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2000 DIGILAW 529 (AP)

Lakshmibai v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.

2000-07-21

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, P.SATHASIVAM

body2000
ORDER M. Karpagavinayagam and P. Sathasivam. JJ. - Lakshmi Bai, the petitioner herein, the mother of the detenu S. Jagannath, challenging the order of detention directing the detenu to be detained under Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods in future, passed -by the Secretary to the Government, Public Department, State of Tamil Nadu, the first respondent herein in G.O.S.R 1/1222-7/91 Public (SC) Department dated 22-9-1999, has filed this habeas corpus. Petition before this Court invoking the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking to quash the same and to set the detenu at liberty. 2. The factual matrix leading to the passing of the order of detention, to some extent is essential in order to understand the controversy which is to be dealt with in this case: (a) S. Jagannath, the detenu on 4-8-1999, the holder of Indian Passport came from Singapore to Chennai. After completion of his immigration formalities, he collected his two registered baggages and one polythene hand bag from conveyor belt and proceeded to Table No. 14. There he declared to the Table Superintendent that he had goods valued at Rs. 1,20,000/-. At that stage, the Directorate. Revenue Intelligence Officers collected two more registered baggages booked in his name available near the conveyor belt. On suspicion that he left the registered baggages near conveyor belt in order to evade customs duty the D.R.I. Officer took him to the A.I.U. room alongwith the other baggages which were in his possession for examination. When he was questioned he stated that he was not in possession of any contraband including electronic goods. (b) Thereafter, the Officer opened and examined four registered baggages and one hand baggage. These four registered baggages on being opened found to contain several Panasonic Portable V.C.D. Player with accessories, Samsung Cellular phones, Panasonic Carm Corder. Panasonic Cordless phone. Pioneer Car Stereo worth about Rs. 5,58,100/- (CIF) and Rs. 8,37,150/- (market value). On further interrogation he gave a voluntary statement that he went to Singapore and booked four baggages in his name containing electronic goods and declared the goods to the Superintendent of Customs contained only in two baggages by giving the value of Rs. Panasonic Cordless phone. Pioneer Car Stereo worth about Rs. 5,58,100/- (CIF) and Rs. 8,37,150/- (market value). On further interrogation he gave a voluntary statement that he went to Singapore and booked four baggages in his name containing electronic goods and declared the goods to the Superintendent of Customs contained only in two baggages by giving the value of Rs. 1,20,000/- and the D.R.I. officials found two other baggages booked in his name and when questioned him he admitted the ownership of those baggages also which were found to contain electronic goods and that he knew that it is an offence to smuggle these baggages with electronic goods without declaring to customs. (c) On 5-8-1999 he gave further statement that he had earlier been arrested by the customs and detained under COFEPOSA Act in 1995 for attempting to smuggle electronic goods. The authorities found that he committed the offences punishable under Sections 112; 132 and 135 of the Customs Act and the goods which were attempted to be imported to India were liable for confiscation under Sections 111(d), (1) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962. (d) The said Jagannath was arrested and the goods were seized. He was produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. E.O-I. Chennai and he was remanded to judicial custody. On his behalf a bail petition was filed on 6-8-1999 stating that he was innocent and that he did not give any voluntary statement to the officials. The Customs -Department filed a counter denying the assertion made by the detenu in the bail petition. Ultimately the said bail petition was dismissed on 17-8-1999, as the same was withdrawn by the Counsel for the detenu. (e) Thereafter, on his behalf, representation was sent to the Commissioner of Customs that no contraband was seized from him under voluntary confession and the Customs. Department did not fix the correct value as he brought the goods worth about Rs. 4,00,000/- only and requesting to furnish the statement of the Customs Officers and to fix the correct value. The Customs Department sent a reply refuting those allegations and rejecting the request. (f) Thereafter, the Detaining Authority, the State Government - on the basis of the materials placed by the Sponsoring Authority formed the subjective satisfaction to detain him under custody under the COFEPOSA Act. The Customs Department sent a reply refuting those allegations and rejecting the request. (f) Thereafter, the Detaining Authority, the State Government - on the basis of the materials placed by the Sponsoring Authority formed the subjective satisfaction to detain him under custody under the COFEPOSA Act. in order to prevent him from indulging in such smuggling activities in the future by the order dated 22-9-1999. This order is the subject matter of the challenge before this Court in this habeas corpus petition filed by the mother of the detenu seeking for the intervention of this Court." 3. On behalf of the detenu, though in the affidavit filed by the petitioner, several grounds were raised assailing the impugned order of detention, in view of the counter filed by the respondent giving the factual details, Mr. B. Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would confine himself to three contentions. 4. As a matter of fact, the main ground urged in paragraph 11 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner that these Sponsoring Authorities did not place before the Detaining Authority the earlier detention order detaining the detenu under COFEPOSA Act and the order of the High Court which quashed the same on being challenged in the earlier H.C.P. and that, therefore, the subjective satisfaction derived by the Detaining Authority is entirely vitiated. 5. In reply to this ground, counter has been filed by the first respondent stating that the Sponsoring Authority placed both earlier detention order and the High Courts order which quashed the said order and the same were taken note of, but, however, those things were not relied upon to clamp the order of the detention on the detenu. 6. In the light of the stand taken in the counter, Mr. B. Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel has raised only three contentions, as referred to above. They are the following: (A) Under Section 77 of the Act, any passenger intending to clear any baggage brought by him shall make a declaration. Where a person does not want to clear the goods, then there is no obligation upon him to make the declaration as to the contents of the baggage. He declared two baggages containing the goods worth about Rs. 4,00,000/-. To say that he declared only for Rs. 1,20,000/- is false. Where a person does not want to clear the goods, then there is no obligation upon him to make the declaration as to the contents of the baggage. He declared two baggages containing the goods worth about Rs. 4,00,000/-. To say that he declared only for Rs. 1,20,000/- is false. The other two baggages though registered in his name were not intended to be cleared by him. Therefore, there cannot be any accusation against him that he attempted to smuggle the goods contained in all the four baggages by putting the total value of Rs. 5,58,100/ - (CIF) and Rs. 8,37,150/- (market value). (B) Though the detenu was earlier detained under COFEPOSA Act by the order dated 6-12-1993, the said order was subsequently quashed by the High Court order in the habeas corpus petition. Therefore, the non est order under which he was earlier detained had been considered and relied upon by the Detaining Authority to pass the present order of detention. Hence, the detention order is illegal. (C) On behalf of the detenu, a representation had been sent to the authorities requesting for the above referred prominent documents, namely, earlier detention order and High Court quashing order, but the same were not furnished. This is clear violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India which would render the detention of the detenu illegal. 7. In reply to these contentions, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that there are materials to show that the detenu has committed offences under the Customs Act, as he had attempted to smuggle the goods by evading the customs duty and that the documents such as, the earlier detention order and the High Court quashing order though were placed by the Detaining Authority, they were not furnished to the detenu, as they were not the relevant material documents so as to be relied upon and, consequently, the detention order cannot be said to be vitiated on any ground. 8. To begin with, it shall be noticed that the ground Nos. 2 and 3 have not been specifically raised in the petition though there is reference about the first ground in the petition. As noted above, these fresh grounds, namely, second and third grounds, were urged only during the course of arguments on coming to know of the factual details given in the counter filed by the respondent. 9. 2 and 3 have not been specifically raised in the petition though there is reference about the first ground in the petition. As noted above, these fresh grounds, namely, second and third grounds, were urged only during the course of arguments on coming to know of the factual details given in the counter filed by the respondent. 9. It is quite important to note that the grievance of the petitioner at the initial stage that there two documents referred to above were not placed before the Detaining Authority and if they had been placed, those things would have weighed in the mind of the Detaining Authority, which in turn would have taken some other decision. But, that grievance is no more available at present, in view of the assertion by the Detaining Authority through the counter that the same were placed before it for consideration. 10. In the light of this statement, now, the present grievance of the petitioner is that they have not been furnished the said documents, even though they were placed for consideration before the Detaining Authority, despite the request made on behalf of the detenu. 11. As noted above, these additional grounds have not been raised in the pleadings by filing the petition seeking to raise the same. In addition to that, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has also not given details as to when such a representation requesting for furnishing the said copies was sent and as to whether the said requisition was received by the authorities. But, it is clear that the said requisition had not been sent till 20-10-1999 on which date the present petition had been filed before this Court, as there is no reference about the said requisition in the affidavit which accompanied the petition. 12. It is argued by the learned Senior Counsel that since the said oral plea with reference to the requisition was not denied by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it must be taken that the documents were requested to be furnished and the same were not furnished. Without going into this aspect, it would be better to straightaway consider the merits of the contentions one by one urged by the learned Senior Counsel. 13. Without going into this aspect, it would be better to straightaway consider the merits of the contentions one by one urged by the learned Senior Counsel. 13. Regarding the first contention, it is noticed that the grounds of detention and other documents including the confession statements of the detenu dated 4-8-1999 and 5-8-1999 would show that after leaving the two baggages near the conveyor belt, the detenu went to the Table No. 14 and declared that the electronic goods contained only in the other two baggages, that too for a lesser value of Rs. 1,20,000/-. It is stated through representation and through this petition that the detenu declared that the goods in two baggages are not for is. 1,20,000/- but for the value of Rs. 4,00,000/-. But, as seen in the declaration document, it is revealed that the detenu had declared the value of the goods contained in the two baggages as Rs. 1,20,000/-. 14. Furthermore, as admitted by him in his statement given on 4-8-1999 and 5-8-1999 that he deliberately left the two other baggages near the conveyor belt and collected two baggages only for customs clearance in order to take those two baggages without duty sometimes later with other two baggages opted for clearance. These facts would clearly show that he attempted to evade the customs duty by giving a misdeclaration in violation of Section 77-of the Customs Act. Consequently; the goods that were attempted to be imported to India through smuggling were liable to be confiscated under Sections 111(d), (1) and (m) of the Customs Act. 15. Further, it is alleged that these electronic goods were being attempted to be imported in total contravention of the Rules by hatching a careful plan by leaving the two baggages near the conveyor belt in order to take them away after getting clearance of the other two baggages with put making any payment of the customs duty for those goods and as such, this act would definitely be dubbed as an act of attempted to smuggling as defined in Section 2(39) of the Customs Act. 16. Anyway, the truth or otherwise in regard to the accusation contained in the various documents of the customs authorities, in the light of the rival contentions of the parties, cannot be gone into this habeas corpus petition by this Forum. 17. 16. Anyway, the truth or otherwise in regard to the accusation contained in the various documents of the customs authorities, in the light of the rival contentions of the parties, cannot be gone into this habeas corpus petition by this Forum. 17. As laid down by the Apex Court in Ahamed Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu1, the merits and demerits with regard to the factual position cannot be the subject matter for consideration in habeas corpus petition. In those circumstances, the first contention would fail. 18. The grounds 2 and 3 as they are interconnected, can be considered jointly. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the important documents; which would influence the mind of the Detaining - Authority, were placed and that the earlier detention also was considered to pass a second detention order and, as such, they would be entitled to those copies in order to enable the detenu to make an effective representation and at any rate, he must have been furnished the said copies, as he had requested through his representation and non-supply of the said documents would make his detention illegal. 19. To deal with this point, it would be appropriate to understand the settled principles of law on this aspect by referring to the various decisions given by this Court as well as the Apex Court cited by the Counsel for both. 20. In M. Aharnedkutty v. Union of India2, the Apex Court has held as follows: "The constitutional imperatives in Article 22(5) are twofold: (1) The Detaining Authority must, as soon as practicable, after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of he detention has been made, and (2) the Detaining Authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making the representation against the order of detention. The right is to make an effective representation and when some documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention without copies of such documents the grounds of detention would not be" complete. The detenu has therefore, the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention alongwith the documents, so referred to or relied on. The right is to make an effective representation and when some documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention without copies of such documents the grounds of detention would not be" complete. The detenu has therefore, the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention alongwith the documents, so referred to or relied on. If there is failure or even delay in furnishing the documents, it would amount to denial of the right to make an effective representation." In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal3 the Supreme Court has held thus: "Therefore, in a case where the material before the District Magistrate is of a character which would in all reasonable probability be likely to influence the decision of any reasonable human being. The Court would be most reluctant to accept the ipse dixit of the District Magistrate that he was not so influenced and a fortiori, if such material is not disclosed to the detenu the order of detention would be vitiated both on the ground that all the basic facts and materials which influenced the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate were not communicated to the detenu as also on the ground that the detenu was denied an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention." In Icchu Devi v. Union of India4, it has been observed as under: "There can, therefore, be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, Subsection (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to Clause (6) of Article 22 copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu alongwith the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, Sub-section (3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal, and void." In L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral5, the Apex Court has observed as follows: "It is, therefore, clear that every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds of detention is not an infringement of Article 22(5), fatal to the order of detention. It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the Detaining Authority, making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation, that amounts to violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 22(5). In our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the Detaining Authority in making the order of the detention." In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India6, the Supreme Court has held thus: "It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenus right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu merely on the ground that there is a, reference thereto in the grounds of detention cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired Of prejudiced his right however slight or insignificant it may be. In the present case, except stating that the documents were not supplied before the meeting of the Advisory Board, there is no pleading that it had resulted in the impairment of his right nor could Counsel for the petitioners point out any such prejudice." In Subbiah v. Commissioner of Police, Madras City7 this Court has held as follows: "Having regard to the scope and object and the facts disclosed in the order of detention, we have to examine whether the documents asked for by the detenus have any relationship to the allegations made against the detenus. It will not be proper to hold that the detenu can ask for the moon and if it is not made available, the order of detention is vitiated.” In Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India8, it has been observed thus: "Only copies of documents on which the order of detention is primarily based should be supplied to the detenu and not any and every document. We must not, however, be understood to say that the Detaining Authority will not consider any other document. All that has to be shown is that any document which has bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority but not relied upon by him was before the Detaining Authority at the time he passed the order of detention." In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India9, the Apex Court has held as follows: "When the Detaining Authority has merely referred to some documents in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Only when the Detaining Authority has not only referred to but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstaI1.ces amount to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Whether in a given case the Detaining Authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the Court." In Pawanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu10, the Supreme Court has observed thus: "However, this Court has maintained a distinction between a document which has been relied upon by the Detaining Authority in, the grounds of detention and a document which finds a mere reference in the grounds of detention. Whereas non-supply of a copy of the document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, the detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. This is because non-supply of such a document would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. This is because non-supply of such a document would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. But, it would not be so where the document merely finds reference in the order of detention or amount the grounds thereof. In such a case, the detenus complaint of non-supply of document has to be supported by prejudice caused to him in making an effective representation." In Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v. N.L. Kalna11, it has been held as follows: "A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by the Court issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or certiorari the grounds of the said order should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in part even alongwith the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the requisite subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once the Court strikes down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies the entire order." In Ramesh v. State of Gujarat12, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "On a careful scrutiny of the grounds of detention, we unreservedly hold that the Detaining Authority has taken into consideration the two criminal cases mentioned under Sr. Nos. 1 and 2 of the table which were the materials in the earlier order of detention that had been quashed and that it cannot be said that those two cases are mentioned only for a limited purpose of showing the antecedents of the detenu." In Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat13, the Apex Court has held as under: "Where an order of preventive detention is quashed by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, the power of making a fresh order under Section 11 (2) is not available to be exercised. Such a fresh order under Section 11 (2) can be made only when the previous order is revoked under Section 11 (1) of the Act. Such a fresh order under Section 11 (2) can be made only when the previous order is revoked under Section 11 (1) of the Act. " In V.J. Solanki v. Union of India14, the Bombay High Court has held thus: "It is therefore clear that an order of detention cannot be made after considering the previous grounds of detention when the same had been quashed by the Court, and if such previous grounds of detention are taken into consideration while forming the subjective satisfaction by the Detaining Authority in making a detention order the order of detention will be vitiated." In Ibrahim Ahmad Baiti v. State of Gujarat15, the Apex Court has observed as follows: "Two propositions having a bearing on the points at issue in the case before us. clearly emerge from the aforesaid resume of decided cases: (a) all documents statements and other materials incorporated in the grounds by reference and which have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority in arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction must be furnished to the detenu alongwith the grounds (b) all such material must be furnished to him in a script or language which he under stands. Failure to do either of the two things would amount to a breach of the two duties cast on the Detaining Authority under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.” 21. The reading of the above judicial pronouncements would provide the following mandates, which shall be reminded of for the purpose of dealing with the facts of the present case: (a) The detenu has the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention alongwith the documents referred to or relied on. If there is a failure it is a denial of right to make an effective representation. (b) Where the material before the Detaining Authority is of a character, which would in all probability be likely to influence the decision of the authority is not disclosed to the detenu the order of detention would be vitiated. (c) Every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made is not an infringement of the Article 22(5). It is necessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference made and which are not relied upon in making the order of detention. (c) Every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made is not an infringement of the Article 22(5). It is necessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference made and which are not relied upon in making the order of detention. (d) Mere statement that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand would not automatically make the grounds of detention illegal. The detenu must show that the non-supply of the said document had impaired or prejudiced his right however, slight or insignificant it may be. (e) The detenu would be entitled to the copies of documents on which the order of detention is primarily based and not any and every document. (f) When the Detaining Authority has merely made some reference to some document in the narration of events and has not relied upon them. The failure to supply those documents will not cause any prejudice to the detenu. (g) Whether in a given case the Detaining Authority has casually or passingly referred to those documents or also relied upon them would depend upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the Court. (h) In the case of non-supply of the copy of document relied upon in the grounds of detention, the detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. But, where the document finds mere reference in the order, the plea of non-supply of document on demand has to be supported by the prejudice caused to him. (i) When an earlier detention was quashed by the Court, the grounds of the said order should not be taken into consideration to pass a fresh order, while forming the subjective satisfaction in making the detention order. If it is done the order of detention will be vitiated. 22. In the light of the above mandates, we shall now proceed to decide the crucial point involved in this case. To decide the above point, it shall be decided first whether the Detaining Authority had relied upon these two documents, namely, the earlier detention order and the High Court order which quashed the same, for- arriving at subjective satisfaction in order to clamp the order on the detenu. 23. To decide the above point, it shall be decided first whether the Detaining Authority had relied upon these two documents, namely, the earlier detention order and the High Court order which quashed the same, for- arriving at subjective satisfaction in order to clamp the order on the detenu. 23. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the first document, namely, the earlier detention order was not relied upon by the Detaining Authority, and the said document was referred to as a casual reference in the narration of the events in the order, while giving the crux of the confession statement given by the detenu to the Sponsoring Authority and the High Court order was not even referred to in the detention order and, therefore, these documents which were not actually relied upon by the Detaining Authority need not be supplied to the detenu. 24. In the context of the above submission, it has become necessary to go into the grounds of detention. 25. As pointed out by the Additional Public Prosecutor, the reference about the earlier detention order was made by the Detaining Authority in paragraph (iii) of the grounds of detention, while stating the contents of the admission made by the detenu. The following is the said reference: "In your further voluntary statement given before the Custom Officers at Chennai, Custom House on 5-8-1999, you, Thiru Jagannath inter alia stated that you had earlier been arrested by Customs and detained under COFEFOSA Act in 1995 vide O.S. No. 17/95 for attempting to smuggle electronic goods into India by using Passport Number R080467 dated 6-12-1993; that you had repeated this offence; that you requested to be forgiven; that you had given the statement voluntarily without any compulsion and written by you." 26. Except in this paragraph, there is no reference about the earlier detention order in any of the other paragraphs of the grounds of detention. It is clear that paragraph 1 containing 13 subparagraphs would give the entire narration of events. As indicated above, in sub-paragraph (iii), it is merely stated that the detenu admitted before the Customs Authorities that he was earlier detained for attempting to smuggle electronic goods into India and as such, he has repeated the offence. This is merely a reproduction of the statement made by the detenu before the Customs Authorities mentioning the earlier detention order. 27. This is merely a reproduction of the statement made by the detenu before the Customs Authorities mentioning the earlier detention order. 27. The reading of the other paragraphs from 2 to 9 would clearly show that the Detaining Authority derived subjective satisfaction only on the single incident which took place on 4-8-1999. In other words, it can be safely held that the earlier detention order was not relied upon for the purpose of clamping the present detention order on the detenu. 28. As a matter of fact; the first respondent in his counter has clearly stated in page Nos. 14 and 15 of the counter as follows: "The Detaining Authority did not rely upon the previous detention order in respect of passing the detention order for the offence that had been committed by the detenu on 4-8-1999 The materials relating to the offence committed by the detenu on 4-8-1999 were alone taken into consideration for passing the detention order." 29. In our view, this statement of fact as contained in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent is correct, inasmuch as there is nothing in the detention order to indicate that the said document was considered and relied upon for the purpose of passing detention order. On the other hand, it can be stated that the reading of the detention order as a whole would make it clear that the Detaining Authority arrived at subjective satisfaction to pass the order of detention order regardless of the earlier involvement and the Detaining Authority arrived at such a subjective satisfaction to pass the order taking into consideration of the nature of the offence committed on 4-8-1999 alone. 30. At this juncture, it shall be noticed from the wordings of the counter that the Detaining Authority, while passing detention order has not only gone through the earlier detention order but also the High Court order by which the earlier detention order was quashed. According to the Detaining Authority, it went through both the detention order and the order of this High Court for verification of the earlier involvement and the result of the order and found that the earlier order was set aside by the High Court on a technical mistake. 31. It is settled law, as indicated above, that once the earlier order of detention was quashed by the High Court, that cannot be the subject-matter of the fresh detention. 31. It is settled law, as indicated above, that once the earlier order of detention was quashed by the High Court, that cannot be the subject-matter of the fresh detention. Therefore, the Detaining Authority would be well within the limits to go through the High Court order in order to decide whether the earlier grounds could be considered for the fresh detention. Probably, that was the reason as to why the grounds of earlier detention or the detention order earlier passed were not relied upon by the Detaining Authority in any of the paragraphs of the detention order. 32. As noticed above, reference about the admission of the detenu with regard to the earlier detention order is only factual narration. In other words, the said reference can neither be termed to be consideration nor any reliance for the purpose of passing detention order. 33. In this context, it is worth while to refer to paragraph 13 in the counter giving the details of the materials relied upon by the Detaining Authority for passing the detention order, which is as follows: (i) The detenu admittedly was having three passports. The first passport was bearing No. R080467, dated 6-12-1993, the second passport was bearing No. A4434690, dated 4-12-1997 and the third passport bearing No. Z1053445 dated 25-3-1999. Hence it is clear that the detenu was having several passports in his name and he was frequently making visits abroad. (ii) Even according to his statement dated 4-8-1999 he has explained elaborately the modes of operandi. According to him, he used to take eversilver vessels and used to sell them at Singapore and he used to purchase electronic goods from there and he used to sell them at Chennai. (iii) Even according to his own statement, the first passport expired fully and he got an additional passport No. Z1053445. This clearly shows that the detenu has travelled on several occasions to abroad. In his statement he has elaborately explained with regard to the illegal act of smuggling. (iv) The detenu has already made several visits to India in spite of his several visits he made a false declaration with regard to the nature of the goods, quantity of the goods and the value of the goods. Just to evade the payment of duty and to smuggle the goods without payment of duty to the Government. (iv) The detenu has already made several visits to India in spite of his several visits he made a false declaration with regard to the nature of the goods, quantity of the goods and the value of the goods. Just to evade the payment of duty and to smuggle the goods without payment of duty to the Government. (v) The detenu should have made a true declaration under Section 77 read with Sections 111(1) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962 (Central Act 52 of 1962). (vi) But for the timely intervention of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officials the detenu would have succeeded in clearing the goods by way of false declaration without payment of duty. (vii) The goods which were brought by the detenu were huge in quantity and they were commercial in nature. (viii) The detenu was not having any valid permit or order to import such a huge quantity of goods which are commercial in nature which is an offence under the Customs Act read with Foreign Trade Development and Regulation) Act. (ix) The seizure of the above said goods under a valid Mahazar in the presence of independent witnesses the voluntary statements given by the detenu on 4-8-1999 and 5-8-1999, the retractions sent by the detenu and the letters written by the Department denying the allegations were taken into consideration for passing the detention order. (x) The detenu has cleverly booked four luggages in his name at Singapore. He deliberately left behind two baggages near the conveyor belt and presented only two baggages in order to take the other two luggages after customs clearance to avoid customs duty. The modes of operandi was also taken into consideration alongwith the other materials." 34. On going through the counter and the detention order, we are of the opinion that the detention order had been passed by the authority only on self-sufficient materials referred to above. Thus, it is clear that the earlier detention order relating to the previous involvement cannot be said to have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority for clamping the order of detention especially when the Detaining Authority clearly stated in the counter that it went through the detention order and High Court order quashing the earlier detention order for verification. 35. 35. In the case before us, it is true that these two documents namely the earlier detention order and the High Court order the copies of which were not furnished to the detenu. But we are satisfied that those documents cannot be said to be the documents which were relied upon by the Detaining Authority in making the order of detention. When these documents were not relied upon by the Detaining Authority as reiterated by the Detaining Authority itself in the counter affidavit then the detenu would not be entitled to get the same especially when we feel that these documents would not weigh in the mind of the Detaining Authority in any way while forming the subjective satisfaction in making the order of detention. As such, we fail to understand as to how the above two documents will assist the detenu to make an effective representation. 36. The mere fact that there is reference to the earlier detention order as per the statement of the detenu would not lead to any conclusion that it is a primary document upon which the grounds of detention were formulated. As a matter of fact, the Detaining Authority in the present case had passed the order of detention after perusing both the earlier detention order and the High Court order by which the earlier order was quashed. This shows that the Detaining Authority had thought it fit not to rely upon the earlier detention order in view of the same having been quashed by the High Court. Under these circumstances, the detenu could not be permitted to complain to the effect that he was not furnished with these documents. 37. Furthermore, the detenu also could not complain about the non-supply of documents even on demand especially when there is no pleading for the prejudice. Once the earlier detention order was quashed by the High Court and consequently, there is no reliance on the grounds in the earlier detention by the Detaining Authority then there is no point in asking for those documents which are not relevant and which have no bearing to the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority in passing the present order of detention. Virtually, it can be safely stated that even the inference of any trace of prejudice in the present case could not be drawn due to the said non-supply. 38. Virtually, it can be safely stated that even the inference of any trace of prejudice in the present case could not be drawn due to the said non-supply. 38. For the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs we are of the view that the order of detention is perfectly justified and does not suffer from any illegality and. consequently the habeas corpus petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed. 1. 2000 Crl. L.J. 33. 2. 1990 SCC (Cri.) 258. 3. AIR 1975 SC 550 . 4. AIR 1980 SC 1983 , 5. AIR 1981 SC 1191 . 6. AIR 1991 SC 1640 . 7. 1993 L.W. (Cri.) 113. 8. 1990 SCC (Cri.) 51. 9. 1992 SCC (Cri.) 1. 10. AIR 1999 SC 618 . 11. 1989 SCC (Cri) 367. 12. AIR 1989 SC 1881 . 13. 1985 Cri. LJ. 533: AIR 1985 SC 697 . 14. 1996 Cri. LJ. 3957. 15. AIR 1982 SC 1500 .