V. K. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Appeal is directed against an order dated 2nd November 1998 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in C. A. No. 1715 of 1996 relating to and arising out of Matter No. 3815 of 1991 on an application filed by the appellant Sarogi Industrial Corporation for obtaining certain directions with regard to the extension of time for performance of a contract obtained by the Appellant from the Respondents. Brief facts loading to the filing of the Appeal may be stated as hereunder : ( 2 ) STEEL Authority of India Limited (SAIL) owns and manages Durgapur Steel Plant (DSP) as one of its Units. Metal Scrap Trade Corporation Ltd. (MSTC) is also a Government concern wholly owned by the Government of India. SAIL appointed MSTC as its agents and in turn MSTC appointed M/s Subhadra Trading Company as its sub-agents to dig, recover, process and load iron scrap from the slag dumps of DSP at Durgapur. Some disputes and differences having occurred in the meanwhile between the said Subhadra Trading Company on the one hand and DSP, MSTC and SAIL on the other. On 29th December 1991 Subhadra Trading Company (STC for short) filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for certain reliefs and directions against the aforesaid parties. It is in this writ application filed by STC that on 23 April 1993 an order was passed by a learned single Judge of this Court for sale of the processed material lying at the slag dumps of DSP through Public auction. Accordingly on 6th July, 1993 an order also was passed by the learned single Judge directing that the quantification of the material be made within a fortnight. Special Officers were appointed for this purpose and they were directed to submit report regarding such quantification by 14th July, 1993. Quantification was made by the Special Officers and a report was submitted by them to this effect before the learned single Judge. Special Officers were appointed for this purpose and they were directed to submit report regarding such quantification by 14th July, 1993. Quantification was made by the Special Officers and a report was submitted by them to this effect before the learned single Judge. On 22nd October 1993 a notice was published by the Special Officers in the Statesman to the effect that 28,000 M. T. s of processed iron scrap kept in the specified area in the plant of DSP would be sold by public auction by the Special Officers through M/s. India Auction Mart on 1st November 1993 at Calcutta Hosiery Trade Hall, Free School Street, Calcutta. Accordingly in this auction held on 1st November 1993 the appellant Sarogi Industrial Corporation was declared the highest bidder and the aforesaid 28,000 M. T. of processed iron scrap was sold to it on the basis of the terms and conditions governing the said sale. The appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 28 lakshs by way of security in accordance with the aforesaid terms and conditions of sale. The terms and conditions inter alia provided that the material value along with excise duty and taxes as applicable shall have to be deposited by the purchaser in equal instalments, each covering material value for 2800 M. T. and that first such instalment shall have to be deposited by 5th November 1993 and thereafter, after lifting the material already paid for. It was also provided, inter alia in the terms and conditions that the lifting of the materials by the purchaser was to be completed by 10th December 1993. It is basically this requirement in the terms and conditions of sale which perhaps forms the subject matter of the controversy in the present litigation. It is the case of the appellant that it commenced lifting of the material on 9th November, 1993 by depositing the first instalment and that on 18th November, the 2nd instalment was also paid for by the appellant. Third instalment was paid for by the appellant on 1st December 1993. On 4th December 1993, the appellants state that they wrote a letter to the Special Officers stating that the delivery of the entire remaining quantity of the specified 28000 M. T. was not likely to be completed within the date stipulated in the tems and conditions of sale and requested them accordingly to extend the time for delivery appropriately. On 4th December 1993, the appellants state that they wrote a letter to the Special Officers stating that the delivery of the entire remaining quantity of the specified 28000 M. T. was not likely to be completed within the date stipulated in the tems and conditions of sale and requested them accordingly to extend the time for delivery appropriately. It is the case of the appellants that based on the aforesaid payment of three instalments the appellants appear to have lifted 7719. 278 M. T. s of the material between 9th November 1993 and 10th December 1993 as against the total payment made of Rs. 3,24,10,568 including the security deposit of Rs. 28 lakhs. ( 3 ) IT appears that at that point of time the writ application filed by STC in which the learned single Judge had made the aforesaid sale order was still pending in the Court and accordingly the appellants appear to have filed an application in the aforesaid pending writ application for directions from the Court for extension of period for lifting of the materials beyond 10th December 1993. Even while the aforesaid application filed by the appellant in the aforesaid writ application of STC was pending, the same neither been disposed of nor any orders having been passed thereupon by the learned single Judge. The appellant filed a separate independent writ application, being Matter No. 4389 of 1993 in this Court for directions upon the Respondents therein to suitably extend the time for lifting of material beyond 10th December 1993. On 22 January 1996 this writ application of the appellants was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court (Shyamal Kumar Sen, J.) primarily and mainly on the ground that since serious disputed questions of fact and interpretation of clauses of the terms and conditions of the contract of sale were involved, it was not proper to interfere with the actions complained of by the writ petitioner-appellant and also because the issues involved in the writ application related to the enfocement of a contract. The learned single Judge while dismissing the writ application appeared to be of the view that the remedy of the appellant lay in filing a suit for specific performance. It was perhaps on the basis of such thinking that the learned single Judge granted liberty to the appellant to avail of other remedies. The learned single Judge while dismissing the writ application appeared to be of the view that the remedy of the appellant lay in filing a suit for specific performance. It was perhaps on the basis of such thinking that the learned single Judge granted liberty to the appellant to avail of other remedies. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Even though the Letters Patent Appeal, being Appeal No. 746 of 1996 was dismissed by the Division Bench vide Judgment dated 18th April 1996, the Division Bench was of the view that the writ application filed by the appellant was not maintainable on the ground that it was not open to the appellant to enforce certain orders earlier passed in a petition already pending in this Court and filed under Articls 226 of the Constitution. The following observations of the Division Bench with regard to the non maintainability of the writ application of the appellant are apposite. We quote :"however, after having heard the learned counsels for the parties, and after perusing the deicisions cited by them, we are of the view that the writ petition was not maintainable but not for the respons given by the learned single Judge, but on the grounds that by the filing the writ petition the writ petitioners appellants were seeking to enforce certain order passed in a previous preceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, which in our view, is not permisible in law. As will appear from the materials on record, the contract in question was given to the appellants in the proceedings arising out of matter No. 3815 of 1991 and if any dispute has risen in that proceeding, the same should not have been questioned by a separate writ petition, since it is now well settled that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is not available against any judicial order passed in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The subsequent writ petition filed on behalf of the appellants and out of which this appeal arises, is in our view, not maintainable. The subsequent writ petition filed on behalf of the appellants and out of which this appeal arises, is in our view, not maintainable. " ( 4 ) THE Division Bench accordingly was of the view that the learned single Judge vide Judgment dated 22nd January 1996 should not have dismissed the writ application on the grounds and for the reasons mentioned in that judgment but because the writ petition was not maintainable on the grounds and for the reasons quoted hereinabove. Since the Division Bench was clearly of the opinion that it was open to the appellant to have approached the learned single Judge in the pending writ application of STC, it granted such liberty to the appellants by making the following observations in the concluding part of its judgment dated 10th April 1996 which we reproduce herein-below for ready reference:"having regard to the view taken by us, the appeal filed by the appellants also deserves to be dismissed. Before us part with the case, we would like to observe that the remedy of the appellants was not by way of filing a separate writ petition, but by filing an application in the earlier writ petition No. 3815 of 1991 before the learned single Judge before whom the said writ petition was pending. If the appellants have any further grievences they are always at liberty to prefer an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge, if as adviced. We dismiss the appeal with the aforesaid observations. There will be no order as to costs. All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of the ordering portion of this Judgment. " ( 5 ) IN the meanwhile it appears that since the appellant construed and interpreted the judgment dated 22nd January 1996 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing its writ application to mean that the appellant's application for directions filed in the pending writ application of STC also stood dismissed by that judgment, it preferred another Appeal being APOT No. 197 of 1996. This Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench vide its Judgment dated 25. 4. 1996 by passing the following short order:"this is an application for leave to prefer an appeal. This Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench vide its Judgment dated 25. 4. 1996 by passing the following short order:"this is an application for leave to prefer an appeal. While disposing of the Civil Appeal No. 746 of 1996, we observe that the remedy available to the appellant is to move an application before the learned single Judge who decided the writ petition No. 3815 of the 1991 and, thereafter, if the appellant has further grievance he may file an appeal. The appellant without taking recourse to filing an application has preferred this appeal and has sought for leave to file this appeal. We feel that this appeal is not in conformity with the observation that we made in appeal No. 746 of 1996. The appellant is at liberty to move such an application before the learned Judge/appropriate Court who decided the writ petition No. 3815 of 1991, or if not available then before the appropriate Court. Since there is an urgency of the matter, we feel that in case the appellant moves any such application for recall or modification of the order or any other relief the learned Judge will decide the same after giving notice to the parties concerned within a period of three weeks, if possible. This application along with the appeal will be listed after disposal of the appliation, if any, moved by the appellant. Liberty to apply. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking. " ( 6 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the Division Bench had granted liberty to the appellant to approach the learned single Judge in the pending writ application of STC. ( 7 ) AN interesting development in the meanwhile took place. The appellant came to learn that the aforesaid pending writ application of STC being Matter No. 3815 of 1991 was disposed of on 18th March 1994. Actually on 18th March 1994 as many as three writ applications filed by STC were disposed of by the learned single Judge of this Court aparently on the basis of an out of Court settlement between the parties in these writ applications. Actually on 18th March 1994 as many as three writ applications filed by STC were disposed of by the learned single Judge of this Court aparently on the basis of an out of Court settlement between the parties in these writ applications. Evidently, it was these writ applications filed by STC which were the subject matter of reference by the Division Bench in its two orders dated 10th April 1996 and 25th April 1996 wherein the appellant was given the liberty to approach the learned single Judge by filing an independent application for appropriate relief. It is in this background and in the aforesaid facts and circumstances that the appellant appears to have filed the instant application for appropriate relief mainly after recalling the order dated 18th March, 1994 whereby the aforesaid writ application was dismissed. Reliefs prayed for by the appellant may be quoted as under :" (A)THE order dated 18th March, 1994 passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prabir Kumar Majumdar in Matter No. 3815 of 1991 (Subhadra Trading Co. and Anr. v. DSP (SAIL) and Ors.) be recalled and/or set aside and/or modified suitably to grant appropriate reliefs to the petitioners/applicants herein. (b)The time for taking delivery of the balance quantity of 28,280 M. Ts of processed iron scrap from Durgapur Steel Plant (SAIL) being the subject matter of the instant proceedings be extended suitably in favour of the petitioners herein with appropriate direction for payment of the sale value in suitable instalments as may deem fit by this Hon'ble Court. (c)In the event it being held that the writ petition No. 3815 of 1991 stood disposed off by the order dated 23rd April, 1993 passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shyamal Kumar Sen the said order dated 23rd April, 1993 also be recalled and/or set aside and/or modified suitably as for it relates to the disposal of the said writ application and for not passing any interim order to be in conformity with the facts and circumstances of the case. Justice Shyamal Kumar Sen the said order dated 23rd April, 1993 also be recalled and/or set aside and/or modified suitably as for it relates to the disposal of the said writ application and for not passing any interim order to be in conformity with the facts and circumstances of the case. (d)Injunction restraining the respondents and each of them and the said Special Officers from dealing with and/or disposing of and/or parting with the processed iron scrap of the petitioners lying at slag bank of DSP and the subject matter of the petition any further in any manner whatsoever till the final hearing of this application; (e)Ad-interim order in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) above; (f)Cost of and incidental to this application be paid to the petitioners by the respondents. (g)Such further or other order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be passed as this Hon'ble Court may seen fit, just and proper. " ( 8 ) IT is the aforesaid application of the appellants which has been dismissed by the learned single Judge vide the impugned order dated 2nd November, 1998. ( 9 ) WE have heard the learned Advocates of the parties at great length. We have also gone through various orders passed by the Court from time to time. We have very carefully perused the order under Appeal as well. ( 10 ) IT appears that the learned single Judge dismissed the appellant's application mainly and broadly on two counts. Firstly, that the application was not maintainable because the questions and issues arising in the application had already been decided by the writ Court in Matter No. 4389 of 1993 (Judgment dated 22nd January 1996 by S. K. Sen, J. ). According to the learned single Judge, the Appeal preferred by the Appellant against the aforesaid Judgment also having been dismissed by the Division Bench (Division Bench Judgment dated 10th April 1996 in Appeal No. 746 of 1996), the application was yet again not maintainable. According to the learned single Judge, the Appeal preferred by the Appellant against the aforesaid Judgment also having been dismissed by the Division Bench (Division Bench Judgment dated 10th April 1996 in Appeal No. 746 of 1996), the application was yet again not maintainable. The learned Judge accordingly appears to have been influenced by the consideration that since the questions and issues involved in the application had already been determined by this Court in the aforesaid writ application, and also confirmed by the Divsion Bench, it was not permissible for him to re-open and re-judge the same issues and since it was a closed chapter, the appellant had no right to re-agitate the same all over again before him. The following observations with respect to the aforesaid first ground of dismissal of the application being relevant, are reproduced hereunder :"after considering the facts and circumstances and the arguments put forward before me it appears to me that this application at this stage is not maintainable. Question has arose in this application as it has already been decided by this Hon'ble Court on earlier occasion in deciding the writ petition No. 4309 of 1993. It further appears that the appeal also preferred from the said order which has been dismissed by the Appeal Court. It further appears that by the order which has been asked by the petitioner in this application to be recalled, has been passed long back. The submission which has been made that they have come to learn the said fact only on November, 1995 cannot be accepted at this stage also. As it appears that the petitioner herein agitated the identical point as it is now agitating in the present application. It further appears that Sarogi has also filed a written note on submission in the said writ petition which was placed before me by Mr. Chatterjee and it appears that it is indentical to the submission made by Mr. Lala before me. Once the said fact has already been determined by this Court and furthermore, appeal was preferred by the petitioner and which already been decided by the Honble Appeal Court. It is not possible for me to reopen and rejudge the same at this stage. In my opinion, the same is a closed chapter. The petitioner hasn't any right to re-agitate the same before me. It is not possible for me to reopen and rejudge the same at this stage. In my opinion, the same is a closed chapter. The petitioner hasn't any right to re-agitate the same before me. " ( 11 ) THE second ground on which the application appears to have been dismissed was on the question of limitation. Even though the learned single Judge has not spelt out in details nor has he supported the same with reasoning as to how the application was time barred, it appears that since the appellant was asking for recalling of the order dated 18th March, 1994 by filing the application in the year 1996, the learned single Judge was of the view that the application was time barred. ( 12 ) TAKING up the first question first, we are of the very firm view and clear opinion that the learned single Judge was totally incorrect in his appreciation of the events right from the very beginning, starting from the year 1993, when he held that the issues involved in the appellant's application were a closed chapter, the same having been determined and decided by this Court earlier and that the appellant could not be permitted to re-agitate these issues all over again. While saying so, the learned single Judge appears to have ignored the clear directions and observations made by the Division Bench in its Judgment dated 10th April, 1996 (in Matter No. 4309 of 1993) and repeated by the judgment dated 25-04-1996 (in Matter No. 179 of 1996 ). A combined reading of the aforesaid two orders of the Division Bench should leave no one in any manner of doubt whatsoever that the Division Bench was of the clear and unequivocal opinion that the issue of extension in period of time for completion of the work of lifting of the material was to be decided in the pending writ petition of STC through an application moved for that purpose by the appellant in that pending writ petition. The Division Bench was of the clear opinion that it was not open to the appellant to file a separate writ petition for this purpose and therefore the appellant's writ petition not being maintainable was dismissed by the learned single Judge, the dismissal order being upheld by the Division Bench but on a different reasoning about the maintainability part. The Division Bench was of the clear opinion that it was not open to the appellant to file a separate writ petition for this purpose and therefore the appellant's writ petition not being maintainable was dismissed by the learned single Judge, the dismissal order being upheld by the Division Bench but on a different reasoning about the maintainability part. The Division Bench therefore clearly upheld that the appellant was entitled to avail of the remedy of filing an application for appropriate relief in the aforesaid pending writ petition of STC. That is one aspect of the matter relating to the first ground of dismissal of the application. The second aspect, equally important, if not more is that uptill now never has any occasion arisen whereby any Court has been able to decide and determine the issues involved and raised in the application of the appellant. The only previous occasion was when the appellant's writ petition was dismissed. A very careful perusal of the order dated 22nd Januaruy, 1996 dismissing the writ petition and the two orders dated 10th April, 1996 and 25th April, 1996 upholding the dismissal clearly reveal and suggest that the Court did not go into any question about the fact as to whether the appellant was entitled to the extension in period or not. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ application on the question of its non-maintainability. The same approach was adopted by the Division Bench. None of them went into any aspect relating to the merits of the appellant's application. There was no other adjudication by this Court or by any Court so far as the appellant was concerned. We therefore totally fail to understand as to how did the learned single Judge come to this finding that the issues having been decided and determined, the same being a closed chapter, it was not open to the appellant to re-agitate them all over again. The appellant had a right of consideration as far as the issues raised by him are concerned. The appellant always had a right that the prayers made by him in the application be considered by the Court, on their merits and a finding returned whether the prayers merited rejection or acceptance. This was never done at any stage by any Court in any proceedings. ( 13 ) THE second ground of dismissal of the application was on the question of limitation. This was never done at any stage by any Court in any proceedings. ( 13 ) THE second ground of dismissal of the application was on the question of limitation. Even this ground was not available. Once the Division Bench held in its judgment dated 10th April, 1996 that it was open to the appellant to agitate this matter in the pending writ application of STC, the appellant immediately took steps to find out about such pending writ petition and learnt that it had already been disposed of by order passed on 18th March, 1984. Based on the liberty and permission given to the appellant by the Division Bench, the appellant had no option but to ask for recalling of that order because unless the writ application stood revived, in normal circumstances, the appellant's application perhaps could not have been considered on its merits. In our view, therefore, the limitation question did not even arise in this case. Even if one takes a technical view about the limitation aspect being applicable to the recelling of the order dated 18th March, 1994 one should have no hesitation in holding that there was sufficient ground for condoning delay, especially if one takes into account and considers the import of the Division Bench order dated 10th April, 1996. On either count therefore, it cannot be said that the application should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. ( 14 ) ANOTHER important aspect which cannot escape our attention and which also cannot be ignored or overlooked by us is the fact that neither party to the litigation bothered to inform the Division Bench about the writ application having been dismissed in the year 1994 by passing of the order on 18-3-1994. Had the Division Bench been informed by either of the parties about the disposal of the writ petition by the aforesaid orders it would have issued appropriate directions taking into account the aforesaid fact and the effect of the disposal of the writ application. Undoubtedly, the Division Bench passed the order disposing of the appeal in the presence of both the parties, yet the parties, particularly the respondent, did not choose to inform the Division Bench about the disposal of the writ application. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons therefore we set aside the order under appeal and while allowing this appeal, pass the following order:-1. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons therefore we set aside the order under appeal and while allowing this appeal, pass the following order:-1. Matter No. 3815 of 1991, being writ petition filed by the STC shall stand revived and restored to the limited extent about the consideration of the appellant's application and to that extent the order dated 18-3-1994 disposing of the writ petition shall be recalled. 2. The learned appropriate single Bench having determination in the matter shall accordingly consider the appellant's application for appropriate relief, with regard to the question relating to the extension of period, purely on its merits and in accordance with law, after hearing the parties, and after affording all of them opportunities of filing appropriate affidavits and dispose of the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of four months from today. We have not at all gone into any question relating to the issue of extension of time. Nothing stated in this judgment shall be construed as any expression of opinion by us with regard to the merits of the appellant's application. The parties shall have liberty to mention before the appropriate single Bench. No order as to costs. A. Barua, J.-I agree. Later : let a xerox copy of this judgment, duly counter-signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court, be given to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of the same upon usual undertaking. Appeal disposed of