ORDER: The Aundipatti Co-operative Stores Limited has filed the above two writ petitions against the District Munsif, Periyakulam as the first respondent and one V.Ramar and another B.Pandiaraj respectively as the second respondents in these two writ petitions. The petitioner has prayed to issue a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the first respondent from proceeding any further with O.S.No.341 of 1993 so far as it is concerned with W.P.No.13234 of 1993 and O.S.No.358 of 1993 so far as it is concerned with W.P.No.13235 of 1993 pending before the first respondent. 2. Since the relief sought for in both these writ petitions being common and the facts and circumstances connected to both the writ petitions also being almost one and the same, both the above writ petitions are heard together and this common order is passed. 3. For easy reference, W.P.No.13234 of 1993 is hereinafter referred to as the first writ petition and W.P.No.13235 of 1993 is hereinafter referred to as the second petition. 4. 3. For easy reference, W.P.No.13234 of 1993 is hereinafter referred to as the first writ petition and W.P.No.13235 of 1993 is hereinafter referred to as the second petition. 4. In the affidavits filed in support of these two writ petitions which are common excepting for certain personal particulars of the second respondents therein, the petitioner has stated that the second respondent in the first writ petition was working as the Manager and the second respondent in the second writ petition was working as the clerk of the petitioner Stores; that one salesman viz., K. Chinnadurai since involved in a scandal and misappropriation of huge sum of the petitioner Stores, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him placing him under suspension and since some other office staff have also been found to have acted hand in glove with the said Chinnadurai in suppressing deficit during the regular stock verification, they were also to be proceeded against and hence the Deputy Registrar, Periyakulam ordered a detailed enquiry into the affairs of the Stores appointing a Sub Registrar as the Enquiry Officer under Sec.81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’); that after enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report enlisting those persons involved in the mismanagement of the affairs of the Co-operative Stores acting in collusion with the said Chinnadurai and the nature of their participation right from 1989 wherein the second respondents in both the writ petitions were found to have indulged in the fraudulent act, acting in collusion with the said Chinnadurai; that based on this report, both the second respondents in the writ petitions were placed under suspension pending enquiry by orders dated 20.5.1993 since he is competent to do so; that such disciplinary action is purely an internal affair and within the powers conferred under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 and the Rules 1988; that the Special Officer is competent to take administrative decisions and pass suitable orders. Such internal administrative decisions or orders of the petitioner are beyond the jurisdiction of the District Munsif’s Court, the first respondent herein; that under Sec.156 of the Act, as bar is created and the Section reads as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no order or award passed, decision or action taken or direction issued under this Act by an arbitrator, a liquidator, the Registrar or an officer authorised or empowered by him, the Tribunal or the Government or any officer subordinate to them shall be liable to be called in question in any Court and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act.” 5. The further averments of the affidavit are that the second respondent in the first writ petition filed O.S.No.341 of 1993 and the second respondent in the second writ petition filed O.S.No.358 of 1993 praying for an injunction restraining the petitioner from enforcing the suspension order and to declare the suspension order passed by the petitioner dated 20.5.1993 as mala fide and null and void; that the first respondent District Munsif by his order dated 1.6.1993 granted an interim injunction restraining the petitioner from enforcing the suspension order dated 20.5.1993 made in I.A.No.610 of 1993 in O.S.No.341 of 1993 so far as it is concerned with the first writ petition above and in I.A.No.636 of 1993 in O.S.No.358 of 1993 so far as it is concerned with the second writ petition above, which is nothing but a clear violation of Sec.156 of the Act, that on the part of the petitioner, a counter statement has been filed stating that the impugned order has already been implemented and that the first respondent lacks jurisdiction, but the second respondent initiated contempt proceedings for which also the petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. 6. 6. The further averments are that the orders of suspension were passed based on the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer; that based on prima facie evidence, appropriate disciplinary action has to be taken against the second respondents; that the interim order passed by the first respondent is prejudicial and detrimental to the proposed disciplinary action against the second respondents in writ petitions; that keeping the second respondents in the office, under the above circumstances and in present state of affairs, would defeat the very purpose of the disciplinary action since it would permit the second respondents to tamper, manipulate and destroy the documents and the evidence since they will have access to those documents and hence contending that the suit and application have been filed before the District Munsif and the orders passed by the first respondent District Munsif in this regard in both these cases are beyond his jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary. Therefore, the petitioner would seek for the relief extracted supra on certain grounds alleged in support of his case in the grounds connected to both the above writ petitions. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent in the first writ petition above, he would submit that the writ petition is misconceived and is not maintainable; that the writ petitioner participated in all the proceedings of the suit and the application is pending before the first respondent District Munsif; that the petitioner is also at liberty to agitate any of his grievance before the Civil Court. Detailing as to how the Special Officer dealt with the day to day affairs taken place in so far as the petitioner Stores are concerned and what had happened during the stock verification and in the internal audit, etc., this respondent would ultimately allege that none of these officials who are charged with the specific duty, detected the shortage and it was he who discovered the shortage on verification of the stock in March, 1992; that in his report, the concerned Salesman Chinnadurai was removed from service; that some other office staff joining hands with the said Chinnadurai cannot definitely implicate this respondent since it was he who unearthed the offence and the report under Sec.81 of the Act does not directly implicate him with the offence. Giving certain other instances, this respondent would ultimately state that he was not responsible for stock control, but the Special Officer, Auditor and the Internal Auditor are directly responsible and the same has not been controverted in the statement or in the counter statements. 8. The second respondent would further submit that the order of suspension is vitiated by bias and mala fides apart from being arbitrary and motivated; that the present Special Officer did not pay the salary to any staff in November, 1992 and as the President of the Staff Union, this respondent protested and salary was paid later in December, 1992; that enraged, the Special Officer has started wrecking vengeance against him; that the Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules contemplate suspension from service only on enquiry into grave charges against an employee; that the Officers, viz., The Special Officer, the Auditor and the Internal Auditor are only guilty of the grave charge. But they have made this respondent a scapegoat; that the Act, Rules and By-laws of the Stores require that the period of suspension must be specified, but the order of suspension is a blanket one without a time frame and is made out of personal enmity and bias; that the same was going on from 1988; that he got promoted as Office Manager only on 1.7.1991; that the stand taken by the Special Officer that it is this respondent to disprove the charges is contrary to the settled law and exposes the mala fide of the entire proceedings. 9. The second respondent would further submit that the allegations that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to grant injunctions is meaningless; that when the proceedings are vitiated by bias and mala fides, the Civil Court can give appropriate relief and the officer who is guilty of bias and mala fide action, cannot seek cover of the statutory bar; that the report of the Enquiry Officer under Sec.81 and the other documents enclosed with the written statement and the counter statements were not served on him which were furnished only in July, 1993 after repeated protests; that only to stall the proceedings, they, have come to the writ Court; that he had obtained an interim order restraining the petitioners from enforcing the order of injunction and hence he took another proceeding against the petitioner for contempt of Court. But unfortunately, the petitioner has obtained an order of suspension of the injunction suppressing the vital information; that even in the event of any erroneous order passed by the District Munsif, there are appropriate civil forums to have the same corrected and the writ petition is misconceived and not maintainable; that in these circumstances,the proceedings against this respondent and the order of suspension is non est in the eyes of law; that the civil suit filed by him is well maintainable; that the order of suspension had greatly prejudiced the petitioner and unlawfully prevented him from attending to his duties and hence the same is vitiated by mala fides. On such averments, this second respondent would ultimately pray to dismiss the writ petition with exemplary costs. 10. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the second respondents have not raised the plea that the Special Officer is not competent to pass orders and it is the Registrar who is competent to place him under suspension; that in the present case, it is the Sub Registrar and the Special Officer who has done it; that even in the event that it is the Registrar who is competent to do, the second respondent has no reason for that matter to resort to the civil forum of law for relief since the Act is a self-contained Code and regarding those subjects powers and duties which are contained in the Act, one is specifically barred under Sec.156 of the Act from resorting to any other Court much less the Civil Forum of law; that Sec.156 is specific to the effect that no order or award passed, decision of action taken or direction issued under this Act by an arbitrator, a liquidator, the Registrar or an officer authorised or empowered by him, the Tribunal or the Government or any officer subordinate to them, shall be liable to be called in question in any Court and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act. The act of the second respondent in having resorted to the civil forum of law is definitely barred under Sec.156 of the Act and hence it is impermissible. With this, the learned counsel would pray for the relief as sought for in the writ petitions. 11. The act of the second respondent in having resorted to the civil forum of law is definitely barred under Sec.156 of the Act and hence it is impermissible. With this, the learned counsel would pray for the relief as sought for in the writ petitions. 11. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent citing a judgment delivered in Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 893 would contend that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder: “We ought to point out that the provisions contained in Secs.3(4) and 16 undoubtedly raise a bar against pleas which challenge the correctness or propriety of the orders in question. The merits of the order are concluded by the decision of the appropriate authorities under the Act and they cannot be agitated in a Civil Court. But where a plea seeks to prove that the impugned order is a nullity in the true legal sense, that is a plea which does not come within the mischief of the bar created by Secs.3(4) and 16 of the Act.” The other decision cited by the learned counsel for the second respondent is one delivered in Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Parthasarathi, (1988)1 M.L.J. 210 , wherein it is held: “In that view, it is not necessary to consider whether a Co-operative Society is a statutory body or it is an authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution of India. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not a statutory body or an authority under Art.12 of the Constitution of India, this being a civil suit, a decree can be passed against the Co-operative Society as it is a legal person and the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a civil right. However, I would refer to the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the Special Officer of the appellant-bank having been appointed under Sec.4 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies (Appointment of Special Officers) Act, 1976 (Act 25 of 1976) is a statutory authority. Under Sec.4(2) of the Act, the Special Officer shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such directions as he may, from time to me, give, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or the board. Under Sec.4(2) of the Act, the Special Officer shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such directions as he may, from time to me, give, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or the board. It is, therefore, submitted that the special officer is a statutory authority and any order passed by him can be questioned in a Civil Court. This contention is supported by the decision of Nainar Sundaram,J., referred to earlier in Mahadevan v. Special Officer, by Registrar, South Arcot Saravanabhava Consumers Co-operative Wholesale Stores Ltd., Cuddalore, 1987 Writ L.R. 120. No doubt, as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, in the case dealt with by Ratnavel Pandian, J., in Kannan v. Director of Sugars, 1984 Writ L.R. 152, the society was managed by a Special Officer. Though his Lordship refers to the contention of counsel for the appellant before him that the special officer being a statutory authority, could be subjected to the writ jurisdiction, he has not ultimately considered that aspect of the matter in the judgment. He has proceeded to hold the Co-operative Society was not an authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition was not maintainable. In my view, the Special Officer being a statutory authority, the validity of his orders could be questioned in a Court of Law.” 12. Regarding the charge and the enquiry instituted against the second respondents, the learned counsel would point out that the charges are concerned with scandal and in spite of the enquiry having been completed, the result is not made known; that in the criminal case, they were acquitted. The learned counsel would also contend that it was the second respondent in the first writ petition who gave complaint of fraud and such pleas could be raised before the Civil Court; that he was only a witness for the prosecution in the criminal Court. The learned counsel would end up his argument stating that the suit filed in the Civil Court is perfectly valid and it is only the writ petitions filed by the petitioner before this Court which are to be dismissed. 13. The learned counsel would end up his argument stating that the suit filed in the Civil Court is perfectly valid and it is only the writ petitions filed by the petitioner before this Court which are to be dismissed. 13. Assessing the merit of the case based on the pleadings of parties in the writ petition and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent in the first writ petition and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, the only point hat stands upper most for determination is the legal point whether against the domestic enquiry instituted on certain delinquencies alleged to have been committed on the part of the second respondents in both the above writ petitions by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, in adherence to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operatives Act, 1983 and the Rules 1988, a suit could be filed in the Civil Court of Law praying to restrain the authorities who instituted the domestic enquiry from proceeding further praying for a permanent injunction to restrain the writ petitioner from enforcing the suspension order duly passed by them at the time of instituting the enquiry and in such event, whether such a suit would lie before the civil forum of law is the only legal point that is to be answered in both the above writ petitions. 14. On the part of the petitioner, it would be strongly argued that there is a definite bar created under Sec.156 of the Act and regarding those subjects which come under the purview of the said Act concerned with the Co-operative Societies, no suit or application shall be instituted nor will the civil forum of law such as the District Munsif, the first petitioner herein will have jurisdiction to entertain the same and decide. 15. Two cases have been cited on the part of the respondents to show that the Civil Court could entertain such matters for decision and the suits instituted by the second respondent in both the writ petitions would be admitted to be justified based on those decisions. 15. Two cases have been cited on the part of the respondents to show that the Civil Court could entertain such matters for decision and the suits instituted by the second respondent in both the writ petitions would be admitted to be justified based on those decisions. Any how since there is a specific bar created under the Act it is relevant to once again extract Sec.156 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 which is given hereunder: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no order or award passed, decision or action taken or direction issued under this Act by an arbitrator, a liquidator, the Registrar or an Officer authorised or empowered by him, the Tribunal or the Government or any Officer subordinate to them, shall be liable to be called in question in any Court and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act.” 16. Now, fundamentally and basically, one factor that is to be borne in mind is that while deciding such issues when there are conflicting interests arising in between two enactments, the provision of the Act and that of the Civil Procedure Code. (sic.) Here are the cases wherein the Deputy Registrar, in exercise of his powers given under the Act instituted domestic enquiries against the second respondents in both the writ petitions in accordance with the provisions contained in the said Act and Rules and placed them under suspension pending enquiry. Such of the acts perpetrated on the part of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies has been challenged by the second respondent before the first respondent Civil Forum and the first respondent also entertaining those suits, has passed interim orders restraining the authority designated under the Act, further entertaining applications for violation of such orders. It is only testifying the validity of the first respondent in so far as he had entertained the suits and applications and passed interim orders, the petitioner society has come forward to institute these writ petitions stating that the first respondent has no such jurisdiction since the first respondent Civil forum is specifically barred under Sec.156 of the Act. 17. It is only testifying the validity of the first respondent in so far as he had entertained the suits and applications and passed interim orders, the petitioner society has come forward to institute these writ petitions stating that the first respondent has no such jurisdiction since the first respondent Civil forum is specifically barred under Sec.156 of the Act. 17. On the contrary, the second respondents would argue that only in exercise of the powers granted under the Code of Civil Procedure the suits have been filed and the orders have been obtained and further the contempt proceedings have been instituted and such of the powers enshrined therein cannot be said to have been barred by any of the provisions of the Act and Rules much less under Sec.156 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. 18. When such conflicting interests occur as to which Act or code has the overriding effect on the other and which of the two will prevail over the other, it should always be borne in mind that basically it is the provisions of the Special Act which always prevails over the general provisions of law. Here, in the instant case, the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 being a Special Act, barely dissecting the point, it should be concluded that this Act will always prevail over the other general Acts, especially in the context of the case, the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, credence must be given to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act whenever such conflicts occur with the provisions of the general enactment. 19. The second question that is to be answered is that as to what are those items that would come under the purview of bar created under Sec.156 of the Act. It is specifically mentioned therein that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no order or award passed, decision or action taken or direction issued under this Act by the registrar or officer authorised or empowered by him shall be liable to be called in question in any Court and no injunction shall be granted which is done or intended to be done under this Act. Hence, it is clear that those subjects or items that are covered under the Act are not subjects to be questioned by any other forum much less the civil forum of law as it is in this case. 20. On facts, it is the domestic enquiry that is instituted by the authority constituted under the Co-operative Societies Act against the second respondents in both the writ petitions in accordance with the provision of the Act and Rules placing both of them under suspension and proceeding with the enquiry which is undoubtedly done in exercise of the powers conferred on the co-operative officials by the Act and there is no denying of this fact by the second respondents themselves. While so, regarding such powers duly exercised invoking the provisions of the Special Act, could it be said that the same could be challenged before a civil forum as it is done in the case in hand by the respondents is the next question that is to be answered. A big NO is only the answer and hence given to arrive at this conclusion, no lengthy discussion need be necessary since Sec.156 of the Act is very clear and bars such jurisdiction of entertaining the suits and granting of any injunction order. There are appeal provisions embodied in the Act itself and recourse must be had only to those provisions. 21. The two cases cited on the part of the second respondents have neither any relationship with the facts of the case in hand nor have they been decided on the questions involved in this case and hence they both are inapplicable to the case in the context of the subject matter of these writ petitions. Moreover, those extracts cited from the judgments have been passed as only obiter dicta and not in the manner of laying down the propositions of law. Such crucial questions involved are not covered under the main Act wherein the bar is created and unless in the Special Act itself provisions are made to recourse to the civil forum, it could be decided that the Civil Court cannot gain jurisdiction over the subject which is directly covered under Special Act. Such crucial questions involved are not covered under the main Act wherein the bar is created and unless in the Special Act itself provisions are made to recourse to the civil forum, it could be decided that the Civil Court cannot gain jurisdiction over the subject which is directly covered under Special Act. The Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 is self contained Code wherein regarding the co-operative activities alien influence is averted giving powers to such co-operative officials to effectively deal with in order to streamline the co-operative activities whenever it is required and wherever it is necessary. While such being the scope and application of the said Act even so far as its general activities are concerned, it is unimaginable that a suit could be entertained in the Civil Courts regarding disciplinary proceedings instituted against its officials wherein generally even the upper forums of Law such as, this Court and the Apex Court have themselves created a veil to go into the facts or circumstances or even regarding reappraisal or reappreciation of evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under the judicial review. While such being the attitude of the upper forums of law relating to the disciplinary proceedings or domestic enquiries generally instituted by authorities, needless to mention that in such matters, the lower judiciary, the Civil Court will hardly gain jurisdiction especially when a specific bar is created by the special enactment meant for governing the co-operative activities and management of thier affairs and disciplinary proceedings of their officials. The act perpetrated by the first respondent Civil Court in entertaining the suits filed by the second respondents in both the above matters is nothing but an act in derogation of the principles governing such matters and such of the acts committed on the part of the first respondent Court has to be decried, discredited and condemned rather. The interference of the first respondent Civil Court into the affairs of the Co-operative Societies activities which are governed by the Act is unwarranted and in excess of the powers conferred on them by law. 22. The interference of the first respondent Civil Court into the affairs of the Co-operative Societies activities which are governed by the Act is unwarranted and in excess of the powers conferred on them by law. 22. Since always it is the special Act which prevails on the general provisions of law and the subject being one which is directly covered under the Act and Rules, the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts created under Sec.156 of the Act undoubtedly prevails and in application of the same, it should be decided that the suits as instituted by the second respondents before the first respondent and entertained by the first respondent and the orders of injunction granted therein and all such acts perpetrated on the part of the first respondent should be declared null and void and unenforceable in law as they are quite repugnant to Sec.156 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 from the very institution of the suit itself. 23. In these circumstances, needless to point out that disciplinary proceedings instituted against both the second respondents are perfectly valid and within the bounds of law. If at all the second respondents are aggrieved in any manner as they have spelt out in their arguments that the Deputy Registrar is incompetent to initiate such disciplinary proceedings, such questions could be raised not before the Civil Court much less the first respondent herein as they have done, but before such appellate forums as provided for under the Act. Hence, they are at liberty to testify the validity of such matters in the proper forum within the four walls of the Co-operative Societies Act and not elsewhere. 24. For all the above discussions held and in result, both the above writ petitions filed by one and the same petitioner succeed and they are allowed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos.20384 to 20387 and 10755 of 1993 are closed.