obliged him by passing order dated 6.5.1998 vide which she set aside the order of resumption dated 1.2.1994 passed by respondent No. 3 and ordered the restoration of the site subject to clearance of the dues within 45 days and withdrawal of the case pending before the High Court. Unfortunately for him, the revision petition filed by respondent no. 3 against the second order passed by the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad has been allowed by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana. Town and Country Planning Department resulting in setting aside of the order dated 6.5.1998. 3. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that the revisional authority has mis-interpreted the scope of Section 17(7) of the Act which empowers the Chief Administrator, HUDA to review any order passed under the Act. According to him, the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad had the jurisdiction and the authority to review the order dated 31.7.1995 and no illegality was committed by the successor Administrator when she restored the site to him subject to the condition of deposit of the amount due and withdrawal of the litigation. He has averred in the petition that the order of resumption passed by respondent No. 3 was void abinitio because notice under Section 17 of the Act had not been served upon him and in any case, the extreme step of resumption .could not have been by the said taken by the said respondent over looking the fact that the site allotted to him had not been developed and, therefore, he could not make full utilisation of the building constructed over it. 4. The respondents have controverted the petitioners assertion regarding the lack of development. According to them, basic amenities like public toilet, public tape, approach road, street lights, sewerage etc. have been duly provided at the site. 4. The respondents have controverted the petitioners assertion regarding the lack of development. According to them, basic amenities like public toilet, public tape, approach road, street lights, sewerage etc. have been duly provided at the site. They have averred that the petitioner deliberately refrained from making payment of the instalments and, therefore, the site was resumed by respondent No. 3 after issuing notices under Section 17(1), 17(2), 17(3) and 17(4) of the Act. They have further averred that the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad who passed the order dated 6.5.1998 did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the application dated 31.10.1997 submitted by the petitioner for nullification of the order of resumption. In paragraph 14 of the written statement, it has been averred that a cheque of Rs. 5,42,335/- was issued to the petitioner in pursuance of the order passed by the revisional authority but the same was not encashed. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. 6. Shri S.C. Kapoor, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the impugned order passed by the Secretary to Government of Haryana, Town and Country Planning Department should be quashed because the officer concerned reversed the order passed by the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad without considering the fact that the petitioner had withdrawn the suit and deposit the amount due in accordance with the directions given by the latter and thereby placed himself in an irretrievable situation. Learned counsel further argued that under Section 17(7) of the Act, the Administrator, HUDA could review an order made under section 17(5) and therefore, the order dated 6.5.1998 did not suffer from any jurisdiction infirmity justifying interference by the revisional authority. In the end, he submitted that if this Court comes to the conclusion that the order passed by the then Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad was illegal and the same has been rightly set aside, the petitioners possession may not be disturbed because the entire amount due to HUDA has been paid along with interest. On the other hand, Shri R.S. Ghuman argued that in view of the law laid down by this Court in C.W.P. No. 7037 of 1999 M/s. Printer Engineering Company v. State of Haryana and Anr., decided on 24.5.1999, the revisional order should be upheld and the writ petition be dismissed with costs. 7. On the other hand, Shri R.S. Ghuman argued that in view of the law laid down by this Court in C.W.P. No. 7037 of 1999 M/s. Printer Engineering Company v. State of Haryana and Anr., decided on 24.5.1999, the revisional order should be upheld and the writ petition be dismissed with costs. 7. Before proceeding further, we may notice the reasons recorded in the orders dated 6.5.1998 and 26.7.1999 passed by the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad and the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Town and Country Planning Department respectively. The relevant portions of these orders are extracted below. "Order dated 6.5. 1998 I have heard both the parties and gone through the records carefully. From the perusal of the records, it is revealed that the appellant had failed to deposit the instalments despite repeated notices issued to him. The appellant has filed a suit for permanent injunction in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Faridabad. The Honble High Court has ordered the parties of maintain status quo regarding the suit property, till further orders on 27.9.95. The appellant has agreed to withdraw the case from the Honble Court and ready to deposit the further dues within a short period. In view of the above and the assurance given by the appellant. I hereby set aside the order of respondent dated 1.2.94 and ordered that the above booth in question may be restored to the appellant with the condition that the appellant will clear all the up to date dues within a period of 45 days from the date of issue of this order and withdraw the case from the Honble Court and produce the copy of the same to the respondents office otherwise the order of the respondent for resuming the booth will automatically come into force. Order dated 26.7.1999 I have heard both the parties and gone through the record of the case carefully. From the facts of the case, it is clear that the Estate Officer passed the resumption order of the site on 1.2.1994 for non-payment of price of the plot. Appeal filed by the allottee before the Administrator was dismissed by him on 31.7.1995, being time barred. No review petition or revision was filed by the allottee against the order of the Administrator dated 31.7.1995. Meaning thereby the order of Administrator dated 31.7.1995 had become final. Appeal filed by the allottee before the Administrator was dismissed by him on 31.7.1995, being time barred. No review petition or revision was filed by the allottee against the order of the Administrator dated 31.7.1995. Meaning thereby the order of Administrator dated 31.7.1995 had become final. There is no provision in the HUDA Act where the Administrator is authorised to hear and decide any appeal a second time on the same issue. In the present case, the Administrator has clearly crossed his jurisdiction to decide the appeal afresh on the same issue. Conditional order to restore the site to the allottee was passed by the Administrator only to favour the allottee. The allottee deposited the price of the plot as per directions/orders of the Administrator dated 6.5.1998 only with the connivance of staff of the Estate Officer. The amount so deposited was accepted in advertantaly. In the circumstances, I order to set aside the orders passed by the Administrator on 6.5.1998 which were passed without jurisdiction and were not in conformity with the provisions of the HUDA Act. The Estate Officer is directed to refund the amount deposited by the allottee after the orders of the Administrator date 6.5.1998, immediately on receipt of this order and further action in the matter may be taken as per Rules of HUDA." 8. A bare reading of the above extracted portions of the two orders shows that while setting aside the order of resumption and restoring the site to the petitioner, the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad completely overlooked the following stark facts: (i) that vide order dated 31.7.1995, her predecessor in office-had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 17(5) of the Act for setting aside the order of resumption passed by respondent No. 3 and that order had become final because the petitioner did not challenge the same by filing revision under Section 30 of the Act:and (ii) that the application dated 31.10.1997 filed by the petitioner for quashing of the order dated 1.2.1994 passed by respondent No. 3 was hopelessly time barred and there was no valid ground to interfere with the said application. 9. Shri S.C. Kapoor tried to defend the decision of the then Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad to entertain the application dated 31.101997 by arguing that she will be deemed to have done so under sub section (7) of Section 17 of the Act. 9. Shri S.C. Kapoor tried to defend the decision of the then Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad to entertain the application dated 31.101997 by arguing that she will be deemed to have done so under sub section (7) of Section 17 of the Act. We have given serious thought to the submission of the learned counsel but have not felt impressed. A bare reading of the said sub section shows that the Chief Administrator can, within 6 months from the date of the order passed by the Estate Officer, either on his own motion or on an application received in this behalf, call for the record of the proceedings in relation to such order for the purpose of satisfying himself about the legality or propriety of that order and pass appropriate order in relation thereto. It is, thus, clear that the action under Section 17(5) of the Act can be initiated within a period of six months from the date of passing of the order and not thereafter. In other words, the Chief Administrator cannot exercise power Under that section after expiry of six months from the date of passing of the order by the Estate Officer. We are further of the opinion that the provision contained in Section 17(5) is not available to the petitioner to justify the order dated 6.5.1998 passed by the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad because, as already mentioned above, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 1.2.1994 had been dismissed by her predecessor on 31.7.1995 and that order had become final. 10. The Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Town and Country Planning Department had correctly held that the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner had become final and thereafter no power was vested in the office holding that post to entertain the application filed by the petitioner on the same issue. 11. The parameters and the limitations within which the certioraris jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised have been laid by the Apex Court in Syed Yakoob V. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., AIR 1964 S.C. 477. 11. The parameters and the limitations within which the certioraris jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised have been laid by the Apex Court in Syed Yakoob V. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., AIR 1964 S.C. 477. Some of the observations made in that decision, which have direct bearing on the issue relating to the legality of the order Annexure P. 10 are extracted below: "A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: there are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessary means that finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings." 12. If the impugned order is scrutinized in the light of the guiding principles laid down by the Supreme Court, we do not have the slightest hesitation in approving the view taken by the revisional authority that the Administrator did not have the power and jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioner after 3 years and 8 months of the passing of the order of resumption and that too after 2 years and 3 months of the dismissal of appeal filed against that order. This view of ours is fortified by the order dated 24.5.1999 passed in the case of Printer Engineering Company. The facts of that case show that after the dismissal of appeal, revision and writ .petition filed against the order of resumption, the petitioner succeeded in persuading the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad (Smt. Sumita Mishra Singh) to restore the site. This view of ours is fortified by the order dated 24.5.1999 passed in the case of Printer Engineering Company. The facts of that case show that after the dismissal of appeal, revision and writ .petition filed against the order of resumption, the petitioner succeeded in persuading the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad (Smt. Sumita Mishra Singh) to restore the site. However, on a revision filed by the Estate Officer, HUDA, Faridabad, the Commissioner and Secretary of Government Haryana reversed the order of restoration and the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on the ground that the Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioner after the dismissal of the appeal filed by him. 13. Having held that the revisional order does note suffer from any illegality, we may take note of the statement made by Shri S.C. Kapoor that the petitioner should be allowed to retain the possession of the site because he has not only paid the amount due along with interest but has also withdrawn the suit filed in the trial Court in 1994 to restrain the respondents from dispossessing him. Learned counsel stated that the cheque sent in pursuance of the direction given by the revisional authority has not been encashed by the his client. Shri R.S. Ghuman did not controvert the last part of the statement made by Shri Kapoor but submitted that the situation in which the petitioner finds himself is his own creation and, therefore, no indulgence should be shown to him by the Court . However, in response to the Courts query about the market price of the site, learned counsel, after seeking instructions from the concerned authority of HUDA made a statement that in the latest auction held on 3.5.2000, the highest bid of Rs. 10,71,000/has been given in respect of a similar booth site. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client is ready and willing to deposit the additional amount in instalments. 14. Ordinarily, we may have declined the prayer made by the learned counsel but, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner has withdrawn the case filed by him and has expressed his readiness to pay the present market price in respect of the booth site, we deem it proper to accept his request. 14. Ordinarily, we may have declined the prayer made by the learned counsel but, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner has withdrawn the case filed by him and has expressed his readiness to pay the present market price in respect of the booth site, we deem it proper to accept his request. Therefore, while upholding the order dated 26.7.1999 passed by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Town and Country Planning Department, we dispose of the writ petition in the following terms: (i) The petitioner shall pay difference of the market price of the plot i.e. Rs. 10,71,000/- and the amount already deposited by him i.e. Rs. 6,00,591.75 in four equated half yearly instalments with simple interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. (ii) The first instalment of difference of price shall be paid on or before 15.11.2000 along with interest at the rate of 14 per cent on the amount of instalment. (iii) The second instalment shall be paid on or before 15.5.2001 along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent on the amount of instalment. (iv) The third instalment shall be paid on or before 15.11.2001 along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent on the amount of instalment. (v) The last instalment shall be paid on or before 15.5.2002 alongwith interest at the rate of 15 per cent on the amount of instalment. (vi) If the petitioner fails to pay any of these instalments, then order of resumption shall stand automatically revived as if this concessional order had not been made by the Court.