ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'the C.P.C.') the defendant petitioner has called in question the sustainability of the Judgment and decree passed by the 4th Civil Judge Class-I Jabalpur in C.S. No. 3-B/99 on 27-1-2000. 2. The facts as have been uncurtained are that the non-applicant as plaintiff instituted the aforesaid Civil Suit under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code for recovery of an amount of Rs. 40,860/-. The defendant appeared in the case and filed an application for grant of leave which was granted by the Court. After grant of leave the Written Statement was filed by the applicant and the same was received by the Court. The Court framed issues arising out of plaintiff. The Court thereafter fixed the case for recording of evidence in the case. As alleged on 27-1-2000 the Court reviewed the earlier orders and came to hold that the earlier proceedings were bad in law and decreed the suit under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. On a perusal of the impugned order it appears that the Court after narrating the facts has held that the defence taken by the defendants was not acceptable and on the basis of the Hundi the Court directed payment of Rs. 40,860/-. It is pertinent to state here that after delivery of Judgment a decree was also drawn up. It is not disputed before this Court that the Judgment and decree passed by the Court below is under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is worth noting here that Mr. A.K. Jain learned Counsel for the petitioner has seriously challenged the procedure adopted by the Court below in proceeding under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is his submission that the Court below has not followed the procedure as envisaged in law. Mr. Jain while assailing the Judgment and decree has contended that when the order granting leave was withdrawn and the defences were not taken into consideration the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are vulnerable and in fact they cannot be termed as Judgment and decree under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. 4. Mr. Mr. Jain while assailing the Judgment and decree has contended that when the order granting leave was withdrawn and the defences were not taken into consideration the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are vulnerable and in fact they cannot be termed as Judgment and decree under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. 4. Mr. T.C. Naik learned Senior Counsel appearing for the non-applicant has raised a singular contention that the revision is not maintainable as the Judgment and decree passed under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code is appealable. 5. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar it is apposite to reproduce Order 37 Rules 2 and 3 which are relevant for the present purpose. They read as under:- Order 37- Summary Procedure.- R. 2. Institution of summary suits.- (1) A suit, to which this Order applies, may, if the plaintiff desires to proceed hereunder, be instituted by presenting a plaint which shall contain,- (a) specific averment to the effect that the suit is filed under this order; (b) that no relief, which does not fall within the ambit of this rule, has been claimed in the plaint; and (c) the following inscription immediately below the number of the suit in the title of the suit, namely:- (Under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) (2) The summons of the suit shall be in Form No. 4 in Appendix B or in such other Form as may, from time to time, be prescribed. (3) The defendant shall not defend the suit referred to in sub-rule (1) unless he enters an appearance and in default of his entering an appearance the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for any sum, not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified, if any, up to the date of the decree, and such sum for costs as may be determined by the High Court from time to time by rules made in that behalf and such decree may be executed forthwith. R. 3. R. 3. Procedure for the appearance of defendant.- (1) In a suit to which this Order applies, the plaintiff shall, together with the summons under Rule 2, serve on the defendant a copy of the plaint and annexures thereto and the defendant may, at any time within ten days of such service, enter an appearance either in person or by pleader and, in either case, he shall file in Court an address for service of notices on him. (2) Unless otherwise ordered, all summonses, notices and other judicial processes, required to be served on the defendant, shall be deemed to have been duly served on him if they are left at the address given by him for such service. (3) On the day of entering the appearance, notice of such appearance shall be given by the defendant to the plaintiffs pleader, or, if the plaintiff sues in person, to the plaintiff himself, either by notice delivered at or sent by a pre-paid letter directed to the address of the plaintiffs pleader or of the plaintiff, as the case may be. (4) If the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff shall thereafter serve on the defendant a summons for judgment in Form No. 4A in Appendix B or such other form as may be prescribed from time to time, returnable not less than ten days from the date of service supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit. (5) The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the Court or Judge to be just: Provided that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious: Provided further that, where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in Court. (6) At the hearing of such summons for judgment.- (a) if the defendant has not applied for leave to defend, or if such application has been made and is refused, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith; or (b) if the defendant is permitted to defend as to the whole or any part of the claim, the Court or Judge may direct him to give such security and within such time as may be fixed by the Court or Judge and that, on failure to give such security within the time specified by the Court or Judge or to carry out such other directions as may have been given by the Court or Judge, the plaintiff shall be entitled to Judgment forthwith. (7) The Court or Judge, may, for sufficient cause, shown by the defendant, excuse the delay of the defendant in entering an appearance or in applying for leave to defend the suit. 6. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is luminously clear that the procedure has been laid down for institution of summary suit, role of the defendant and the role of the Court. The language used in the Rule is 'judgment' and accordingly the Trial Court has passed a judgment and decree. 6. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is luminously clear that the procedure has been laid down for institution of summary suit, role of the defendant and the role of the Court. The language used in the Rule is 'judgment' and accordingly the Trial Court has passed a judgment and decree. In this connection, I may refer to the decision rendered in the case of Madanlal vs. Kedarnath, AIR 1930 Bom 364, wherein a division bench of Bombay High Court held that an appeal lies from the final judgment under Order 37 Rule 3(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Chief Justice Marten, speaking for the Court expressed thus:- ...........................technically an appeal lies from that judgment, though whether on the merits it would have the slightest chance of success is another matter. That distinction between 'whether an appeal lies' and 'whether it has any chance of success' was indeed pointed out in the Full Bench case of Narayan Putapa vs. Vaikunt Subaya (AIR 1927 Bom. 1) (supra). In the case of Venkatachalapathi Nidhi, Ltd. and others vs. Nanjappa Goundan and others, AIR 1933 Mad 299, an appeal was entertained from a Judgment and decree passed under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the case of Ms. D. Shanlal vs. Bank of Maharashtra, 1988 Mh.L.J. 956 : AIR 1989 Bom 150 , the learned judges followed the law laid down in the case of Madanlal (supra) and expressed the view that an appeal lies. 7. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that the entire procedure adopted by the learned Trial Judge is absolutely illegal and vitiated and when leave to defend was refused in an improper manner an appeal does not lie but a revision lies. I am afraid such a contention has to be noted to be rejected solely on the ground that a Judgment and decree have come into existence and it may be ex-parte judgment but as per the law an appeal lies from such Judgment and decree. 8. In view of my preceding analysis, I conclude and hold that the present revision is not maintainable as an appeal lies against the Judgment and decree passed under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, it is open to the petitioner to prefer an appeal and explain the delay on the ground that he was sanguinely prosecuting this civil revision. Hence, it is open to the petitioner to prefer an appeal and explain the delay on the ground that he was sanguinely prosecuting this civil revision. The certified copy of the impugned Judgment and Decree be returned to the defendant petitioner on substitution of photo state copies. 9. The Civil Revision is accordingly disposed of. Order accordingly.