Judgment T.H.B.Chalapathi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned ASJ Jalandhar on the accused-appellant in Sessions Case No. 24 of 97 decided on 2-6-98 convicting the accused-appellant u/s 15 of the NDPS Act (for short the Act) and sentencing him to undergo RI for a period of 10 years and a fine of Rs. one lac. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 17-3-97 Angrej Singh SI along with other police officials was present at Bus Stand Pratap Pura in connection with some nakabandi. He received a secret information that the accused was in the habit of indulging in the sale of poppy husk in the room of the motor of Mohinder Singh Lambardar of village Sheikhpura. Accordingly they went to the tubewell of Mohinder Singh and when they reached at the canal bridge in the area of village Begumpur, the appellant was seen coming from the opposite direction. On suspicion he was apprehended. When he was searched 15 bags of poppy husk were found concealed in the room of tubewell of Mohinder Singh Lambardar situated in village Sheikhpura. He also admitted this fact in his disclosure statement. On completion of the investigation chargesheet was filed against the accused- appellant. The learned ASJ framed charge against the accused u/s 15 of the Act for which he pleaded not guilty. In order to prove the guilt of the accused the prosecution examined 5 witnesses. On a consideration of the evidence on record the learned ASJ convicted the accused for the offence u/s 15 of the Act. Aggrieved by the same the appellant has preferred this appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that there is a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act and the statement of the accused cannot be relied upon since it is not admissible in evidence u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. The SI who received the information was examined as PW3. A reading of his evidence clearly shows that he has not recorded the secret information as is required u/s 42 of the Act though it is stated that he sent the information on wireless. The SI who received the information was examined as PW3. A reading of his evidence clearly shows that he has not recorded the secret information as is required u/s 42 of the Act though it is stated that he sent the information on wireless. Sub-section (1) of Section 42 of the Act provides that "Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of the Central Government or of the Border Security Force as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing, that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, in respect of which an offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed, or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may, between sunrise and sunset." 4. It has been held in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, JT 1994(2) SC 108 : (1994(l) All India Criminal Law Reporter 863 (SC)) as follows :- "The very fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 42 requires that where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (I) or records grounds of his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior, itself is a strong indication of the mandate that the officer should record his reasons for his belief as required under the proviso and also that the information received should be reduced to writing so that it can be verified whether there were sufficient reasons for belief. The object of NDPS Act is to make stringent provisions for control and regulation of operations relating to those drugs and substances. The object of NDPS Act is to make stringent provisions for control and regulation of operations relating to those drugs and substances. At the same time, to avoid harm to the innocent persons and to avoid abuse of the provisions by the officers, certain safeguards are provided which in the context have to be observed strictly. Therefore these provisions make it obligatory that such of those officers mentioned therein, on the receiving an information, should reduce the same to writing and also record reasons for the belief while carrying out arrest or search as provided under the proviso to Section 42(1). To that extent they are mandatory. Consequently, the failure to comply with these requirements thus affects the prosecution case and therefore vitiates the trial." 5. In the present case there is non-compliance of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. On this ground alone the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned ASJ is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that the learned ASJ placed reliance on the disclosure statement said to have been given by the accused. According to him the statement cannot be used for the purpose of holding that the accused was responsible for selling the poppy husk in the room of Mohinder Singh Lambardar situated in village Sheikhpura. There is no dispute of the fact that the poppy husk was recovered from the rooms belonging to Mohinder Singh Lambardar. There is no evidence to show that the accused has been in possession of the said room. Even u/s 27 of the Evidence Act "The information received from accused may be proved-provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." 6. This statement cannot be used for the purpose of showing that it was the accused who concealed and kept the poppy husk in the room of the motor of Mohinder Singh Lambardar. This statement cannot be used for the purpose of showing that it was the accused who concealed and kept the poppy husk in the room of the motor of Mohinder Singh Lambardar. It has been held by the Privy Council in Pullukuri Kottaya & others v. Emperor, 1947 PC 67 that :- "Section 27 which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the proceeding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered must be proved. The section must be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the fact discovered, is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates. distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a be the effect or Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to S. 26 added by S.27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships view, it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant........ 7. I am of the opinion that Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to the facts of this case. The evidence of PW3 clearly shows that even prior to the disclosure statement the police received the information that poppy husk had been concealed in the room of the motor of Mohinder Singh Lambardar of village Sheikhpur. When the investigating agency had already received the information of the place where the property was concealed it cannot be said that the recovery has been effected only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the accused. When the investigating agency had already received the information of the place where the property was concealed it cannot be said that the recovery has been effected only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the accused. Therefore, in my view Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not attracted since the fact of concealing the poppy husk at the place mentioned is already known to the police. I am therefore of the view that the statement of the accused cannot be used against him. On a consideration of the entire material on record I am of the view that conviction and sentence imposed by the learned ASJ Jalandhar is liable to be set aside. 8. I accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused-appellant and direct him to the released forth with if he is not required to be detained in any other case. Appeal allowed.