ORDER D. K. Seth, J.: Against an assessment an appeal has since been preferred under section 189 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. Sub-section (6) of section 189 requires deposit of tax till the date of filing of the appeal at the rate the same is assessed. In this case, there are several flats in the same building which were subjected to assessment and against such assessment several appeals have since been filed. In one such appeals the valuation has since been reduced to Rs. 25,000/- and odd. Relying on the decision of the Appellate Authority, the petitioners claim that they may be permitted to deposit the tax on the basis of assessment of Rs. 25,000/- as reduced by the Appellate Authority instead of the valuation at which the petitioners' flats have since been valued. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, both these two flats are identical and as such there cannot be any discrimination and the deposit in terms of section 189 (6) should be allowed to be made on the said basis. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the provision of sub-section (6) has left a wide area within which the Corporation can play foul. Since the Appellate Authority had reduced the amount, therefore, the same should have been the real valuation at which the flats ought to have been valued by the Hearing Officer. On the face of such valuation, even by reason of sub-section (6) of section 189, the Corporation or the Appellate Authority cannot insist upon payments or deposit of taxes as assessed by the Hearing Officer. He had relied upon a decision in the case of Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1956 SC 346 . In support of his contention that sometime a judgment operates as estoppel, on this ground on the basis of the valuation of the flat as determined by the Appellate Authority and the appeal may be decided on the basis of such deposit. 2. Mr. Das Adhikary, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the provision of sub-section (6) is a statutory provision. 2. Mr. Das Adhikary, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the provision of sub-section (6) is a statutory provision. Until the provision is declared ultra vires or so long it remains in the statute, it is not open to the Court to pass an order contrary thereto Whether the statute is oppressive or not cannot be gone into until the same is declared ultra vires by reason thereof. However, similar provision has since been upheld by the Apex Court to be intra vires and as such the petitioners cannot raise this question whether the valuation has been reduced in another appeal is immaterial. Subsection (6) brooks no scope of any such situation. In view of the express provision contained in the statute, there is no scope for formulating a second opinion or taking a different view. These questions were dealt with by this Court on earlier occasion in the case of The Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Sitaram Charity Trust, reported in 1998 (2) CLJ 246 and John Jeffery Madan vs. The Commissioner, Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 98 CWN 568, wherein the contention as has been made by Mr. Das Adhikary was upheld. He had also relied on a decision in the case of Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. India Automobiles Private Limited, reported in 2000(1) CHN 220 , in order to contend on the question of merit that the valuation cannot be made on the basis of the rent. He had also pointed out that another flat in the same building was valued at a higher rate and on appeal the same was assessed at the rate of Rs. 7.50 per sq. ft. while that of the petitioners were assessed at lower rates. Therefore, according to him, the decision by the Appellate Authority cannot be a basis or foundation to claim relief against compliance of sub-section (6) of section 189. He had also pointed out that if it can be a standard in that event the petitioners can be asked to deposit a higher amount since has been determined by the Appellate Authority in another appeal. Thus, according to him, this writ petition should be dismissed. 3. I have heard both the counsel at length. Section 189 of sub-section (5) provides an appeal which is a statutory remedy against an order of assessment made by the Hearing Officer. Thus, according to him, this writ petition should be dismissed. 3. I have heard both the counsel at length. Section 189 of sub-section (5) provides an appeal which is a statutory remedy against an order of assessment made by the Hearing Officer. Sub-section (6) imposes certain conditions in order to maintain such appeal. The condition that has been provided in sub-section (6) of section 189 is a statutory condition. It provides that, "No appeal under this section shall be entertained unless the consolidated rate in respect of any land or building for the period ending on the date, of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined under section 188 has been deposited in the office of the Corporation and the appeal shall abate unless such consolidated rate is continued to be deposited till the appeal is finally disposed of". 4. This condition being a statutory condition stands on a different footing. Now it has to be examined whether the Court can resile from the said condition on certain situation as has been sought to be urged by the petitioner before this Court. The expression used in sub-section (6) is clear and unambiguous. If we look on a simple grammatical meaning to the said provision, in that event there is no doubt that the provision is onerous but still then it is clear and specific. It provides that unless the amount assessed at the rate determined in assessment up to the period of presentation of appeal, the appeal shall not be entertained. It further provides that even after preferring the appeal complying with the said condition, the appeal would abate if consolidated rate at the revised rate is not continued to be deposited. Thus, subsequent condition makes it abundantly clear that in order to maintain an appeal the deposit is mandatory and such deposit is to be continued till the appeal is decided. Thus, there appears to be no scope for taking a different view of the statutory provisions contained therein. 5. Once the condition is a statutory condition, the Court has very limited scope to play with it. The provision having not allowed any room of discretion, there is little for the Court to be done. The condition being specific, it is not dependent on any situation. Whether in another appeal the valuation has been reduced or not is completely foreign to the condition provided in sub-section (6). The provision having not allowed any room of discretion, there is little for the Court to be done. The condition being specific, it is not dependent on any situation. Whether in another appeal the valuation has been reduced or not is completely foreign to the condition provided in sub-section (6). It clearly lays down that the deposit is to be made according to the revised rate as determined till the period of presentation of the appeal and is to be continued at the said rate. Thus, even if in a similar appeal the valuation is reduced, the same cannot be a foundation for allowing any other view to be taken in respect of the condition laid down in sub-section (6). The statutory condition cannot be moulded on the basis of a situation which is not conceived of particularly in view of the express provision used in the said sub-section. The contingency that has been sought to be pleaded in order to reduce the deposit cannot be perceived within the scope and ambit of the said sub-section which is clear and unambiguous and cannot be deviated from. 6. At the same time, if the contention of the petitioners is to be accepted that the valuation in respect of an identical flat has been reduced, in that event it would be absolutely fallacious in view of the fact that in respect of another flat in the same building the valuation has been held at a very high rate. Then, of these two valuations what should be the basis for deposit in terms of sub-section (6). Be that as it may, since sub-section (6) does not brook of any scope of introducing any contingency into it, it is not possible for the Court to hold otherwise. Inasmuch as while interpreting a statute the Court has to give its full meaning as is apparent by following the simple grammatical meaning. The Court has no authority to travel into the domain of legislation. In order to accede to the condition of the petitioner, the Court has not only to read something which is not in the statute but has to add some more words in the statute which is otherwise impermissible. 7. The decision in the case of Sailendra Narayan (supra) is altogether on a different question. In order to accede to the condition of the petitioner, the Court has not only to read something which is not in the statute but has to add some more words in the statute which is otherwise impermissible. 7. The decision in the case of Sailendra Narayan (supra) is altogether on a different question. It relates to a consent decree which are pleaded as estoppel and the Court had entered into the said question as to whether it could be an estoppel by judgement. In paragraph 8 of the said decision the said question was dealt with which runs as follows:- "The plea of estoppel is sought to be founded on the compromise decree, Ex. 'O' passed by the Patna High Court on 2.5.1945, in F.A.No.15 of 1941. The compromise decree is published in the first place as creating an estoppel by judgment. In - 'In re: South American and Mexican Co. Ex parte Bank of England', (1895) 1 Ch 37(C), it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughar Williams, J. Lord Herschell said at page 50:- 'The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as such as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.' " 8. To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in - 'Kinch vs. Walcott', 1929 AC 482 at p. 493 (D):- "First of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal." The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the cases of 'Secy. of State vs. Ateendranath Das'., 63 Cal 550 at p. 558(E): - 'Bhaishanker vs. Morarji', 36 Bom 283 (P) and - 'Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur' vs. Thatha Ramasamy Chetty', 35 Mad 75 (G). In the Calcutta case after referring to the English decisions the High Court observed as follows: "On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. When we say 'every step in the reasoning' we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgement or the ultimate conclusion was founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate as estoppel by judgment. The correctness of these principles laid down in these decisions is not disputed by Mr. P. R. Das. Proceeding on the basis that there is such a principle of estoppel by judgment, he contends that the test laid down in the decisions referred to above is whether the judgment in the previous case could have been passed without the determination of the question which was put in issue in the subsequent case, where the place of estoppel by the previous judgment is raised. This leads us to a consideration of the facts, which are material to this question." 9. It appears that such estoppel operates as between the same parties in respect of the same property. In the present case, the parties are not same in the two judgments and the property is also not the same though the parties and the properties may be identically situated and then there was no decree in between the parties and as such, there was no question of estoppel by judgment in the present case. In the present case, the parties are not same in the two judgments and the property is also not the same though the parties and the properties may be identically situated and then there was no decree in between the parties and as such, there was no question of estoppel by judgment in the present case. In the event, if there is estoppel by judgment the same might operate as such estoppel in the appeal but not at a stage before the appeal is entertained or is abated. Therefore, the said decision does not help the petitioners. 10. This court in the case of John Jeffery Madan, reported in 98 CWN 568, while dealing with sub-section (6) had held that the law is well settled in this regard and the provision of appeal is a creature of statute. Nobody can claim the right to prefer an appeal against an order passed by a judicial or quasi judicial authority unless there is a provision therefore in the statute itself. If a statute provides for appeal it can be hedged with conditions. Thus it supports the existence of the condition and clearly steps out of the argument with regard to its being onerus or oppressive. In the case of Sitaram Charity Trust (supra) it was held that in view of the provision of section 189 sub-section (6) of the 1980 Act the appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Authority only if the conditions precedent therefor were fulfilled. Unless the appellant fulfils such condition the appeal cannot be entertained or disposed of. The court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot issue a direction which would be in violation of law. Thus these two decisions have clearly laid down that the right to prefer an appeal may be hedged by conditions and such conditions is required to be fulfilled in order to maintain an appeal. The contingencies as pleaded cannot be a ground for limiting or taking liberty with the conditions provided in the statute by the court. The decision in the case of Indian Automobile Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is not necessary to be gone into in view of the observations made above and it is not necessary to deal with the contention of Mr. Das Adhikari as was advanced relying on the said decision. In the result this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The decision in the case of Indian Automobile Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is not necessary to be gone into in view of the observations made above and it is not necessary to deal with the contention of Mr. Das Adhikari as was advanced relying on the said decision. In the result this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 11. The deposits already made shall be adjusted for the purpose of the deposit to be made under sub-section (6) of section 189 of the 1980 Act in the appeal. As prayed for by the counsel for the petitioners the petitioners may deposit the balance amount within a period of one month from date and if such deposit is made the appeal may be disposed of by the Appellate Authority as early as possible preferably within a period of three months thereafter. The counsel for the petitioners submits that in case the Appellate Authority reduces the valuation in that event the excess amount may be refunded to the petitioners. Mr. Das Adhikari points out that such a provision is contained in section 197 of the 1980 Act. In such a case, the petitioners may make appropriate application which is expected to be decided by the Authority in accordance with law as early as possible. 12. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this order on the usual undertaking. Petition dismissed.