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2000 DIGILAW 523 (KAR)

SAROJA v. MAHALINGAPPA

2000-07-25

H.N.TILHARI, T.N.VALLINAYAGAM

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TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises from the judgment and award dated 11. 3. 1993 delivered by the motor accidents claims tribunal No. 1, bijapur in mvc No. 288 of 1991. ( 2 ) THE tribunal had awarded a total compensation of Rs. 1,62,380 with costs and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till the date of realisation. ( 3 ) THE material facts and the findings recorded by the tribunal are to the effect that on the fatal day, i. e. , 24. 3. 91 at about 8. 45 p. m. , as established by the claimants, mallikarjun irappa awati suffered injuries and died on account of the accident that had taken place on the aforesaid date at 8. 45 p. m. Near basaveswar circle, maha-lingapur town on mahalingapur-mudhol road. While he was going on the bicycle, at that time the tractor bearing No. Ka 29-357 along with trailer No. Ka 29-358 driven by respondent No. 1 in a rash and negligent manner and at high speed came and knocked down the deceased mallikarjun, who was going on his cycle and, caused his death. The tribunal, further found that the claimants have proved that the tractor belongs to respondent No. 1 and was insured with respondent No. 2, the insurance company. The tribunal after having recorded its findings and answering issue nos. 3 and 4 in the negative, held that the cause of death was on account of negligence on the part of the driver of the tractor and trailer. ( 4 ) AS regards the award of compensation, the tribunal found that on the date of accidental death, as per exh. P-8, the age of the deceased was 53 years. The tribunal opined on the basis of the material on record that the deceased was a teacher in a high school and was getting a salary of Rs. 4,043 per month. It found that the claimants have failed to prove that the deceased was working as a watch repairer also. As such it found that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 4,043. The tribunal multiplied the figure of monthly salary of Rs. 4,043 by 12 and arrived at yearly gross salary of deceased to be Rs. 4,043 per month. It found that the claimants have failed to prove that the deceased was working as a watch repairer also. As such it found that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 4,043. The tribunal multiplied the figure of monthly salary of Rs. 4,043 by 12 and arrived at yearly gross salary of deceased to be Rs. 48,516 and opined that had deceased been alive he could have served for five years more, as such the tribunal multiplied the yearly income of deceased by the multiplier of 5 and held that claimants suffered loss of dependency to the tune of Rs. 2,42,580 (rs. 4043 x 12 x 5 = Rs. 2,42,580 ). The tribunal thereafter deducted the sum of Rs. 1,02,000 therefrom on the ground that the claimant was getting family pension, it assessed the net loss of dependency to be Rs. 1,40,580. The tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000 for loss of consortium, a sum of Rs. 5,000 for mental agony, pain and suffering, a further sum of Rs. 500 towards funeral and obsequies and Rs. 1,300 towards transportation charges. The tribunal awarded a further sum of Rs. 500 for damage to bicycle and thus awarded in total a sum of Rs. 1,62,380 with costs and interest at 6 per cent per annum. ( 5 ) THAT having felt dissatisfied with amount of compensation awarded, the claimants have come before the court by this appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that award of a sum of Rs. 1,40,580 towards loss of dependency suffers from error of law. He submitted that deduction of Rs. 1,02,000 has wrongly been made from the loss of dependency assessed. It has no doubt been pointed out very fairly by the learned counsel for the parties that there has been a calculation mistake. It was submitted that at least 1/3rd should have been deducted towards his personal expenses and after deducting the same loss of dependency would have come to Rs. 2,700 per month and that after having been multiplied by 12, yearly loss of dependency would have been Rs. 32,400. As regards the multiplier, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the multiplier of 5 has been wrongly applied and the multiplier of 12 should have been applied. 2,700 per month and that after having been multiplied by 12, yearly loss of dependency would have been Rs. 32,400. As regards the multiplier, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the multiplier of 5 has been wrongly applied and the multiplier of 12 should have been applied. We find there is an error in the calculation of loss of dependency. Really from Rs. 4,043, 1/3rd should be deducted towards personal expenses, etc. , bringing the loss of monthly dependency roughly at Rs. 2,700; multiplied by 12 it comes to Rs. 32,400 yearly loss of dependency. Though the insurance company has no right to challenge the multiplier, but the learned counsel submitted the multiplier of 5 adopted by the tribunal is wrong and the proper multiplier would be 9. In our opinion, the proper multiplier would be 10. So, Rs. 32,400 multiplied by 10, comes to Rs. 3,24,000 as loss of dependency. ( 6 ) THE tribunal has illegally made the deduction of family pension. It has been so held in the case of Helen C. Rebello V. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corpn. , 1999 ACJ 10 (sc), wherein their lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that amount received on account of provident fund, or family pension or under insurance policy, these amounts are not receivable by claimant, nor payable on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the death of an employee or say an employed person and these are not liable to be deducted while assessing the compensation. Their lordships in para 34 and onwards of the report have dealt with this question and it will be appropriate to quote the following passage from the said report:"so far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death, with the 'pecuniary advantage' which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the Provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this act has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, AIR flight not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this act must co-relate to this type of injury or death, viz. , accidental. If the words, 'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the 'pecuniary advantage' resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased, etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz. , the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz. , the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the Present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death. The Constitution of the motor accidents claims tribunal itself under Section 110, is as the Section states: '. . . For the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to. . . ' thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account of other forms of death, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received (sic.) Out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso to Section 95. Under it, the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of and in the course of employment of an employee. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of the legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz. , same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz. , either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. , same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz. , either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc. , either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will would be said to be the 'pecuniary gain' only on account of one's accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no correlation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any correlation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or, any Provisions of law. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz. , accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured, if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. , though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any correlation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount has no correlation to the compensation computed as against tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribu tion towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual. " ( 7 ) A reference to full bench of this court in the case of Parvati V. Hollur hallappa, 1999 ACJ 344 (karnataka), has been made before us wherein it has been held and laid down as follows:"the decisions of this court in parvatamma, 1977 ACJ 72 (karnataka) and shantha, 1993 ACJ 850 (karnataka), are correctly decided insofar as they hold that family pension should be taken into account while assessing damages. But while calculating the compensation by using the multiplier method, they fell into an error in deducting family pension, as the corresponding pension factor had not been taken into account for arriving at the pecuniary loss and only the actual emoluments had been taken as the basis for arriving at the monthly pecuniary loss. " ( 8 ) THE verdict and law laid down by the Supreme Court in helen c. Rebello 's case, 1999 ACJ 10 (sc), as referred to above in extenso is very clear that the family pension is also earned by the employee for the benefit of the family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of service conditions receivable by his heirs after his death. The heirs receive the family pension even otherwise than the accidental death and no correlation exist between the two amounts receivable as family pension payable on death of employee to his heirs and the amount receivable, under a statute; only on account of accidental death. That as such amount receivable as family pension cannot be termed as a pecuniary advantage under the Motor Vehicles Act, liable for deduction, and as such family pension is not deductible from the compensation amount assessed. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter, in our opinion, the tribunal illegally made the deduction of Rs. 1,02,000. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,24,000 towards loss of dependency and is awarded as such. As the deceased would have been in employment for a period of five years, as the retirement age is 58 years, and thereafter it is not very definite that he would earn. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,24,000 towards loss of dependency and is awarded as such. As the deceased would have been in employment for a period of five years, as the retirement age is 58 years, and thereafter it is not very definite that he would earn. But no doubt it cannot be said that he would not do some job. A contention was raised on behalf of respondents that for and on account of uncertainties of life from the sum of Rs. 3,24,000 assessed for the loss of dependency and lump sum payment, deduction may be made to the tune of Rs. 75,000 or at least to the tune of Rs. 50,000. This contention runs counter to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hardeo kaur V. Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corpn. , 1992 ACJ 300 (sc), wherein their lordships laid it down (para 7):"with the value of rupee dwindling due to high rate of inflation, there is no justification for making deduction due to lump sum payment. "this view has been followed in later cases, namely, in the case of Urmilla Pandey V. Khalil Ahmad, 1994 ACJ 805 (SC) and in the case of Rani Bala V. Dharan Chakravarthi, (1988) 8 SCC 363. That as such this contention as was made on behalf of contesting respondents is rejected. The compensation under other heads, namely, Rs. 10,000 for loss of consortium, Rs. 5,000 for mental agony, pain and suffering and loss of love and affection; Rs. 500 towards funeral and obsequies; Rs. 1,300 towards transportation charges and damage to the bicycle to the tune of Rs. 500 are taken to be just compensation. Thus, the total compensation assessed and awarded is as under: ( 10 ) THAT interest awarded by the claims tribunal at 6 per cent per annum; in view of galloping inflation and erosion of the value of the rupee appears to be on lower side, a fact judicially noticed even by the Supreme Court in the case Dr. Thus, the total compensation assessed and awarded is as under: ( 10 ) THAT interest awarded by the claims tribunal at 6 per cent per annum; in view of galloping inflation and erosion of the value of the rupee appears to be on lower side, a fact judicially noticed even by the Supreme Court in the case Dr. K. R. Tandon V. Om Prakash, 1999 ACJ 1299 (sc), in the context of rate of interest to be awarded, it would be just and proper to enhance the same to 9 per cent per annum and to award interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, from the date of claim petition to the date of payment (if not on entire amount of Rs. 3,41,700) but on the sum of additional amount of compensation, i. e. , Rs. 1,79,700 (rupees one lakh seventy-nine thousand seven hundred) and it is so awarded at 9 per cent per annum on the enhanced additional amount of compensation, i. e. , Rs. 1,79,700, i. e. , the amount of difference of total amount awarded by this court and that awarded by the tribunal. Thus the respondents are directed and allowed to deposit this additional sum of Rs. 1,79,700 with interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition to the date of deposit or payment in tribunal within two months from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment, on a proper application being made therefor. The entire amount of compensation, i. e. , Rs. 3,42,000 along with interest on being deposited by the respondents in the court/tribunal 85 per cent thereof shall be invested in interest earning long term securities/fixed deposits of some nationalised bank for a period of five years and, thereafter, if the appellants so desires the deposits will be renewable. During this period, the claimants-appellants will be entitled to withdraw the interest which accrues on investment, either every month or every quarterly in the year as they desire, but through appellant No. 1. Only to this extent as indicated above the award of the tribunal is modified, rest is maintained. Parties have to bear their own costs of appeal. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .