S. K. AGARWAL, J. ( 1 ) ADMIT. Learned counsel for the parties submit that the trial court record hasalready been called and the point involved is very short, therefore, the appeals maybe disposed of at this stage itself. Accordingly by this common judgment we proposeto dispose of these two appeals as same questions of fact and law arise forconsideration. ( 2 ) THESE two appeals are directed against the judgments and decrees deliveredunder Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short CPC) on 2 3/12/1998 by the court of Sh. B S Chaudhary, Additional District Judge, Delhidecreeing two suits, one for possession of basement and the other for possession ofground floor of the premises No. 4, Vinoba Puri, Lajpat Nagar (for short, the suitpremises), and for mesne profits at the last paid rent with 50% increase, along withrs. 2,300. 00 per month, on account of fittings and fixtures charges, with effect fromseptember, 1996 till the date of handing over of the possession, in favour of therespondents (plaintiffs) against the appellant (defendant ). ( 3 ) FACTS giving rise to these appeals briefly are: that on 27. 1. 97respondents (plaintiffs) filed two separate suits against the appellant (Defendant),seeking decrees of possession and mesne profits in respect of basement andground floor of the suit premises, alleging therein that the plaintiffs had rented out thebasement at Rs. 10,580. 00per month and the ground floor at Rs. 18,250. 00per monthw. e. f. 12. 9. 93 for a period of three years, by two registered tease agreements dated 12/05/1994; and under two other agreements dated 26. 7. 93, the defendant wasto pay Rs. 2,300. 00 per month for fittings and fixtures; the defendant was also to payelectricity and water charges as per the bills received; the defendant failed to pay theelectricity charges from October, 1994 and started deducting the same from the rent. In 1995 the defendant violated the terms of the tenancy, and was called upon to handover the vacant possession of the premises. On 25/05/1996 a notice wasserved upon the defendant to vacate the premises, The tenancies also expired byefflux of time on 12/09/1996; and telegraphic notices were also sent to thedefendant on 8/09/1996 requiring it to vacate the suit premises. It waspleaded that a sum of Rs. 1,82,160. 00for the basement tenancy and Rs. 2,46,600. On 25/05/1996 a notice wasserved upon the defendant to vacate the premises, The tenancies also expired byefflux of time on 12/09/1996; and telegraphic notices were also sent to thedefendant on 8/09/1996 requiring it to vacate the suit premises. It waspleaded that a sum of Rs. 1,82,160. 00for the basement tenancy and Rs. 2,46,600. 00forthe ground floor tenancy was payable as arrears of rent and damages, till the date offiling of the suit. ( 4 ) AFTER service of summons, the defendant (appellant) filed identical writtenstatements, generally denied the averments made of each plaint and raised severalpreliminary objections: that it was in occupation as a tenant since 29. 9. 85: tenancywas not terminated in accordance with law and no notice of termination of tenancy, ascontemplated under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, had beenserved upon it: the suit on the basis of the alleged lease deed dated 12. 5. 94. was notmaintainable as there was no surrender of original tenancy, and the defendantcontinues to be a contractual tenant, in respect of the basement since 12. 9. 90 and inrespect of the ground floor since 29. 11. 85. It was further pleaded that the lease deeddated 12. 5. 94, was never acted upon and was a sham document obtained for thepurposes of taxation for the benefit of the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs concealed the factthat there are two separate tenancies in respect of the ground floor and two separatetenancies in respect of basement. And that plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 had separately beenreceiving one cheque each for basement tenancy and one cheque each for groundfloor tenancy, in their individual names. Another objection was also taken that the suitfor possession of the ground floor was without seeking possession of front and backcourt yards and bath room was not maintainable. Plaintiffs filed replication reiteratingthe averments made in the plaint, inter-alia pleading that upto March, 1995, chequestowards rent used to be given in the joint name of the plaintiffs and receipts used tobe issued. However, the defendant started giving two separate cheques for theground floor tenancy and two separate cheques for basement tenancy, in favour ofthe plaintiff No. 1 and 2 respectively, and the same was received by plaintiffs in termsof the lease deed dated 12/05/1994, without prejudice to their rights. ( 5 ) ON 29. 8. 97 the trial court framed same set of issues in both the suits, which are: 1. ( 5 ) ON 29. 8. 97 the trial court framed same set of issues in both the suits, which are: 1. Whether the defendant is a contractual tenant? If so, what is effectthereof? OPD2. Whether the lease has been validly terminated or it stands terminated byefflux of time? OPP3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of Sec. 53a of Transfer ofproperty Act? OPD4. Whether the defendant is entitled to deduct the amount on account ofelectricity, if so, to what effect? OPD5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in view of prel, objectiontaken by the deft? OPD6. Whether the defendant is not liable to pay the amount as alleged in writtenstatement by the defendant and to what effect? OPD7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the amount as claimed? OPP8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages, as claimed and at what rateand for what period? OPP9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the interest, as claimed and to whatextent? OPP 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession as claimed in the plaint, asprayed? OPP1 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of injunction, as prayed? OPP12. Relief. ( 6 ) ON 9/07/1997 plaintiffs moved separate applications in both suits underorder 39 Rule 10 of the CPC, praying for directions to the defendant, to pay anddeposit the charges towards use and occupation of the suit premises. Trial court,vide orders dated 7. 4. 98 allowed the applications and directed the defendant, to payuse and occupation charges in respect of the suit premises. The defendant filedrevision petition against the said order, however, the same was withdrawn on12. 5. 99, after the suits were decreed. ( 7 ) IN December, 1997 plaintiffs also filed applications under order 12 rule 6 readwith order 20 rule 12 CPC, for decree of possession, of the tenancy premises on thebasis of the alleged admissions in the written statements. The defendant filed replycontesting the same. The defendant during the pendency had also moved applicationsseeking leave to amend the written statements, however, these applications remainedpending, as in the meantime the trial court allowed the plaintiffs applications anddecreed both the suits for possession aswell as for mesne profits on 23. 12. 1998, byidentical orders. Against these orders the appellant (defendant) has filed theseappeals. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have been taken throughthe record. 12. 1998, byidentical orders. Against these orders the appellant (defendant) has filed theseappeals. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have been taken throughthe record. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant argued that as the issues were alreadyframed it was not permissible for the court to have proceeded with the applicationsunder order 12 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and to dispose of the suits without adjudication onthe issues. Reliance was placed, on a decision of this court in Punjab Nationalbank and Anr. Vs. S. Kartar Singh: 66 (1997) DLT 857. We find no force in thiscontention in view of the explicit language of Order 12 rule 6 of CPC, which reads asunder: ORDER XI I (Admissions)1. XXX2. XXX6. Judgment on admissions. (1) Where admissions of fact have been madeeither in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court mayat any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its ownmotion and without waiting for the determination of any other question ,between the parties make such order or give such judgment as it may thinkfit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1 ) a decree shall bedrawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the dateon which the judgment was pronounced. ( 9 ) BARE perusal of the above rule shows, that it confers very wide powers on thecourt, to pronounce judgment on admission at any stage of the proceedings. Theadmission may have been made either in pleadings, or otherwise. The admissionmay have been made orally or in writing. The court can act on such admission, eitheron an application of any party or on its own motion without determining the otherquestions. This provision is discretionary, which has to be exercised on well establishedprinciples. Admission must be clear and unequivocal: it must be taken as a wholeand it is not permissible to rely on a part of the admission ignoring the other part; evena constructive admission firmly made can be made the basis. Any plea raisedagainst the contents of the documents only for delaying trial being barred by thesection 91 and 92 of Evidence Act or other statutory provisions, can be ignored. These principles are well settled by catena of decisions. Any plea raisedagainst the contents of the documents only for delaying trial being barred by thesection 91 and 92 of Evidence Act or other statutory provisions, can be ignored. These principles are well settled by catena of decisions. Reference in this regard bemade to the decisions in Dudh Nath Pandey (dead by L. R s) Vs. Suresh Chandrabhattasali (dead by L. R s) AIR 1986, Supreme Court 1509; Atma Ram Propertiespvt. Ltd. Vs. Air India 65 (1997) DLT 533; Surjit Sachdev Vs. Kazakhstaninvestment Services Pvt. Ltd. 1997 II AD (Delhi) 518; Abdul Hamid Vs. Charanjitlal and Ors. 1998 2 DLT 476 and Lakshmikant Shreekant Vs. M N Dastur andco. 1998 71 DLT 564 . ( 10 ) THE use of the expression "any stage" in the said rule itself shows that thelegislature s intent is to give it widest possible meaning. Thus merely because issuesare framed cannot by itself deter the court to pass the judgment on admission underorder 12 rule 6, CPC. The case of PNB Vs. Kartar Singh (Supra) runs into only twoparagraphs without any discussion. Observations made in the case, referred to bythe learned counsel, in support of his argument do not reflect any proposition of law. The order must have been passed on the facts of that case. Learned counsel for the appellant, next argued that there was no clear andunequivocal admission in the written statements and no finding on the issues framedcould be recorded without trial. Reiterating the above principles in a recent decision,the Supreme Court in Bairaj Taneja andanr. Vs. Sunil Madan andanr. (1999) 8 SCC396, while considering the scope and ambit of the provisions of rule 6 of order 12cpc observed: "23. Under this rule, the court can, at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings,pass a judgement on the basis of admissions made by the defendant. Butbefore the court can act upon the admission, it has to be shown that theadmission is unequivocal, clear and positive. This rule empowers the court topass judgement and decree in respect of admitted claims pending adjudicationof the disputed claims in the suit. 24. In Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. This rule empowers the court topass judgement and decree in respect of admitted claims pending adjudicationof the disputed claims in the suit. 24. In Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. That is tosay, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading,the court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in theplaint. 25. Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to thesuit, the court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has beenadmitted by the defendant. This is also in consonance with the provisions ofsection 58 of the Evidence Act which provides as under:"58. Facts admitted need not be proved.-No fact need be proved in anyproceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at thehearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writingunder their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time theyare deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the court may,in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than bysuch admission. "26. The proviso to this section specifically gives a discretion to the court torequire the facts admitted to beproved otherwise than by such admission. The proviso corresponds to the proviso to Rule 5 (1 ) Order 8 CPC. 27. In view of the above, it is clear that the court, at no stage, can act blindlyor mechanically. While enabling the court to pronounce judgement in asituation where no written statement is filed by the defendant, the court hasalso been given the discretion to pass such order as it may think fit as analternative. This is also the position under Order 8 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code where thecourt can either pronounce judgement against the defendant or pass suchorder as it may think fit. This is also the position under Order 8 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code where thecourt can either pronounce judgement against the defendant or pass suchorder as it may think fit. (emphasis supplied) ( 11 ) AT this stage it would be useful to recall some factual contentions emerging fromthe pleadings: In 1995 the appellant/defendant was asked to vacate and hand overpossession of the suit premises, on the ground of the violation of the terms of thelease; On 25/05/1996 a notice was alleged to have been served upon thedefendant, requiring it to vacate the premises, on 12/09/1996, tenancy isalleged to have expired by efflux of time and on 8/09/1996, telegraphicnotices were also alleged to have been served upon the defendant. The defendanthad pleaded that they were the contractual tenants in respect of the basement since12. 9. 90 and in respect of ground floor since 29. 11. 85; that the lease deeds dated12. 5. 94 were never acted upon and were sham documents: two tenancies existed inrespect of the ground floor and two tenancies existed in respect of the basement andplaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 used to get separate cheques in their individual names, inrespect of each of these portions. In fact, the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that theyhad been receiving the rent separately in their respective names, with regard to theground floor and basement tenancies. However, it was pleaded that in 1995, thedefendants started issuing two separate cheques in the name of each of the plaintiffsfor their convenience. On the basis of these pleadings trial court, inter alia, framedspecific issues that whether the defendant is a contractual tenant or not and whetherthe lease was validly terminated or was terminated by efflux of time? ( 12 ) THE question whether the defendant became contractual tenant after 1995,when they were called upon to vacate the premises on the ground of alleged violationof the terms of the lease, and effect of the circumstances leading to the acceptance ofthe rent by the two plaintiffs individually in their respective names would require trial. These questions could not be determined without evidence and, therefore, it cannotbe said to be a case of "unequivocal" and clear positive admission, which is anessential requirement of law for a decree on admission. These questions could not be determined without evidence and, therefore, it cannotbe said to be a case of "unequivocal" and clear positive admission, which is anessential requirement of law for a decree on admission. Learned trial court instead ofconcentrating on the question that whether there was any admission on the part of thedefendant or not in its pleadings or elsewhere, proceeded to adjudicate upon someof the issues on merits by observing that the pleas raised by defendant areunbelievable, which could not have been done. There being triable issues raisedgoing to the root of the case, the trial court ought to have proceeded to try the suitsand returned findings on merits. The impugned judgment and decrees are thus liableto be set aside and the suits deserve to be remanded for trial in accordance with law. ( 13 ) SINCE the matter is being remanded for trial, we deem it fit and expedient toorder that the appellant shall pay to the respondents the arrears of rent and chargesfor fittings and fixtures payable under the agreements dated 12 . 5. 94 and 26. 7. 93between the parties in respect of the basement and the ground floor tenancies uptoseptember, 1996 (the date on which the lease expired ). And for the subsequentperiod the appellant shall pay to the respondents at the rate of last paid rent with anincrease of 50% in respect of each of the tenancies towards damages for use andoccupation charges alongwith Rs. 2,300. 00 per month on account of fittings andfixtures with effect from October, 1996, without prejudice to the rights of the respectiveparties and subject to the result of the two suits. The appellant shall continue to payuse and occupation charges at this enhanced rate, till the final disposal of the suit, bythe 7th of each month. The arrears of rent and arrears for use of occupation charges,if any, be paid within two months. ( 14 ) IN this case both the suits are between the same parties, and are in respect ofthe premises i. e. , basement and ground floor. These are based on two separatelease agreements of the same date, common set of issues have been framed in boththe suits therefore, both the suits ought to be consolidated and tried jointly to avoidmultiplicity of proceedings and we order accordingly. These are based on two separatelease agreements of the same date, common set of issues have been framed in boththe suits therefore, both the suits ought to be consolidated and tried jointly to avoidmultiplicity of proceedings and we order accordingly. ( 15 ) BEFORE we part with the judgment, we would like to observe that after thejudgment was reserved it was noticed that part of the trial court file of suit no. 47/97was not received along with record; only two pages of the plaint were available, andeven the written statement was not on record. Similarly, file of the suit no. 48/97 wasalso not complete. Therefore, we had directed the Ahalmed (record clerk), to bepresent. On 3. 3. 2000 M. K. Verma, record clerk of the court of Sh. B. S. Choudhary,adj appeared and brought some loose papers. He was directed to file the same inthe registry. Perusal of these papers reveal that at some stage papers from of the fileof suit no. 47/97 were removed from the main file and were not placed back in the file. Further at page no. 9 of the plaint, in this suit, some figures appear to have beentyped again after using white fluid. Copy of the original page no. 9 is also available onrecord. Other file was also not complete. It is a serious matter and calls for a properenquiry. Therefore, we direct the trial court to hold an enquiry and take an appropriateaction against the erring officials without delaying the disposal of the suit. In fact itought to have been noticed by the trial court earlier. The trial court record be sentback in a sealed cover. ( 16 ) WITH the above directions, appeals are allowed with costs; impugned judgementsand decrees are set aside. Suits are remanded for trial in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 28/07/2000. Registry toissue necessary certificates to the appellant for refund of the court fees.