ORDER R.S. Garg, J. By this petition u/s 115 of the CPC the applicant/objector seeks to challenge the correctness, validity and propriety of the order dated 10-5-1999 and 19-7-1999 passed by the learned 6th Civil Judge, Class-I, Jabalpur in Execution Case No. 176-A/82, whereby the applicant's right to lead evidence has been closed. The facts in nut-shell are that the applicant-decree holder filed a civil suit some where in the year 1974 seeking possession of the property in dispute against the non-applicant No. 2. The suit was decreed in favour of the present decree holder but during the pendency of the suit, some where in the year 1991, the present applicant purchased the property. When the decree was put into execution the present applicant/objector resisted the delivery of possession and submitted his objections inter alia pleading that as he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice, the decree could not be executed against him. It appears that the trial Court was moved by the application and permitted the present applicant to lead evidence in support of his objections. Number of the opportunities were given to the applicant but as he failed to lead evidence, the executing Court closed his right to lead evidence. Being aggrieved by the said order the applicant/objector has filed this petition. Submission of the Learned Counsel for the present applicant is that the Court below was unjustified in observing that the applicant was engaged in delaying tactics and was also unjustified in closing the right to lead evidence. While on the other hand Learned Counsel for the non-applicant No. 1 submits that even if the allegations made in the application are taken to be true and in favour of the present applicant then too he would have no right to resist therefore, the process of leading evidence would be an exercise in futility. I have heard the parties at length. The defence of the present applicant appears to be u/s 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act which provides that every transferee under a subsequent contract shall be bound by the terms of the first contract in a suit for specific performance except in a case where the subsequent purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the existence of the contract. The principles underlying section 19(b) of Specific Relief Act, in the opinion of this Court would not come to the rescue or defence of the present applicant. The defences which are applicable to a subsequent purchaser for consideration without notice, are available to the said purchaser in a suit for specific performance of contract but not in a case where the plaintiff claims title in himself and files a suit for possession. To a case like present, provision of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable. According to section 52 of the Act, during the pendency of the suit the party/defendant shall not be entitled to alienate the property and if alienation is made it would be deemed to be illegal. The principles underlying section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act are commonly known as principles of lis pendens and are ordinarily understood to be that if a defendant against whom a suit has been filed seeking possession if transfers the property then such purchaser at best would step in the shoes of the transferor and he would not acquire independent rights. Any order or decree passed against such transferor would bind the transferee pendente lite. A person who purchases the property during the pendency of the suit would not acquire any right better than those which his transferor has, because the common law says that a person cannot transfer more than what he has. Not only this, a right to resist the execution is available to a person if he is claiming independent rights in the property in dispute and not otherwise. A person who claims right through the judgment debtor cannot be permitted to say that he has acquired better and independent right then what were possessed by the judgment debtor to defend himself. If resistance is made to the delivery of possession, the decree holder is entitled to make an application under Order 21, Rule 97, CPC to the Court that the resistance be removed and he be delivered the possession of the property. A person resisting on the spot may also come to the Court or event before the possession is delivered may make an application to the Court that if the execution is taken out he would resist the delivery of possession. A person resisting on the spot may also come to the Court or event before the possession is delivered may make an application to the Court that if the execution is taken out he would resist the delivery of possession. In either of the case, the Court would be required to make an inquiry into the allegations and counter allegations of the parties. If the Court comes to the conclusion that resistance was lawful and was by a person who had independent rights and was in fact a third party, the Court may reject the execution against him but if the Court comes to the conclusion that the resistance was frivolous or misconceived, the executing Court may reject the objections. At this stage, Rule 98(2) of Order 21 cannot be ignored. Rule 102 of Order 21 provides that nothing in Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. According to explanation appended to Rule 102 a transfer would include a transfer by operation of law. According to Rule 98(2) where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at his instigation and or in his behalf, or by any transferee, when such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit, or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant (decree holder) be put into possession of the property. Taking into consideration the nature of the objections raised by the present objector, the Court was not required to conduct an inquiry into the objections because Rule 102 is an complete answer to the objections raised by the objector. Be that as it may, at this stage, the Court should not forget that a purchaser during the pendency of the suit can also not be allowed to resist the execution in view of Rule 98(2) of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. Be that as it may, at this stage, the Court should not forget that a purchaser during the pendency of the suit can also not be allowed to resist the execution in view of Rule 98(2) of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. For disposal of the present revision petition I assume that whatever is said by the present objector is a gospel truth but then too in view of Rule 98(2) of Order 21, the applicant would not be entitled to any relief. The applicant in any case would not be permitted to lead evidence beyond what is contended by him or pleaded by him in his objections. If the objections are that he has purchased the property during the pendency of the suit then Rules 102 and 98(2) of Order 21 of the CPC would be an complete answer to the objections. Learned Counsel for the non-applicant No. 1 is justified in his submission that an inquiry would in fact be an exercise in futility in view of the pleadings of the present applicant, and it is at all not necessary to record the evidence of the parties. The trial Court even otherwise was justified in closing the right of the present applicant in the opinion of this Court. The revision deserves to and is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed